Government Matching of Cultural Crowdfunding: An exploratory comparative analysis of the Spanish and Swedish cases

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ABSTRACT

Over the last decade, crowdfunding has become a major way to fund and develop creative projects. This is why regional governments in many European countries have begun to support crowdfunding platforms as providers of technology. Governments offer various kinds of support, including match-funding, which, as its name suggests, supplements crowdfunding campaigns with public monies. However, there is a dearth of academic research on cultural crowdfunding and public-private partnerships. This paper uses a qualitative methodology to come up with a conceptual model for governmental support and collaboration with cultural crowdfunding platforms. It also gives two case studies of public-private partnerships that support crowdfunding initiatives in Spain and Sweden. The lack of support and intervention mechanisms may suggest that regional and local governments still see crowdfunding as a marginal way of financing those cultural projects that cannot access other sources of funding.

Keywords: crowdfunding, match-funding, regional cultural policy, platform economy

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INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the first decade of the 21st Century, artists and cultural entrepreneurs have used crowdfunding in its digital form to raise money for their projects. Most European cultural policies have paid little attention to this new model of funding and citizen participation (Binimelis, 2016). Why is this the case, and where does crowdfunding fit into the major European cultural policy paradigms? During the second half of the 20th Century, four overlapping paradigms have been used to justify European cultural policies and interventions. These four paradigms are: (aesthetic) Excellence; Cultural Democratisation; Cultural Democracy; The Creative Economy (Bonet and Négrier, 2018). Excellence and Cultural Democratisation stress autonomy (excellence) and access (democratisation) to The High Arts (Rius-Ulldemolins, Pizzi, et al., 2019). Conversely, values driving the cultural democracy paradigm are openness towards amateur culture and popular expression (Lindström Sol, 2019), with instrumental values in which culture and accompanying policy serve as tools to accomplish extrinsic social or economic goals (Vestheim, 2008), sustaining the creative economy paradigm. According to Bonet and Négrier (2018, p. 67),

crowdfunding plays a secondary role and lies at the intersection of three of the paradigms: cultural democratisation, cultural democracy, and the creative economy.

Why is crowdfunding at the intersection? First, in terms of cultural democratisation, crowdfunding facilitates the dissemination of cultural creation and expression to a broader audience. Second, in terms of cultural democracy, crowdfunding provides a bottom-up conduit that lets citizens and audiences support "small-scale" cultural entrepreneurs and help them become self-sustaining. Third, the crowdfunding business model offers new ways of organising creative work and production by offering a new way to solve the problems of funding cultural and creative industries (EU, 2010; De Voldere and Zeqo, 2017).

However, our review of existing cultural policy interventions to support crowdfunding shows (see Table 1) that they are few and far between. This may be because the commonest approach to the public funding of the cultural and creative sector in Europe is one that is still oriented towards the work of established institutions, legitimate artists, and expressions linked to the traditional paradigms of excellence and cultural democratisation (Vestheim, 2008; Dubois, 2015; Rius-Ulldemolins, Pizzi, et al., 2019). Conversely, the incentive to support the creative economy and its workforce may be greater at the regional and city levels. (Menger, 2010; Styhre, 2013). Furthermore, artists and creative workers (who make up most of the workforce in the creative economy) often find themselves in limbo, caught between education and a succession, of shaky projects as they try to launch a professional career. (Menger, 1999). Many of these "entrepreneurs out of necessity" may find getting public funding both challenging and competitive (Dalla Chiesa and Dekker, 2021). By contrast, starting a crowdfunding campaign to raise funds may not be worth the financial and marketing effort for well-known institutions and artists.

The main research question is: *How have local and regional governments in Europe responded to the emergence of crowdfunding as an alternative funding mechanism to support cultural projects?* The study delves into governmental support for cultural crowdfunding, as experienced from the perspective of crowdfunding platforms, with a stress on match-funding. Here, we consider "match-funding" to be as the pairing of a crowdfunding campaign's private contributions with public funding through reverse matching grants.

Government intervention and match-funding have been studied in a pre-digital context (Schuster, 1989). General reports and policy documents analyse these forms of public-private partnerships as used on online crowdfunding platforms (Myndigheten för kulturanalys, 2013; Baeck et al., 2017; De Voldere and Zeqo, 2017). However, review articles (McKenny et al., 2017; Lenart-Gansiniec, 2021) and contributions on crowdfunding in the cultural and creative sector (Moreau and Nicolas, 2018; Rykkja et al., 2020) draw attention to a lack of academic analysis of these models of interventions.

Using case study design as methodology and document analysis and semi-structured interviews as methods, we bridge the gap by proposing a cultural crowdfunding model based on the literature on civic crowdfunding (Davies, 2014, 2015; Wenzlaff, 2020a) and analysis of actual schemes carried out at the regional and local level to support crowdfunding for cultural projects (Wenzlaff, 2020b). We then explore one of the intervention forms in the model – facilitating match-funding - through cross-country comparative case studies of public-private partnership built on the role in Spain (Goteo) and Sweden (Crowd Culture).

The theoretical framework is outlined in the following section, along with a model illustrating some of the current approaches taken and roles played by regional governments seeking to

support cultural crowdfunding. This framework is based on a review of recent literature on civic crowdfunding as well as on government strategies and interventions to support public-private partnerships in the context of European cultural policies. Following that, we detail our methodology, data collection and analysis procedures, and case studies in the following sections. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of our findings and some recommendations for further research.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The cultural variant of crowdfunding

Crowdfunding is the use of a digital platform for fundraising projects or ventures through the collection of small amounts of money from a large crowd of dispersed individuals (Belleflamme et al., 2014). The organising principle mirrors distributed, community-enabled financing without the involvement of financial intermediaries (Macht and Weatherston, 2015; Shneor and Munim, 2019). The term "platform" metaphorically refers to 'a level playing field' that facilitates interaction between those seeking funds (promoters) and those providing them (patrons) (Davidson, 2019). These 3Ps (Promoter, Patron, Platform) make up the crowdfunding stakeholder ecosystem. Within these ecosystems, investment-based (raising equity or securing loans for business ventures) or non-investment (encompassing philanthropic donations, funding in exchange for rewards or "pre-ordering" of products, and subscription-like forms of digital patronage) forms of crowdfunding occur (Swords, 2017; Ziegler et al., 2019).

What became the conventional approach to studying crowdfunding (Belleflamme et al., 2014) begins with the premise that a crowdfunding platform is a two-sided market (Rochet and Tirole, 2003), with promoters and patrons on the one side, and patrons on the other. The two

are brought together through an intermediary (a platform). Here, the former seek funding for their projects while the latter stump up money for those they want to help (Evans and Schmalensee, 2016). One group finances the operation of two-sided markets for the other group's benefit. In the case of crowdfunding, a portion of the funds raised by promoters are used to maintain the platform.

Alongside the conventional method, sectoral approaches—of which there are several—discuss and seek to explain contextual issues related to these two-sided markets. Some examples are cultural (Rykkja et al., 2020; Dalla Chiesa and Dekker, 2021), civic (Hong and Ryu, 2019) and social venture (Lehner, 2013) approaches. In this paper, we adopt a cultural approach.

Two interrelated features characterise the cultural approach. First, an acknowledgement that the type of campaigns promoted are predominantly small-scale efforts spearheaded by aspiring artists and creators acting as cultural entrepreneurs using the reward-based crowdfunding model (Bonet and Sastre, 2016; van den Hoogen, 2020). Second, a reason why many projects are fairly small in size and scope is because the same promoters lack access to other funding options and opportunities (Dalla Chiesa and Dekker, 2021). The average amount of funding raised per campaign, the profile of the patrons, and the local bias of projects further substantiate the claim. First, the average amount of funding raised by successful campaigns in Europe between 2010 and 2016 ranged from €3,000 in Spain (Bonet and Sastre, 2016) to €6,200 (the EU average) (De Voldere and Zeqo, 2017). Second, most patrons supporting the campaigns have "strong ties" (friends, family, or fans) to the promoter (Dalla Chiesa and Dekker 2021). As a result, Cameron (2016) and Mendes-Da-Silva et al. (2016) have compared the cultural variant to a "welfare tool" that depends on localism (of the promoter) or 'glocalism' (diverse, mostly local communities of patrons).

Moreover, while advancing one's own career or reputation can motivate artists and cultural entrepreneurs to engage in cultural crowdfunding, the common good can also be a strong incentive (Dalla Chiesa, 2020). This goal is pursued when a cultural common participates in crowdfunding. Cultural commons are communities of practise that are more or less formally organised to share the management of public goods by sticking to a set of institutional norms and conventions (Barbieri et al., 2019). The "… low entry barrier, low transaction costs, and crowd validation that it is proportionate" provide a rationale for cultural commons to engage in cultural crowdfunding in situations where "… collective action is required or traditional funding routes appear inaccessible" (Dalla Chiesa, 2020, p. 184). Thus, if there is a vested community interest and a shared governance system for a given project or initiative at the regional or local level, it can empower citizens to curate and create their own cultural offerings and values in collaboration with cultural project promoters (Borchi, 2020). The realisation of these community-based cultural projects could be funded by adopting cultural crowdfunding as a bottom-up, participatory initiative, to continue this line of thought (Bonet and Négrier, 2018).

Thus, the relationship between artists, agents, citizens, cultural commons, and cultural crowdfunding has implications for cultural policy at both the individual (artists and cultural entrepreneurs) and community (cultural commons) levels. This is especially true for cultural commons projects that follow the cultural democracy paradigm. How should government support be provided for these initiatives? This topic is discussed and analysed in the next sub-section.

The relation between cultural crowdfunding and cultural policy

Given its regulatory and competitive role in cultural finance, the public sector's involvement in supporting crowdfunding appears ambiguous and complex. From a civic crowdfunding perspective, empirical evidence suggests that government intervention acts as a validation mechanism by lowering information asymmetry and raising confidence in the project's worth and quality (Hong and Ryu, 2019). This is an excellent starting point. From an economic and welfare perspective, projects that civic crowdfunding initiatives seek to fund are comparable with cultural crowdfunding campaigns since both types of projects are basically (semi-)public goods that do not compete for consumers (see Wenzlaff, 2020a, pp. 447-452)). However, specific to any variant of crowdfunding, successful intervention must account for factors affecting different governmental deliverables within a given policy area. Bonet and Sastre (2016) identify some of these for the cultural variant:

- Selection and evaluation of grants (outsourcing or direct supply);

- Quality control (who decides);

- Investing in producing cultural expressions (power to determine what to produce, how and by whom), and

- Access to and dissemination of cultural content.

Supporting crowdfunding offers governments a chance to provide grants and support to artists failing to secure funding through traditional grant programmes while avoiding bureaucratic procedures (Loots, 2020). The critical question, however, is whether outsourcing selection and evaluation by supporting crowdfunding to the platforms and crowds leads to a loss of quality and excellence. Two experimental studies evaluating performing arts and music projects give us an inkling of the answer. They found that crowds and expert evaluators reach similar conclusions as to what constitutes "artistic quality" in crowdfunding projects (Bernard and Gazel, 2018; Mollick and Nanda, 2016). Another polemical issue is whether the power shift in who decides what to

produce has a broader impact on who decides who gets arts and culture funding. An argument against public support of crowdfunding is that the celebratory media discourse framing crowdfunding as a "democratisation" of financing is also used by those arguing against public funding of culture (Brabham, 2017). Furthermore, government support for crowdfunding might be interpreted as evidence that governments have effectively abandoned attempts to encourage or support certain cultural projects as a result of budget cuts and reductions in public funding (Barbieri et al., 2019).

From a cultural democracy perspective, citizens and civil society achieve more power of decision and responsibility, representing a shift in paradigm, with the stress on participatory practises and philanthropy (Bonet and Sastre, 2016; Cejudo Cordoba, 2017). However, one empirical study (performing arts in the Netherlands) shows that crowdfunding initiatives mainly engage existing audiences, raising questions about whether the funding mechanism helps establish new ones (van den Hoogen, 2020). Additionally, the campaign-based model gives communicative and outgoing artists with sizeable social networks an advantage (Davidson and Poor, 2015). Technologically competent promoters or those with strong economic networks can gain from match-funding by 'gaming' the system and buying out the public funding (Myndigheten för kulturanalys, 2013). From a creative economy perspective, it may be that a variety of stakeholders—the public sector, audiences, banks, and private companies—struggle with the potential changes brought by crowdfunding and the implementation of strategies to meet these (Binimelis, 2016). The legal status of crowdfunding serves as an example. While regulation of investment-based crowdfunding has been approved by the European Parliament ("EU Regulation 2020/1503 on European Crowdfunding Service Providers for Business," 2020) specific legislative measures for the predominantly reward-based cultural crowdfunding models are

non-existent (Lazzaro and Noonan, 2020). Often, we see blurred bounds between pure donation and presale with different levels and types of consumer rights protection and taxation in Spain (Munoz Villarreal, 2018) and Sweden (SOU, 2018:20).

Interventions by the government to promote crowdfunding

Before discussing measures for fostering crowdfunding, one should briefly discuss two aspects of contemporary cultural policy. To begin with, there are varying views on the importance of public-private models for co-financing art and cultural projects throughout Europe. Most of today's cultural policy regimes place varying weight on the value of these public-private partnerships. (Chartrand and McCaughey, 1989; Dubois, 2015). In many English-speaking countries, the model of supporting private donations through matching grants in exchange for tax exemptions is well-established (Cummings and Schuster, 1989). Regimes in other European countries prefer a more interventionist and less consumer-driven liberal cultural policy model (Rius-Ulldemolins, Pizzi, et al., 2019) even though public-private partnerships are encouraged (Klamer et al., 2006, pp. 63-64). As a result, neither of the countries in which our case studies take place (Sweden, Spain) has a long history of private cultural financing (Stenström, 2008; Bustamente, 2013) However, at the institutional level, some evidence suggests that this might be changing in Spain. The claim is based on empirical evidence that private patronage and philanthropic donations to certain prominent performing arts institutions and museums have risen over the last decade (Rubio-Arostegui and Villarroya, 2021).

Second, the justifications for grant giving and allocation of funding to the arts and culture rely on different paradigms (Bonet and Négrier, 2018) at the national and regional level, respectively. In Sweden, the national level shifts towards the paradigms of excellence and cultural

democratisation (quality, professionalism, and artistic freedom) (Lindström Sol 2019). The aesthetic and intrinsic values of State cultural policy – autonomy, quality, and professionalism – guide regional and municipal arts policy (Blomgren, 2012). This arts policy coexists alongside a cultural policy tilted towards cultural democracy (inclusion, welfare, and popular forms of culture) (Henningsen and Blomgren, 2017). Besides, as in many other countries (Menger, 2010) and cities in Europe (Evans, 2009; Holden, 2015), we find schemes to support goals aligned with the creative economy paradigm: developing creative industries, cultural entrepreneurship, and cultural tourism (Styhre, 2013).

In the case of Spain, the paradigm of cultural democratisation is the dominant rationale of cultural policies, with the Creative Economy trailing some way behind, and slightly behind that cultural democratisation (Rius-Ulldemolins and Rubio Aróstegui, 2016). However, the preceding statement is more of a general rule with some deviations. Those exceptions would be the result of tensions between the quasi-federal state, autonomous regions, provinces, and municipalities, which result in differentiation rather than standardisation of cultural policies (Bonet and Négrier, 2011). Without standardisation, it becomes hard to assign intervention powers (who does what?) to the various tiers of government. The State's problems in co-ordinating cultural policy in the regions generally lead to different models and approaches. This explains why autonomous regions make every effort to resist national and cultural assimilation (Zamorano, 2017). As a result of this tendency towards differentiation, each region will to some extent define and implement policies reflecting their own desires and local needs (Rubio Arostegui and Rius-Ulldemolins, 2020). Additionally, these regional disparities may occasionally foster nepotistic behaviour and cronyism, as evidenced by studies of the funding and operations of several major institutions in Valencia (Rius-Ulldemolins, Flor Moreno, et al.,

2019) or the way cultural budget fluctuations are related to electoral cycles (Sanjuán et al., 2020).

In other words, to understand how regional governments might choose to support digital crowdfunding as a novel method of fundraising, we need to consider the contextual factors shaping the type of intervention. Some of these factors are the traditions and experience associated with private funding of culture, the various paradigms and rationales justifying policy intervention, and the types of grants that may be used to support cultural crowdfunding monetarily.

According to Schuster (1989), governments use three kinds of public grants: co-financing, challenge grants, and reverse matching grants. Co-financing refers to the government's role as co-financers of the arts, acknowledging that the public sector rarely funds all the project costs. In the European context, co-financing is the dominant grant mechanism within both the Nordic and Southern (Rius-Ulldemolins, Pizzi, et al., 2019; Rubio Arostegui and Rius-Ulldemolins, 2020) cultural policy models. Statutes enshrine the principle in Sweden. SFS 2012:516 on subsidies to the performing arts and music states that the Swedish Art Council or other State agencies will not fully finance projects. A challenge grant takes a 'carrot-and-stick' approach. The government challenges specific cultural institutions or individuals to raise 'new' money from private sources in exchange for promises of an additional 'challenge' grant rewarding success (Schuster, 1989, p.65). Reverse matching grants' underlying principle is a governmental undertaking to match, more or less automatically, private fundraising with a set proportion (for example, from 1:1 to 1:4) of public funding. The term 'reverse' follows from the 'reactive' *modus operandi* of the grant mechanism: public subsidy follows private choice. Governments may find reverse matching grants hard to implement because dishing out funding by relying on public choice does constitute an innovative approach (Senabre and Morell,

2018). Conversely, and because reverse matching grants foster participation and work well with a campaign-based fundraising approach, governments see reverse matching grants as a viable form of intervention to support crowdfunding (Loots, 2020).

The grey literature (Baeck et al., 2017; De Voldere and Zeqo, 2017; Eurocrowd, 2021) describes four types of match-funding based on reverse matching grants: in first, top-up, bridging, and real-time. 'In first' is allocating a pre-set percentage of the project costs as public match-funding before the start of the crowdfunding campaign. Conversely, a 'top-up' adds a similar percentage or set sum after the end of the campaign. 'Bridging' seeks to strengthen the success potential of the campaign through a single contribution to the campaign once it reaches a pre-set threshold (e.g., from 30 to 50 percent). 'Real time' consists of 'matching' the value of any contributions, effectively multiplying the value of any pledge. Thus, the public partner's contributions effectively double the value of the amount of funding pledged to the projects by private patrons. In any case, the overall outcome and effect is that available funding for cultural projects increases (Barbieri et al., 2019).

How governments combine match-funding with other kinds of measures to support crowdfunding has yet to be defined. The literature on civic crowdfunding (Davies, 2015; Wenzlaff, 2020a) first theorised a taxonomy of intervention schemes, which provide guidance. Wenzlaff (2020a p.457–458), building on the work of Davies (2014), describes five roles regional governments may adopt in the context of civic crowdfunding:

- Owner models: the government take ownership of crowdfunding by promoting a campaign.

- Facilitator model: the government, through the provision of economic support, co-funds campaigns promoted by private citizens or organisations.

- (Selling)-service models: the government offer services (due diligence of projects, education, training, or mentoring) free or at cost.

- Curator models: the government selects and promotes campaigns through the public institution's official communication channels.

- Platform models: the government owns a crowdfunding platform.

Figure 1 **The tensions and forces in CF match-funding: ownership, curation, facilitation and services.**

LEVEL OF CONTROL

LEVEL OF INTERVNTION

LEVEL OF PRESELECTION

LEVEL OF INNOVACIÓN

SERVICE PROVIDER
- Provision of counselling and training.
- Offer subsidized (covered by grants) or at-cost access to marketing services.
- Occasionally, prize money to selected campaigns.
- Based on preselection (curation)

OWNER
- Use crowdfunding to promote proprietary projects.
- Operate platform for individual or multiple projects in collaboration with platforms.

FACILITATOR
- In addition to provision of services, facilitate access to matched funding.
- Based on preselection (curation).

CURATOR
- Preselect project on the basis of criteria (e.g., geography, cultural field, gender, age)
- Promotethe usage of crowdfunding through these projects on a dedicated landing page on existing platform.

Using the work of Wenzlaff and Davies and analysis of existing partnerships to support crowdfunding (see Section 3), Figure 1 proposes an operational model of possible interventions to support cultural crowdfunding.

We situate the forms of interventions (different roles) along four (two vertical and two horizontal) continuums (approaches). The horizontal continuum at the bottom indicates the interventions' position relative to the degree of innovation. The rationale is that innovating administrative procedures (facilitation) may represent the most challenging aspect of intervening. By this, we mean changing the model of allocating grants from reliance on experts (e.g., civil servants) or peers (e.g., Art Council committees) to popular (crowd) decisions. The horizontal continuum at the top indicates the degree to which the public partner intends to control and manage the partnership. This means setting up and administering a platform to promote proprietary (in the sense of self-elected) projects as the owner. The left vertical continuum shows a position on a scale indicating commitment (from low to high). Thus, the service model of intervention would involve a marked laissez-faire, or passive attitude, by limiting involvement to indirect support of the promoter's effort by giving discretionary grants to cover their marketing and promotional costs. The right vertical continuum indicates the degree of openness of the intervention scheme. By 'openness', we mean the work that goes into vetting projects for participation. These may range from the inclusion of any potential project solely at the discretion of the public partner, via compliance with criteria (geography, industry category, age, gender, and professional status), to selection based on formal applications that are like the ones bearing on grant allocation in co-financing models of intervention.

Due to the fluid nature of the boundary transitions between the various roles, they are highly hybrid and will frequently contain parts of one

another in their respective positions. The exception is the platform ownership position, in which regional and local governments act as promoters in direct collaboration with a platform. This means that, in most cases, the facilitator role entails curation (pre-selection of projects) and service provision (training, follow-up, aid with communication, and marketing). Additionally, some forms of service provision include project support in the form of cash prizes, while others require application processing in order to access a subsidised provision. Curation involves communication and marketing efforts without the promoter necessarily gaining specific benefits from a proprietary campaign. Without regard for the owner role, the value of intervention for artists and cultural entrepreneurs can be summarised as follows: curation-services-facilitation.

METHODOLOGY

We examined local and regional government initiatives to boost cultural crowdfunding using a case study research design and methodology (Creswell, 2013; Yin , 2018, p. 97). Stake's taxonomy (in Creswell, 2013, p. 99) classifies our case study as a collective (or multiple) case study. The goal was to gain a better understanding of these programmes, their implementation, and functionality by analysing and evaluating existing operational schemes.

Two steps of data collection were undertaken concurrently. One phase centred on the development of a framework to aid our interpretation and understanding of the many roles that local and regional governments adopt to support cultural crowdfunding through match-funding and other sorts of involvement throughout Europe. Using document analysis (De Voldere and Zeqo, 2017; Baeck et al., 2017; European Crowdfunding Network, 2018; Senabre and Morrell, 2018; Myndigheten for Kulturanalys, 2013) and web searches (the websites crowdfunding4culture.

org, eurocrowd.org, and nordic-crowdfunding. org), 77 programmes from across Europe's various countries were identified. We eliminated 40 of them (no regional or local government, n = 5; predominantly civic crowdfunding, n = 22; and corporate partners, such as a bank, n = 13). For the remaining, selected schemes (n = 37), a data collection matrix was drawn up for which we collected information on location (country), year of launch, collaborating crowdfunding platform, public partner, and crowdfunding business model. After evaluating the schemes, we wrote a synopsis of how they worked (abbreviated version in column "description", Table 1). In a few instances, we contacted the public administration, engaging in an e-mail dialogue with civil servants to ascertain and verify information we had difficulty understanding or interpreting. As a final stage of the process, a crowdsourced initiative to map existing initiatives conducted on the LinkedIn platform was consulted to ensure that our searches were complete (Wenzlaff, 2020b).

After plotting the basic information, we delved into analyses of roles and types of involvement of public partners, developing a model (see Figure 1) based on our findings while using the literature on civic crowdfunding as guidance. Thereafter, the model was used to determine the type of intervention for each of the initiatives by assigning a role to each of them. The information can be found in Table 1.

Table 1 **Overview of analysed partnerships**

Country	Year started	Platforms collaborating	Regions/Cities	Role
Austria	2016	Wemakeit, Conda, Kickstarter, Startnext, Zmartup, Greenrocket, 1000x1000, Companisto, Firstcap 1	Graz	Service
France	2015	Proartis	Rennes	Curation and Service
Germany	2016 (Berlin), 2017 (Kassel)	Startnext	Berlin, Kassel	Service
Germany	2019 (Rheinland-Palantine), 2020 (Dresden)	Startnext	Rheinland-Palantine, Dresden	Curation
Germany	2013 (Frankfurt), 2014 (Munich), 2011 (Hamburg)	Startnext	Frankfurt, Munich, and Hamburg	Facilitation
Italy	2013	Idea Ginger	Bologna	Platform
Italy	2015	Idea Ginger and Kickstarter	Emilio Romagna	Service
Netherlands	2010	Voordekunst	Groningen, Gelderland, Limburg, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, The Hague, and Amersfoort	Facilitation
Spain	2011	Goteo	Andalucía,, Gipuzkoa, Barcelona, Zaragoza	Facilitation
Spain	2016	Verkami	Gijon	Facilitation
Sweden	2010	CrowdCulture	Blekinge, Filmbasen, Gävleborg, Jönköping, Kronoberg, Stockholm, Sörmland, Västra Götaland, Dalarna	Facilitation
Switzerland	2012	Wemakeit	Basel	Curation
UK	2011	Crowdfunder	Newcastle, Cornwall, Plymouth, Birmingham	Facilitation

Description	Crowdfunding model
Grants to fund creative services (> 50% of costs, capped at €5,000) required for a campaign (video production, graphic design and communication).	Lending, Equity, Reward
Starts with curation (preselection) followed by training programme and counselling. Two rounds of campaigns. Prize money of €1,000 (most liked and most money raised) and €500 (special award by the city)	Reward
Offers free consultation services to aspiring promoters (Berlin). Advises on campaign development and promoting promotional services (Kassel). Occasionally, prize money to selected campaigns.	Lending, Equity, Reward (Berlin) Reward only (Kassel)
A channel on the platform promotes crowdfunding projects from the area	Reward
Application based selection, coaching, and access to grants to pay for services, and match-funding (cap €5,000 per campaign). Top-up (Munich and Hamburg) or real-time model (Frankfurt)	Reward
The city funded part of the restoration of a cultural heritage site using a crowdfunding platform set up by Idea Ginger. Over 7,000 citizens donated €339,000.	Donation
The regional government, in collaboration with an innovation agency and crowdfunding experts, offer counselling, PR and communication services.	Reward
The Platform manages partnerships with the government partners, hosts workshops and consultations, and facilitate match-funding for selected projects. Matching funds typically represent 25–30% of campaign goals as in-first, bridging, or top-up funds.	Reward and Donation
See case study	Reward and Donation
Verkami responsible for counselling and hosting campaigns. Matching doubles the amount collected if the target is met, up to a maximum of €2,000 per campaign.	Reward
See case study	Reward
Launch of a regional channel for Kanton Basel. The region covered costs of programming, hosting and manpower to promote crowdfunding and possibility for inclusion on the channel to the local artist community.	Reward
Based on meeting criteria and fundraising targets, prospective projects may access match-funding (+Extra funding).	Reward

Own desk research and elaboration, based on Wenzlaff (2020b), De Voldere and Zeqo (2017), Loots (2020)

Concurrently with the mapping historic and existing European initiatives, we sought to identify embedded case studies to be used to further examine and validate the facilitator role we ended up defining. These cases were chosen based on their paradigmatic relevance (Flyvbjerg, 2011). In this instance, 'paradigmatic' cases highlight the more general characteristics of the studied object or phenomenon. Thus, the rationale for choosing them is that they help us understand some of the issues and challenges inherent in collaborations between public (regional governments) and private (crowdfunding platforms) entities that aim to boost the adoption and use of the cultural crowdfunding variant. Consequently, they were selected because they clearly illustrate how regional governments, as facilitators, and crowdfunding platforms work together.

Three reasons are given for the approach. First, in both instances, the launches of the platforms and their collaboration with regional governments were among the earliest in Europe. The claim is supported by the timeline of launch years, as shown in Table 1. Second, both cases reveal distinct values, which shaped how the collaboration was implemented in practice: Goteo's strong commitment to creative commons and CrowdCulture's participatory model for providing public support to culture based on the impact of digitisation, respectively. Some may question why we chose Goteo as the Spanish case instead of Verkami. Verkami is a platform with more campaigns and some experience in the facilitator role (see Table 1). However, Goteo was finally chosen given the platform's much wider experience in developing and operating facilitator-like public-private partnerships. Third, the selected schemes may shed some light on the impact the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and different cultural policy models have on the performance of these schemes. Other empirical studies (Rius-Ulldemolins et al., 2019) have confirmed that crisis-related structural problems in Sweden and Spain are vastly different. This is due to the fact

that their social, political, economic, and geographical settings are at opposite ends of Western Europe.

From a methodological standpoint, these embedded cases were drawn up in the same way as that used in the intervention model. We began by conducting desk research by reviewing case-specific literature. Examples of key sources, in addition to the platform's websites, are published as case studies (Amman, 2016, Zeqo, 2016), reports (European Crowdfunding Network, 2018; Myndigheten for Kulturanalys, 2013; De Voldere and Zeqo, 2017), and peer-reviewed papers (Senabre and Morrel, 2018; Loots, 2020). We also compiled and analysed information on the financial performance of the match-funding programmes.

After conducting a preliminary analysis of the documents and campaign data, we wrote (Maxwell, 2009) descriptive texts outlining our understanding of the schemes' rationale, the features of the platforms, and their underlying business models. We drew up a set of questionnaires for semi-structured interviews based on these 'memos'. Then, we held separate interviews with the respective founders of the two platforms (Goteo's Oliver Schulbaum and CrowdCulture's Max Valentin). The aim of the interviews was to gain knowledge about three issues we believed to be key for answering the research question: (1) the value(s) underpinning the platform's operation; (2) the functionality of the schemes (including match-funding mechanism) and collaboration between partners; (3) and the economic results and performance of the schemes, measured as a multiplier effect.

Each interview lasted between 90 and 120 minutes. We chose to hold interviews for the same reason as our mapping of the schemes, namely completeness.

Thus, the interviews gave us the last chance to validate our understanding of the platform's op-

erations, match-funding schemes, and financial data accuracy.

After transcribing the interviews, the case studies were completed, which included updating the financial performance data and calculating the multiplier effect for each scheme. The case reports are presented in the following section.

CASE STUDIES
Goteo

Goteo's crowdfunding platform fosters public-private partnerships based on a commitment to the creative commons as a philosophical principle. The project for the platform was inspired by Flattr, a micro-donation subscription service for creative work, to address the plunge in project funding following the GFC. A conceptual model for Goteo emerged through co-design workshops with stakeholders – citizens who support cultural or social projects, government staff, and investors. Transparency and shared responsibility are the key values shared by all stakeholders. Citizens value transparency because it lets them grasp how funds are spent on funded projects. The public sector has a general duty to transparency in government, whereas the Goteo model simplifies and resolves reporting issues. Investors appreciated the transparency provided by the signalling system – a red light flashing when projects fail to deliver on their promises.

However, these values turn operating a crowdfunding platform into a more complex procedure in the case of Goteo compared with commercial platforms like Verkami or Kickstarter. There was uncertainty about whether a model with offline antecedents – collecting funds by appealing to solidarity – would work in the online world. Goteo resolved the challenge through innovation and transparency. The platform operates as a foundation whose initial capitalisation (€28,000) comes from valuing the platform's open-source code. An-

other "transparent" innovation was establishing legally and fiscally valid models of collaboration in partnership with the Extremadura regional government. However, because of transparency, the template was made public, and everyone could use it. Consequently, during the public procurement process to award a new contract to operate the scheme, Goteo lost the job of organising the match-funding to other companies.

Managing a platform as a foundation confers both advantages: surplus work and limitations. Fiscally, a contribution to a campaign represents a gift to the foundation, which then distributes funds to the respective promoters. Therefore, all patrons must verify their identity and become eligible for tax benefits. These legal safeguards represent advantageous features for the public administration in their role as facilitators. However, getting the right tax certificates sent to all contributors represents surplus work and requires special software for communication with the tax authorities. Hence, considering the uncertain legal status of reward-based crowdfunding, Goteo's model provides a legitimate framework that commercial platforms cannot offer. Concurrently, "transparency," adherence to creative commons, social compromise, and a rigorous and realistic vetting process limit the type and number of projects on the platform. Commercial music projects chose different platforms because of requirements to release the crowdfunded recordings under a creative commons licence. One feature of the platform's social commitment is that promoters must state how their projects can foster gender equality. Realism signifies looking at the campaign's funding goals and a requirement that the contributions from family and friends equal 20 percent of the first week of the campaign. As a result, most projects wanting to raise €20,000 in funding from 1,500 contributors are rejected by the platform because of unrealistic ambitions.

Between 2011 and 2020, Goteo launched 18 match-funding programmes targeting 11 audi-

ences and private sector partners (City, Provincial, and Regional Governments, Universities).

Our analysis focuses on META!, Goteo's most stable and longest-running collaboration in partnership with the Provincial Government of Gipuzkoa (Basque Country region in Spain) and the city of San Sebastian as its capital. The collaboration came about due to the connection and affinity between the platform and the Department of Culture, who saw match-funding as a way to provide more resources to the cultural sector in the province. The Goteo foundation receives a nominal yearly grant whereby the Council contributes €70,000 annually in match-funding and approximately €65,000 in support, communication, training in campaign management and advice to promoters. All the projects go through a formal selection process (curation) assessing the viability of each project and its consistency with public policy objectives (e.g., helping strengthen the region's cultural ecosystem) and Goteo's values. Selected promoters receive training, access to personalised advice, and participation in a joint communication campaign, something explaining the outstanding success rate of the projects (set in percentages). Campaigns run over two rounds, each lasting forty days. Match-funding in the first round follows the 'Real Time' principle, adding one euro from the Council for every Euro raised by a promoter. In the second round, a dynamic algorithm multiplies matched contributions by two or three on pre-established days, linked to marketing activity, campaign performance, and success rates, with the aim of promoting solidarity and co-operation. The algorithm also limits the maximum contribution of each patron and the public match allocated to each project.

Table 2 gives statistics of META!'s first four editions. The average amount raised per campaign was €9,921, of which €4,327 represented the average public allocation (with a 2.22-multiplier effect). Citizen contributions average €55, higher than the €49.60 overall for regular Goteo campaigns.

Table 2 **Descriptive statistics META!**

Variables	Match-funding Campaigns				
	Meta 2016.	Meta 2017.	Meta 2018.	Meta 2019.	Total
Match-funding Budget	€70,000	€70,000	€70,000	€70,000	€280,000
Allocation used	€70,000	€62,631	€70,000	€70,000	€272,631
Applications	37	33	46	38	154
Selected Projects	20	16	15	14	65
Successfully funded	20	15	14	14	63
Contributions Patrons	€84,450	€94,080	€77,619	€76,708	€332,857
DFG contributions[1]	€66,572	€63,722	€59,641	*MD*	€189,935
Participants	1,556	1,333	1,441	1,322	5,652
Average Contributions $(\bar{M})$	€54	€71	€54	€58	
Average Campaign $(\bar{M})$	€7,723	€10,939	€10,544	€10,479	
Multiplier Effect	2.21	2.50	2.11	2.10	2.22

1. DFG = Contributions to cover costs of administration, training, counselling and communication

CrowdCulture

In 2006, Max Valentin, founder of CrowdCulture, was confident that e-commerce and the impact of digitalisation on other sectors would eventually affect the cultural sector. Inspired by precursors to today's crowdfunding platforms, like the closed, members-only website Underfund, used to pitch and fundraise creative projects, Max Valentin sought to transpose participatory forms of organisations from the cultural sector to an entrepreneurial, digital environment. The building block of the new structural model was democratic participation based on the organising principle of a hybrid economy. "Hybrid" refers to the meeting of public and private interests to realise a project, and "economy" refers to a digital co-financing solution where the number of participants, not the capital involved, has prominence. Thus, the point of entry was not crowdfunding per se, but an attempt to facilitate democratic participation in the allocation of public funding through digitalisation.

However, a public-private partnership between the platform and regional governments has as much to do with a need for other income streams as commissions from crowdfunding contributions alone. CrowdCulture initially lobbied the Swedish Internet Foundation for financial support, arguing that the benefits of the platform project included increasing government usage of digital web-based services. Responses ranged from negative (too commercial; the internet should not be about money) via lukewarm (complicated) to positive (we want match-funding). Eventually, CrowdCulture declined to participate in the public procurement processes to operate the pilot scheme because the match-funding scheme would need to apply the real-time principle. Real-time models contradict Max Valentin's personal belief that match-funding schemes should be based on the number of participants rather than the quantity of funding raised. Otherwise, the risk of fraud or misuse is too great because a person with available capital may buy out public funds. In the

end, CrowdCulture settled on a business model based on software licensing to use the platform, consultancy fees to manage partnerships with the regional funds, and service provisioning (e.g., workshops and training in running campaigns for promoters).

Simultaneously, a newly elected councillor in the city government of Stockholm was interested in changing the way the city allocated cultural funding. Some institutions had received regular money from the city for 30 years, while the list of others wanting support was long. To work on solutions, the city set up a semi-autonomous agency called Innovativ Kultur. The agency's objectives were to promote co-operation between the cultural sector, businesses, and research, provide funding for innovative cultural projects, stimulate cultural entrepreneurship, and most importantly, work on method development for funding the cultural sector. "An agency to challenge the status quo." According to Max Valentin's words, CrowdCulture, with funding from and VINNOVA, successfully ran two pilot programmes with match-funding for Innovativ Kultur in 2010 before officially launching in 2011, with the first regional match-funding scheme outside Stockholm launched in 2012. Valentin cites these partnerships and having SKL's (the organisation for Swedish Municipal and Regional governments) legal department validate CrowdCulture's match-funding model as enabling partnerships with regional authorities. However, challenging the status quo is not the only impetus behind the drive to operate public-private partnerships. As Max Valentin points out: "We couldn't survive financially with a business-to-consumer model. That is why we must also work with the public sector. It's not just ideology'

Match-funding comes from a designated fund where the public partner sets aside a fractional percentage of its cultural budget specifically for projects promoted on the platform meeting the criteria to access these funds. The platform uses an algorithm to calculate public support based on

266 — DEBATS · Annual Review, 8 · 2023

Anders Rykkja and Lluís Bonet Agustí

the number of active projects at any given time targeting a specific public fund and their respective donations from people. Accessing match-funding requires at least five private patrons to support the project (SOU, 2018:20) and that the project reaches its predetermined funding goal. The government's motives for collaboration vary, ranging from showing the capacity to innovate and strengthen democratic participation to following political signals stressing a need to externalise activities through digitalisation. What Valentin finds most challenging is the short length of the partnerships (lasting for one year, with exceptions) and that crowdfunding requires more and different ways of working from the administration. Loss of control and power is usually not the issue. The challenge is the administrative implementation and management of programmes, including training, education, and most importantly, getting people enthused.

Table 3 provides descriptive statistics of selected match-funding programmes. They have a smaller multiplier effect than in the Spanish case.

Table 3 **Descriptive statistics CrowdCulture 2010 - 2016**

Regions	Successful Campaigns	All projects		Match-funding		Private Funding		Multiplier Effect
	N	Total	$\bar{M}$	Total	$\bar{M}$	Total	$\bar{M}$	
Blekinge	21	38 260	1 822	32 917	1 567	5 343	254	0,16
Dalarna	4	10 588	2 647	9 119	2 280	1 469	367	0,16
Filmbasen	12	27 189	2 266	15 802	1 317	11 387	949	0,72
Gävleborg	9	38 615	4 291	30 344	3 372	8 271	919	0,27
Jönköping	1	7 022	7 022	4 616	4 616	2 406	2 406	0,52
Kronoberg	13	43 422	3 340	*33 666*	2 590	*9 756*	750	**0,29**
Sörmland	13	26 530	2 041	21 546	1 657	2 728	210	**0,13**
Västra Göta-land	21	54 278	2 585	35 034	1 668	19 244	916	**0,55**

DISCUSSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The paper focuses on one main research question: how have local and regional governments in Europe responded to the emergence of crowdfunding as an alternative funding mechanism to support cultural projects?

Our conceptual model shows that at the regional level of government, available roles depend on choosing between expectations or innovative approaches. The expectant approach refers to governments supporting the efforts of promoters running campaigns by indirectly promoting or

encouraging the uptake of crowdfunding. The approach signals an interest in crowdfunding as "out there" and available but does not indicate an extensive commitment towards engaging with the mechanism. Conversely, the innovative approach refers to direct facilitation of crowdfunding through match-funding or using crowdfunding to promote campaigns for projects considered strategically or artistically important. As with most typologies, hybridisation is common. Facilitation usually involves curation and the provision of services, while curating a special 'season' of campaigns or service provision may include some modest facilitation through prize money. In any event, one can see tensions between the drive to innovate and the wish to keep control. Most schemes facilitating match-funding use a selection process mimicking the traditional model of project application in the cultural sector. Depending on the chosen approach, the successful application of policies depends on four mechanisms: (1) a rigorous process of preselection; (2) professional training and mentoring; (3) communication; (4) outsourcing of work (to the platform).

Some of the differences in the multiplier effect between the schemes may be explained by the kind of organisation, the financial and operational involvement of the public partner, and common values. "In match-funding rounds, we do more assessment work; we are paid to be more thorough," says Oliver Schulbaum. Furthermore, "marketing and communication work, training, and education programmes" are linked to success. Therefore, the kind of partnership and level of involvement indicate that the platform and public partner are close collaborators. Furthermore, both partners prize their collaboration being based on openness and transparency.

CrowdCulture, on the other hand, operates as a business, mainly licencing usage rights and sometimes providing services as part of the agreement. CrowdCulture also plays no significant role in curating and vetting projects, other than

ensuring that the platform's and partners' rules are followed (i.e., number of backers, geographic origin, and type of project). Because of the chosen business model, public partners become clients and are less involved in the operation of scheme. This exemplifies a less intensive, less demanding type of collaboration.

By comparing the platform's values, a possible explanation for the differences in the multiplier effect can be found. While Goteo stresses transparency and the commons, CrowdCulture stresses democratisation of the funding allocation process (CrowdCulture). Based on economic performance, the former appears to produce better results. As a result, in addition to platform values, variables shaping the multiplier effect of these schemes include the partnership's inherent level of commitment, dedicated marketing investment, and, curation.

In addition, match-funding mechanisms appear more complex than simply topping up the private contributions with public funding. The platforms use dynamic, algorithm-driven models to avoid 'free-riding' (promoters benefiting without contributing) by incentivising promoters to work during key moments of the campaigns. Therefore, we propose a fifth model, dynamic multiplication, to complement the four previously described by Baeck et al. (2017). We define dynamic multiplication as an algorithm-based matching model, computing the public commitment to campaigns using a formula considering participating projects, contributions, campaign stages, and the scheme's general goals.

Still, these findings do not explain the regional and local governments' cautious and ambivalent embrace of crowdfunding. Has little pressure or demand from the professional arts sector and cultural heritage institutions something to do with this? In both of the cases individuals representing the government, in Stockholm and Gipuzkoa, drove the process based on a rationale that to boost and

change the allocation of funding, governments need to innovate. Crowdfunding, as our research has shown, is a departure from the traditional model of co-financing, which is based on experts in Arts Councils and public administrations making decisions for audiences and consumers (Bonet and Sastre, 2016). Most cultural expressions and objects financed through cultural crowdfunding skew, in cultural policy terms, towards the popular and commercial end of the high – low arts continuum. They are not part of the cultural establishment (Rius-Ulldemolins et al., 2019), such as heritage, performing arts, or classical music (Menger, 2010), leading to difficulties in justifying their support as merit goods. Nonetheless, use of match-funding represents an endogenous outcome of cultural policies' participatory turn (Bonet and Négrier, 2018). It could help legitimise governmental support of culture for those projects adhering to the paradigms of cultural democracy and creative economy. This is of particular importance when faced with the perennial problem of precarity and difficulties in accessing funding and paid work for artists and cultural entrepreneurs (Menger, 1999).

However, the emergence of crowdfunding evidence some level of disconnect between regional, reiterative political discourses and the economy of the creative city (Menger, 2010). This is part of an ongoing issue of connecting the intrinsic values of cultural policy that fosters economic growth and social cohesion through the adoption of a broader, more socially relevant, and inclusive cultural agenda (Styhre, 2013). Despite the fact that they share the same criteria and mechanisms that underpin arts policy in general (e.g., aesthetic quality, professionalism) (Pratt, 2005), there is a lack of inherent financial mechanisms tailored to the real practises and needs of emerging artists. A majority of interventions are indirect schemes (Evans, 2009; Menger, 2010; Holden, 2015), including building new cultural centres and infrastructure, or funding festivals, events, and spaces for co-working. Another reason for limited involvement may be the ambiguous legal status of many

projects benefiting from crowdfunding: some are presales that would generate VAT payments; others focus more on philanthropic donations and gift economics, with a third in an unclear position between these two poles.

Another, more prosaic explanation of the hesitancy is the non-prescriptive nature of crowdfunding's capacity for intermediation compared to the dominant selection models. Under co-financing models, the government, foundations, or private companies provide financing based on selecting between any number of "submitted" projects, often relying on instrumental criteria, such as ability to attain stated intrinsic requirements and external goals. The same mechanisms are implemented under the facilitator role in some match-funding programmes, e.g., the case of META! This evidences a certain intent on behalf of governments to adapt support for crowdfunding to the preselection model used for allocation of co-financing grants. In Crowd-Culture's case, the impression of founder Max Valentin is that the government's concerns over supporting crowdfunding and match-funding may have more to do with the additional workload involved. Besides workload, the costs of taking on a facilitator role are also quite high, due in part to governments' replicating preselection mechanisms on the one hand, and on the other hand, the costs associated with training, mentoring, and communication of schemes and campaigns to the public. In the case of META! these costs equalled nearly as much as the amounts set aside for match-funding for the campaigns. What are the drivers and barriers to supporting cultural crowdfunding from the perspective of local and regional public administration? This could be an interesting topic for future research.

To conclude, most regional and local governments see crowdfunding as a marginal financing mechanism used by cultural projects unable to access other sources of funding. Thus, our research indicates no widespread adoption of the role of facilitator, service provider, or curator of

crowdfunding support. One reason may be that support implies allocating funding through different grant mechanisms and models of intervention. Civil servants, Art Councils, established artists, and institutions might resist these changes out of fear of losing control and influence over cultural policy. Failure to address the tricky legal and fiscal debate on whether crowdfunding income constitutes gifts or sales of production provides another explanation for reticence (Lazzaro and Noonan, 2020). Public support of crowdfunding involves outsourcing of grant-giving through collaborations with private organisations (platforms). Lack of control over proceedings can lead to misuse of funds and failed partnerships, causing reputational loss for the public partner. Nevertheless, due to the predominantly local or regional orientation of match-funding schemes, legal and fiscal obstacles should be easy to address given the ease of controlling proceedings. Research in France demonstrates a geographic link between the cultural 'terroir' and crowdfunded initiatives (Le Béchec et al., 2018). Thus, governments may use support for crowdfunding as a method to augment reduced or stagnant public finances and benefit from the dynamism and complementarity between crowdfunding and the local and regional cultural ecosystem. The likely beneficiaries are emerging artists and projects falling under the cultural democracy and creative economy paradigms.

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