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Special Issue
Sociability's emotional structures

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Special Issue
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Debats was launched in 1982 as the journal of the Institution of Alfonso The Magnanimous (IAM) and shortly afterwards, of the Valencia Institute of Research and Investigation (IVEI). Its mission, then as now, is to foster and update the great debates on social sciences in the Valencian region, and to facilitate participation by leading experts in the field. The Debats journal is now a bi-annual publication. Its objective is to: (1) bring together current intellectual reflections on culture (both in its broadest sense of cultural practices and in the narrower sense of the Arts); (2) examine the links between culture and power, identity, geographies, and social change. The Journal covers matters that are relevant to Valencian society and its wider setting. That said, the aim is to make Debats a key scholarly publication in both Europe and further afield. Debats' starts from the perspective of the social sciences but it also aims to forge links with contemporary analysis and debates in the humanities, communication studies, and cultural studies fields. It calls for methodological pluralism while fostering innovation through the adoption of new research techniques and ways of communicating scholarly findings to a broader public. In a nutshell, the Journal is an invaluable tool for analysing emerging problems in the cultural field and in contemporary society. In playing this role, it takes a broad, multi-disciplinary view and combines social impact with scientific rigour in scholarly publications and debates at the international level.

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Special Issue

Sociability's Emotional Structures

Presentation of the Monographic Issue. Sociability's Emotional Structures

Coordinated by
Eduardo Bericat
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This special issue comprises a selection of the proposals discussed at the Spanish Federation of Sociology's (FES) 1st Conference of the Research Committee on the Sociology of Emotions. The conference was held in Valencia in 2018 and was an open invitation to social scientists in general and to sociologists in particular to incorporate in their word the analysis of affects, feelings, moods, passions and, in short, all the emotions people feel that human beings experience in the course of their social interactions.

The issue contains five papers that respectively analyse the: (1) ideological discourse on happiness; (2) controversies bearing on the concept of depression; (3) role that emotions play in public debates on prostitution; (4) emotional dynamics present in collective bargaining in big corporations; (5) emotional quality of jobs in post-industrial societies.

THE EMOTIONAL STRUCTURES OF HUMAN EXPERIENCES

The concept of 'experience' proposed by the pragmatist philosopher John Dewey in the third chapter of his book *Art as Experience* is a catalysing one when it comes to imagining how emotions help shape social life. It is thus a useful one for thinking of ways of incorporating feelings in our research. What do we mean when we say that we have had an 'experience', and what can be considered an 'experience'?

Dewey frames the matter thus:

> A generalized illustration may be had if we imagine a stone, which is rolling down hill, to have an experience. The activity is surely sufficiently "practical." The stone starts from somewhere, and moves, as consistently as conditions permit, toward a place and state where it will be at rest – toward an end. Let us add, by imagination, to these external facts, the ideas that it looks forward with desire to the final outcome; that it is interested in the things it meets on its way, conditions that accelerate and retard its movement with respect to their bearing on the end; that it acts and feels toward them according to the hindering or helping function it attributes to them; and that the final coming to rest is related to all that went before as the culmination of a continuous movement. Then the stone would have an experience, and one with aesthetic quality.
>
> John Dewey, *Having an Experience* (1934)

An experience constitutes a specific life process seen as a unit, to which we can usually give a name. Our experiences contain intellectual, practical, emotional and volitional aspects but all of them take on a unique quality that is recognisable by the individual undergoing the experience. MARKER One can think of many examples of experiences: the first time one met one's current partner; a summer storm; a job interview; the day we argued with the neighbours; a soccer match in which our team reached the final; separation or divorce; graduating; attending a demonstration; a terrorist attack.

All human experiences are specific, recognisable, and unique. They are time-limited life processes with a beginning and an end. They are linked to a meaning that is consummated by the experience itself. One goes into a job interview with certain expectations and emotions. Initial feelings can be hope or despair, anxiety or calm, fear or confidence. As the interview unfolds, a changing, transformative succession of emotions unfolds. These all stem from the job-seeker's wishes for future well-being. When the experience ends, the job seeker may experience great joy, deep disappointment, or uneasiness. All experience embodies complex 'emotional structure' as well as a step-by-step 'emotional dynamic' in which the subject tries to alter the course of events (Bericat, 2016).

Dewey rightly points out that "we are given to thinking of emotions as things as simple and compact as are the words by which we name them. Joy, sorrow, hope, fear, anger, curiosity, are treated as if each in itself were a sort of entity that enters full-made upon the scene, an entity that may last a long time or a short time, but whose duration, whose growth and career, is irrelevant to its nature" (Dewey, 2005: 43). Each experience traces its own path through time and space. Emotions are felt by subjects but only insofar as the latter are interested in wished-for or unwished-for facts and events affecting them. According to Dewey (2005: 45), "All emotions are qualifications of a drama and they change as the drama develops." Therefore the constituent interaction of all experience contains both doings (deeds) and sufferings (that which is undergone). The agent acts upon the world but is also acted upon by it. Emotions are the driving and integrating force behind all the subject's experiences.

So far, we have assumed that human experiences and emotions are individual, regardless of the fact that all of them are also social (von Scheve and Ismer, 2013). First, our experiences emerge from socially patterned situations and interactions, reflecting both a given society and a given culture. Our personal experiences, though unique, can be shared by those in a similar social situation. Experiences of social discrimination — whether based on race, gender, sexual orientation, or religious affiliation — while highly diverse, tend to have a common underlying pattern. They will share a certain emotional structure and dynamics and, in the Weberian sense of the term, they could reflect a limited number of ideal types mirroring the diversity of this social phenomenon.

Second, social experiences occur when all members of a society or social group experience a given social situation at the same time. When thousands of people throng a soccer stadium, they find themselves in 'the same boat'. Although their feelings depend on how 'their team' is playing, the behaviour of both groups of fans is similar. We share experiences because we identify with social groups and are feelings are shaped by this group identity. We can therefore speak of experiences as collective emotions.

On other occasions we feel the same because we share the same situation and experience. For instance, all Spaniards suffered the same house confinement between March and June 2020. The parameters of daily life changed radically and new social situations arose that gave rise to new experiences. The study of these radical experiences of confinement at home was comparable to the situations spawned by a scientific experiment. They clearly reveal how we undergo situations (*undergoings*) with others and respond to them through our actions (*doings*). The study of these experiences and the emotional dynamics and structures arising from them can shed light on human sociability, which is precisely Sociology's goal.

To sum up, our experiences as individuals take place within given social contexts, each one of which contains the germ of a potential range of emotional structures and dynamics. This strong link between experience, social circumstances, and the structure of emotions offers a way of gaining a fuller, deeper insight into human nature in the social setting. Whatever our focus (the legitimacy of political systems and disaffection with them; social inequality; poverty; health and sickness; the *status quo*; great social changes; consumption of goods and information; war and peace, solidarity and discrimination; family relations, friendship, and so forth), studying the emotions undergone by the various actors offers a different sociological perspective.

The study of social experiences gives scope for incorporating emotions in social research.

THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF EMOTIONS AND THE EMOTIONAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE SOCIAL SPHERE

The complex link between the emotional universe with culture and society, and to sociological approach to emotions can take various forms. On the one hand, emotions

can be analysed as a social product of a given historical and cultural moment. On the other hand, we can see emotions, together with ideas and values (the basic components of any culture) as shaping social reality. Without losing sight of mediating process, both these perspectives are covered in this special issue.

Unlike the usual psychological and biological readings of emotions, all the papers in this special edition are based on the idea that emotions are of a social nature. Nevertheless, in this first bloc, the social nature of emotions is made clear by focusing on the (de)construction of emotions and their consequences. In the first paper, Alberto Martín Pérez, José Antonio Rodriguez Díaz, José Luis Condom Bosch, and Aitor Donínguez Aguayo examine culture in relation to happiness. Using quantitative and qualitative textual analysis techniques, they analyse the tips and advice offered by 'positive psychology' to attain happiness. As opposed to an individualistic discourse on happiness, these authors propose a social view of this emotion. In other words, they propose reconstructing the social context that lays such ideological stress on what has been called 'the happiness industry'. They do so by drawing up a typology based on categorising the various calls to action to reach the goal of happiness. Here, they highlight the normative component of these formulae (emotional rules) and the moral obligations they enshrine.

In the second paper, Javier García-Martínez proposes approaching emotions through Actor-Network Theory. Specifically, he analyses depression as an individual and as a social pathology. He stresses the controversy surrounding how depression is framed and maps the scientific definitions chosen by various social stakeholders, depending on whether they have or have not suffered the condition themselves. The paper reveals the paradox that the cultural habit of not blaming individuals for their illness only compounds the problem, which is basically a mental one (Rose, 2016: 41). Here, the biological 'solutions' offered do even more to hide the social nature of this emotion than does the individualist approach to depression. The paper takes a Post-Humanist perspective to consider emotions as socio-material entities, and in so doing breaks with modern nature/culture dualism.

Three papers make up the second bloc and focus on the emotional aspects of social problems. Vanesa Saiz Echezarreta and Cristina Peñamarín take a socio-semiotic perspective to delve into the public debate on prostitution. In doing so, they reveal the role emotions play in collective action. At a time when prostitution is the subject of heated debate, social actors draw up affective strategies to defend their positions. In this respect, emotions are devices (rules of feeling) that are temporarily mobilised to block change. That is why it is hard to turn a crisis into an opportunity for it means overcoming the barriers to change. Giving the issue a new meaning demands affective strategies but for these to succeed they need to overcome the existing emotional devices created by hegemonic forces.

The next two papers cover the labour relations field and share a theoretical approach to changing the organisational culture paradigm, in this case with a shift from the

Fordian paradigm to a post-Fordian one. Carmen Bericat, José Luis Antoñanzas and Eva Tomás study the change in labour relations through more emotional aspects of collective bargaining. Based on communications between the management and the works council of an automobile company in the nineties, they analyse the socio-affective dynamics of the protagonists, which were to culminate in a new labour relations model. The management discourse typifying the new paradigm lets us follow this shift and see how it trickled down from top managers to the base of the business structure.

Last but not least, María Cascales Mira has two goals, namely to: (1) construct an Index of Emotional Quality at Work (ICET); (2) analyse the link between the emotional conditions of the job and the social structure on the other. Post-industrial societies, based on the service sector, turn social interaction into a productive resource. Thus, emotional management becomes one more job requirement, which Hochschild conceptualised as "emotional work" (1983). The ICET is a measurement model that accounts for emotional demands when assessing working conditions. The paper takes a social approach to analysing the relationship between the emotional quality of work and the worker's position in the social structure. This analysis highlights a new structural inequality based on gender.

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Recipes for Happiness: a Proposal for Analysing the Moral Orientation of Actions and Emotions*

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ABSTRACT
This paper draws up a proposal for analysing discourses on paths to happiness. Recipes promoted by the happiness industry are studied as moral guidelines for social action: imperative messages spread through the Internet seek to guide their recipients in their quest for happiness. In a field dominated by positive psychology, we approach happiness from a sociological perspective, which is to say as: an institutionalised social discourse; a form of social production; a socially-framed emotion. Research is based on systematic Internet observation and on quantitative and qualitative textual analysis procedures. We show how digital media in the 'happiness' field: (a) promotes

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recipes; (b) provides scientific legitimation for said recipes; (c) focuses on a generic individual as the recipient of the messages and as protagonist. A typology is proposed based on the meaning, nature and object of the actions that lead to happiness. Results show how recipes involve normative and moral orientations of actions and emotions: they indicate what to do and how to think and feel to be happy. Happiness as a moral obligation involves most concerns shaping the agenda of contemporary societies, with a strong emphasis on individualism and on a utilitarian understanding of social relations and the social environment.

Keywords: happiness, emotions, social norms, social behaviour, rules of feelings, morality.

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This paper proposes a method for analysing happiness as the social discourse stemming from the so-called "happiness industry" (Davies, 2015; Whippman, 2016; Cabanas and Illouz, 2019). Over the last few decades, this production space has spawned a common social representation of happiness as a goal that lies within the grasp of individuals, organisations, States, and for societies in global terms (Diener, 2000; Seligman, 2002; Bok, 2010). One scientific field in particular, Positive Psychology (Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi, 2000), has spawned a huge body of literature on the quest for happiness (Lyubomirsky, Sheldon and Schkade, 2005a; Tkach and Lyubomirsky, 2006; Kesebir and Diener, 2008) in general and on the causes of happiness in particular (Seligman, 2002, Layard, 2005; Lyubomirsky, King and Diener 2005b; Lyubomirsky, 2008; Caunt, Franklin, Brodaty, N., and Brodaty, H., 2013; Delle Fave *et al*., 2016; Schiota, Campos, Oveis, Hertenstein, Simon-Thomas and Keltner 2017; Bubic and Erceg, 2018). Although some research addresses the issue from physiological, neuronal and cognitive standpoints (Sauter and Scott, 2007; Berridge and Kringelbach, 2013; Hofmann, Platt and Willibald 2017; Sauter and Fischer, 2018), the most common perspective starts from subjective evaluation of individual experience, mainly through happiness indicators (Diener, 2000; Tkach and Lyubomirsky, 2006; Bok, 2010; Weimann, Knabe and Schöb, 2015; Schiota *et al*., 2017). Among the various products of the happiness industry, we delve into a specific kind of message spread through global digital channels, namely "recipes for happiness". Such messages are spread through the Internet by popular digital media, health and psychology magazines, web pages, company and professional blogs, and through social networks. These recipes follow a formula as the following titles reveal: "9 Keys to Lasting Happiness"; "10 Habits of Incredibly Happy People"; "10 Simple Lifestyle Changes for Greater Happiness".[1] They all have a common structure, namely: a set number of vital ingredients, a 'cooking method' or explanatory text fleshing out each ingredient, some social actors formulating the recipe, and a discourse justifying and legitimating the magic formula. Setting out the 'vital ingredients' endows the formula with an obligatory nature, making the reader interpret the recipe as strict rules (Hochschild, 1979; 1983) or as normative propositions that guide behaviour and feelings (Goffman, 1963; 1967). To these are added norms constituting a kind of collective moral conscience

1 All the texts cited from our empirical evidence were in English.

(Collins, 2004). We argue that the message produced by the happiness industry may contain a certain interpretation of contemporary social life, placing the achievement of happiness as a fundamental goal "in the lives of human beings" (United Nations, 2012), as well as an objectifiable emotional purpose resulting from scientifically legitimised processes.

We first draw up an approach for analysing these social discourses. The subject material was provided by the texts contained in a set of recipes for happiness, and was garnered from systematic observation on the Internet. After setting out the research process and highlighting the main promoters, legitimators and recipients of the messages, we examine both our findings and the literature to put forward a typology of the actions and emotions paving the paths to happiness that are charted for and targeted at a global audience.

HAPPINESS AS A SOCIAL DISCOURSE

Approaching happiness as an institutionalised social discourse in contemporary societies implies a two-pronged approach that both creates discourse through scientific contributions led by Positive Psychology and that considers sociological interpretations of the 'happiness industry's' output. The contributions made by Positive Psychology in sustaining this industry go beyond the philosophical distinction between a hedonistic dimension (understood as pleasure) and a eudaemonic dimension (which comprises a deeper, more lasting experiential state) (Pawelski, 2013). Most recent research studies delving into the causes of and paths to happiness seek to define the phenomenon through practice, highlighting a wide range of interactional factors that include and combine many kinds of happiness. However there is no consensus on the causes of happiness but rather a host of proposals based on leading authors such as Diener (2000), Seligman (2002), and Lyubomirsky (2008). These coincide in a model based on three major factors: (1) a personal starting point that includes previous traits and predispositions — genetics and personality traits; (2) a series of life circumstances and stable socio-demographic factors — being married, religion, level of health and/or wealth; (3) factors that the individual can control at will, including everything that a person thinks and does to be happy (Lyubomirsky *et al*., 2005a). Kesebir and Diener (2008) add to the formula by giving weight to friendship and social relationships in achieving happiness. Weight is also given to love in some studies — a factor that is closely linked to the same social relationships (Rodríguez, Condom Bosch, Marín and Yter, 2017a).

Among all the possible causes of happiness (on which there is mixed evidence) (Delle Fave *et al*., 2016; Schiota *et al*., 2017), the schemes with general explanatory power are articulated to different degrees by contextual aspects, circumstantial factors, and will and action. This can be seen in the literature: thus, Tkach and Lyubomirsky (2006) stress the centrality of thought and action for happiness, relativising the impact of the individual's previous traits and circumstances. They indicate eight action strategies covering a broad list of factors (positive or negative, depending on individual experience) influencing happiness. The categories are: (1) social membership, which involves relationships and social skills; (2) party-going and hedonistic behaviours, ranging from dancing and having fun with friends to consuming drugs and alcohol; (3) mind control, which involves thinking activities: reflecting on what makes one happy/unhappy, accepting life as it is, ignoring its negative side; (4) the pursuit of instrumental, training, professional or other life goals; (5) passive leisure, which includes reading, sleeping, singing or watching television; (6) active leisure, which involves physical activity and personal effort; (7) religion, both in terms of beliefs and practices; (8) direct actions, including laughing, showing a willingness to be happy, and acting accordingly.

Caunt *et al*. (2013) take a different tack from Tkach and Lyubomirsky's broad, voluntarist view (2006) of happiness and instead stress the dimensions of personality, life circumstances, and social relationships. While they distinguish between three broad kinds of

individual activities: behavioural (physical, meditation, social), cognitive (gratitude, forgiveness, optimism, faith) and volitional (goals, hope and meaning of life), this comes in second place. Third, they add a time frame by differentiating between initial aspects and elements that result from the action. Their system of dimensions and categories includes: (1) Personality, which includes optimism and self-esteem; (2) Social Relationships, which involve family, friends, partner and the closest community; (3) Circumstances, involving initial situations such as religion, wealth, money, work and health, and those arising from action such as education, safety and mental health; (4) Initial Behavioural Activities — physical activity and meditation — and new ones — hobbies and interests, travel, relaxation, nature, humour, laughter, good food; (5) Initial Cognitive Activities — forgiveness, gratitude — and new ones — social values, philosophy of life; (6) Volitional Activities, which imply life goals, hope and the meaning of life. All the categories appear at significant levels as components of happiness, yet great weight is given to social relationships, new actions and circumstantial aspects. Finally, in a more recent study, Flores-Kanter, Muñoz-Navarro and Medrano (2018) identify a series of central terms in their sample on individuals' conception of happiness, which also involves actions, circumstances and social relationships. In descending order, these terms are: love; family; friendship; joy; pleasure; health; peace; solidarity; personal growth; company; travel; work; freedom; optimism; recreation. Here, one should note that their approach does not involve assigning dimensions and categories,

From a sociological perspective, one needs to make a critical reading of Positive Psychology's contributions to the literature on happiness. Without denying the value of delving into the causes of happiness and measuring its impact (Seligman, 2002; Lyubomirsky *et al*., 2005a; Tkach and Lyubomirsky, 2006; Kesebir and Diener, 2008; Caunt *et al*., 2013; Delle Fave *et al*., 2016; Flores-Kanter *et al*., 2018), swift advances in this academic field (Rodríguez, Yter and Arroyo, 2016) and its social influence can also be analysed as a set of messages of a performative nature that spawned an industry (Davies, 2015; Whippman, 2016; Cabanas and Illouz, 2019). These messages (which enshrine values and definitions of individual happiness) constitute a discourse on what is socially desirable (Mckenzie, 2016 and 2018; Bericat, 2018). This look at happiness as an institutionalised discourse lets us situate it as a social production, or more specifically as a socially-framed emotion (Turner, 2010; von Scheve and Ismer, 2013; Bericat, 2016 and 2018; Goldman, 2017; Salmelay Nagatsu, 2017; Olson *et al*., 2017) both at institutional levels and in the interaction between individuals (Turner, 2010). From this discursive perspective, happiness can be analysed as a collective emotion insofar as it mirrors an individual's present concerns (Salmela and Nagatsu, 2017) and his wish to be happy now — (Mckenzie, 2018) and as a social process (von Scheve and Ismer, 2013; Goldman, 2017; Bericat, 2018; Mckenzie, 2018) stemming from his interaction with others (Turner, 2010; Burkitt, 2016).

This notion is clearly supported by Hochschild's (1979; 1983) approach to emotions that holds that we find normative and moral elements in emotions, which constitute socially-produced rules on feelings. This is similar to Goffman's approach (1963; 1967) and Collins' Micro-Sociology of Interaction (2004), which consider this emotional universe as forging a collective moral conscience. Under this perspective, discourses on how to attain happiness and the recipes they foster enshrine a constructed emotion guiding the individual's social practices and behaviours.

METHODOLOGY: DISCOVERING THE RECIPES FOR HAPPINESS

Our analysis is based on the identification of 75 English-language recipes for happiness drawn from a broader observation of 914 web pages bearing on the happiness industry and taken from a broad series of searches, conducted in 2017. These searches included the word 'happiness' along with similar terms. For this purpose, we used the Google search

engine (given its global market dominance[2]), and followed an anonymity protocol to limit its biases. For this purpose, we used the same previously formatted computer, browsing in incognito mode, without links to any e-mail account and wiping cookies and history after searching. The first 10 results were taken for each search, weeding out repetitions and discarding those cases lacking any link to the subject. Each web page was used to fill in a questionnaire to gather data on: organisational forms; productive sectors; definitions of happiness; motivations for happiness; referential and legitimating authorities; subjects taking actions; products and services offered; the textual content, links and images of the pages. This information also included the media, the fields of knowledge, the messages recipients, those carrying out the actions, and a full list of each recipe's ingredients.

Most recipes have between 5 and 10 ingredients, with anything between a single ingredient for the simplest recipe to 29 for the most complicated one. The total number of ingredients collected was 639 and the average per recipe was 8.52, with 7 ingredients being the commonest value. Let's look at a typical example:

- Recipe: "The Happiness Lifestyle: Why It's Not All In Your Head" *Goalcast*, May 19, 2017.[3]
- Ingredients: (1) "Exercise"; (2) "Social contact"; (3) "Omega-3 fatty acids"; (4) "Good sleep hygiene"; (5) "Sunlight"; (6) "Concentrate your mind on something external to yourself."
- "Cooking method" or explanatory text (stress added):

> We all know that exercise is good, but many of us don't realise how physical activity affects our brain chemistry, and by extension, our moods, mental clarity, energy, motivation, and long-term health. Physical activity has been shown to alter the body and mind more effectively than any pill you can take. Physical activity, according to Ilardi, is "literally medicine" and yet many of us find it difficult to make it part of our lives.
>
> It shouldn't be a fight. If the gym isn't for you, try yoga. If yoga doesn't appeal to you, start biking everywhere, or even just go for long walks. Whatever the activity, find one that appeals to you and makes you want to integrate it into your weekly routine. Choose a form of physical activity that is social and helpful rather than running alone on a treadmill and getting nowhere, for example it can help you stop thinking of it as "exercise" and find joy in the activity itself. Exercise is powerful medicine, says Stephen Ilardi [Professor of Psychology at The University of Kansas].

Both qualitative and quantitative methodological text analysis and text-mining were carried out (Breiger, Wagner-Pacifici and Mohr, 2018). Once the information had been gathered, the text was coded and transformed into multi-response nominal variables using the IBM SPSS Statistics 24 programme, which helped with the descriptive analysis the construction of empirical groupings.

The qualitative analysis involved dimensionalisation and categorisation of recipes and ingredients with procedures rooted in Grounded Theory (Corbin and Strauss, 2015; Trinidad, Carrero and Soriano, 2006). This yielded deeper analysis of meanings in an open coding process, letting us identify central categories in the discourse system. We then defined alternative axial dimensions that were used together with the theory to come up with items for analysis.

RESULTS: KEYS TO ANALYSIS OF RECIPES FOR HAPPINESS

In presenting our proposal, we first contextualise the specific product of the recipes by characterising the main web pages used for spreading them. Next, we analyse the Legitimating mechanisms, among which science and the identification of experts stand out, especially in the field of North American Positive

2 In 2017, Google market share of global searches exceeded 80%. Source: https://netmarketshare.com/

3 https://www.goalcast.com/2017/05/19/life-of-happiness-why-its-not-all-in-your-head/ , consulted 27th March 2019.

Psychology. We show the clearly individualistic conception of responsibility for one's actions underlying the messages. We end by putting forward an analytical typology for grasping the discourses behind the recipes, which serve as moral guidelines to action and emotions in contemporary societies.

Dissemination channels of recipes for happiness

Most of the recipes for happiness in our study come from four types of broadcast channel. Of these recipes, 36% comes from digital information media, whether they be digital newspapers (22%) — such as The Huffington Post, Time, The Observer, Forbes — or psychology and health magazines (15%) such as *Psychology Today, Men's Health, and Spirituality & Health* (Table 1).

Table 1 Types of entities to which web pages belong

Main entity	Freq.	%
Virtual community	24	32 %
Digital newspaper	16	22 %
Influencer or expert	12	16 %
Magazine	11	15 %
Company	4	5 %
Association	2	3 %
Foundation	2	3 %
University	1	1 %
Web contents	1	1 %
Non-profit organisation	1	1 %
Unknown	1	1 %
Total	**75**	**100 %**

Source: Authors.

The other two main dissemination channels are collective and individual social actors, who present their visions of how to achieve happiness. These actors can be virtual communities (32%), that is, organisations or groups that collaborate in thematic web pages, usually bearing on emotional, self-help or personal growth issues. *Goalcast*[4], *Authentic Growth*[5] and *Action for Happiness*[6] are just a few examples of these. They are also pages run by what we call "influencers or experts" (16%): well-known people or experts in the field who share content through their individual web sites. Included here are pages that range from Oprah Winfrey's[7] web site to that of coach Gary van Warmerdam's personal *Pathways to Happiness*[8] page.

Legitimating mechanism: the science of happiness

Dissemination of recipes for happiness through these channels needs to be given legitimacy if they are to be effective calls to action. Appealing to Science is the main way chosen to confer this legitimacy (Table 2). That is why the recipes are seldom dreamt up by journalists (a single case) or by professionals pushing a product (for example, a nutritionist or a happiness expert with no other credentials). Instead, the main technique used to plug the recipes rests on the objectification of knowledge.

Science appears explicitly as a legitimating element in 90% of the recipes. Furthermore, there is a generic appeal to research or science in general (31 cases), the dominant specialty being Psychology (29 references), with hardly any express reference to the specific field of Positive Psychology (a single case), coming ahead of the other Social Sciences (4 references), Medicine (2 references) and Philosophy (2 references). Appeals to other channels, such as quotations from authors and their books, occur in 22% of cases, mostly in tandem with references to Science.

Scientific legitimation includes a second dimension: dropping the names of individuals or experts whose

4 https://www.goalcast.com/, consulted 27th March 2019.

5 https://www.authenticgrowth.com/, consulted 27th March 2019.

6 https://www.actionforhappiness.org/, consulted 27th March 2019.

7 http://www.oprah.com , consulted 27th March 2019.

8 https://www.pathwaytohappiness.com/ , consulted 27th March 2019.

Table 2 **Legitimating fields for the happiness recipes**

General legitimation	Scientific field	Speciality	Fr.	%	% Cases
Science			**68**	**76 %**	**90 %**
	Science (general)	Research (general)	23	26 %	31 %
		Science (general)	5	6 %	7 %
		Scientific - PhD	3	3 %	4 %
	Psychology	Psychology (general)	27	31 %	36 %
		Positive Psychology	1	1 %	1 %
		Neuro-Science	1	1 %	1 %
	Medical specialties	Psychiatry	1	1 %	1 %
		Medicine	1	1 %	1 %
	Social Sciences	Social Sciences (general)	2	2 %	3 %
		Economics	1	1 %	1 %
		Behavioural Science	1	1 %	1 %
	Philosophy	Philosophy	2	2 %	3 %
Dissemination			**16**	**18 %**	**22 %**
		Author	14	16 %	19 %
		Book	2	2 %	3 %
Business activities			**5**	**5 %**	**5 %**
		Consultancy	1	1 %	1 %
		Happiness Expert	1	1 %	1 %
		Journalism	1	1 %	1 %
		Business	1	1 %	1 %
		Nutrition	1	1 %	1 %
Other legitimation		Shogun	**1**	**1 %**	**1 %**
Grand Totals			**90**	**100 %**	

Source: Authors.

career paths, works or contributions to the 'happiness field' give credence to the recipes. The references are very varied because it is a field in which there is a group of people who have made a name for themselves rather than any clear leaders. This group includes people such as Dan Gilbert, Professor of Psychology at Harvard (4 cases), Elizabeth Dunn, Professor of Psychology at The University of British Columbia (4 cases), Michael Norton, Professor at Harvard Business School (4 cases), Martin Seligman, Professor of Psychology at The University of Pennsylvania (3 cases), and Sonja Lyubomirsky, Professor of Psychology at The University of California Riverside (2 cases), in a long list of the leading lights in American academic Psychology (especially in Positive Psychology) and in scientific and social outreach. The appeal is thus to a well- consolidated, highly influential base of scientific knowledge. Many of the authorities cited, apart from being renowned academics, are also authors of happiness and self-help bestsellers, and regularly giving

talks and appear in the media and social networks. This knowledge is endorsed by leading scientific institutions, providing strong justification for most of the following recipes (we have added underlining to stress this link):

> According to Dan Gilbert, Professor of Psychology at Harvard University and author of *Stumbling on Happiness*, the key is to spend one's money on experiences rather than on material things. Material things, while dear and highly desired, tend to lose their lustre quickly in both literal and figurative terms. Memories of people, places, and activities, however, never grow old. In a survey, Gilbert found that 57% of the respondents reported greater happiness after an experiential purchase. Only 34% said the same about a material purchase (White, October 29, 2014)

> As the author of *Happy Money: The Science of Happier Spending*, Professor Elizabeth Dunn suggests: Don't buy a slightly fancier car just to get heated seats during your two-hour commute to work. Buy a house close to work so you can use that last hour of daylight to play ball in the park with your kids. A study from the University of Zurich stated this, mentioning that a 40% increase would be needed to counteract the added sadness of a one-hour commute (Tony Robbins, n.d.)

> In one study, Martin Seligman, a Psychologist at The University of Pennsylvania, categorised hundreds of people into three groups based on how they sought happiness: a pleasant life […]; a committed life […]; a life with meaning […]. Seligman found that people who sought a pleasant life experienced little happiness, while those who sought a meaningful life and committed life were very happy (Bradberry, 15th February 2017).

These examples show how credence is lent to the recipes for happiness flogged to the general public by stressing that the knowledge is based on scientific enquiry and is endorsed by leading universities. Such solid legitimation strengthens the recipes as guides to social action and in shaping the target audience's emotions.

Messages targeted at the individual

The vast majority of messages target a single but generic individual forming part of the general population, with no notable differences regarding status, profession, age or gender (Table 3). Only a

Table 3 Recipient, objective and person responsible for the action

Message recipient	Freq.	%	Target audience	Freq.	%	Protagonist	Freq.	%
Individual	69	93 %	General Public	66	89 %	Individual	68	92 %
Older person	2	3 %	Businessmen	3	4 %	Unknown	2	3 %
Business	1	1 %	Men	2	3 %	Society	1	1 %
Society	1	1 %	People with health problems	1	1 %	Parents	1	1 %
Children	1	1 %	Psychologists	1	1 %	Family	1	1 %
Government	1	1 %	Women	1	1 %	The State	1	1 %
Totals	75	100 %	Parents	1	1 %	Businessmen	1	1 %
			Totals	75	100 %	**Totals**	75	100 %

Source: Authors.

small group of recipes target particular individuals and groups.

This generic individual is made responsible for his actions, which affect both him and others. The moralising nature of the discourse is thus strengthened, offering just one chance of achieving happiness. All the paths proposed to that end must (save in highly specific cases) yield the same results for everyone regardless of their station in life. On the other hand, the individual is identified as being actively responsible for his own happiness. Reaching this goal depends on the individual acting as he should. Those who fail to stick to the recipe are doomed to stay miserable.

The content: towards a typology of actions for happiness

One would expect a strong match between the recipes and the literature on the causes of happiness given the way the main authors of Positive Psychology are used to legitimise the approaches advocated (Seligman, 2002; Tkach and Lyubomirsky, 2006; Caunt *et al.*, 2013; Delle Fave *et al.*, 2016; Flores-Kanter *et al.*, 2018). However, the set covers a host of diverse facts and proposals for action. The number of combinations is bewildering — something that reflects: (a) the lack of consensus on scientific proposals, and (b) the process whereby academic knowledge is trivialised and packaged into a product that is pitched at a mass, global audience.

Let us look at an example: "10 simple lifestyle changes for greater happiness" (Slavko Desik, n.d.). Its ingredients are: (1) "Exercise"; (2) "Laughter"; (3) "Have a good night's sleep"; (4) "Feel the light of day"; (5) "Get in tune with your senses"; (6) "Move more, think less"; (7) "Go out with friends"; (8) "Experiment with smell"; (9) "Get a massage"; (10) "Enjoy the moment". At first glance, we can see varied proposals as imperatives of action on: the body (1, 3, 6 and 9); the mind (5, 6); the senses (5, 8); social relationships (7); nature (4); enjoyment of life (2, 10).

Consider another example: "The psychology of happiness: 7 rituals for a happy life" (James, n.d.). The ingredients are: (1) "Practice meditation"; (2) "Be grateful"; (3) "Cultivate your physical well-being"; (4) "Do what you love"; (5) "Spend money on experiences, not things"; (6) "Surround yourself with happy people"; (7) "Find your flow". The same focus is reproduced on: the body and physical well-being (3); the workings of the mind (1, 7); relationships and social behaviours (2, 6), and new possibilities for analysis emerge, such as self-realisation (4 and 7) and an idea that is absent from the literature: buy, consume, spend (5), even appealing to "post-materialist" consumption patterns (Inglehart, 2007). In addition, we find an exhortation (5) to refrain from acting in a certain way in the pursuit of happiness.

After systematically observing the 639 recipe ingredients in our sample, we drew up proposed dimensions covering the nature, the meaning, and the object of the action. First, we drew a distinction between proposals for external actions carried out by the individual and internal evaluations, thoughts or changes in attitude. Regarding the meaning of the actions advocated, most of them cover self-realisation. The advice on what one should avoid doing in order to attain happiness stands out. Last but not least, we placed the object of the individual's action in relation to him and his social relationships. Looking at the individual involves two aspects: actions linked to the body (external and visible), and actions bearing on 'the inner man' (the mind, thought, or consciousness). In Table 4 we give some examples of the resulting dimensions.

The first distinction between actions and attitudes can be analysed in Goffman's terms (1967) under the metaphor of the scene and the backstage: actions would be the socially visible face of the moral framework of the individual within society that urges him to seek happiness. Attitudes would refer to the structures of meaning that frame the individual's actions in his quest for happiness. Action can also be seen as the ritual for achieving happiness, enshrining certain attitudes and beliefs (Rodríguez, Mohr and Halcomb, 2017b). It can also be analysed in Bourdieu's terms (1994), under the dichotomy

Table 4 **Proposed dimensions**

		Body	Mind	Social Relationships
Actions	Realisation	"Exercise"; "Sleep"; "Stay Active"; "Go dancing"; "Go walking in the country"	"Meditate"; "Make your dreams come true"; "Count your blessings"; "Train your brain"; "Take pleasure in small doses"	"Show gratitude"; "Mix with happy people"; "Play with friends"; "Spend money on others"
	Abstention	"Don't do anything illegal"; "Don't spend more than you earn"	"Don't waste time feeling jealous"; "Don't link happiness with external events"	"Don't be promiscuous"; "Don't use friendliness as a weapon"
Attitudes	Realisation	"Stay healthy"; "Soak up the sun"	"Live life to the fullest"; "Focus more on the moment"	"Think of others"; "Feel love and compassion for others most of the time"
		"Stop chasing things such as fame and money"; "Stop seeing dollar signs"	"Don't think about things that make you sad"; "Don't chase happiness"	"Don't worry about others' views"; "Don't be frightened of showing your feelings to others"

Source: Authors.

between structure and agency. Here, actions would be the socially visible part of subjects' behaviour, structurally marked by the limits of the social field of happiness, whereas attitudes would configure the *habitus* towards happiness. Thus the recipes contain the society's own discourse that building happiness as key life goal, an emotional goal, and is a normative, moral guide to behaviour.

One can also readily see the normative intent behind the recipes in the exhortations to take certain actions and to abstain from others (especially the latter), based on the moral distinction between good and evil. On the one hand, one is offered many paths of thought and action to achieve happiness. On the other hand, there is a series of prohibitions, including not breaking the law but that mainly dwell on 'negative' values and actions (jealousy, envy, greed, passing judgement on others).

The object of the action is something that is shared between the individual and his social relationships. On the one hand, the body/mind dichotomy represents a form of agency with socially-determined modes of interaction on the path to happiness, and a structurally- conditioned form of introspection (Burkitt, 2016). The purpose of the guided introspection is make individuals aware of the society in which they live, getting them to act morally, to think deeply about who they are, and to become resilient and competitive. What is put over in the process is a beefed-up version of contemporary individualism (von Scheve *et al.*, 2016) While individuals may also achieve happiness in their social relationships in the process, the results are always strictly measured in terms of their individual impact.

The specific actions suggested in the recipes for happiness are very diverse and cover a much wider range than that dealt with in the academic literature.

Table 5 below sets out our classification system, comprising 13 categories of meanings grouping the most relevant kinds of actions and attitudes:

Table 5 Proposed categories

Categories	Dominant dimension	Examples of ingredients taken from different recipes
1 Relationships and social behaviours	Action on social relations	"Connect with others. Invest in relationships with family members, friends, work colleagues, neighbours"; "Do things for others"; "Inspire others"; "Do good deeds"; "Show gratitude"; "Support your family in times of need"; "Spend time with friends"
2 Eating and drinking	Action on one's body	"Eat oranges"; "Eat blue potatoes" [Adirondack Blue (*Solanum tuberosum*), a potato variety pioneered by Cornell University]; "Drink red wine"; "Drink coffee (two or three cups of caffinated coffee"; "Help your body by eating more nutritional food"
3 Body		"Keep active"; "Exercise"; "Have a massage"; "Walk"; "Sleep"
4 Nature		"Find your natural side"; "Walk in the country"; "Take a walk in the park"; "Get into a natural rhythm"
5. Salud	Action on one's mind and body	"Good health"; "Take care of your physical and mental health"; "Stay healthy"
6. Comprar		"Buy back your time"; "Use your money to secure your future"; "Buy what you like"; "Buy experiences rather than possessions"
7 Life management and organisation	Action on one's mind	"Work is work and that is what you get paid for"; "Wean yourself off social networks"
8 Mental exercise		"Meditate"; "Slow down so that you can enjoy life's pleasures"; "Mindfulness"
9 Mental management	Attitudes to and actions on one's mind	"Be hopeful"; "Ditch the spiral of negative thoughts"; "Seek positive emotions to pave your way to success"; "Always expect happiness"
10 Self-fulfilment		"Spin your own story about yourself"; "Know thyself"; "Learn to love yourself"; "Don't link happiness to external events"; "Shoulder responsibility for your life"; "Set a day just for yourself"
11 Enjoyment		"Enjoy every moment"; "Laugh"; "Sex"; "Listen to music"; "Indulge in pleasurable rituals"
12 Economic behaviour		"Remember to save for the future"; "Those who grasp interest earn more than they pay"; "Make more money than your colleagues"; "Don't spend more than you make"; "Money is not everything"
13 Religion and spirituality		"Read a religious or spiritual book, or attend Mass every day"; "Be spiritually connected"; "Show spiritual commitment and discover meaning"

Source: Authors

Most of these actions and attitudes coincide with the categories found in Positive Psychology's proposals: social relationships and behaviours; actions on the body; health; religious practice and beliefs; enjoyment; the self-realisation of the individual; mental management; exercise (Tkach and Lyubomirsky, 2006; Caunt *et al*., 2013). However, our study also highlights aspects that are often given little weight in those typologies, such as: eating and drinking; contact with nature; financial guidelines and, above all, shopping.

Although healthy eating is included in Caunt *et al*. (2013), this is subsumed in behavioural activities. Tkach and Lyubomirsky (2016) only mention alcohol as something that some religions forbid. On the other hand, eating and drinking feature prominently in the global recipes for happiness. In fact, these subjects had the highest counts for specific ingredient stories. The 'recipes', in addition to stressing the moral value of healthy eating, also go into all kinds of foods and beverages that lead to happiness, including wine and coffee.

Nature is another thing that does not appear in academic typologies of paths to happiness. Yet in recipes it is waxing fast. The explanation lies both in the fact that environmental awareness has become a hot issue in modern society, and in typologies based on individuals' introspection, not on social discourses. As a result, the discourse on the environment and nature is in full swing, which is why these issues feature prominently in the recipes for happiness.

The recipes call for financially responsible behaviour, which involves making money, being competitive, and saving. This is a category liberally sprinkled with prohibitions: not spending more than what one earns, and not coveting the money/wealth of others. However, a fundamental idea is that happiness is a market good and one that can be bought. This is an open invitation to "post-materialist" consumption (Inglehart, 2007) in which the individual can buy time, security, and experience. In reality, the proposal is fully in line with the context of the happiness industry for it is presented as an object that is not only measurable and achievable but also one that is objectifiable in a way that makes it readily definable, attainable, and consumable. Indeed, such consumption is — so goes the discourse — vital if one to be happy.

Finally, it highlights the recipes' lack of contextual and circumstantial factors — a shortcoming noted in the legitimating scientific literature (Seligman, 2002; Lyubomirsky, 2008; Caunt *et al*., 2013). Here, the 'happiness industry' turns knowledge into a market product targeting a global generic individual. The recipes focus on will and action, mostly of a hedonistic nature but always holding out the promise of lasting happiness. By contrast, they ignore elements that would undermine the 'rules' given and the normative and moral guidance they enshrine.

CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, we have approached the happiness industry as the creator of a social discourse with clear normative and moral content, and which indicates the paths of action, thought and emotion towards the utopia of happiness in today's societies. We have noted that the context has given wings to the happiness discourse, which is spread endlessly through the Internet and through personalised scientific legitimation of leading international researchers at top universities. The messages target an abstract individual, who could be anywhere in the world. This is proof of a discourse that reflects the global dynamics of societies guided by individualism. Although happiness may appear institutionally as a social objective, it is understood that those who seek the path to happiness are first and foremost individuals, no matter what their station in life.

Happiness is presented as an object of consumption, it has a price. The discourse presents happiness as a good like any other and so is for sale. In reality, this discourse panders to most of the concerns shaping the agenda of contemporary societies. It

not only subsumes the consumer society but also the individual's inward gaze (covering his body, health, diet, religious practices, life satisfaction, enjoyment, and self-fulfilment) in a utilitarian vision of social relationships and the world around him. All this is developed in a context that is at one with the model of society and with the social institutions of modernity. In this respect, the recipes for happiness reinforce the most traditional social ties with family, work, consumption and religion. This finding sets our paper apart from the research led by Positive Psychology on the causes of happiness in that we interpret them as being spawned by a social discourse. Accordingly, we have focused less on individual experience and more on how social institutions and agendas underlie individual dimensions and categories. In this respect, it is no coincidence that the recipes' discourse targeting an abstract individual on the quest for happiness wholly ignores the hurdles posed by social, international, and gender inequalities. It shows how the happiness industry is deeply rooted in the socio-political context of market individualism (von Scheve *et al.*, 2016). As a result, achieving happiness is turned into a moral duty and a merit for those lucky enough to attain it (Cabanas and Illouz, 2019). The message is spread through the Internet and thus the 'digital divide' is also present in terms of recipients and non-recipients. Those who do attain happiness then get to flaunt it as a badge of 'distinction' (Bourdieu, 1979). The language used in this discourse and the proposals mirror a strong class bias and the morality of a self-appointed meritocracy. Furthermore, there are no recipes to address the frustration of all those who, while pursuing happiness, fail to achieve it or are who are shut out of the charmed circle (Bericat, 2018).

Our paper makes several proposals for advancing research in this field. On the one hand, we face a multi-dimensional discourse with a great variety and richness of meanings, starting with the polysemy of the concept of happiness itself. One approach would be to look at how the recipes work in practice, analysing the uptake of the happiness industry's output from the standpoint of would-be consumers, and the fault lines in the discourse. Since we are dealing with a worldwide product, we cannot ignore the fact that the recipes for happiness we examined were all framed in English and their cultural reference was that of The United States. However, the product is also found in other languages, so it would worth comparing the language versions (for example, between English and Spanish) or even in different areas of the world (The United States, South America, Europe) in order to give the analysis an international dimension.

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Defining Depression: Endogenous Materialities, Exogenous Immaterialities*

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ABSTRACT
Definitions are narratives in action, implying a need to track down the ontology of what is defined. In this case, we explore the mutual tension and/or symbiosis (with consonant and dissonant spaces) arising from the definition of depression. We approach the term 'depression' as a controversial subject, mapping a comparison between lay and expert narratives on the malaise, and making use of digital ethnography as the methodology. A self-administered online open questionnaire was completed with the definitions of 29 lay respondents. In addition, expert narratives were gathered with the definitions of 9 health institutions' web sites, and public mediation forums. Definitions echoed from both spaces, with splits between biological materiality and psychological-social immateriality, with a reiteration of the division between exogeneity and endogeneity, respectively. Here, the emotiveness of the subject can be seen as stemming from the sum of reductionisms and cumulative factors as to what depression is. Finally, we consider other possible ontologies of depression that either: (1) take socio-material assemblies into account or (2) follow the pragmatical turn, defining depression in action. This research opens new approaches towards identifying external materialities, shifting the blame from the diagnosis of the individual towards the mechanisms that spawn harmful relationships.

Keywords: STS, controversy mapping, digital ethnography, defining depression, sociology of emotions, pragmatical turn.

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The first programme of a new season of *Salvados* [Saved!] was broadcast in Spain's *La Sexta* TV channel on the 26th of January 2018. The programme was titled *Uno de cada cinco* [One in Five], a name that referred to the proportion of the population who suffer depression in Spain. The aim was to bring the issue of depression to the fore in the public debate through testimonials from experts and those diagnosed with the malaise. Reactions on social networks and in the mass media were mixed. While there was broad support for the programme's goals, it was criticised for over-stressing the biological causes of depression and for omitting others. Some of these criticisms can be found in *eldiario.es* — an online newspaper (Castaño, 2018) and in *Pikara Magazine* (Plaza, 2018).

Throughout the TV broadcast, the issue of depression was put under the spotlight through various means. It boosted public awareness of and reflections on the subject by taking a critical, dramatic approach in which it was argued that depression should not be 'a black box' but rather a matter for heated debate. Putting the subject in the limelight implies serving the common good, giving voice to various opinions, and daily problem-solving (Cefaï, 2012). Notwithstanding the limitations of the medium, the TV programme achieved its goal of boosting public awareness of the issue.

This paper does not seek to redefine depression. Its goal is a much more modest one, namely grasping the definition of depression as a negotiation controversy and the various arguments articulated to resolve it. Specifically, it seeks to understand what shapes the narratives in action for both laymen and experts through two digital spheres. In pursuing this line of enquiry, we take the definitions of depression found on the web sites of major institutions working in the health and/or mental health fields. In addition, we gathered definitions of depression from a sample of laymen, including both those who have suffered depression and those who have not. Comparing these two spheres gives an idea of the rhetorical anchors used in each for offering solutions and in legitimising their definitions.

We will identify the fragmentation found in explanations for depression, with a clear division between social and natural causes. The analysis reveals an earlier split between exogenous and endogenous depression, and that is reflected in how these definitions are articulated. Furthermore, the radical individualisation of depression puts a burden on the sufferer, ignoring his socio-material context. Here, we identify materialities leading to shared, transversal harm as an alternative to these dematerialised, individualising approaches.

DEPRESSION AS A POST-HUMAN ONTOLOGICAL CONTROVERSY

> Because the innate and primordial feeling is fear, everything is explained by fear: original sin and original virtue. My very virtue is born of fear; it is called Science (Nietzsche, 1970: 208)

Science, Technology and Society Studies is an emerging discipline and stems from the Sociology of Knowledge and Science. It has yielded useful approaches to the study of Science and Technology as techno-social mechanisms. These reflections have approached science from a practical standpoint, focusing on the actions of knowledge production in techno-scientific societies. Authors making major contribution in this new field include Callon (1984), Mol (2002), Latour (2005), Law (2004), and Knorr-Cetina (2009).

"Sociology of Associations", "Symmetric Sociology", "New Materialism" and "Relational Materialisms" are some of the names given to this perspective. Specifically, this has crystallised in Actor-Network Theory (ANT) with an ontological proposal that does not distinguish between human and non-human actors, studying as it does the interrelationships between the two as socio-material assemblies.

Latour (1992) argues that knowledge can be presented as a 'black box'. When this is the case, the matter is taken for granted and is naturalised. Black boxes are not discussed but instead are taken as truth and are the

basis of the knowledge that is built from them. Opening the black box implies debate, sparking controversy in a negotiation conducted from different standpoints.

Latour invented the mapping of these controversies as a teaching tool but it has since become a methodology in its own right (Venturini, 2010). The approach implies mapping the various positions in a given controversy and grasping their mutual consonances and dissonances. In this case, I use such mapping to compare definitions of depression as the controversy itself. Thus (as indicated above) it is not my aim to impose a definition of my own but rather to focus on the interplay of clashing and common meanings. Here, I seek to map the anchors used to legitimise a given definition. The very act of defining something supposes a closing movement with respect to a controversy. Coming up with a definition is a way of closing the lid on a Black Box and with it, the controversy it sparks when opened. This closing movement needs a hinge in order to execute its argumentation.

Stemming from Feminist epistemologies, Haraway's (1988) "situated knowledge" proposes ways of dealing with the inevitable plurality of perspectives in the face of a false claim to a single truth, situating experiences in their enunciation settings. As Shapin (2010) notes both in the long-winded title of his book [*Never Pure* ...] and at its beginning, Science has never been pure for "it has always been produced by bodies, situated in time, space, culture and society, and in continuous struggle for credibility and authority".

This negotiation of meanings implies a rhetorical exercise. The approach here takes emotions as an object of argumentative construction, as Micheli advocates (2010) — basing his work on Plantin's ideas. Micheli's methodological proposal (2010) was based on three points of analysis, which serve as our starting point. In the first place, there is a process whereby emotion is attributed to a subject. Second, evaluations of emotion are made in which a certain hierarchy is included and a certain moral judgment made. Third and last, emotions are legitimised (or delegitimised) by the narrator.

From this starting point, we look for both matches and differences between lay and expert knowledge. This cross-sectional approach gathers definitions of depression not only from a bibliographic exploration but also by looking at public forums in which the nature of the illness is disputed. These forums help us reflect on what the hegemonic definitions are. Said narratives (which are deployed as argumentation) go beyond a mere verification of or rhetorical exercise on reality. This is so because these narratives are performative and therefore affect the social fabric. In the public arena, this ontology bears on both the solutions and the processes of subjectivation or objectification, and —where applicable — with an identification with depression. The ontological definition of depression, the solutions offered and the processes of objectification-subjectivation provide the framework of this controversial, hotly-debated issue. A novel feature of the paper is its adoption of a post-humanist perspective to tackle a subject (depression) — a condition that seems quintessentially human. This approach is taken to understand the bilateral relationships of mutual transformation between the human and the non-human, and between the social and the material.

DIGITAL MAPPING METHODOLOGIES

Some see the *online* world as 'unreal' (a view that mirrors the Cartesian dualist 'mind-body'discourse or even Plato's *Two Worlds* line of argument). We, on the contrary, hold that the *online* sphere is just as real as the offline one. The *online* world cannot exist without the physical one supporting it and in this sense is just as 'real' as the latter. That said, the online space is governed by a framework of specific relationships that differ from those in the offline world. Here, we are speaking of the meaning frameworks proposed by authors such as Goffman (1974) and Lakoff (2007) that shed light on how a given set of relationships and actions arise in a given sphere. This is relevant when highlighting the varying enunciation conditions of the texts analysed in this paper.

The arguments have been garnered from two spheres — the expert one and the lay one. Both concern practice-based narratives, from which definitions naturally flow. In the first place, the expert narrative was harvested from a broad examination of the scientific bibliography, as well as from online texts on depression found on the web pages of sundry institutions. These online mediation forums transform the narratives by simplifying them for the general public. In the process, they make choices in which many of the complexities are left out. This information let us establish a hierarchy in the expert discourse. We chose nine informational mediation spaces[1] based on the hierarchy yielded by search engine results. Here, we confined our attention to specialised health institutions. We discuss the findings later on.

In addition, the lay narrative was gleaned through a self-administered online open questionnaire in which participants were asked to define depression from a series of open questions.

'Snowball sampling' was used. The questionnaire comprised open-ended questions, all of them optional. It had two parts. The first consisted of a closed socio-demographic questionnaire to identify the respondent in terms of reported age, nationality, gender, whether the subject considered he suffered from depression (whether diagnosed or not), and if he had taken anti-depressants. A filter question was asked to weed out psychologists and psychiatrists from the sample. The second section asked four open-ended questions in the following order: (1) What is depression?; (2) Why do we have depression?; (3) What can we do about depression?; (4) Are anti-depressants an adequate solution to depression or not?

The 29 respondents were aged between 18 and 24, of whom 22 were women and 6 were men. One respondent did not state gender. Of these, 12 people claimed to have suffered depression at some point, 7 claimed to currently being depressed, and 10 said they had never had depression. There were 8 respondents who said they had taken anti-depressants. Of the 29 participants, 26 said they were Spanish and 3 did not state their nationality. All of the respondents said they had completed upper secondary and/or university studies.

An online map[2] of the positions was created for the 29 people taking part in the survey. In the process, a flow chart was drawn up to group kindred discourses. Unlike a closed questionnaire, the map was presented online to the participants so that they could see the other contributions and make changes if they so wished. Only one respondent chose to do so.

One should note the limitations of the sample given that it focuses strongly on young women with upper secondary and/or university studies. There are special difficulties in getting older males to take part, raising issues that deserve study in greater depth.

It was the first contact with a qualitative methodology that is wholly in keeping with a participatory component. The same methodology could be extended in the future to a larger sample.

MEDIATIONS OF EXPERT NARRATIVES: MATERIAL ENDOGENOUS DEPRESSION AND INTANGIBLE EXOGENOUS DEPRESSION

To get a better idea of the expert narratives, I shall now sketch some of the best-known reflections on depression found in the literature of various scientific disciplines. The bibliographic review is brief, focusing

1 The texts were taken from the web sites of the following institutions: universities (Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana y Clínica, Universidad de Navarra), a Pharma company (Cinfa Salud), NGOs (Mental Health America, Sana Mente, Mayo Clinic), a research institute (National Institute of Mental Health), the US national medical library (Medline Plus) and WHO (World Health Organization).

2 This map can be seen online through the following link: https://coggle.it/diagram/WvuURNZe3m48VEor/t/cartografiando-depresi%C3%B3n/56b417d29253cdc1f97ed4b4f1b2f4a37044d24cf854b2093d3b083411a18afa

just on the questions that are usually posed on definitions of depression. The illustrations give a simple yet comprehensive overview of the main strands found. Second, the aforementioned mediation spaces are discussed to reveal the meanings enshrined by each.

Psychology has explored the subject from various perspectives, including "learned helplessness» (Seligman, 1975). The cognitive approach has yielded good results in clinical practice and there are many studies evidencing its efficacy. These studies include those by Beck, Rush, Shaw and Emery (1985), and by Ingram, Miranda and Segal (1998). From the Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy perspective, the Beck Inventory stands out in both its first edition (Beck, Mendelson, Mock and Erbaugh, 1961) and second edition (Beck, Steer and Brown, 1996). The approach proposes a variety of exercises to get the patient to test his "distortions of reality" and to enable him to boost "activation" and "motivation". From this more psychological approach, links have also been found between depression and conditions such as insomnia (Lustberg and Reynolds III, 2000), loneliness (Weeks, Michela, Peplau and Bragg, 1980), drug and alcohol abuse (Regieret et al., 1990), Internet addiction (Ryu, Choi, Seo and Nam, 2004), perfectionism (Hewitt, Flett and Ediger, 1996), and ageing (Newmann, 1989).

The Social Psychology perspective[3] has also raised interesting reflections in this regard, inviting us to rethink depression as a cause of social inequalities (Álvaro-Estramiana, Garrido-Luque and Schweiger-Gallo, 2010). From this starting point, interrelationships are charted between depression and issues such as race (Fernando, 1984), gender (Manasse and Ganem, 2009), unemployment (Dooley, Catalano and Wilson, 1994), body image (Noles, Cash and Winstead , 1985) and social exclusion (Leary, 1990). As we will see later, the more markedly sociological approaches are not usually part of the definition of depression commonly found in the public arena.

Meanwhile, controversy rages in the scientific literature on the biology of depression. Traditionally, links were made between depression and serotonin (specifically from the so-called "serotonergic neurotransmission") — a focus found in works such as these by Asberg, Thoren, Traskman, Bertilsson and Ringberger (1976), Meltzer (1990), and Owens and Nemeroff (1994). The gene responsible for the production of serotonin (5-HTTLPR) was thought to be responsible for depression-associated levels, as shown in works such as those by Eley et al. (2004), and by Karg, Burmeister, Shedden and Sen (2011). Research was also carried out on other links, such as those that between serotonin and fish consumption (Hibbeln, 1998) and glutamate (Müller and Schwarz, 2007).

However, recent scientific publications claim no relationship between depression and serotonin production (Rischet et al., 2009). This lack of robustness has led to the search for other explanations, such as inflammation's role in depression. This has led to a shift in research from serotonin to cytokines, the latter being responsible for both anti-inflammatory and pro-inflammatory responses in the brain. Here we find works such as those of Raison, Capuron and Miller (2006), Dantzer, O'Connor, Freund, Johnson and Kelley (2008), Howren, Lamkin and Suls (2009), Miller, Maletic and Raison (2009), Dantzer, O'Connor, Lawson and Kelley (2011), and Berk *et al.* (2013). This new perspective is making headway, eclipsing the old argument for a causal link between serotonin levels and depression. From this perspective, the brain is considered more plastic and thus more adaptable to its environment. In the brain's relationship with the external world, both anti-inflammatory and inflammatory processes arise, the former helping depression subside and the latter aggravating it.

Uncertainty and ignorance play roles in the expert narrative, sparking controversy and attempts to anchor arguments and clinch the debate. Yet experts cannot claim ignorance since this would cast grave

3 When I speak of Social Psychology here, I focus more on Social Psychology tan on Sociology. I have considered it better to classify a more psychological approach to Social Psychology within the psychological perspectives noted earlier.

doubts on their competence. The crystallised narratives reveal the hinge from which they close in (or try to) on depression. Being able to challenge resistance to expert prescriptions boosts legitimation of a new hegemonic perspective. This ontological novelty is translated into sundry performativities such as diagnoses and treatments.

The public forums on depression conceal debates in the scientific community, claiming to offer proven, irrefutable truths. The knowledge is intentionally simplified for public consumption, making it easier to spread. Once the complexities and uncertainties have been thrown out, the residue is used to establish and uphold a hierarchy of knowledge.

In this case, the chosen forums tell readers about depression in a simple, direct way. Rather than highlighting the latest developments, they speak of 'established truths'. The use of strong definitions helps readers tell whether they or others have depression. These forums are not trivial because the emotional instability associated with depression does not readily lend itself to self-evident explanations. Yet dealing with depression involves venturing into a twilight zone of uncertainty in which one has to ask oneself some hard questions. The task of defining depression invites the reader to look at himself in the mirror in the light of a long list of ambiguous symptoms.

> Different people have different symptoms. Some of the symptoms of depression include: feelings of sadness or "emptiness", feelings of hopelessness, irritability, anxiety or guilt, loss of interest in favorite activities, feeling very tired, trouble concentrating or remembering details, not being able to sleep or sleeping a lot, eating too much or not wanting to eat at all, suicidal thoughts, suicide attempts, aches and pains, headaches, stomach cramps (colic) and digestive problems (National Institute of Mental Health, 2019)

The narrative is very similar in all these institutions' web pages, in terms of its development, structure, and anchors, with clear distinctions made between symptoms, causes, and treatment.

Treatment is carried out by a specialist in all cases. In a crisis, the 'patient' is actively encouraged to contact a centre that can treat his depression. Medication and psychotherapy are common treatments, although electroshock is mentioned as viable under certain circumstances.

Regarding the causes of depression, it is worth noting how differences are garnered. It is here that the ontological arguments are anchored, seeking to dispute the nature of depression. From this point of departure, a whole set of abstract, intangible *topoi*[4] unfold that are more apparent in broad psychological issues than in biochemical explanations. That is because the technical language used to describe biochemical causation is both highly specialised and thus much less accessible to the general public.

> […] Depression is generally produced by the interaction of certain biological factors (hormonal changes, alterations in brain neuro-transmitters such as serotonin, norepinephrine and dopamine, genetic components, etc.), with psychosocial factors (stressful circumstances in the sufferer's affective life, work, or relationship) and personality (especially, their psychological defence mechanisms). (Pla Vidal, s. f.)

> Depression is a brain disorder. It has several causes, including genetic, environmental, psychological, and biochemical ones. (Sana Mente, 2019)

References to biological issues are translated into rich language that embraces biochemistry, genetics, hormones, and neuro-transmitters. Psychology occupies a much more diffuse, dematerialised space when it comes to resilience, stress, trauma and loss. Yet the discourse often goes no further than "psychological factors", Finally, environmental causes are stated in a highly dematerialised way, as are their attendant circumstances

4 *Topoi* are stereotyped meanings that may hide big gaps. They are the 'non-places' in a text, the padding in the narrative. Nevertheless, they have many 'voices' given the host of meanings they can take on. Studies by Ducrot (1988) and Ansombre (1995) played a key role in coining this term.

(environmental factors, grieving, labour issues, and so forth). There is a staggered ordering present in these collected causalities. We found a direct relationship between terminological and material precision, leaving out *topoi*, and biological terms related to depression. However, this specificity diminishes in psychological causality and even more so when it comes to anything bearing on Social Psychology. The materiality of the depression is lost along the way.

Traditionally, a distinction was drawn between endogenous and exogenous depression. The former was causally attributed to brain biochemistry, while the latter — as the name suggests — was considered a consequence of factors external to the brain. This split was intended to offer specific treatments for each case. However, anti-depressants were shown to be equally effective in both cases, which ruled out this dichotomy and gave treatment with anti-depressants greater legitimacy than psychological therapies. There are hybrid approaches that combine more than one approach but these are not so common. A case in point is furnished by Kaufman *et al*. (2004), who state that social support greatly lessens the risk of depression in abused children with a genotype that makes them prone to depression. However, such approaches are seldom used and are far from the norm.

The output of expert knowledge both in scientific publications and in the informative texts considered here continues to make the distinction between: (a) an endogenous depression (with a specific materiality), and (b) an immaterial exogenous depression that articulates its own ontology. The set of factors claimed to cause depression constitute a fragmentation of that dichotomy, involving asymmetric explanations ranging between the natural and social dimensions, with depression seen as the result of all these factors. Yet such explanations fail to explore the interrelationships between said factors and their relative importance.

The new biological approaches focusing on brain plasticity challenge this division, something that is also true with regard to the interest shown in inflammation processes. The distinction between biology and psychology, endogenous and exogenous depression could eventually collapse and give rise to new approaches that explore complex interrelationships. Yet such a sea change in paradigm is unlikely to happen soon.

LAY NARRATIVES: FRAGMENTED DISPUTES BETWEEN ENDOGENEITY AND EXOGENEITY

The attribution process in people who have had depression involves them speaking directly of their own experience. In the case of expert discourse and that of laymen who have not suffered depression, emotion is attributed to a figurative "other". The evaluation of depression as an emotion is not negative regardless of whether the respondents spoke of their own experience or that of others. In all cases, depression was recognised as a serious condition.

Dilthey (1944) held that a distinction should be drawn between explaining and understanding texts. In a way, understanding the text means diving into it. As Ricoeur (1975) points out, a text has a life of its own and our task is to delve into and embody it. This is the basis of the hermeneutical perspective. In keeping with this approach, Ahmed (2012) makes interesting methodological proposals on how to understand texts through emotions. Once we accept that a text is 'alive' and conveys various emotions, we can grasp its claims, what it is struggling to do and assert, and the doubts and fatalism besetting lay narratives. As we have already pointed out, human and non-human ontologies are intertwined and span both definitions and those who make them.

The biological and endogenous ontology of depression

A biochemical alteration, a dearth of neuro-transmitters, hormonal problems, and hereditary factors were explicitly associated with how some lay respondents saw depression:

> "An alteration of psychological and biochemical functioning» Woman aged 24. She has had depression."

> "[Sic] Physiologically it is a deficiency of neuro-transmitters such as serotonin, which is characterised by apparent sadness, with symptoms [sic] such as lessening appetite, interest in things, sex drive, even losing the will to live and having suicidal ideas." Woman aged 19. She has never had depression.

An internal debate appears between sadness, emotional state and illness, in which the need to consider depression as a disease is raised so that the condition can be given the attention it is due. Extending the concept in this way gives depression the same legitimacy that has historically been attributed to other diseases as part of biological materiality.

> "It is a disease and not a state of mind. Many people say "you are depressed" when you are fleetingly sad, worried and so on. That idea is wrong. It may be a disease that is hard to "detect" and that also has to be "admitted" by the sick person because as my psychologist told me: you have to accept that you have a serious problem." Woman aged 20. She has had depression.

> "I consider depression to be an illness, not a state of mind [...]" Woman aged 22 years. She has depression.

> "It is a state of mind in which your life is strewn with obstacles [...]" Woman aged 20. She has depression.

In all cases we find descriptions of stagnation over a longish period. Both the words "state" and "disease" capture this specific long-term emotional malaise.

The Exogenous Ontology of Depression: Individuality and Control

> "From my point of view, depression is reached when someone for certain reasons reaches a point at which their desire for everything around them hardly exists and there is an almost permanent state of sadness, anxiety and often of loneliness". Man aged 22. He has had depression.

> "The day-to-day circumstances, and the perception of these due to an individual's way of thinking". Man aged 20. He has never had depression.

Among the host of ideas on depression, we first find an approach based on individualism in which the various respondents stated that the condition must stem from a "lack of desire", "perception" or "initiative" on the sufferer's part.

> "I suppose because of the way things are and how he thinks and feels about them". Woman aged 23. She has never had depression.

> "Because there are people who tend to be more negative and sadder than others, it is generally a result of their childhood experiences and how they were treated at home". Woman aged 23. She has depression

Direct reference to contexts gradually emerged when respondents were asked what one should do and why folk suffer from depression. Attributed causes included situations, shortcomings, neighbourhoods, negative life experiences, failures, complexes, losses. All of these attributions lacked specific materialities and did not point to shared processes inflicting exogenous harm.

> "[...] you have reached the end of your tether and your pain, feelings go beyond your ability to control them and have overwhelmed you". Woman aged 21. She has never had depression.

> "[What should we do about depression?] Fight it each day, force the mind and body to work as they should." Man aged 21. He has had depression.

> "Psycho-emotional state of loss of control of emotions [...]" Woman aged 24. She has never had depression.

> "Depression not only kills joy but it masks the presence of emotions, fosters apathy and loss of control over one's life". Woman aged 24. She has never had depression.

There are definitions of depression that see the malaise as a loss of control over emotions, indicating the subject feels overwhelmed. It is a discourse that reproduces the mutually exclusive, Cartesian distinction between reason and emotion — mind and body — in such a way that emotion is subordinate to reason. Yet the two cannot fully co-exist so emotion must be controlled otherwise — goes the argument — it would run riot, overthrowing reason and sound judgment. In the context of contemporary Capitalist societies, psychological malaise is strongly privatised (Fisher, 2009). It appeals to an individualised control, a radical self-control by the sufferer himself.

Anti-depressants: Solutions for the diseased body from the endogeneity standpoint

> "Treat it pharmacologically with anti-depressants acting at the level of the neuro-transmitter metabolism, inhibiting it or fostering re-uptake, using drugs such as Citalopram and Sertraline. On the other hand, it will have to be treated from a psychological point of view, that's very important". Woman aged 19 years. She has never had depression.

> "See a specialist straight away for a diagnosis and get put on anti-depressants [...]" Woman aged 22. She has depression.

The specialist terminology covering neuro-transmitters and the names of anti-depressants leads us to a powerful reflection on how these narratives filter down to laymen. The more biological, endogenous approaches can present a surprising wealth of terms — something that is not true of other perspectives.

> "Talking to that person, I think that few specialists care about the life of the patient and focus on prescribing pills. Support the patient, make him feel more important and realise what he is missing in the world. Give him a reason to keep going and not to stagnate." Woman aged 20. She has had depression.

Expert treatment was also constantly mentioned, as was the need to consult experts to turn the situation round. However, there was a certain scepticism regarding bio-medical treatment with anti-depressants but this did not extend to psychological approaches. Anti-depressants were considered insufficient and it was argued that changes in medical practice need to be made.

The effectiveness of anti-depressants was what initially ruled out the dichotomy between exogenous and endogenous forms of depression given that the drugs proved equally effective in both cases. Prescribing anti-depressants has become the norm, particularly for major depression. Regarding this variant, the combination of anti-depressants and therapy has yielded good results. Yet psychological treatment is generally more expensive than prescribing drugs. The use of an anti-depressant produces deep changes in the subject, greatly changing his view of the world. However this approach does not address socio-material mechanisms leading to psychological harm and depression.

Solutions from immaterial exogeneity: radical individualism or healing communication?

> "[...] You are the one who must put the solution into action. You must do things that make you happy instead of waiting for happiness to come to you. You build your own happiness". Man aged 24. He has never had depression.

> "[...] The best solution comes from within". Man aged 21. He has had depression.

Another strand enshrines extremely individualistic solutions, which go so far as to argue that only the sufferer can haul himself out of the pit, regardless of his circumstances and life. Such discourses take the individual and his emotional behaviour as lying at the heart of the problem.

This argument is reminiscent of the so-called "performance subject" (Han, 2017), in which the victim is doomed to endless dissatisfaction in a world that is hell-bent on re-inventing and renewing itself. Thus Han (2015) argues that we live in frenetically positivist societies in which we are driven to a

frenzy of self-monitoring, self-criticism, and self-exploitation.

To make matters worse, we are bombarded with a welter of messages and socialisation demands as the path to self-healing. Put another way, socialisation and communication are seen as curative *per se*:

> "Socialise with these people and always be at their side.. Let others show their emotions and share yours with them. Never be alone. . . and above all, meet people who accept you as you are — that's really important". Man aged 23. He has had depression.

> "Stop treating depression as a taboo subject. Help people who have this illness. Do not exclude them from groups, thinking that they are weird and even dangerous". Woman aged 20. She has had depression.

The most social issues are not part of the hegemonic narratives on the ontology of depression. However social demands for integration are made explicit as a way of tackling depression. These demands include normalising how we think about the illness and the need for social relationships to facilitate a cure. "[What should we do about depression?] Listen and speak". Woman aged 23. She has never had depression.

> "[What should we do about depression?] Make the problem visible and go to specialists". Woman aged 24. She has never had depression.

> "[What should we do about depression?] Make it visible as just another illness, normalise it, assume that a lot of people suffer from it. Give more help to alleviate the situation and improve the living conditions of these people". Woman aged 22. She has had depression.

"Visibility", "listening" and "speaking" are some elements that are claimed to offer solutions. Expressing the pain felt by sufferers is supposed to help in healing depression. By contrast, "invisibility", social exclusion and loneliness are seen here as causing harm. Exogenous depression is explained from the human standpoint in a dematerialised process, and is framed in terms of immaterial communication that is assumed to have healing properties.

SUMMARY OF FACTORS IN AN INDIVIDUALISING AND INTANGIBLE DEPRESSION: WHAT IT IS AND WHAT IT COULD BE

There is a split between crystallised common sense on depression, and common sense structures. Depression is articulated through a set of "factors", which is why it is presented as the sum of its parts. A common approach in these narratives on depression might be represented in an equation of the ontology of the malaise, articulated thus:

> Endogenous (biological/material) + Exogenous (psychological-social/immaterial) = Depression

Although the word 'combination' often crops up, it is used to speak of a sum of factors from which a result is inferred. The arguments seeking causal relationships in depression are deployed through a reductionism that tries to locate specific elements to add them to a list of possible causes. However, studies delving into the relationships among these factors are pretty thin on the ground and are non-existent in the hegemonic narrative targeting the general public.

Explanations based on both social and natural components have been replaced by theories focusing solely on natural causation. Endogenous depression is explained away by biochemical brain states. Meanwhile, exogenous depression is relegated to the psychological-social dimension in which the malaise is explained only through sufferers' relationships with others. In other words, the individual has been placed at the heart of the issue. Nevertheless, we can look beyond the individual. Here, identifying external materialities may lift the burden for making the diagnosis from the individual and turn our gaze to what is actually causing him harm.

The material form of violence has given way to another that is without subjects, and that is anonymous and systemic (Han, 2018) hence the need to pin down the socio-material mechanisms causing the harm and violence. Only thus can we begin a new conversation on depression that holds out the prospect of overcoming the present asymmetries. Faced with dematerialisation, a process of rematerialisation is needed that embraces both endogenous and exogenous aspects.

We should therefore ask ourselves what specific, transverse socio-material mechanisms foster damaging relationships. How is our materiality, our body, transformed in relation to these mechanisms? How do social relationships affect brain biology? What are the non-human materialities that alter our emotions?

As Smithson (1989) argues, specialisation is a kind of blindness. Although I have reservations about the wisdom of acting on this belief, the idea is key to being able to: (a) carry out exchanges of meanings among the social and natural sciences; (b) overcome the asymmetries in tackling depression. Faced with asymmetric and reductionist approaches, there is a need to focus more on emerging, cross-cutting properties in the material and social spheres. There is a long history of examining such properties, spanning from Mill to the present. The message is that the product is more than the sum of its parts. Our senses in action are thus more than just the sum of so many symbols — a fact that helps explain this emerging property. In the same way that intersectional discrimination does not arise from a mere sum of oppressions, there is also no reason why depression should be an exercise in reductionism. Thus examining the interaction between the various biological-psychological-social assemblies involved in depression can greatly enrich our analyses.

There is a general issue in relation to depression, namely that medical treatments concentrate on curing the condition rather than preventing it (Martínez-González and De Irala, 2005). In both the expert and lay spheres, solutions always focus on treatment after the damage has been done. Preventative mental health initiatives have been taken, especially when it comes to children yet there is much that we do not know. I believe that the social sciences still have a lot to offer in identifying the social mechanisms driving these undesirable emotional dynamics. Here, there is a need to collective approaches to both preventing and curing depression. This means going beyond resorting to experts for treatment. Making the suffering of those with depression is a first step but not a magic wand for making the illness vanish. In addition to conveying the suffering, it is also vital that those with depression talk about their condition and make it 'visible' for all to see. In this respect, the so-called 'mental health technologies' have a key role to play. This implies a process of democratisation and boosting public awareness of psychological treatment that goes beyond the specialist sphere to become a vital step in fostering mental health and treatment. Such measures are justified by soaring stress levels in Capitalist societies and the way in which the problem has been 'privatised' by shoving the blame on the individual. In this respect, one should ask why we meekly accept such an approach when so many people (especially the young) suffer from depression (Fisher, 2009).

Along these lines, our paper raised the scope for a socio-material ontology of depression in which neither party excludes the other. Both sides of the debate need to work together to explore assemblies and so improve theories and diagnoses. This begs a host of questions (not in any special order), such as: (1) How do socio-material assemblies and brain plasticities tie in with certain practical materialities and socio-cultural structures?; (2) How is brain resistance handled when subjected to changing emotions?; (3) What 'negotiation' strategies can we come up with to improve this mental processing? This assembly is dynamic not static, depression is reflected in action; (4) How does one act when depressed?; (5) How is the definition of depression reflected in the actions of the person defining it?; (6) How are emotions put into action in a consistent or chaotic form in daily life?; (7) What daily strategies boost or depress depression in transforming emotions?; (8) How can one collectively use mental care technologies in ways that do not necessarily involve experts? These are just some of the questions we must begin to ask ourselves if we are to make a new start on tackling the malaise.

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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

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Emotional Management in the Workplace of the Spanish Population. Quantitative Analysis through the Construction of an Emotional Quality Index at Work and its Link to Social Structure

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ABSTRACT
The organisation of work, located in the post-Fordist paradigm, stresses the emotional aspects of employee-client interaction processes. This emphasis arises from the shift in the productive structure towards growth in service activities in which interpersonal relationships are key factors. In this "new culture", the organisation is conceived as a 'sentient' environment and emotional work captures the interest of researchers and social scientists who analyse the role played by emotions in occupations and organisational culture (Zapf, 2002, Grandey 2000, 2015, Seymour and Sandiford 2005, Bolton 2000, Wharton, 2009, Totterdell, and Holman, 2003). Most related research has focused on qualitative case studies of workers in the service sector (Steinberg and Figart, 1999) — an approach that limits the inferences one can make and hinders one in linking findings to the social structure. The aim of our research is to expand this field of analysis and explore the link between emotional management and social structure. That is why we used a quantitative methodology, for which purpose we built an Emotional Quality Index in the Workplace (EQIW), allowing us to measure the emotional quality of workers in Spain and analyse their relationship with the three key structural variables: social class; occupation; gender. Here, we used data from the European Working Conditions Survey (2015). The results show that there are significant differences in the emotional management of work by occupation, social class and gender, verifying that there is indeed a link between the EQIW and the social structure.

Keywords: Emotional Management, Emotional Quality Index at Work, Structural Factors, Social Class.

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INTRODUCTION. EMOTIONAL WORK IN THE NEW SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM

Over the past two decades, emotion has been put on the organisational agenda (Bolton and Boyd 2003), with researchers and social scientists showing growing interest in the subject (Zapf, 2002, Grandey 2000, 2015; Seymour and Sandiford 2005; Bolton 2000; Wharton, 2009; Totterdell, and Holman, 2003). The reason for this lies in the major shift towards service industries found in advanced societies and the rise in jobs where interpersonal relationships play a key role in the way organisations work. The shift from manufacturing to service industries has driven new dynamics in labour relations, with emotions at the core of corporate culture. This culture rests on a "new spirit of Capitalism", which introduces creative and emotional dimensions as key factors for managing organisations, and has become enshrined in the new managerial ideology since the 1990s (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2002). The emergence of this new spirit is related to the paradigm shift in labour relations. This shift was from the Fordist model (which saw corporations as heartless, rational settings where workers followed scientifically-set routines) to the post-Fordist model. In the latter, the creative, emotional part of work is vindicated, contrasting with the rigidities of the mass-production model of yore. Now, it is argued that "Organisations have feelings" (Albrow, 1994) and have become flexible settings where interaction with others is a key competitive factor. As Bolton points out: "In direct contrast to the orthodox view of rational bureaucracy, we are now presented with emotional organisations and it is increasingly accepted that emotion constitutes a major element of the 'new' organisation of the 1990s" (Bolton, 2000: 158). Although the emergence of emotion in corporations does not spell the end of reason, emotion and rationality have become intertwined. There are two reasons for this. The first is that "corporate culture" requires workers to become more emotionally involved with clients. The second is that "financial logic" increasingly permeates the "new" management team (Bolton, 2000: 159). Here, Hochschild (1983) argued that a distinctive feature of contemporary societies is executives' growing interest in incorporating emotions as a way to drive performance and to manage companies (D´Oliveira, 2018: 114).

Coinciding with the emergence of this "new spirit of Capitalism", social scientists began to analyse the role emotions play at work and in organisational culture, the emotional content of many kinds of job, and the social and personal consequences of emotional management at work (Clay-Warner and Robinson, 2008; Hochschild, 1979, 1983; Wharton, 2009; Grandey, 2000; Sennett and Cobb 1972; Gorroño 2008). Research on emotional management in corporations often takes the form of qualitative case studies on workers in the service sector (Steinberg and Figart, 1999). This kind of research has several limitations. Sampling is one of these given that the number of workers surveyed tends to be fairly small and unrepresentative, with studies often focusing on a small subset of workplaces or even just one (Wharton, 2009). This makes it well-nigh impossible to make inferences and to link findings with the broader social structure. Our research has two goals with a view to remedying these shortcomings. The first goal is to measure the quality of emotional work among Spanish workers by employing a quantitative methodology. To this end, we construct an 'Emotional Quality Index at Work' (EQIW). The methodology lets us measure the diverse aspects implied by the complex, multidimensional concept of 'emotional work'. We used data from the Eurofound European Working Conditions Survey 2015 to operationalise the index given that it: (a) incorporates a set of key indicators bearing on emotional management at work; (b) has a wide sample base, enabling us to link emotional work with the social structure. The second goal is to analyse the link between emotional quality of work and social structure, through three variables. There is a pattern of affective experiences based on social structures (Hochschild, 1975), since members of the various segments of society experience and manage emotions based on the place they occupy in the social pecking order (Shott, 1979).

The paper's scheme is as follows: the first part reviews the literature on emotional work. The second part

describes the EQIW model and its structural variables. The third part sets out the operationalisation of the model is explained. The fourth part describes the analyses and findings, and gives the main conclusions.

EMOTIONAL WORK AS PART OF ORGANISATIONAL DYNAMICS

The post-Fordist paradigm of work organisation stresses the emotional aspects of employee-client, employee-boss, and employee-employee interactions for control purposes. This control not only covers quantitative aspects of staff performance but also workers' ability to incorporate emotional management in their jobs (Hochschild, 1983). Companies are increasingly seeking to manage workers' emotions (repressing, hiding, or eliciting specific ones, as the case may be) in order to secure competitive advantages (Bolton and Boyd 2003) in a setting where "The Customer is King" (Alonso and Fernandez, 2013: 55).

'Emotional labour' was a term coined in the 1980s by Arlie Hochschild, who explicitly introduced the concept in his book *The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling* (1983). In this seminal work, Hochschild studied the labour dynamics in the burgeoning Tertiary Sector. The book added the concept to existing physical and cognitive factors to take account of the new demands made by the service sector (D´Oliveira, 2018). Following in Hochschild's footsteps, many studies have been carried out that use the concept of emotional labour to analyse: (a) how organisations seek to manage employee's emotions as part of the work process (Ashforth and Humphrey, 1993; Morris and Feldman, 1996; Bolton and Boyd, 2003; Bolton, 2000; Grandey, 2000; Zapf, 2002; Wharton, 2009), and (b) the impact of emotional factors in the workplace (Bericat, 2001; Gorroño, 2008; Bolton, 2006; Calderón, 2008; Steinberg and Figart, 1999).

What is meant by emotional labour? Based on Hochschild's definition, it consists of the management of worker's feelings to create the appearance of accord with the organisational rules, and to generate a desired response in others. "I use the term emotional work to refer to the management of feeling to create a publicly observable facial and body presentation; emotional work is sold for a salary and therefore has exchange value" (Hochschild, 1983: 7). Emotional work involves social interaction within the framework of rules that dictate how to act emotionally. As D´Oliveira points out "when *emotional work* is done, individuals elaborate their emotions according to certain *rules of feeling* in a specific field of interaction" (D´Oliveira, 2018: 112). The worker's presentation of an adequate emotional image responds to the organisation's visualisation rules (Hochschild, 1983; Grandey, 2000; Wharton 2009; Morris and Feldman, 1996; Ashforth and Humphrey, 1993), which may be explicitly established or known through observation of co-workers (Grandey, 2000). The rules are designed to make the worker feel an emotion that is not initially present (*evocation*) while suppressing an existing one (*suppression*), or modelling an emotion (Hochschild, 1979). The rules of emotional action have received several names: *display rules* (Ekman, 1973) (when it comes to which emotions should be expressed publicly but not necessarily felt); *feeling rules* (Hochschild 1979, 1983) (when the rules specify the range, intensity, duration and object of the emotion to be 'felt'). From a dramaturgical standpoint Hochschild (1983) established two main ways in which actors handle emotions: (i) through *surface acting*, where emotional expressions are regulated; (ii) through *deep acting*, where feelings are consciously modified to express the desired emotion. According to the author, service sector workers need to do more emotional work in their daily jobs with a view to evoking responses in others that boost corporate profits[1]. Wages are increasingly tied to workers' ability to perform in these ways.

1 'Pecuniary' emotions follow commercially-inspired rules, although Bolton distinguishes three more kinds of emotions that are not inspired by mercenary considerations, namely: 'professional pride', presentational skills, and philanthropic feelings, all of which follow the rules found in social emotions (see Bolton 2000, 2005, 2009)

Managing emotions for a salary is termed emotional labour (Hochschild, 1983) since it occurs in a commercial context and has exchange value in the market.[2] In this context, emotional management is carried out as part of the work activity, it is exchanged for a salary and its purpose is to generate a profit or capital gain for the organisation. Thus it becomes part of the public sphere in the supply of services in which emotional performance adds 'exchange value' and enshrines a business approach (Hochschild, 1983). Thus, the commercialisation of feelings becomes a vital part of the Capitalist labour process in service societies (Hochschild, 1979, 1983), framing the economic changes that took place at the end of the 20th Century. The result of this paradigm shift is a ruthless commercialisation of emotional life (Hochschild, 2008). According to D´Oliveira, "Hochschild's analysis affects precisely some of these transformations in contemporary Western societies. Among them are the emergence of a "new" or more developed Capitalism; the growth of the services sector [...] changes in work dynamics; the growing participation of women in public life, and so forth" (D´Oliveira, 2018: 113).

These transformations in the work organisation model since the end of the 20th Century have shaped a "new spirit of Capitalism" in which the emotional dimension has become the key to grasping corporate culture in the service sector. Within this framework, Hochschild's research has performed an invaluable role in placing emotional management in a broader context by linking "the work of emotions, the rules of feelings and the social structure" (Hochschild, 1979: 276). In this connection, our research analyses the link between emotional work and social structure. The following sections describe the emotional work construct and its operationalisation through the Emotional Quality Index at Work (EQIW), and set out the key structural variables. We then go on to analyse the link between the index and social structure through its relationship to occupation, social class and gender.

MODEL COMPOSITION. INDEX OF EMOTIONAL QUALITY AT WORK, AND STRUCTURAL VARIABLES.

In setting up the empirical model to measure emotional work we have taken into account the following aspects. First of all, the concept of emotional work adopted in this paper focuses on the observable behaviours of emotion management based on visualisation rules (Wharton, 2009), not on workers' deeply internalised actions. Following Ashforth and Humphrey (1993), we prefer to use the concept of *display rules* rather than *feeling rules*, since what interests us is the external expression of emotions required of workers by the organisation. Second, we focus on the emotional aspects of employee-client interaction as a key dimension in the context of services, leaving aside employee-employee and supervisor-employee interactions. Following Zapf (2002) we use 'client' to refer to anyone who interacts with an employee, for example, patients, students, customers, passengers, guests and so forth. Along these lines, we treat emotional work with reference to the quality of interactions between employees and clients (Zapf, 2002).

How has emotional work been measured? Few studies have operationalised emotional work with a single measure since it is a complex concept encompassing several dimensions. That is why a multi-dimensional approach is a better yardstick as it lets one specify the various features of emotional work (Wharton 2009). Research treating the subject as a multi-dimensional concept has measured it through various indicators such as: the frequency and duration of interactions; the variety of emotions required; the discrepancy between expressed and felt emotion; compliance with visualisation rules; interactive work measures (Morris and Feldman, 1996; Hochschild, 1983; Wharton 1993, 2009; Rafaeli and Sutton, 1989; Erikson and

2 The concept of 'exchange value' is a key component in emotional work and its roots lie in Marxist theory. Hochschild uses the Marxist distinction between 'use value' and 'exchange value' to refer to emotional work as a good that is exchanged for a wage (D´Oliveira, 2018)

Ritter 2001; Steinberg, R. and Figart, D 1999). More recent studies have used a variety of strategies to identify and measure key factors. Although there is no consensus on the best approach, Wharton (2009) has highlighted practical measures containing some common elements, namely: job interaction requirements, workers' efforts in managing emotions, and display rules and compliance therewith. Given the diversity of aspects encompassed by emotional work and the complexities of measuring it, we discarded a uni-dimensional approach in favour of a multi-dimensional one based on a composite index. "An index or composite indicator is a complex descriptive structure, based on a theoretical framework and a conceptual definition, which forms an empirically operationalisable measurement model capable of quantifying a social aspect or phenomenon" (Bericat and Sánchez, 2015: 3). In accordance with the dimensions proposed by Wharton (2009), we have operationalised the concept through the construction of an Emotional Quality Index based on three parameters: (1) Interaction; (2) Visualisation of Emotions; (3) Workers' Efforts in Managing Emotion.

1. Interaction: There is broad agreement that occupations requiring emotional work are those in which workers must interact with others. Accordingly, researchers have used indicators such as the frequency and type of these interactions as a way of measuring emotional work. The management of emotions seems to be a characteristic of "almost all occupations in which the worker must interact with people" (Wharton, 2009: 158). In our analysis we have used interaction to measure emotional work through the following indicator:

   "Please tell me, using the following scale, the extent to which your main job requires you to work with angry clients, students, patients, etc.?" The 7-point scale's scheme is: 1 = All the time; 2 = Most of the time; 3 = About three-quarters of the time; 4 = Half the time; 5 = About a quarter of the time; 6 = Almost never; 7 = Never.

2. Visualisation of Emotions: One way to capture the degree to which workers manage emotions at work is by asking them about the visualisation of emotions, either in the form of expression or suppression. In this analysis, the indicator covers the extent to which emotions have to be hidden at work, corresponding to Hochschild's concept (1983) of *suppression***.** Here, an unwanted emotion or feeling is deliberately suppressed so that the desired image can be put over to the client. The indicator used to measure this suppression is the following variable:

   "For each of the following statements, select the answer that best describes your work situation: Your job requires you to hide your feelings." The 5-point scale's scheme is: 1 = Always; 2 = Most of the time; 3 = Sometimes; 4 = Rarely; 5 = Never)

3. Workers' Effort in Managing Emotions: This dimension reflects the extent to which employees have to manage their emotions at work in situations they may find disturbing, and seek to differentiate the management of emotions from the interactive work itself. Based on Hochschild, several researchers have designed measures in which workers engage in superficial or deep action when carrying out their activity (see Grandey 2003). The indicator that we have used to measure the effort in managing emotions is:

   "Please tell me, using the following scale, the extent to which your main job involves being in emotionally disturbing situations." The 7-point scale's scheme is: 1 = All the time; 2 = Most of the time; 3 = About three-quarters of the time, 4 = Half the time; 5 = About a quarter of the time; 6 = Almost never; 7 = Never).

We have operationalised the concept through an Emotional Quality at Work Index (EQIW) through the foregoing parameters and their corresponding indicators. We shall now go on to describe the structural variables of social class, occupation and gender.

Structural variables: Social Class (EGP), Occupation (ISCO) and Gender

According to some authors (Grandey, 2000; Wharton, 2011; D´Oliveira 2018, among others) Emotional Management at Work's vital contribution lies in the link it forges between emotion and social structure (Hochschild 1979, 1983). In emotional work, people actively shape and direct their feelings but the social structure and institutions impose restrictions. In this sense, emotions are not seen in their biological dimension but rather as responses to a societally-configured normative structure (Hochschild, 1979, 1983; Kemper, 1987; Bolton 2008; Shott, 1979; Bericat, 2000). That is why it is so important to analyse the relationship between emotional work and the structural factors shaping emotional quality in the job.

To analyse the relationship between EQIW and social class, we constructed the 'EGP' variable, named after Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero's class typology (1979). This variable is based on a neo-Weberian scheme that distinguishes between two elements: (1) possession or not of the means of production; (2) the nature of the relationship with the employer (Breen, 2005). The typology is expressed in Roman numerals and is as follows. Classes I and II represent the service class *par excellence*, Class I is large owners with employees and Class II is professionals. Class III is non-routine manual workers (Class IIIa is clerks, Class IIIb is assistants, shop and other lower-grade sales services), Class IV is the petty bourgeoisie (comprising: Class IVa is small owners with employees; Class IVb is small owners without employees; Class IVc is small agricultural owners), Class V is technicians and supervisors, Class VI is skilled workers and Class VII is unskilled workers (Class VIIa is industrial workers, Class VIIb is agricultural labourers).

To analyse the relationship between EQIW and occupation, we used the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88), which is based on the International Labor Organization's scheme (ILO) for organising job and employment information.[3] The survey gathers information on occupations through the ISCO-88 variable. Jobs are classified into the following categories: Armed Forces; Managers; Professionals; Technicians and Associated Professionals; Administrative Support Workers; Sales and Service Workers; Specialised Workers in Agriculture; Forestry and Fishing; Crafts and Related Trades; Plant and Machine Operators; assembly workers and basic occupations. Gender analysis has been a focus of interest in research on emotional labour. Hochschild (1983) highlighted that most service jobs are performed by women, and as such, gender becomes an important aspect in analysing emotional work. The growth of service-related activities (which require greater employee-client interaction and thus more emotional work) has spawned a market niche in which women occupy most of the jobs. This has led to what some authors call the 'feminisation' of the service sector (Hertel, 2017; Wharton, 2009). Wharton and Erickson (1993) also agree that women are more likely to manage emotions both at work and at home and thus tend to be more involved in situations requiring emotional management.

OPERATIONALISATION OF THE MODEL

This section covers the construction of the EQIW empirical model used for verifying the adequacy through statistical analysis.[4] Factorial Analysis (a multivariate statistical technique for analysing interdependence relationships among a set of variables) was employed for this purpose. The idea behind Factorial Analysis is to come up with a small number of factors that can represent the original variables, identifying explanations for the correlations between those variables. It is used to reduce and summarise the data being analysed into a meaningful structure. The most suitable method for factor extraction is

3 The classification scale is a tool for organising jobs in a set of clearly-defined groups depending on the tasks and functions carried out in each kind of work.

4 The statistical analysis was carried out through SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences).

Principal Components Analysis (PCA). Employing this, we obtained a factor (which includes all the proposed indicators) that explains 59.6% of the variance, with a KMO[5] (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Test) figure of 0.62. The factorial scores were high (above 0.60) therefore all the model's indicators represent the factor well.

In the descriptive analysis one needs to ensure the internal reliability of the data. For this purpose we used Cronbach's Alpha, which is a measure of internal consistency — that is, how closely related a set of items are as a group. It estimates the lower bound of the reliability coefficient based on the average of the correlations between the items. The reliability measure using Cronbach's Alpha assumes that the items (measured on a Likert-type scale) measure the same construct and are highly correlated. The alpha score was 0.657[6], which indicates that the indicators are well correlated. Finally, the index was operationalised such that a higher score represented greater emotional management and a lower score, less emotional management.

The following table shows the results of the factor scores. The result of the iterations led to the calculation of a factor making up the Emotional Quality Index at Work. The indicators yielded high scores for the factor (above 0.6), which means that they represent it well. These results show that the index is suitable for measuring emotional labour. Earlier studies showed that work content factors such as control must be taken into account, which has been a good predictor of well-being since it leads to less staff burn-out (Erickson and Wharton 1997: Erikson and Ritter, 2001)

Table 1 Factor scores in the EQIW

EWCS variables (2015)	Component
Does your main job require you to work with angry clients, students, patients, etc.?	0.804
Does your main job put you in situations that are emotionally disturbing?	0.830
Does your job require you to hide your emotions?	0.673

Source: EWCS (2015).

Indicator frequencies

Once we had verified the indicators (i.e. that they adequately measure the concept of emotional labour), we drew up a frequency table for 2015 and compared the results for 2010 and 2015 to see whether there had been any change in the demands made by emotional work over the five-year period. Table 2 shows the frequencies of the three indicators used in the index. Looking at the accumulated percentages of "Always" and "Almost always" it will be seen that: 29.4% of workers dealt with angry clients as part of their jobs; 30.4% had to hide their feelings; 18% faced situations that they found emotionally disturbing.

The following table shows the cumulative frequencies in "Always" and "Almost always" categories for the indicators in 2010 and in 2015.[7] The data reveals a rise in the emotional demands placed on workers over the 5-year period, with 25% of workers stating in 2010 that they had to hide their feelings at work, a figure that rose to 30.4% in 2015. Regarding working with angry clients, 12.6% of workers always or almost always worked with angry clients in 2010, a figure that rocketed to 29.4% in 2015.

5 The KMO provides information on the extent to which the simple fits the hypothesis of the Factorial Analysis model.

6 Huth, De Lorme and Reid (2006) the reliability value in an exploratory study must be equal to or greater than 0.6; in confirmatory studies, it must lie between 0.7 and 0.8.

7 The 'emotionally disturbing situations' variable could not be included given that this indicator was not used in the 2010 survey.

Table 2 Frequency of EQIW indicators for 2015 (in percentages)

	Dealing with angry clients	Hide emotions	Emotionally disturbing situations
Always	11.2	15.8	4.2
Almost always	18.2	14.6	13.8
Sometimes	9.2	21.9	8.1
Rarely	30.0	12.9	28.6
Never	31.3	34.8	45.3

Source: EWCS 2015.

In short, there was a rise in emotional labour demands over the five-year period. Workers had to make greater emotional management efforts in their jobs and suppress unwanted emotions/feelings in order to create the image desired by their employers. Three out of ten workers had to deal with angry clients. The data reveal the importance of emotional work and the role of emotional management in labour relations. This relevance is increasingly reflected in surveys on working conditions as they incorporate and measure these new facets. For instance, the 6th European Working Conditions Survey had an item measuring emotional demands as a component of the workload, along with the usual intellectual, physical and psychological demands of the job. The survey data revealed that 21.5% of the workers stated they that they "Always or Almost always" had to cope with emotional demands (the percentage was similar to that covering intellectual demands) and that 15.6% "Often" had to deal with emotional demands (in this case, a percentage higher than that for intellectual demands). These data indicate that the present level of emotional demands roughly equalled that for intellectual demands (Marrero and Abdul-Jalbar, 2015). This finding stresses the need to take emotional demands into account when gauging job quality.

Table 3 Cumulative figures for "Always" and "Almost always" in the EQIW indicators for 2010 and 2015 (in percentages)

	Hide feelings	Deal with angry clients
2015	30.4	29.4
2010	25.1	12.6

Source: EWCS 2010 and 2015.

Link between the Emotional Quality Index at Work and social class, occupation and gender.

Applying the EQIW on a database with a large sample size (3,200 cases for Spain) and with a great variety of occupations, collected through the ISCO international code of occupations gave us some advantages in coming up with a much more representative sample than that found in qualitative studies. In the latter case, such studies use relatively small samples drawn from a single workplace or from a small subset of workplaces (Wharton, 2009) .Using these conditions we measured the link between the EQIW and three structural factors: social class; occupation; gender. Table 4 shows the average index score by social class and gender. The data reveal that the social classes that are most strongly linked to interaction and interpersonal relationships are the ones that score the lowest in the index (i.e. their emotional quality at work is lower). By comparison, the social classes most strongly linked to the industrial and agricultural sector score highest in the index. Entrepreneurs with employees (I), professionals (II), and low-grade routine white-collar workers (IIIb) (corresponding to lower-grade assistants, office workers, stores and other sales services) were the social classes most likely to deal with angry clients, to hide their feelings, to suffer the most stress, and to find themselves emotionally disturbing work situations.

Table 4 EQIW by social class (EGP) and gender

EGP	EQIW
I	-0.3374788
II	-0.3070742
IIIa	-0.0655459
IIIb	-0.2830549
IVab	-0.0108619
IVc	0.6680796
V+VI	0.415297
VIIa	0.3059678
VIIb	0.5703623
Género	
Male	0.07999
Female	-0.08303

Source: EWCS 2015.

Table 5 EQIW by ISCO-88 occupation

ISCO	EQIW
Managers	-0.17789
Professionals	-0.32431
Technicians and associated professionals	-0.18442
Workers and administrative support	-0.15180
Service and sales workers	-0.24620
Specialised agricultural, forestry, and fishing workers	0.51259
Craftsmen and related jobs	0.35069
Plant and machine operators, assembly workers	0.31199
Basic occupations	0.32000
The Armed Forces	0.08952

Source: EWCS 2015.

Given the logic underlying the theoretical framework of the post-industrial model, women take a greater part in the service sector and therefore undertake more emotional labour. In our analysis, the average score of the emotional quality index at work for women was negative (indicating that they have a lower quality of emotional management than men). Earlier studies revealed that women are exposed to greater emotional labour in the post-industrial model (Hochschild, 1979, 1983; Wharton, 2009; Wharton and Erikson, 1993), which has been accompanied by a marked feminisation of service occupations (Esping-Andersen 1993, 1999; Hertel, 2017).

Table 5 shows the mean index score by occupations, with those requiring interaction with others and in the service sector associated with lower job quality when it comes to emotional management at work.

Professionals are those with the worst average score of all occupations (-0.324), followed by service and sales workers (-0.246). These are jobs where workers had to deal with angry clients, patients, students, etc. and that spawn emotionally-disturbing situations. These workers hide their feelings to a greater extent than those in other occupations given that a key part of their work involves face-to-face interactions. Managers, associate professionals and technicians, and administrative support workers also showed negative scores on this index. The occupations scoring highest were those in the agricultural sector (workers specialised in agriculture, forestry and fishing), with the highest scores for emotional quality at work (0.5125), followed by artisans and unskilled workers (machine operators and basic jobs).

In general terms, there were differences in emotional quality at work depending on social class, occupation and gender. To check whether the differences were statistically significant, we performed a one-way ANOVA (ANalysis Of VAriance) to compare several groups with a quantitative dependent variable, which in this case was the EQIW. The category variables (nominal or ordinal) defining the groups that sought to compare covered social class and occupations, constituting the

independent or factor variables.[8] The hypothesis tested in the one-way ANOVA was that the population means (the means of the dependent variable, the EQIW, at each level of the independent variables) were equal. Assuming *k* independent populations, the contrast hypotheses were as follows:

H_0: μ1 = μ2 =… = μk The population means are equal

H1: μ1 ≠ μ2 =… = μk At least two population means are different

The goal was to check whether the EQIW impact varies depending on social class and occupation (Alternative Hypothesis, H1) or on the contrary its impact is not affected by these factors (Null Hypothesis, H_0).

In the ANOVA performed for each of the independent variables and the EQIW, the p-value was <0.00, so we must reject the null hypothesis of equality of means. The conclusion we drew from the hypotheses tests is that social class and occupation significantly affect the index score. In other words, the emotional quality of work is influenced by structural variables.

CONCLUSIONS

Given: (a) the growing importance of service sector activities; (b) the paradigm shift towards post-Fordist organisational models based on interpersonal work; (c) rising emotional demands at work, one needs to focus attention on a new dimension of labour (namely, the quality of emotional management at work). Surveys are beginning to address this need as they increasingly incorporate items on both emotional demands in jobs and the key aspects of emotional work. This paper makes two major contributions to this field of research. The first is the construction of an index measuring the quality of emotional management at work based on three parameters: (a) Interaction; (b) Visualisation of Emotions; (c) Workers' Effort spent on Emotion Management. The second is by establishing a link between emotional work and key structural factors such as social class, occupation and gender.

The main findings of our study are that: (1) the index constructed to measure emotional quality at work was both empirically valid and verified; (2) the link between emotional quality at work and structural variables was verified. Classes I, II and IIIb (workers who are more exposed to dealing with clients and interpersonal work) scored worse for emotional job quality than manual and agricultural workers. There were also differences by occupation, with professionals, and service and sales workers having the worst emotional quality at work, followed by managers, technicians and associated professionals and administrative support staff. Last but not least, we found differences by gender, with women suffering worse emotional quality at work than men — a finding mirroring that in earlier studies (Hochschild, 1979, 1983; Wharton and Erikson, 1993; Wharton, 2009). These results invite new research on the importance of emotional management for work quality. This is because differences stemming from structural variables may be a new facet of structural inequality when it comes to emotional quality at work in post-industrial societies.

8 We were unable to include gender in this analysis given that it was not present in over two response categories.

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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

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Analysis of Affective Discourse in the Change Process of the Employment Relationship Model: Environment Management through Collective Bargaining

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ABSTRACT
This paper covers research whose goal was to analyse affective changes in the process of change in the labour relations model that was consolidated throughout the 1990s. Based on a case study, the focus was on the emotional content expressed by the protagonists in relation to this collective bargaining framework. In conducting the analysis, we used the wide range of procedures provided by Discourse Analysis (DA). Part of this analysis focused on the protagonists' emotional management of the early stages of the negotiation. The results let us delve deeper into the affective nature of this process, thereby expanding the light shed by other theoretical and methodological perspectives on this change in the labour relations model.

Keywords: collective bargaining, socio-affective dynamics, risk society, management discourse.

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INTRODUCTION

The Neo-Liberal policies drawn up in the 1980s were to make a decisive contribution to breaking the Keynesian 'Social Contract'. The reforms introduced by highly Conservative 'Free Market' governments led by Ronald Reagan and by Margaret Thatcher to halt the industrial decline of the 1970s proved a watershed in labour relations. The casualties of these reforms included 'Social Contracts', the decision-making capacity of Nation States, and Trade Unions.

Under the impact of all these changes, the standard model of labour relations and formal regulation created after The Second World War began to weaken. New, more flexible, tailored labour relationship models began to spring up. As a result, a new model of labour relations took hold, inspired solely by the Capitalism of the English-speaking world, focusing on the short-term and the financialisation of the economy as a mechanism for inculcating social discipline (Martín Artiles, 2014).

Despite the decades that have gone by since the 1990s, this process of change still sparks heated debate on the value and nature of the new labour relations model. Some stress the steady loss of social and labour rights that have come in its wake. Others defend it as objective, necessary, and even 'natural'. Be that as it may, the truth is that it has had huge labour, social, and human consequences.

Given its multidimensional nature, this shift from a Fordist to a Post-Fordist model of labour relations[1] has been approached from many angles and in various spheres. Since the change did not happen all by itself, there was a clear need to research the protagonists' actions in making the paradigm shift possible.

The first step was to take their motivations and strategies into account. One of the pioneering studies in this regard was made by Kochan, Katz, and McKersie (1993). While openly acknowledging that the context did not favour its protagonists equally, these authors described Management's strategies as active and the union ones as defensive, concluding that it was Managerial Capitalism that not only defined the traditional Fordist model of labour relations[2] but that also drove the quest for its successor. From a more subjective perspective (and considering Capitalism's evolutionary path)[3], Boltanski and Chiapello (2002) felt that social actors should have been much more aware of the risks posed by these changes. They argue that if social players had been more awake, they would have delved deeper in their analyses and resisted the new scheme of things much more fiercely.

These works furnish two major examples of how the protagonists' actions during this transitional period were seen. Yet actors' feelings need to be taken into account because agreement, persuasion, domination, coercion, and resistance are coloured and altered by emotions such as pride, fear, shame, and so on expressed during actors' interactions. Accordingly, the affective universe forms an integral part of this study. No sociological analysis should exclude the emotions felt by the subjects taking part in a given phenomenon, event, structure or social process (Bericat, 2012).

1 Regulation Theory (Aglietta, 1979) was drawn on to identify both models regarding: (1) denomination; (2) the chronological division established in relation to the sundry *Capitalist accumulation models* and their economic and social regulatory regimes. The period covered by the paper falls under *Fordist* regulation, which evolved during a period of intensive accumulation between 1930 and 1975. The beginning of a period of Post-Fordist regulation characterised by a financial accumulation regime began around 1990. The gap between the first and second periods was marked by a struggle for hegemony between the two models.

2 Focusing on the US automobile industry, they analysed the decline of the traditional system of collective negotiations ushered in by The New Deal. The study, which was concluded in 1986, stressed the transformation in labour relations based on business reorganisation driven by competitive pressures. This paradigm shift created an alternative non-unionised system based on a set of sophisticated Human Resource management policies.

3 Boltanski and Chiapello (2002) focused their analysis on the ideologies underpinning Capitalism — an approach that followed in the Weberian tradition. The 'Spirit of Capitalism' was seen as a set of beliefs linked with the Capitalist Order and that served to justify and underpin it.

Analysing the change in the labour relationship model from its most affective dimension would reveal many highly subjective meanings and nuances. One of the merits of this approach is that by looking at the shift in model from new angles, it lets us delve into and describe the changes in ways that have been barely explored. As Hochschild rightly argues, Sociology will find it hard to shed light on the real world if it remains blind to feelings. They need to be taken into account if we are to reflect upon the world around us. (2008: 111)

Despite the vital role feelings and emotions play in our lives, they have largely been ignored by the Sociology of Labour Relations. To help redress this shortcoming, are goals are to: (a) Identify the socio-affective patterns generated by the actors and their evolution throughout the period studied; (b) Describe the dynamics of the socio-affective relationship through which the transformation took place; (c) Relate the most affective dimension of this process to the formation of those new subjectivities and identities that characterise our society, contemporary Capitalism and current labour organisations.

By 'affectivity'[4] we mean the emotional tone that permeates Man's life. Affection, according to Russell (1980), can be understood as a set of dimensions that are inextricably intertwined and can be represented by a spatial model. Russell's circumplex model gives a representation of cognitive structure that both experts and laymen alike use to conceptualise affection.

The resulting model of affective states[5] lets us graphically situate their components around a circle split into the four quadrants produced by the intersection of two dimensions: the evaluative (pleasant/unpleasant) and the level of activation or arousal (high/low). This scheme creates four semantic fields. The dimensional vision (which does not provide a discrete measure of affectivity) gives scope for generating a whole series of *affective patterns* with many descriptive and comparative options.

Figure 1 Russell's affective diagram (1980)



However, we must not forget that it is society and culture that modulate and facilitate our emotions. The expression of all kinds of affection can only be understood in relation to both, especially when great transformations are afoot (which was the case here, entailing as it did a radical change in the labour relations model).

Many of these new scenarios will bear on the debate as to whether we have crossed the threshold of modernity or not — a discussion that offers key reflections for grasping this change (Bericat, 2017, 2019). Aspects such as: (a) risk and globalisation (Beck, 2001, 2002); (b) the disappearance of the social actor and the trend towards individualisation (Touraine, 2009); (c) the shift from industrialism to informationalism as a technological paradigm (Castells, 2000) all directly bear on the new labour relations paradigm.

Beginning in the early 90s, the notion that modern society is mainly based on logic, reason and order

4 Affectiveness is manifested in *feelings* and *emotions*, although the basic nature of emotions has been considered as the keystone of affectiveness (Mora and Martín, 2010). Feelings are interpreted as the subjective expression of emotions (Fernández and Carrera, 2007).

5 Fernández and Carrera (2007: 314) propose a model based on contributions made by Russell (1989), Kercher (1992), Fernández-Dols *et al.* (2002), and García (2002).

came under attack. Here, many felt that reflections linked to the notion of 'Post-Modernity' offered better explanations of the way society really worked (Sarries, 1993). These ideas also posed new challenges for the role of traditional actors in labour relations given that they envisaged novel actions and commitments, and a different, dynamic view of the world of work (Vega, 2006). However, it was not union pressure, labour disputes, or self-management proposals that led to this paradigm shift but rather companies themselves (Marín Artiles, 1999).

A host of new challenges sprang up from the cracks in Fordism and Taylorism[6], favouring the emergence of a host of employers' initiatives for creating new productive systems and forms of work organisation. On the one hand, a new, much more flexible production system was imposed as new life was breathed into old *laissez-faire* ideas and capital and labour markets were deregulated (Alonso and Fernández, 2013). On the other hand, traditional mass production and assembly lines proved too inflexible for uncertain, rapidly-changing markets and could not meet the need for diverse products and swift response to turbulent demand patterns. As a result, New Forms of Work Organisation (NFWO) were drawn up to deal with these shortcomings. These changes were accompanied by new management models[7] trumpeting 'pro-business values'. The *leitmotive* of triumphalist discourses in management literature and the unrelenting stress on workers' commitment to the company played a vital role in pushing these changes through (Fernández 2007a).

In its endless quest for excellence, a flexible company hides its most daring transformations under a new culture based on the myth of 'Total Quality', which turns out to be the best mirror of change (Sarries, 1993). New schools of thought (such as Critical Management Studies) were sceptical of these management techniques given their highly subjective nature (Fernández, 2007b). All these 'corporate culture' programmes seek to boost control over the affective domain in a systematic, legitimised fashion. Human Resources (HR) and 'Total Quality' programmes are used to this end, shaping employees' views (Gorroño, 2008).

Methodologically speaking, the research was based on two key elements: (1) The in-depth study of the change in the employment relationship model carried out at the Opel España plant in Figueruelas (Zaragoza, Spain); (2) Analysis of the relational dynamics of the actors running the negotiations through communiqués issued throughout the collective bargaining process.

The main functional value of these communiqués was to inform the other party in the negotiation. However, as contextualised written productions, these communiqués constituted stories in which the actors exchanged statements and, with them, feelings and emotions. Accordingly, we chose a highly qualitative approach to these materials, using sundry tools and procedures falling within the broad scope of Discourse Analysis (DA).

In drawing up the corpus of texts, the focus was put on the 1990s, including the communications issued by both Management (D) and the Company Committee (CE). Finally, given the highly specific nature of this research, we included only those bulletins issued during negotiations of the 'peer agreements. Once this criterion was applied, steps were taken to ensure the corpus exhibited sufficient consistency and contextual significance. The total sample was made up of 136 communications distributed as shown in Figure 2. Once the corpus was configured, all those terms and expressions directly or indirectly indicating

6 Although many studies begin by speaking of Post-Taylorism and 'Lean Production' others consider it more prudent to speak of 'The Crisis of Taylorism'. Here, Martín Artiles (1999) argues that NFOT does not necessarily involve a technical change in the basic principles of Taylorism, of work organisation, or of what work is.

7 These new forms of work organisation and management do not always imply a radical change. In most cases they end up partially complementing traditional work organisation (Martín Artiles, 1999).

Figure 2 Total communications included in the Text Corpus

Convenio	6th		8th		10th	
Year	1992		1996		2001	
Actor	Manage-ment	Works Committee	Manage-ment	Works Committee	Manage-ment	Works Committee
No. of bulletins	27	25	19	21	22	22
Contextua meaningl	Shift from mass production to flexible production		External and internal globalisation		Loss-making Financial Yera	

The analysis of the affective patterns so generated fell into one or other of the following two clearly differentiated blocks:

(1) The first block focused on analysis of the affective management carried out by the protagonists in relation to the wider setting in which each negotiation took place.

(2) The second block focused on the affective management of the content of the negotiation agenda in each collective agreement.

Below we present some of the main results from the first analytical block (that is to say, the trading setting). The fact that much broader forces partly shape labour practices and outcomes made us focus part of the analysis on the economic background to the paradigm shift in labour relations.

This affective management was carried out by the protagonists in the first negotiation sessions, specifically in: the bulletins corresponding to the 2nd negotiation session in the 1992 and 1996 agreements, and the 3rd session in the 2001 agreement. The main content for analytical purposes was found in just 6 bulletins out of the total sample. These bulletins contained valuable information on the backdrop against which negotiations were conducted.

THE TALE OF A DECADE

Reporting on the broader setting within which negotiations take place offers arguments to the parties involved. Here, "the tactic is to persuade the other party to make concessions and to come up with counter-arguments to the other side's proposals" (Carrier, 1988: 179).

As we shall see throughout this section, Management skilfully used this tactic in the first negotiating sessions in reporting on the Company's present and future. The Works Committee, for its part, hardly offered an alternative affective description to Management's appraisal, focusing instead on its own set of claims. This is why we shall first analyse the affective discourse made by Management. Second, we will reflect on the extent to which the Works Committee consented to or resisted Management's position.

MANAGEMENT'S APPROACH TO AFFECTIVE ELEMENTS: THE LANGUAGE OF RISKS

The Management view of the economic setting and the steps needed to deal with it can be seen as forming an overarching argument. It was firmly embedded in a whole series of descriptive, informative, and even explanatory sequences that were used to reinforce a persuasive discourse that constantly harped on 'risk'.

As Camps says: "The present is full of uncertainties and risks, to which we react emotionally with fear or look for a solution that holds out hope" (2011: 208). This was to prove the basic affective scheme used by Management throughout its discourse. The 'risk' paradigm was linked to the perception of a hostile, turbulent environment, while the 'risk avoidance' paradigm was

Figure 3 **Contextual elements, goals and lines of action**

1992	1996	2001
DESCRIPTION OF THE SETTING		
• Japanese competition • Sales: - Marked US decline - Europe holds its ground (German growth spurt) - Spanish decline: 'credit squeeze' • European Demand: 1970-1990 constant growth 1990 stagnation • Forecast recession in Germany	• Competition: - Globalising production: Developing Countries - Product Globalisation: Other Company car plants	• Slow-down in demand • Production over-capacity • Price-cutting over and above features offered • A loss booked for the Financial Year
TARGETS, AIMS, AND PROPOSED ACTIONS		
Do not lose COMPETITIVENESS • Make the company more cost-competitive • Achieve top results • Customer satisfaction	Boost COMPETITION • Keep the lid on costs • Constant improvement of product quality • Attract investment	Restore PROFITABILITY
Proposed actions	**Proposed actions**	**Proposed actions**
QUALITY NETWORK • Simplified production • Teamwork • Continuous improvement • Just In Time (JIT)	BE RESPONSIBLE Do nothing to harm competitiveness	• Cut jobs • Stop recruitment • Cut labour costs

linked the Management's proposals at various junctures during the negotiations. The strategy was basically one of inducing fear and then holding out hope.

Discursively speaking, these two paradigms typify the language surrounding risks[8] and cover two kinds of enunciative modes[9] — the epistemic and the deontic. In each of them, two extremes are conjured up, letting the speaker position himself wherever he likes. The epistemic mode, which bears on *knowledge*, is framed within the parameters of 'certainty' and 'likelihood'. The deontic mode, the one bearing on the *duty to be* or the *duty to do*, falls within the parameters of 'permissiveness' and 'duty'.

Before looking at the special features of this approach, Figure 3 gives a brief outline-summary of the key elements on which the Management will rest all its affectivity-based arguments.

The perception of the broader setting or a discourse rooted in fear

As noted above, Management systematically induced fear when describing the broader business setting. However, all this emotional artifice was mainly concentrated during the negotiation of the 1992 collective agreement, dropping off as the decade wore on.

8 Together with these two paradigms, one should also note a third, namely the Risk-Reward one (Íñiguez, 2006).

9 Modality is manifested through two kinds of relations: (a) those between an author and the statements he makes in his texts; (b) those between the author's statements and his interlocutors (Calsamiglia and Tusón, 2007).

Yet one cannot assume that the perception of 'risk' slowly waned as a result. Instead, it was the way in which 'risk' was formulated that changed. Here, one should note that in Management's statements made in 1992 and 1996 to describe the situation, risks were framed with phrases such as:"it is feared", "it is thought" (1992); "will probably occur in the near future" (1996). In this corporate version of virtual reality, the threats loomed in a not-so-distant future. In the 2001 agreement, Management conjured the threat (to jobs) in a much more direct way: *A loss-making Financial Year* (2001).

Curiously enough, the less reliable knowledge of the risk is, the greater the affective component in the discourse, and *vice versa*. It is likely that one does not have to conjure up a palpable risk and gild the lily to make the target audience quake with fear. That said (taking a constructionist perspective); sparking emotion often does the trick. This certainly seems to be the case when one looks at the affective tricks resorted to in describing the wider economic setting in the 6th collective agreement (1992). This accord proved the keystone for consolidating the new labour relationship model.

The main process for articulating affective content in this agreement bore on the steady rise in competition. Management very skilfully directed the semantics in the negotiations to ensure the actors (Japan, Germany, Spain, and the Spanish Government) played their corporately allotted roles.

As the affective diagram shows, Management's remark on "an impressive, growing trend" revealed its admiration for Japan's production capacity. This not only heightened fear of a highly capable enemy but also let Management project its impression of Japanese workers as incredibly hard-working and utterly committed to the company. This was a side-swipe at Spanish workers, who were supposedly shaped by a different work ethic. Within the argument framework,

Figure 4 Management's affective pattern to describe the economic setting in 1992



Japan was given a key role not only because it was seen as both the biggest and most palpable threat: "As of 1993 Europe will be the industrial battlefield of the car industry mainly due to Japanese competition".

Germany also occupies a prominent place in this diagram. In principle, this nation is the only actor that — through the *Gratitude* label — lies in a quadrant corresponding to positive affections. This leaves Germany's image intact and all that it represents for both the Company and for Europe.

On the other hand, the only negative reference to Germany is Management's fear that this nation may have a recession — something reinforced by the statement that Germany has been the 'economic locomotive' pulling the rest of Europe and Spain in its train. This remark nuances Management's apparent gratitude, thereby introducing yet another element of fear — namely the dire consequences for Spain of any major downturn in the German economy.

This apparent gratitude for the role played by Germany reaches its starkest expression in Management's reference to Spain, which occupy the quadrant in the diagram reserved for low activity and negative valence. The comment is an unflattering one: "GM España has weathered the fall in sales thanks to Germany." On this occasion, the Directorate presents GM España as a mere passive agent, a victim incapable of standing on its own two feet to face the dangers that lie in wait for it. Thus, one can see how Germany and Spain have been cleverly woven into the discourse, arousing highly differentiated feelings: compassion and pity for Spain, gratitude and admiration for almighty Germany.

This semantic process of humanisation was to be used widely in the Spanish car industry, with the sector being painted as the victim of the Government's 'credit squeeze'. Making a victim out of Spain's automobile sector let Management wriggle out of any blame for the plant's mediocre results by blaming the Government instead. The government thus became the Company's and the workers' common enemy.

The Directorate resorted to the same symbolic strategies to describe the business setting in the negotiations for the 8th Agreement in 1996, albeit resorting to less emotionally charged language. Discursively speaking, one should recall that the perception of risk in 1996 was based on higher probabilities than in 1992 but on less certainty than in 2001.

That said the source of Management's worries was the same — namely rising competition. This fear was semantically mediated by other aspects: (1) The main threats were seen as coming from Asia, Latin American, and Eastern Europe, as well as from the Company's plants scattered throughout the rest of the world; (2) The combined threat posed by players lay not so much in their organisational virtues as in their low production costs. The argument underpinned Management's affective strategy for the 1996 collective bargaining negotiations.

One of the most striking aspects of this affective pattern was the caution with which Management broached internal competition. In principle, the main worry concerned external competition. Yet even though Management avoided any direct reference to internal competition [i.e. from other Spanish plants], it cunningly suggested it through the term "*Very Strong*". This let Management subtly warn the workers of the peril while shirking any Company blame for the risk.

To this end, Management wrote two clearly differentiated paragraphs, one alluding to the external competition and the other to the internal kind. Although Management did not hesitate to call the Opel Corsa 'a global car', it was keen to avoid GM plants competing for manufacture of the same model. Building a collective identity requires semantically differentiating oneself from 'other car-makers', presenting them affectively as the true agents of risk.

Finally, the affective component was missing from the negotiating climate for the 2001 collective agreement. Management informed workers in a neutral fashion that the Company had booked a loss for that

Figure 5 Management's affective strategy to describe the broader business setting in 1996



Financial Year. Some theories hold that fear always stems from uncertainty but it can also arise from perils that are staring one in the face. The difference lies in how the threat is expressed. A Company 'in the red' does not need to conjure up threats to frighten workers because the danger is plain for all to see.

Proposals for action or the hope of avoiding the risk

Once the description of the economic setting has made workers fearful of the identified risks (whatever their likelihood), Management then has to give workers hope that they can avoid them. In other words, inducing fear of the threats posed by a hostile economic setting is just one half of the strategy. The other is spurring workers to action to either mitigate or avoid those risks. Aristotle said that one of the weapons in a politician's rhetorical armoury is the ability to instil fear in his listeners. Yet this also goes hand-in-hand with the ability to instil confidence when suggesting a solution. Fear and hope, and fear and trust, are two powerful pairs of emotions and often provide what Camps (2011) calls *the prophylactic nature of fear* — something that will be dealt with in this section.

As can be seen in the following diagram, Management's affective stress in presenting its main lines of action was only slightly less than that found in its description of the business setting. In this case, the few emotional references made are indirect ones.

In general, the 1992 and 1996 agreements struck a balance between threats (*challenges and risks*) and potential (*success and opportunities*), endowing the discourse with measured optimism: *Successfully meeting future challenges* (1992), *Opportunities and risks faced by Opel España* (1996).

The situation changed in the 2001 agreement. Just as risk perception over the decade shifted from the realms of possibility to near certainty, so Management proposals for risk avoidance also shifted from permissiveness to obligation. Some features of the discourse are highlighted below, the affective scheme of which boils down to winning people over to face fear (1992), encouraging them to avoid fear (1996), and then forcing them to live with fear (2001).

Figure 6 The pattern of Management's affective approach in presenting its lines of action



The affective discourse reached its zenith at the beginning of the decade, with peaking levels of activation and positive valence. Management's presentation of a new manufacturing system "*opposed to mass production*" and its explanation of how *"… to achieve a lean organisation"*) was put together with great skill and precision. Against the background of expansion in Japanese car production and foreseeing an "*industrial battlefield*", Management conveyed its proposed actions with great pride ("*GM España's great goals for the future*"), noble aims designed to enlist the support of the company's workforce in the fight for *competitiveness*. With workers now cast in the role of heroes, the Management argument called on them to use the new weapons to hand, and to accept changes in the production system and plant organisation as part of the overall battle plan.

Management used its expert knowledge to exploit fear of Japan's production capacity and decided to beat the Asian giant at its own game. The fear induced by Management's description of risk in 1992 was a softening-up move before imbuing workers with the confidence and pride needed to win the business battle later on. In 1992, risk was seen more as an opportunity than as a threat. This positive vision of risk as a source of energy, and the active quest for solutions were used to draw up a new corporate culture based on quality management. The goal was stated thus: *"To achieve first-class results through the Quality Network"*.

As we have seen, in 1992 Management was optimistic about the chances of taking on the Japanese car industry and winning. At this point, one might ask whether the affective discourse was part of a plan to hoodwink the workers, or if instead Management genuinely believed that it was taking the right steps. Bearing in mind the highly persuasive performance Management put in during the early stages of the

negotiation, it is hard to believe the discourse was nothing more than hot air. Management acted along the same lines in the 1996 round of collective negotiations, albeit with much less gung-ho. Here, the stress was not only on constant improvement — "the quality of the product" — but also on "cost containment": "Everyone must avoid doing anything that might harm the Company's competitiveness, which is the only guarantor of the future" (1996). One can thus see a change in Management's affective approach, involving a shift from *pride* in 1992 to *responsible fear* in 1996 that called for a more cautious strategy.

The 1996 Management discourse made it clear that it was no longer a question of winning or losing the battle against the Japanese. Instead, Management chose to blame the Works Council and its members, letting workers glimpse the dire consequences of overstepping 'the red lines' imposed by the broader business setting. Put baldly, if workers chose to go ignore those limits, they would throw away all the effort made by the Company so far to become more competitive. The Company stressed that following Management's proposals was "*the only way to ensure the future*". The discourse effectively argued that workers were duty-bound to follow the Company's strategy. Put another way, in 1992 Management focused on what should be done. In 1996 Management spelt out what should not be done.

In the negotiation of the 2001 collective agreement, *knowledge and duty* were linked to a single pragmatic semantic operator (the word *seriously*), providing an indicator of emotional attitude. By resorting to this word, Management both sought to make the *seriousness* of the situation plain and to underline workers' duty to accept the guidelines already in force at other Company plants. The message was that there was no 'wriggle room', with Management noting a forthcoming *"… announcement of the restructuring of its operations in Europe*". These restructuring measures included cutting production capacity, hiring fewer workers, and slashing jobs and overtime. The dawn of the 21st Century marked a new business context and approach to affective management.

AFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF THE WORKS COUNCIL: SUCCUMBING TO OR RESISTING RISK?

Contrary to what one might have expected, the Works Council did not respond in kind to Management's discourse. Instead, in these early stages of the negotiation, the Works Committee focused more on marshalling protest. That is why few inferences on emotional states can be drawn from the statements made by the Works Committee.

Here, the Work Committee's lack of interest in Management's analysis of the broader business setting was apparent in the former's stock response: *"On Thursday Management will give information on how the Company is faring. Negotiations will begin in earnest once these details have been provided"* (1996); *"As usual, the next meeting will begin with a presentation of how Management sees the Company's present and future"* (2001). Notwithstanding this attitude, we still need to reflect on some subjective considerations arising in this regard.

The lack of affective content in the 1992 agreement is especially significant given the highly affective-based approach taken by Management. This confirms the idea that a great affective display by one of the parties does not necessarily elicit a similar display by the other party. Specifically, the Works Committee gave its members a dry summary of Management's proposals for introducing a new paradigm for running the plant. The lack of emotional reaction to such a watershed moment makes one ask how far the Works Council was willing to fight such plans, and indeed whether it was complicit in them.

A first working hypothesis is that the Works Council was simply unaware of the depth of the changes afoot. Yet the fact is that the unions decided in 1992 to take on advisors and experts covering *"specific issues"* in relation the change in production methods and organisation. This suggests that while the Works Council had some inkling of the changes taking place, it was too slow on the uptake in grasping what these meant for future labour relations.

In addition, Management's arguments were highly persuasive given its clever resort to symbolism and its skilful explanatory discourse. This let Management appropriate the role of expert, giving it even greater power. The clearly asymmetric expert-layman relationship (with Management cast in the role of the former and the Works Committee in the latter) helped undermine Labour's ability to express opposition.

An indication of the Work Committee's weak evaluation skills is the literalness with which it conveyed Management's idea that *"continuous improvement should not mean working more but better"* (1992). Merely parroting the statement without critically challenging it suggest how far Management ideas had spread both within the Works Committee and the workforce, with both of the latter taking the values and organisational schemes proposed by the Company at face value. In 1992, Management was not only wholly convinced it was making the right proposals but also that the Works Committee would take up the discourse as its own.

During the 1996 negotiations, the Works Committee angrily reacted to some of Management's exhortations that workers should not do anything that might harm the Company's competitiveness. Yet this hostility did not involve questioning either the system or the corporate strategy that set the plant's workers against those at other Company factories following implementation of 'internal globalisation' plans. Instead, the reaction was sparked by the perceived Management slight to workers in GM España's plants. The Works Committee's reaction showed this was a sore point: "*… After 12 years in operation, Opel España continues to be the GM company with the largest production in the world, staying first in both efficiency and profitability terms, surpassing even the newly-built plants"* (1996). This bears out the earlier hypothesis. The internal competition fostered by the Company was not defined by the Works Committee in terms of greed or exploitation. Instead, the criticism was limited to Management's lack of trust in the work force, failure to acknowledge workers' efforts, and distrust of workers' ability to meet Company standards. What the Works Committee wanted was respect from Management but in demanding this, it showed agreement with Management's values and interests: "*The way the factory works is very important to us and will be so in the future*" (emphasis mine). In its defence, the Works Committee ended up blaming Management on the same grounds as the Company, namely efficacy: *"Even so, we have made it clear that the same happens in all companies. If there is inefficiency in the industrial process, only 20% of the problem can be laid at workers' door — the remaining 80% is Management's fault"*.

In the 2001 agreement, the Works Council chose another strategy, making up for its lack of appeal to emotions by disputing Management's argument that the Company was going through a crisis (the firm booked a loss for the Financial Year): *"We will not negotiate against the background of an imaginary crisis"*. Oddly enough, it was within the framework of objectivity and affective neutrality that the Committee reacted most vehemently in opposing Management, going so far as to question whether the latter was acting in good faith. Although emotions were not expressed, that does not mean they were not felt.

CONCLUSIONS

The first thing that one should highlight is the function of collective bargaining itself. It came into being under the Fordist model of labour relations and was shaped by its theoretical and practical assumptions, which nevertheless were later harnessed to draw up the new model.

From the protagonists' analysis of the business setting, one can draw the following conclusions.

Based on the affective patterns created throughout the decade, Management played a highly active role while the Works Committee played a relatively passive one. The emotions deployed by Management in the pursuit of its aims were: admiration, gratitude, fear, compassion, pride, trust, optimism, threat, concern, and suffering.

That said, the resort to emotions was unevenly spread throughout the decade. The use made of emotions in the negotiation of the 1992 collective agreement coincided with Management's wish to drive through major changes in the company's production and organisational systems. The appeal made to emotions slowly waned thereafter.

Management's basic affective scheme involved inducing both fear and hope in a discourse typical of the language of risks, which is to say that of 'being' at risk and that of 'avoiding' risk. The affective discourse followed the 'being' paradigm of risk in defining a turbulent, hostile environment but showed some flexibility, especially in relation to 'probable' risk as opposed to 'true' risk. The discourse stressed 'risk avoidance' but put less emphasis on emotions, taking a more indirect approach.

The analysis of these affective dynamics reveals a society that is both reflective and that involves risks. At the beginning of the decade, this affective approach was based on a *virtual reality* in which divining risk was no bar to taking a positive view. By contrast, the risks had become all too clear by the end of the decade.

The evidence also points to a clear consolidation of the organisational ideology enshrined in the *New Management* discourse and in plans for Human Resources. The management literature spawned by the great gurus in response to a crisis-ridden Fordist production system strongly coloured Management's whole affective discourse.

With regard to proposals for future research, the rift between the affective strategies developed at the beginning of one decade and the next is fertile ground for further analysis. Such studies would allow a more accurate comparison of affective deployment during paradigm shifts and their consolidation. It would also be interesting to see whether the dynamics established between the actors in our case are also found in areas other than labour relations, especially in settings involving high uncertainty and asymmetric power structures.

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Emotional Confrontation and Public Deliberation on Paid Sex. The Struggle between Disgust and Shame

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ABSTRACT

In this paper, we address affective and motivational aspects in relation to the controversy, which can be articulated around a mediatised public issue. We are interested in how emotions are a part of the experience and definition of a phenomenon that is seen as intolerable and for which intervention is demanded and the strategic appeal to an affective repertoire in reaching a position on the issue. We analyse the systems of meaning and emotions mobilised in the current controversy about prostitution and trafficking of persons for the purpose of sexual exploitation. The goal here is to grasp how the perspectives involved employ emotional strategies in which basic affective dispositions and transitory emotions intersect, and how this affects deliberation on the issue. Discourses and stories, as well as defining and framing the emotions of the actors in the controversy furnish emotional experiences to their publics, encouraging them to incorporate certain rules of feeling that form part of the moral and ideological perspectives promoted.

Methodologically, we use an ethnographic approach to follow the conflict and a socio-semiotic discourse analysis. Our case study covers two linked viral campaigns in social networks (*Hola Putero and Hola Abolicionista*). The goal is to reflect on the way in which setting and affective strategies hinder resolution of the issue.

Keywords: public sphere, emotions, prostitution, semiotics, socio-sexual imaginaries.

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INTRODUCTION: MEDIATISATION AND PUBLIC CONTROVERSY ON PROSTITUTION

Prostitution, sex work and sex-trafficking are age-old public issues (Cefaï, 1996; Gilbert and Henry, 2012; 1991, p. 31)[1]. The controversy surrounding them has a place of its own in contemporary public debate both at home and abroad (Andrijasevic and Mai, 2016; Bernstein, 2010; Heim, 2012; Sanders, O'Neill, and Pitcher, 2009; Serughetti, 2018; Wagenaar and Altink, 2012; Ward and Wylie, 2017). The debate on prostitution is part of a set of common interest issues that seem to be 'structural' in nature. That is because they are 'old chestnuts' in the public sphere, and arouse strong passions and debate on 'moral policy' (Wagenaar and Altink, 2012).

Likening the 'debate' to a war is not far wide of the mark, given the sheer aggressiveness and tension that has long characterised it (Gimeno, 2012: 17; Lamas, 2016). This sharp divide can be seen in the very first Conference on Prostitution, held in 1971 in New York, which marked the so-called 'Sex Wars' that broke out at the Barnard Conference. Although the controversy has undergone several twists and turns, the battle lines remain much the same. In this respect, the debate and become a long-running classic, or less flatteringly, repetitive and worn.

A controversy advances if it is a quest for answers and fosters dialogue centred on an expectation of closure or solution. However, when the commonplaces, stories and arguments deployed by the two mainstream camps are mutually incompatible, meaningful dialogue with 'the enemy' becomes well-nigh impossible.

There was a paradigm shift from an initial anti-prostitution position based on hygienist and moralistic models (stressing concern about vice and public order) to one based on the broader fight against sex-trafficking (which includes prostitution). This mixing of prostitution and trafficking dominates the controversy. The approval of international regulations rooted in The Palermo Protocol fostered a Defence of Human Rights-based approach to paid sex. However, this focus is of limited practical use in dealing with prostitution given that priority is given to anti-trafficking measures, border control, and stopping illegal immigration. This disjuncture arises from the persistence of a highly-polarised debate on legal, political, and socio-cultural models of prostitution. These conflicting concepts hinder the wider adoption of a Human Rights approach.

The Spanish Congress' *Report on Prostitution*[2] (13th April 2007) was the starting gun for the recent debate, with attention mainly focusing on the controversy surrounding advertisements in the popular press. Later on, the focus shifted to public order and safety issues following the 2015 reform of the Law covering sexual procurement. That same year, *Ciudadanos* [a Far-Right political party] made a highly mediatic proposal for regulating prostitution — a subject it dropped in later electoral debates. In the political arena, *Partido Popular (PP)* [a Centre-Right political party] — took an abolitionist stance while in opposition but when in office took measures that were initially prohibitionist and later tolerant (Álvares, 2016). The *PSOE* [a Centre-Left political party] has institutionalised abolitionism under the banner of equality policies — a drift reinforced by the stance taken by *Podemos* [a Far-Left political party]. While the policy has led to internal rifts, the party nevertheless seems to assume Left-Wing abolitionist proposals — something that can be gathered from the appointment of Beatris Gimeno to the *Instituto de la Mujer* [Institute for Women] given that she is a strong proponent of abolition (Gimeno, 2012).

Contemporary abolitionism has evolved through its definition of the 'prostitution system', which links prostitution to sexual violence, 'criminalising the

1 This paper forms part of the R&D project Problemas públicos y controversias: diversidad y participación en la esfera mediática(MINECO CSO2017-82109-R) [Public Issues and Controversies: Diversity and participation in the media sphere.

2 Translator's Note: The long-winded Spanish title is: *Informe de la Ponencia sobre la situación de la prostitución en nuestro país.*

client' in the process. Although the first wave of radical abolitionism made a big impact on Spanish academia, it was not reflected in the legislation until recently. The context has been neo-abolitionist (above all, since 2008, being most strongly reflected in local by-laws) (Bodelon and Arce, 2018), with awareness campaigns aimed at discouraging would-be prostitution 'customers'.

The controversy has grabbed attention over the last few years, with key abolitionist works getting published (De Miguel, 2106; Cobo, 2017), and a documentary on sex-trafficking winning the *Goya* film prise (Lozano, 2015). The PSOE's abolitionist proposals streamline debate in the political arena, spurring strategic measures by social movements. Against this background of intensifying controversy, in December 2017, the *Towanda Rebels* dynamic duo (Sua Méndes and Teresa Losano) launched the *Hola Putero* [*Hello Whoremonger!*] campaign on their social channel, which went viral and is the subject of our case study. Only a few months later, in August 2018, a controversy broke out after the banning of the Union of Sex Workers (OTRAS). In response to this, the Socialist Government leaked a Draft Bill in December for outlawing sex-trafficking and that enshrined neo-abolitionist approaches to legislation on the subject.

Part of the abolitionist strategy in this recent era has been based on linking prostitution to sex-trafficking, framed in terms of a spectrum of 'patriarchal' violence. The design and implementation of policies in the fight against trafficking at the international level and the ease of translating this issue into awareness campaigns (often from the rhetoric of victimisation) strengthened this stance and turned it into a 'common sense' issue that elicited broad sympathy (Andrijasevic and Mai, 2016). However, its hegemonic position has been contested by the pro-rights movement, which has defended sex work as a legitimate occupation. This movement draws a distinction between prostitution and sex-trafficking, insisting on the need to protect the fundamental rights of those engaging in sex for money (Heim, 2012). In Spain, the movement's ability to effectively advocate its cause in the public sphere is relatively new. The organisation's reach was extended (especially from 2015 on) by a strategy that went beyond self-help to take its message to the wider world and become more media-wise. An example of this can be seen through its re-appropriation and use of the slogan 'feminist whore'. The *Hola abolitionist* [*Hello Abolitionist!*] campaign was pitched within this framework and as a direct response to *Hola Putero* campaign. The former served as a tool for not only questioning the rules of feeling proposed by the abolitionist discourse to target audiences but also as an affective strategy for articulating the movement itself.

"The activities certain groups carry out when drawing up a definition or in stressing one issue over another are aimed at winning over target audiences or at least at emotionally mobilise them. These audiences will be broader the more generalisation mechanisms operate between a given case and the wider social setting" (Schillagi, 2011). By linking a problem to a system of meaning, affection and familiar values for the target audience[3], the greater an actor's chances of winning supporters, conveying the message through the media, putting it on the political agenda, and in general of being acknowledged as the 'owner' and hegemonic voice in said matter. Actors play a game in which they strike a balance between both familiar and 'odd¡ aspects of the issue in pursuing their ends (Peñamarin, 2016). Their goal is to reframe certain aspects of social reality, seeking new emotions and rules of feeling that get more people 'on board' (Flam, 2005, p. 19) with their political programme. This attempt to win over the general public on family issues tends to be made harder when audiences are presented with opposing, incompatible options. Our hypothesis is that blockage occurs when affective strategies seek

3 We use the notion of target audience found in Dewey's work (2004), developed by the French Pragmatist School (Joseph, 2015), with sees this audience as a community of actors who are directly or indirectly affected and mobilized by a given issue. Audiences are a form of social life typified by exploration, a creative quest for values, drawing up needs, and confronting systems of feeling and life in common (Cefaï, 2016).

to maximise opportunities by exploiting fleeting emotions (Irvine, 2008).

THEORETICAL PROPOSALS: GIVING MEANING TO THE EMOTIONS OF THE ACTORS AND THE PUBLIC IN A CONTROVERSY

Emotions play a role in the construction and modification of the public sphere in many ways. Among other things, they help create, foster, limit, or block political projects (Álvares-Peralta, Fernándes and Massoli, 2017; Ahmed, 2004b; Berlant, 2011; Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta, 2001). Emotions underpin new actors, their consolidation, and organisational modes, as well as forging links between these and other subjects (Ahmed, 2004a). They also create an audience interested in a given issue (in this case, prostitution), imaginaries, and socio-sexual practices.

Our working hypothesis is that emotional experience is central to the ways in which a mediated controversy evolves and is settled. We are interested in discovering how emotions: (1) work in aligning individuals with collectives and in mediating the relationship between the psychic and the social; (2) intervene in the power relations between actors and the production of hegemonic representations and values in relation to 'ownership' of public issues. Here, we have drawn on scholarly work stemming from the affective turn (Arfuch, 2016), theoretical-methodological tools for researching the emotional situation each angle on prostitution lays before the public, highlighting the performative, deeply political nature of affects, emotions, and affective dispositions (Frijda, Manstead, and Bem, 2000; Sais-Echesarreta, 2012). Here, we take a socio-semiotic perspective, analysing the values, emotions and links fostering visual and/or verbal discourses, and the stories rooted in each perspective (García and Peñamarín, 2020; Illous, Gilon, and Shachak, 2014).

We analyse the emotional strategies (Whittier, 2001) of the actors in a context of mediated controversy whose goal is to shape power relations and resolve a public issue. These strategies imply the development of affective work (Hochschild, 1990) by the audiences that are directly or indirectly involved, making use of certain empathy maps (Hochschild, 2013) and helping to legitimise systems of meaning, ideologies and rules of feeling — what Ahmed calls 'affective economies' (Ahmed, 2004a).

According to Hochschild, we have expectations about what one should feel in each social practice — something that shapes the emotional work we do to adapt to the norm and the affective style seen as appropriate. Activism campaigns create a common 'territory of feeling' on an issue, conditioning forms of participation and get on the same affective wavelength as everyone else in the community. To identify the rules of feeling in discourses, we looked at the intersection between affective dispositions (stabilised emotional rules and habits) and transitory emotions (Irvine, 2008). The emotional strategies that emerge at this intersection operate through the articulation of the emotional reports issued by the actors involved, repertoires for the public's consumption and interpretation and commanding their adherence (or not) in the mediated public sphere.

Affective dispositions shed light on the difference between feeling an emotion and being willing to feel it. Shared emotions within the framework of collective action are not reactions to singular beliefs or events but rather dispositional phenomena, which are projected, generate beliefs and enable action guides that need to be activated and performed. They are "tendencies that refer to a network of cognitive beliefs and affective evaluations that construct and delimit an object before which the subject positions herself and that, in addition, modulates an enunciative place shared with others" (Sais-Echesarreta, 2012). In this enunciative staging, such disposition acquires a specific trajectory in the face of emerging patterns and potential topics (Boltanski, 2000, p. 83). In this process, the disposition can act as motivation and argument to guide and promote collective actions.

We object to the idea of an *a priori* catalogue of emotions, which would identify those capable of fostering or blocking the emergence of a collective actor, activating or inhibiting political action, facilitating or hindering the closure of a controversy, and so forth. Instead we analyse how each emotion operates in specific contexts, how the various emotions intersect and articulate with one another within the framework of the affective repertoire, bearing in mind that emotions are not intrinsically positive or negative regardless of the meaning they acquire for the subject, spur action, or are experienced (Berlant, 2011; Macón, 2014). This complex, ambivalent articulation of emotion affects the target audience's stories, practices and emotional experiences. It also underlies 'affective economies', revealing "how emotions work to align some subjects with or against others" (Ahmed, 2004b, p. 118).

Our goal is to identify what happens in mediated contexts when affective repertoires emerge and circulate in ways that fuel controversy and confrontation. The emotional strategies used by actors in such contexts not only tie the issue in with feelings, affect, and familiar values in the target audience but also foster transitory emotions (Irvine, 2008). These strategies modulate the underlying affective climate to: (1) heighten emotions; (2) boost discourses and practices for mobilising target audiences and for resolving the uncertainties spawned by public controversies. Transitory emotions are of a strategic nature given that they forge links between public arenas (Cefaï, 2016) and actors: The State, interest groups, social movements, media representations, and citizens constituting emotional audiences.

Certain transitory emotions characterise the alert states common in moral panic strategies, described in the classic works by Stanley Cohen (1972/2017) and Stuart Hall (1978). In situations of moral and sexual panic (Rubin, 1989), the media intervene, together with other expert actors, furnishing key instances that reinforce the legitimising power of emotions and facilitating their circulation. This process naturalises "sexual hierarchies, establishing certain sexualities as normal and others as disgusting or inexpressible". The affective conventions of sexuality — especially sexual shame, stigma, fear, disgust — reinforce this regulatory system and are therefore political" (Irvine, 2008). When certain emotions are naturalised, consolidated as a commonplace, the public can inadvertently identify with such emotional-moral predisposition and with the community that shares it, which evidently affects the power relations between communities and their emotional repertoires.

The performative efficacy of transitory emotions also depends on their dramaturgical dimension (their staging as an expression) that varies strategically depending on the audiences and the frames of meaning (Hochschild, 1990; Le Breton, 2013). In this case, emotional expression is embodied in speeches and stories that have to be adapted to media forms in a simplified and shocking way (Jasper, 2013) to make actors elicit/experience the desired emotions.

The debate on what is presented as a pressing public issue is largely framed by a series of recognisable scripts and patterns such that transitory emotions linked to the object of sexual moral panic are tied into affective dispositions (or emotional habits). The purpose here is to grab attention and to focus mutual commitment and to foster a strong sense of moral rectitude, legitimising public action and the practices of some of the actors (and at the same time, de-legitimising and masking those of other actors) (Irvine, 2008: 18).

Audiences can identify, incorporate and validate these transitory emotions because they are familiar, they stem from shared affective dispositions and repertoires that help in broadening, questioning, or developing an approach. On the other hand, expert actors (specialists, academics, public institutions, organisations) appropriate issues, capitalising on these transitory emotions, and amplifying and justifying them to regulate and legitimise the proposals they put forward.

Prostitution has always been linked to episodes of

sexual moral panic (Juliano, 2008; Rubin, 1989). Human sexuality is often problematic, since personal and social emotions and values intersect in its practices and the categories applied to it can be a source of moral and political conflicts. Prostitution is a grey area of socio-sexual practices in which sex is exchanged for money. It is a phenomenon that has challenged the hetero-normative bourgeois paradigm traditionally linking it to deviation, danger, threat and stigma, typical of sexual panic. In recent decades, the high profile given to sex-trafficking has turned the fight against prostitution into something more akin to a moral crusade and as an issue that overlaps with the re-emergence of criticism of mainstream pornography (Weitser, 2020).

Discursive strategies for eliciting transitory emotion use provocative, stigmatising rhetoric. Resort is made to inciting language and symbols, scapegoating, and depravity narratives (Irvine, 2008). The discussion on prostitution is also presented as unsolvable, timeless, polarised, and takes an aggressive, deliberative tone, hampering the scope for constructive dialogue. It is increasingly common for competing perspectives to be aired in hermetically separate forums, making dialogue between opposing camps even harder.

In addition, common resort is made to reiteration (or 'viral logic') in mediated controversy. This is because strategic repetition boosts the message and its performative capacity. These repetitions, as Butler (1997) explained, play with the gap between the familiar and the strange, between continuity and rupture. This gives rise to a paradoxical combination because the repetitions mobilise norms of basic social regulation, appealing to consensual 'common sense'. They are presented as novel, transformative discourses (Irvine, 2008: 23), questioning the current social order.

To sum up, a repertoire of transitory emotions (whose efficacy lies in the intrinsic intensity of the alert state they delimit) is capable of mobilising an emotional experience. A belief accompanies this experience, managing, justifying and making sense of said emotion and its associated values. In the process, it fosters legitimation of a political proposal. Thus the limits of legitimate, appropriate feelings are marked out in the public sphere. These bounds and their transformation are then played out in the media.

METHODOLOGY

The starting point for the methodology is based on: (1) the idea that the controversy over prostitution has come to the fore of the political, social and institutional agenda; (2) the framework of the R&D Project we have been engaged in since 2014. The methodology combined: socio-semiotic analysis of discourse; an ethnographic multi-situational approach (Boyer and Hanners, 2006; Marcus, 1995) from which to follow the conflict and the emotions aroused through mediated discursive practices. In the process, analysis was carried out of the way the news media conveyed the issue, the advertising of sexual services, and institutional campaigns against sexual exploitation. Among other things, seminars were held with experts, and academic debates and social networks were monitored. This preliminary research let us identify the main perspectives and the actors supporting them, the stories, meaning systems and commonplaces defended by each, and the affective strategies and dynamics characterising the course of controversy.

Our ethnographic approach to the communicative dimension of public problems and controversies is based on the assumption that emotions lie at the heart of human sociality. Here, one should note Flam and Kleres's (2015) suggestion that both the make-up of emotions and how they circulate are nebulous and requires intense interpretation both in everyday life and in the research field. The main analytical tool is socio-semiotic methodology, which puts the construction of the senses and their interpretation at the core of the analysis (Peñamarin, 2015). Semiotics gives us tools to reconstruct and interpret meaning systems and so deal with the richness and intrinsic ambivalence of emotions and discourses, as well as providing ways to take in their complexity and

lessen their multidimensionality in the fostering of hegemony.

Methodologically speaking, we tackle the rhetorical, enunciative and performative aspects of emotional strategies, observing how these are inscribed and circulated through the discourses, and how performative practices define enunciative assemblages facilitating the emergence of audiences around a given issue. The dramaturgical tradition (Goffman) underlies the pragmatic analysis of the public sphere given the importance of the staging of affective dispositions and emotional repertoires. As we have pointed out, emotions respond to certain discursive and narrative patterns that have been described by sociology (Boltanski, 2000), cultural criticism (Ahmed, 2004b; Berlant, 2011; Miller, 1999), and the semiotics of emotions (Peñamarin, 2016). This approach helps us recognise socio-semiotic interpretations of how an emotion operates in a cultural context and to use these as valid analytical tools.

The socio-semiotic analysis of the discourses making up the controversy shed light on the emotional dimension involved. The analysis examines the: argumentative strategy (including framing and labelling); features of the discursive genre used; modes of figuration and narrativisation; appeal and discussion of imaginaries; enunciative dimension of the discourses (covering the construction of the enunciative voices, kinds of mobilisation, and the affective style used). The enunciative analysis helps us grasp how aggregations and proposals for collective action are made and articulated from movements of exclusion and hierarchisation of groups. These processes involve: (a) the intersections of identity dimensions (with gender, race, social class, and socio-sexual aspects playing key roles); (b) specific mobilisation of emotional repertoires associated with each type of subject, practice or object of value.

In this case study, we build the corpus from digital media campaigns, based on the hypothesis that technological mediation translates and adapts contemporary deliberative practices. While such campaigns are not the be all and end all of interactions and practices involved in the public sphere, they do play a great role in the current transformation, hence our focus on them.

On the 3rd of December 2017 and after making themselves known with another video defending the sundry rape victims of *La Manada* ['The Pack', a group of young rapists] the Towanda Rebels[4] launched the *Hola Putero*[5] [*Hello Whoremonger*!] campaign, which epitomised the key premises of the abolitionist position. The campaign was populist, audience-targeted, and took an approach designed to make the message 'go viral' on social networks. It adopted a rhetorical style and affective tone based on anger and outrage. It prompted a direct response on the 22nd of December 2017 with the video *Hola abolicionista*[6] [*Hello Abolitionist*!], published on the sex workers' channel — a reaction that was symptomatic of the defensive strategy taken by the pro-rights movement.

Hola Putero got wide coverage in the news media, with appearances by the protagonists, revealing abolitionism as the dominant discourse (Sais-Echesarreta, 2019). Its dissemination served to publicise this group and subsequently position it as one of the most important media advocates for abolitionism on social networks (the two authors currently have over 35,000 followers on Twitter, outnumbering other advocates such as Mabel Losano -29,300 – and Amelia Tiganus - 19,100).

The *Hola Putero* video had 760,183 views and some eight thousand comments (as of the 27th of April 2018), and received 9,600 'likes' and 10,000 'dislikes' — roughly an even split between support and rejection. From a moderate abolitionist standpoint, Rubio argues that "criminalising bad social practices is not always the best solution because it strongly undermine social legitimacy and prove hard to apply or ineffective in

4 See: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCr4l0skM9D5RcY4Cwd2V-MA

5 See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cb7t10c-bIM

6 See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B1dwlEB8mTI

resolving conflicts" (Cited in Heim, 2012). One should note that the *Hola Abolitionist* video got 108,248 views and 3,500 'likes' but only 205 dislikes, yet received hardly any media attention. This reveals the lack of interaction between opposing groups of activists, which increasingly act like 'bubbles'.

ANALYSIS

Abolitionist perspective

The *Hola Putero campaign* included the best-known arguments of hegemonic abolitionism: equating prostitution and sex-trafficking; the centrality of the victim - the main driver of the discourse and of collective action; the notion of prostitution as an essential institution of the patriarchy, perpetuating inequality, fostering violence, and underpinning practices in which women are seen as chattels or object of exchange. This explanation of the prostitution system gives prostitutes a privileged but puts those who define themselves as 'sex workers' in a small minority.

The construction of a commonplace that equates prostitution and exploitation is articulated through the isotopes of crime/infraction, suffering/violence, through the figurative roles of victims (that is to say, all prostituted women), criminals (clients) and accomplices (those in the know). This discourse stresses and repeats the supposedly degrading link between money and sex, labelling the practice as morally reprehensible and the resulting sexual practices as tainted by money (Seliser, 2011, p. 186 *et seq*.). We find constant references to payment, sale, purchase, money and investment. A chain of equivalences is established: buying sex is equivalent to buying a body and to buying a life (and thus tantamount to slavery). This same argument can be found in the slogan of the Spanish Government's anti-prostitution campaign: "Do not invest in suffering" (2017), a theme used by many other campaigns in recent years. This follows a path in which a legal (though frowned-upon) act in Spain is turned into something that is degrading and even criminal (being put on a par with rape).

With regard to the enunciation and the emotional strategy, the campaign's voice is figuratively represented by two young women who, using a free-form, indirect style, constitute a supposedly omniscient voice that challenges those defending prostitution, allegedly reproducing what they do, want, think and feel. The same voice judges 'pro-prostitution' supporters from a position of moral superiority, endorsed by defence of the victims and a call for compassion. This voice defines itself as courageous, irreverent, and necessary and tags along with a new feminist ethos expressing women's anger at 'the patriarchy'.

The production of transitory emotions in a context of moral-sexual panic calls for 'affective work' whose goal is to elicit estrangement and so help drive rejection of the attitudes, practices and values associated with paid sex. The campaign seeks to scandalise audiences through its combative tone, emotional intensification and maximisation of the arguments for why the public needs to (or 'must') take the 'right' ideological and emotional positions and wholly support the campaigners' proposals.

The affective strategy is achieved through a combination of compassion (as an affective disposition) and an emotional repertoire that resorts to disgust, indignation, shame and moral outrage. An imaginary of the victim's plight is put to work by appealing to strongly standardised affective habits bearing on the suffering of others (Boltanski, 2000) and to values such as justice, generosity, and moral superiority (when dealing with criminals and/or the morally depraved). At the same time, it challenges women to share its outrage because they are all potentially victims of prostitution (which involves objectification of the female body and its degradation) and from which they should defend themselves.

The narrative and figurative dimension of the campaign points to disgust as a basic strategy for eliciting transitory alert emotions. To do this, a mainly corporal, visceral experience prevails over cognitive resources (hence the use of particularly crude body

images: *There comes a moment when you have to let rip, to find an orifice to stuff your frustration into*), a strategy conventionally linked to the use of moral shock (Goodwin *et al*., 2001, p. 16). Behaviours are presented as both morally and physically disgusting (Miller). In this case, the disgust is associated with commonly accepted situations (Hello Whoremonger!, you are not alone) yet at the same time, it creates a strangeness, providing scope for re-categorisation (*You don't pay to fuck, you pay to rape*) which not only affects the cognitive framing of a practice but also the rules on what the 'socially appropriate' emotion is (Hochschild, 1990). The idea is that if we find something disgusting, we should throw it up but this is based on the premise that it is something that we previously swallowed (or accepted). Here, the campaign presents prostitution as a historically normalised practice and thus one that was accepted. The 'affective work' here consists of rejecting (metaphorically 'throwing up') something that is presented as threatening and polluting. Furthermore, disgust operates as a transitory emotion because it is a fleeting one marked by an irrepressible urge to expel what disgusts us so as to avoid harm (Ahmed, 2004b).

The strategy is to push the client into negative categories: from whoremonger to accomplice and, finally, to rapist. The goal is to make men — whether whoremongers and those who might become ones — ashamed and feel so exposed to society's wrath that they end up mending their wicked ways. The strategy is to make them disgusting to large swathes of public opinion. The stereotype of the 'guilty whorer' is used to show the depravity of using prostitutes' services, branding those who consider it 'normal' as the vile accomplices. The campaign opens an enunciative space that challenges the public as subjects who should feel disgusted and indignant, distance themselves and prove their adherence to this moral judgment by sharing the elicited emotion. That is to say, the mere presence of certain bodies and practices is supposed to disgust and anger us, rendering them intolerable.

Disgust serves to argue the discrimination and rejection of subjects and practices, for which it uses its performative capacity to generate a surface, a 'contact zone' as it were in which bodies contaminate one another (Ahmed, 2004b, p. 24 *et seq*.). If all the emotion these unions cause arises from intimate bodily contact, the disgust is intensified, reinforcing base emotions because it lets us link signs and senses to bodies, blocking out our other senses. Disgusting bodies and practices are attractive forces, hence the women-victims are trapped in this affective and value universe characterised by moral disgust, especially when they are depicted as mere orifices and sexual parts (even in the case of the rhetorical strategy followed by the 'whoremonger discourse'). Stigma is performatively reinforced notwithstanding the critical goal, short-circuiting other modes of affective relationship with women in prostitution contexts. In our view, this makes it even harder to mobilise non-revictimising compassion.

The abolitionist discourse seeks to create a public, appealing to a sense of emotional belonging (an 'us') while identifying a disgusting, shameful 'them' (whoremongers and those who consent to their activities) who are placed beyond the pale. The limit of this strategy occurs when women, by contact, are also degraded by being in the thrall of slavery and violence and 'selling' their bodies. This way of linking themes is especially clear in the ambivalence with which the campaign mentions consent (Serughetti, 2018) (*Your money legitimises what you do and they allow you to rape them. Do they consent or resign themselves? Resignation to being second-class women, cattle, throw-away women, 'glory holes'*). Although Serughetti avoids explicitly accusing prostitutes (who present themselves as victims of exploitation), her discourse argues that paid sex is morally contaminating, degrades whores and their clients for which both should be utterly ashamed (especially if their behaviour is freely chosen).

For shame to have political significance, witnesses are needed who agree that any arguments questioning this perspective need to be blocked. This explains the moral reproof of and disdain for those rejecting the ideas of the affective community proposed by the abolitionists (Ahmed, 2004: 99). It can also be seen

in the enunciative change in which the campaign challenges the actors defending sex work (*When you speak of consumers who pay for a service, I speak of whores. When you speak of sex workers, I speak of slaves, because they are the result of thraldom….).* Here, I am not interested in whether women have the right to prostitute themselves or not. When the controversy is framed in such terms, the difficulty of any meaningful dialogue between the two sides becomes apparent.

Pro-sex work perspective

Defending sex work constitutes a counter-hegemonic discourse framed as a response to the dominant abolitionism, adopting (in the campaign studied in this paper) a symmetrical enunciative strategy. This counter campaign — *Hola abolicionista* [Hello Abolitionist!] repeats the previous formula adopted by the *Hola putero* [Hello Whoremonger!], a strategy that limits its scope for connecting with a wider audience. The *Hola abolicionista* campaign got scant media coverage (though it commanded more interest on social networks). Nevertheless it also sought to reach a general public by reversing social contempt for sex workers and overcoming stigma by valuing their work, their freedom and their right to decide.

Hola abolicionista's enunciative strategy stresses the views of sex workers. Several women who say they are sex workers appear in the video snippets, speaking to the camera to question a 'virtual' abolitionist. The only exception to this treatment is a woman who hides her face to prevent her children being stigmatised. *Hola abolicionista* takes the form of a 'home video', a macro-genre found on social networks in which there is a clear unity of meaning and rhetorical orientation among the narrations of the speakers. Visually, the diversity of 'personal' scenes in which each woman has her own video snippet is unified by on-screen superimposition captions of phrases spoken by the women, which are thus highlighted as slogans. The combative graphics and provocative language are combined in the quest for dignity, the basic strategy used here is to value sex workers and normalise the work they do. The pro-sex work perspective has to perform much harder emotional work that in the abolitionist camp because its argumentative and emotional strategy is articulated as a response to the abolitionist discourse, and is based on what is assumed to be a 'common sense' position.

In the first place, the *Hola abolicionista* campaign questions the privileged position of the abolitionist discourse and denounces the way it identifies sex-trafficking and prostitution (*Our work is not a violation. It is a contracted service. My clients treat me much better than those in other jobs. Prostitution is not trafficking*). They argue that such identification fosters greater stigmatisation of sex workers, making them more vulnerable, silencing their testimony and denying them any vestige of legitimacy (*Thanks to your anti-prostitution campaigns and the way you label whoring as 'paternalism', I am much more stigmatised and vulnerable than ever before and am not even allowed to stand up for my rights*). They denounce the abolitionist mission to 'save' them (*You want to save me and be my Prince Charming, well, my dear clients can save me from pretenders like you*). Second, it thematises the issue of women's freedom, claiming the value of their consent, their decisions and sovereignty over their own bodies, thus linking to a key value for the feminist movement (*What you want is to forbid me from doing sex work. But you should know you can't tell a woman what she can and can't do with her body and with her life … / Did you know that when I have traded sex for money, my clients asked me more about my sexual preferences than when I've fucked for free?*). From that common place, she revalues sex work, alluding to the empowerment and scope sex workers have to set their own rules (*This is my bed and my workplace. Here I make the rules. Those who do not agree to them have to go elsewhere*. The *Hola abolitionist* campaign makes its demands explicit: rights for women workers; justice and dialogue in the search for models for managing these rights. It demands dialogue so that sex workers can put their perspective on an equal footing with that of their adversaries and because "*the discourse on prostitution — for or against — eclipses everything*". Lastly, the campaign wins legitimacy by carrying out a performative exercise by reviving the old "feminist

whore" label — a re-appropriation of the insult levelled at feminists in the past to associate the sex-workers' cause with that of feminists, assuming the inclusion of sex workers' rights within feminism even though the latter movement has been overwhelmingly abolitionist.

The movement and the campaign pursue two goals, namely to: (1) activate the affective disposition of solidarity while separating it from mere compassion; (2) deactivate the web of transitory emotions aggressively mobilised by abolitionism, especially those of disgust and shame. Likewise, sex workers must temper the sense of urgency and the state of alert conjured up by abolitionists to justify intervention to tackle prostitution. Here, sex workers need to win the support and sympathy of their fellow citizens and gain respect for their individual choices while avoiding being pigeon-holed as 'victims' or as vile persons engaged in an activity judged to be immoral, violent and contaminating.

First, the campaign seeks to reverse deeply-rooted social contempt for prostitution, and to foster respect for the activity. It does so by highlighting the dignity of the women who choose prostitution and why they feel empowered (for instance, because of the limits they place on their clients, etc.). In the process of redefining the rules of feeling, Flam (2005) mentions the added difficulties faced by movements fighting for recognition and in overcoming public shame. This emotion, like disgust, is one that helps forge links among actors, practices and objects to create a sense of unity and belonging (Ahmed, 2004b; Sedgwick, 2003, p. 104 *et seq*.). In the abolitionist discourse, both emotions facilitate the union between 'whoremongers' and 'prostitutes'. According to Sedgwick (2003, pp. 36-38), while guilt bears on actions, shame bears on a sense of oneself, challenging identity by mobilising social expectations, cultural conventions, and stigmas. Shame does not stem from prohibition or repression *per se* but rather from communicative disruption, from a failure in identifying with others, leading to the subject's isolation. In tackling such a context, the emotional work undertaken in political projects for changing this state of affairs involves linking shame to other affective repertoires offering alternatives to this highly negative emotion. This is so because the emotional pairs of shame and pride, and of self-perception and dignity are simply two sides of the same coin (*Ibid*, 38). New collective identities are spawned by lack of social recognition: "pride, anger, and solidarity are signs of emerging collective identities and a precondition of the co-ordinated action typifying social movements" (Flam, 2005, p. 27) in which members demand respect and honour.

Appiah points out that respect by others and self-respect are central goods for recognition is a basic human need. As human beings, we need others to acknowledge our worth (2010, p. 18). However, this is not just a question of external recognition since each person needs to feel 'worthy' of esteem (Appiah, 2010, p. 31). That is why people who feel despised may come up with their own 'code of honour' (a set of rules and values) in which both their work and their worth as individuals are respected.

In the *Hola abortionista* video, the dignity and honour of women who identify themselves as sex workers and who have freely chosen this activity are key. Appropriating this central, well-established freedom in modern individualism lets sex workers spurn the 'slavery' label often used to describe their activity, helping them feel better about themselves. Sex workers insist that is they who decide to have sex with a client or not, and it is they who make the rules. Reciprocity in giving and receiving is given as proof of the mutual respect on which the sex worker-client relationship is based. In addition to denying that they are slaves and victims, sex workers stress that winning respect for their work is vital to counteract the abolitionist's lack of recognition for their profession. They reject being treated in ways that should elicit indignation. Compassion, they argue, does nothing to improve things that matter to them, such as their status as workers. In arguing that prostitution is a profession that commands respect, they note that their line of work is much less precarious than many other jobs and is less

subject to labour abuses. They also seek to limit the role prostitution plays for them. Sex workers see it as merely another aspect of their lives and not as something that defines them as individuals. This is why they strongly oppose a moral and affective framework that denigrates prostitution and turns sex workers into pariahs.

Recognition is often set against compassion. According to Douglas, the difficulty of this relationship is that there are no free gifts, "Although we praise charity as a Christian virtue, we know that it hurts. If we do not ask for anything in return, we do not recognise the mutual relationship between ourselves and the person to whom we offer our gift" (Douglas, 1990).). "Put simply, reciprocity underlies mutual respect" (Sennet, 2003, p. 223). For this reason, the compassion of abolitionism towards the 'victims' is seen by sex workers as an utter lack of recognition and respect towards the very people the abolitionists say they feel sorry for.

The moral superiority exhibited by abolitionists offends those defending sex workers. The latter's discourse reveals outrage for being stigmatised, for having no rights, and for what they see as the abolitionists' contempt for them. Their response is to show the same contempt for the abolitionists by calling them whore-haters and as being the ones who stigmatise them and make them vulnerable. Thus the shame that would otherwise tar them is heaped upon the abolitionists. The sex workers refuse to feel ashamed because that would merely set the seal of approval on the dominant socio-sexual and moral code. In strategic terms, sex workers have to combat the subordinating potential of shame (Ahmed, 2004b, p. 107) and replace it with anger and indignation. The latter are two emotions where the subject may temporarily succumb to negative feelings, says Ahmed, yet where negativity and evil is then expelled and projected on someone or something else — in this case, on abolitionist feminists. The psychological reason for this 'expulsion' of shame is that if it did not occur, the subject would feel unworthy and contemptible and would end up rejecting herself. (Ahmed, 2004b, p. 104).

CONCLUSIONS: VALUES AND EMOTIONS IN THE TWO OPPOSING CAMPS

Discourses and practices facilitate the circulation of sundry affective experiences, both those that have become habitual (affective dispositions) and those that are strategically mobilised (transitory emotions) in given political contexts. The emotional framework used by the actors in pursuing their political projects makes sense through the intersection that occurs in the production and updating of emotional repertoires in the mediated sphere, reinforcing or transforming the rules on legitimate/illegitimate feelings on a public issue. In the mediated public sphere, emotions are managed strategically and must dovetail with media approaches. These requirements open a gap between the emotions stemming from social actors' internal experience of a public issue and the external context in which those actors must operate and that defines the ways emotions have to be staged. According to our observations, the emotional and argumentative repertoires of the abolitionist movement on the one hand, and of the pro sex work lobby on the other is more complex and diverse than appears in campaigns and public interventions. However, the need to mark one's own position against the other requires emotional management to ensure affective opportunities can be seized to boost public support for one's position. For example, one might say that the pro sex work discourse has limited the movement's ability to publicly express the pain arising from the multidimensional violence found in prostitution contexts. That is because mentioning the unsavoury aspects of prostitution might only strengthen the opposing abolitionist arguments and proposed solutions.

Nowadays we know that emotion is a motivational force and that target audiences are not only driven by ideologically inspired proposals and arguments. This is why political actors strive to change the emotional culture of their target audiences (Gould, 2016, pp. 161-164). This implies that in a controversy such as the one analysed in this paper, the actors seek to 'educate' target audiences by providing emotional repertoires and discursive resources to put words

and images to shared emotions that were previously woolly and ill-defined. Among other things, such nebulousness may arise from perspectives on the world and values that have yet to be explicitly linked to the issue at stake. Common affective habits will help build bridges, bringing out a specific emotional experience bearing on the public issue. On the one hand such habits may work to modify pre-established empathy maps. On the other hand, they may lead to rejection of whoremongers shifting the notion of prostitutes as disturbers of the peace to one of victims worthy of our compassion. In this case, the public's empathy is sought by an appeal to listen to whores' stories and recourse to a performative rupture the 'feminist whore' slogan and identifying prostitutes with fellow citizens and workers who also suffer from precarious employment.

This analysis reveals the strategy behind mobilisation of transitory emotions, which connect the affective report of each perspective with certain emotions typical of the protest (Jasper, 2013) (indignation, disgust, fear, anger, hope, frustration) to foster recognition and to build an audience around a proposal for tackling prostitution. The goal is thus to form an affective community committed to the worlds of meaning, values and, specifically, to the political proposals put forward by each actor in the controversy.

The affects also serve to mark the limits of what is correct and appropriate and thereby define lifestyles. In this respect, the perspectives intervening in the controversy on prostitution involve the affections enshrined in sundry bio political models, which aspire to regulate the regimes of sexuality and gender and, in broader terms, the forms of governance proper to sexual citizenship (Sabsay, 2018). In its current form, the controversy points to how normality and the processes of exclusion and subjugation are configured, rejecting dissident models of sexuality (Berlant and Warner, 1998).

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The Objectification of European Identity in the Treaties and in European Institutions' Declarations

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ABSTRACT
In recent decades the concepts of "nation" and "territorial identity" have undergone a transformation in terms of politics and academia, with a shift from traditionally dominant ethno-cultural concepts to others of a political-civic nature. The former tend to define identity through objective elements (language, history, territory, culture, traditions, etc.) while the latter take a more subjective approach (basically, 'the will to be'). In this paper, we delve into this transformation in the case of European identity. To this end, we propose a qualitative and evolutionary approach that uses texts promoted by the EU (declarations and treaties), in which identity plays a relevant role. We carry out a content analysis that singles out those elements that have come to objectify the European identity (and, as a contrast, we look at those elements bearing on the identity of the Member States). While we identify an advance in the political-civil conception as a reflection of the general trend, culturally-oriented objective elements still remain in 21st Century texts. This reflects the need to publicly present an identity in construction as something naturalised, and as part of a reality built through the ages. For Europe the concepts with greatest presence are "European identity" (more frequent in reports and brief declarations), "European culture" and "common European heritage" (more common in the treaties). These are concepts that, in some sense, reflect a given reality.

Keywords: European identity, European Union, nation, European construction.

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INTRODUCTION. THE SUPRANATIONAL EUROPEAN IDENTITY

Over the last few decades, ethno-cultural nationalism has become increasingly discredited while at the same time political and civil identity approaches have been gaining acceptance (see Author). The conception of European identity has undergone a transformation from culturally-oriented approaches (in which there has been an attempt to objectify the common identity of Europeans) to formulations that some call 'Republican' (but that, following the logic of nationalism, could fit within the civic-political sphere), and even within a partial renunciation of the 'objective' of European identity.[1] This paper takes a qualitative approach from a historical perspective; its goal is to reveal this hypothetical transformation and at the same time show the hurdles to creating a European identity, one of the EU's 'non-economic' priorities at various points in time. This in turn lets one more accurately pin down the self-definition of European identity drawn up by the architects of 'The European Project' and that lay plans for building such an identity.

As a first step and in order to develop an argument, we will try to determine to what extent a European identity can be equated with a national identity. Here, we combine both objective and subjective factors on similar lines to Hroch (1996) and Gellner (1983). In doing so, we consider that a nation enshrines: (1) a community with a common origin and history (often embellished to give a little mystique); (2) a common territory; (3) a shared culture (including some elements that in some cases are decisive such as language, customs, traditions, lifestyles, religion and so forth), and which could have undergone some kind of political formation or institution to which all members are (or were) linked. A nation is also one whose members recognise that they belong to a community based on internal homogeneity that is provided by common characteristics (Author).

European identity is based on a Continental European 'super-nation' and as a 'national identity', combining both objective and subjective elements. Yet its short, murky path towards objectification to date attracts little support from citizens in EU Member States (Authors).

The objectification of European identity

First of all, one needs to determine whether objective factors (the first part of the definition previously cited) make sense in the case of a European identity. Maryon McDonald (1999: 78; also see Delanty, 2003; Innerarity, 2013) highlighted the difficulties of such an approach some years ago, namely:

1. The "culture-history-people-territory" package that nationalism has traditionally used is not easily transferable to Europe, and therefore it is complicated and less than convincing.

2. Nations have been built progressively, in some cases over centuries, permitting a greater accommodation of the elements of identification. The short life of the EU carries connotations of artificiality, making the *ad hoc* construction all the more apparent.

3. Nationalism is linked to certain traditions and beliefs that do not correspond to current forms of diversity and relativism.

4. The old *nationalism* assumes that identities are monolithic and that cultures are homogeneous; however, identities are contextual, relational and changing (something that is becoming increasingly clear).

We largely accept these reasonable objections and consider, like Popa (2016: 11), that we are talking about two identities (the European-supranational and the national ones of Member States) whose interaction — whether competitive or of a complementary

1 The concepts that tend to objectify identity are of an ethno-cultural nature, while those based on subjective elements are more of a political-civic nature (see Author). Political-civic concepts are linked to acquired traits while ethno-cultural concepts are more linked to innate ones (see Westle, 2016), although this last dichotomy is not covered in this paper.

nature — means they need to be approached on the same level. The hegemonic rivalry among pro-European elites and some of the Member States, sharpened precisely by the effort to create a European Constitution in 2004 first, and later by the financial crisis, reveals this need at a time when the European project is being openly challenged.

We have already pointed out the difficulties of pinning down the factors objectifying European identity. In this respect, Europe lacks both a single, exclusive history and clear political precedents providing a shared sense of European belonging. Furthermore, the territory is under constant change and debate, there is no identity based on a clearly-defined cultural tradition. Likewise, there is no single language that could facilitate the development of a common public culture and Christianity cannot yield a clear, unifying nucleus. In addition, European symbols are pending consolidation. Last but not least, there is no recognisable 'other' for the whole of Europe beyond diffuse continental delimitations.

Yet the hurdles to objectifying a European identity are not much different from those faced by Nation States in the past (and even currently), and they have been resolved through ignoring certain facts, modifying others, reframing historical facts, stressing the pertinent elements, etc. (see Hobsbawm and Range, 1998). Yet despite our reservations, we assume that there are still elements (whether clearer or murkier) that help objectify Europe and its identity.

The subjective factor: problems of legitimacy

The EU's own publications set out the European Union as a project that — in theory at least — stemmed from the laudable objectives of preventing new confrontations among States and promoting co-operation and democracy. Yet the embryonic entity (The European Coal and Steel Community — ECSC), and practice since then, and the legal framework deployed to date cannot hide the EU's servitude to the markets, the widening of which (coupled with the creation of better conditions for European capital) have been the drivers of Continental legal-institutional development (Etxezarreta, 2008: 123; Balanyà *et al.*, 2002). In parallel, the ideological struggle against the political model represented by the USSR cannot be underestimated.

Nevertheless, after the excessive initial emphasis on economics and the push towards a single market and the free circulation of goods (and later also of people), the need was felt to bring the EU closer to the citizenry. To address this need, a package of democratic measures was drawn up to attract support for the idea of Europe and for realisation of its founding ideals. This need grew as the EU expanded; surveys confirmed Europeans' disaffection with the European project (Fligstein, 2009), and the stigma of the 'Europe of Merchants' was not lessened by the Treaty of Maastricht. In fact, in order to explain the primacy of a liberal approach to the economy, bureaucracy and the law, Přibáň (2009: 45-46; see also Hernández and Ramiro, 2016) the EU introduced an oxymoron — the "politics of depolitisation" — which in nothing more than an update of the Enlightenment's slogan "Everything for the people nothing by the people" [attributed to Austro-Hungary's Joseph II]. There has been an attempt to neutralise political conflicts through the legal system and through an acceptable level of economic wellbeing, with little democratic development of European institutions.

Therefore, the idea of Europe or the European supranation as an entity that generates a territorial identity with a specific sense of belonging is still far from becoming a reality, as we have pointed out in another work (Author). Identity is still a supposition, because the fact of "being European has not been identified" in a precise way (Friese, 2004: 110), at least for the time being. Furthermore, the national lens of each of the Member States still prevails and there is no decisive support for the idea of a European "supranation". There is, however, insistence on the promotion of democratic values, the goodness of co-operation, and the 'common' history but without questioning the primacy of national identities. This is reflected in the difficulties in passing The Treaty of Lisbon: a treaty that should have meant a step forward for the Union, but that instead is better

remembered for the successful opposition of some of its members (with the culmination of *Brexit*) rather than for its significance and future projection.

METHODOLOGY

Using the European Coal and Steel Community (1951) as a point of departure, European institutions have produced a great number of official documents. Logically, we are interested in those that can reflect the way in which these institutions project European identity. Based on the contributions of various authors (Clerc, 2014; Guth and Nelsen, 2014; Bekemans, 2012; Innerarity and Acha, 2010; Moes, 2008) and prior exploration, we consider the most relevant ones to be those that best show the evolution of official political positions bearing on European identity, namely: The Treaty of Paris (1951), The Declaration on European Identity (1973), The Tindemans Report (1975), The Adonnino Committee's Report (1985), The Treaty on European Union-Maastricht (1992), The Laeken Declaration (2001), the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (2004) and The Lisbon Treaty (2007).

Other documents were explored, including the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community Treaty (1952), which did not alter the provisions of The Treaty of Paris and did not enter into force; The Treaties of Rome (1957) that established the EEC; the Treaty of Merger or Brussels (1965), which arose to bring together various European communities; The Act of the European Union (1986), which marks the beginning of Europe without borders but is mostly economic in character; The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), which does not suppose a fundamental change with respect to Maastricht and implies above all extensions related to justice and security; The Treaty of Nice (2001), which barely alters The Treaty of Maastricht and served to prepare the way for the great Eastern enlargement. An initial content analysis of the above texts revealed a lack of relevant concepts related to identity (in most cases because the documents mainly focus on economic issues).

This is not the case for the finally included treaties (Paris, Maastricht, Constitutional and Lisbon). Although they were very general in nature, they increasingly included (with the advance of the integration process) elements that made reference to European identity. The case is different for the other four documents reviewed. They are briefer and correspond to declarations and reports ordered by the European Commission at different stages (above all during the 1973-1985 period) and are the result of the desire to offer an image of European construction less linked to economics and which would begin to connect with citizens. This desire was spurred by the first European surveys which revealed respondents' general indifference to an EEC that scarcely touched their lives (Fligstein, 2009). These texts contain a greater proportion of concepts bearing on identity, and logically this is even more so in the case of the monographic *Declaration on European Identity*. That said we do not need homogeneity in volume of words or in the nature of the texts given that our goal is not to determine which screed contains most references to European identity. Rather, our aim is to observe the evolution of the conceptualisation of European identity.

For the analysis of these texts, different lexemes have been selected that, based on the bibliography consulted and the semiotic analysis, we see as representing the construction of European identity (initially objectifying it): civilisation; culture; identity; heritage; religion; Christianity; history; ethnicity; tradition; destiny; symbolism; society and reality (these terms and their lexical roots were sought out). Evidently, the lexemes that refer explicitly to "Europe" or the "EU" are part of our analysis (the texts of the EU use both terms interchangeably. See Table 1), and these have been contrasted with the textual fragments where the lexemes have appeared (for example, cultural heritage of Europe, symbols of the EU, European society, religious tradition of Europeans, etc.) At the same time, these same concepts have been identified in the texts of Member States or other territorial groupings (Table 2) in order to serve as a contrast. Through the coding app of the qualitative analysis software *Atlas*

ti, the roots of the terms in the texts were located. Later the meaning was checked to ensure accuracy, either for the construction of the identity of Europe or the Member States. Once meaning was identified, frequency tables were constructed for the content analysis.

As reported by Hopkins and King (2010), and Gattermann, Högenauer and Huff (2016), the literal analysis of government documents is a common, relevant way to understand the policies and even the ideologies of those who run the institutions. Nonetheless, making use of official European texts is infrequent (see, for example, Wisniewski, 2013; or Waldschmidt, 2009), and it is even rarer to work with the treaties and declarations that we have selected. Our approach is thus a novel one, allowing us to get to the core of official EU identity policies in order to delimit the channels running within the framework of the objective-subjective dichotomy.

RESULTS. EVOLUTION OF THE OBJECTIVE FACTORS IN EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS' IDENTITY DISCOURSES

Following on from what has been outlined above, this paper analyses the evolution of the constructive elements in the official discourse of European institutions and — as our end goal — checks on their status in the 21st Century documents. The following frequency tables are based on the quantitative content analysis:

Table 1 Presence of concepts that embody Europe or the EU in a selection of official documents of European institutions

	Words: thousands)	Civilisation	Culture	Identity	Heritage	Religion	History	Tradition	Society	Reality	Ethnicity	TOTALS	Concepts/ word
TP	20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0.50
DEI	3	2	0	7	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	12	45.80
TR	16	1	1	7	3	0	1	0	6	5	1	25	16.11
ACR	7	0	2	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	5	7.19
TEU	104	0	3	1	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	7	0.67
LD	5	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	2	4.40
TCE	155a	0	5	0	5	1	1	1	1	1	0	15	0.97
TL	158	0	2	0	2	1	0	2	0	1	0	8	0.50
TOTAL		3	13	17	13	2	5	4	8	8	2	75	

(a) Without considering the declarations of the Final Act, which imply amendments and modifications of the original Treaty.
Legend: TP=Treaty of Paris (1951), DEI=Declaration on European Identity (1973), TR=Tindemans Report (1975), ACR= Adonnino Committee's report (1985), TEU=Treaty on EU (1992), LD=Laeken Declaration (2001), TCE= Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (2004), TL=Treaty of Lisbon (2007).

Source: Author's own research.

Table 2 . Presence of concepts in a selection of EU institutions' official documents that embody the Member States of the EU or that refer to other territorial realities

	Words -(000s)	Civilisation	Culture	Identity	Heritage	Religion	History	Tradition	Society	Reality	Ethnicity	TOTALS	Concepts/ word
TP	20	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.50
DEI	3	0	3	1	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	7	26.72
TR	16	1	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	5	3.22
ACR	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
TEU	104	0	3	4	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	10	0.96
LD	5	0	1	1	0	-1	1	2	0	0	-1	8	17.58
TCE	155[a]	2	15	3	1	1	1	10	1	1	0	35	2.26
TL	158	0	4	1	0	0	0	8	0	1	0	14	0.88
Totals		4	29	10	2	2	5	23	1	2	1	80	

(a) Without considering the declarations of the Final Act, which imply amendments and modifications of the original Treaty.
Legend: TP=Treaty of Paris (1951), DEI=Declaration on European Identity (1973), TR=Tindemans Report (1975), ACR= Adonnino Committee's report (1985), TEU=Treaty on EU (1992), LD=Laeken Declaration (2001), TCE= Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (2004), TL=Treaty of Lisbon (2007).
Note: Negative values indicate concepts used in a negative sense, as contrary to the EU project.
Source: Author's own research.

In absolute terms, the Tindemans Report (TR), the Constitutional Treaty (TCE) and the Declaration on European Identity (DEI) are the texts in which these concepts have the greatest presence in terms of the objectification of Europe. In the case of the objectification of Member States, the TCE clearly stands out, followed by The Treaties of Lisbon (TL) and of the Treaty of The European Union (TEU). The results are slightly different when one considers the total number of words. Here, objectifying concepts are given more weight in the short texts. They heavily include aspects of identity, most strikingly in the DEI but also the TR and the Adonnino Committee's Report (ACR) in the case of Europe, and the DEI and the Laeken Declaration (LD) for Member States.

In all of the texts, for Europe the concepts with greatest presence are "European identity" (more frequent in reports and brief declarations), "European culture" and "common European heritage" (with greater presence in the treaties); while for Member States, "culture" and "traditions of the Member States" stand out above the rest. In many cases they are cited together to highlight the need to respect the diversity that is characteristic of the EU. "Tradition" does not appear as a concept in the objectification of Europe but we have already shown that it is frequently used for Member States. Likewise, "heritage" and "destiny" are barely used in connection with Member States but The Commission frequently relies on these terms when referring to European identity. In total, 75 concepts have been located that objectify Europe and 80 that objectify mostly all Member States. This reflects the delicate balance that the European Commission tried to strike in the wake of the ructions unleashed by the drafting of the 2004 constitutional text. Here, one should recall that some Member States rejected the text. These objected that it went

too far in extending EU powers and in using the same kind of symbols employed by Nation States. Based on the identification and quantification of the presence of these concepts through content analysis, we carry out a qualitative and evolutive approach to the documents to determine to what extent they maintain elements objectifying Europe as a supranational entity.

The idea of Europe as a union among peoples in order to preserve peace and to advance civilisation has its roots in the Enlightenment, and especially in the works of Kant and Rousseau. The idea was later taken up by Victor Hugo, who coined the term "The United States of Europe" by Victor Hugo (Granja and Charpenel, 2014; Clerc, 2014: 10). Against the wishes of its precursors, the idea of a European federalism along the lines of what had been formed in North America clashed with the formation and settlement of a world of Nation-States that reached its most perfected form in the first half of the 20th Century (Hobsbawm, 1992: 85-152). Around this time however, 'Europeanism' was already trying to find its place among Nation-States, albeit in a secondary fashion.

It was not until after post-war reconstruction efforts that these avenues began to be explored. As a backdrop, it was the desire for peace and reconciliation but also the need for capital (especially from The United States) to shape a stable market on The Continent. It was also part of an ideological battle against the Communist Bloc in Eastern Europe.

One of the most prominent personalities on the world stage, Winston Churchill, was among the first to insist on the need for co-operation and stressed that European States should move towards a sort of federation. His essentialist and supremacist conception of Europe is highlighted in his discourse at the University of Zurich (1946): Europe "is the home of all the great parent races of the Western world, the foundation of Christian faith and ethics, the origin of most of the culture, arts, philosophy and science" (cited in Popa, 2016: 13). He called for a collective "act of faith" to achieve these goals "in which the millions of families speaking many languages must consciously take part" (Popa, 2016: 14). This, he felt, was the only way to forge a European identity and institutions, and so avoid future wars.

This is what stakeholders such as Robert Schuman, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs (who had German forbears) pressed for (albeit in a gradual way and with economic objectives only, without scope for the creation of a political community). In any case, the preamble of the Treaty of Paris (1951), which established the European Coal and Steel Community, foresaw that the pursuit of economic interests could suppose "the basis of a wider and deeper community", an idea that The Treaties of Rome — which gave birth to the European Economic Community (EEC) — also insist upon (Bekemans, 2012). The first text mentions the common destiny to be pursued by European political institutions but there are few other references to constructing European identity. There are references to "civilisation" but with a more universal character, considering what European construction might contribute to Mankind.

It is worth noting that from the outset, European integration was a project of Christian Democrat Catholics[2] and was even supported by the Vatican. Protestant leaders, in contrast, showed initial reluctance of a nationalist nature, continuing the tradition of opposing the "universalist" project of the Catholic hierarchy. These Protestant sensibilities gave way to different branches with national links – Anglicans, Lutherans, and Calvinists. The religious variable has had — (from the first European-wide opinion surveys until now) great relevance to explain the level of citizen adherence to the European project. Catholic individuals (especially devout Catholics) have been those who have most supported European integration, compared with Protestants or agnostics (in general Protestants with nationally-formed

2 Those considered founders of today's EU (Konrad Adenauer, Alcide de Gasperi, Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman) were devout Catholics and Christian Democrats.

churches were the ones most strongly rejected the idea). Only Conservative Catholics in the recently admitted Eastern countries and in some cases, The Republic of Ireland have escaped this tendency (Guth and Nelsen, 2014: 1-3).

Since the EEC's beginnings there have been references in declarations and various documents to a "common cultural heritage" that should join shared democratic values. There is the adoption of "the mechanisms traditionally used by States to create this shared identity, such as the hypostatisation of a common heritage, history and culture or a certain ethnocentric vision of culture" (Innerarity and Acha, 2010: 73-74). According to Keating (2009: 141; cited in Innerarity and Acha, 2010: 74), in this stage the initial elements of the search for a "European nation" can be identified but there is no mention of "European citizenry" (Máracz and Versteegh, 2010: 165). There is no civil conception of the nation, as we have said but rather a "cultural" one. This may be a result of the way identity was understood at the time (Churchill's statements show). The initial texts of the European institutions do not clearly reflect this conception because much greater weight was given to political issues.

It was during the seventies at the time of the first expansion (Denmark and The United Kingdom), that "the identification of European citizens as a base of legitimacy" first became a cause for concern (Innerarity and Acha, 2010: 74). This is explicitly reflected in the Declaration on European Identity (European Commission, 1973), which incorporates this concept, based on "common heritage and shared political values" and with the objective of supporting internal cohesion and ensuring the viability of the European project. There are already plans to integrate these elements into the educational system of Member States in order to forge friendly ties and, in synthesis, a culturally defined community (Innerarity and Acha, 2010: 74; see also Clerc, 2014: 8; Guth and Nelsen, 2014: 5). The civic elements are present in education plans but perhaps they are still subordinate to the historical and cultural ones.

In any case, at the time of the drafting of the Declaration on European Identity (DEI) the EEC was in its infancy, with limited political resources and the evident primacy of the Nation State (had this not been the case, The United Kingdom would have not even considered incorporation). This meant that prudence was a dominant feature in this declaration, and it therefore makes repeated reference to a "variety of cultures" within the framework of a "European common civilisation", highlighting above all the preservation of "legal and political values" and safeguarding "principles" such as representative democracy, the rule of law, social justice and human rights, as the basis for the formation of European identity. There is also trust in the ability of common institutions and policies to plant a seed in citizens' minds to become an "integral part of the European identity". Therefore, we find ourselves before an identitarian architecture that combines ethno-cultural and civic-political perspectives, in which there is no hesitance in using concepts such as "European civilisation" but where the emphasis of European identity clearly rests on present and future political-institutional construction. It explicitly states that:

> Defining the European Identity involves: reviewing the common heritage, interests and special obligations of the Nine, as well as the degree of unity so far achieved within the Community; assessing the extent to which the Nine are already acting together in relation to the rest of the world and the responsibilities which result from this, taking into consideration the dynamic nature of European unification.

In conclusion, there is a combination of the historical-cultural (heritage) with the political-civil (interests and obligations, processes of construction), in addition to including a reference to the dynamics of selfhood-otherness (Europe-World), which is essential in the configuration of any identity (although other paragraphs speak of, for example, a shared heritage with The United States, in an Atlanticist widening of the civilising focus).

This declaration was one of the points of departure of the EEC's political development, and one year

later, at the Paris Summit, among other advances, the first steps towards popular election of the European Parliament took place. Those arrangements took effect in 1979 and thus strengthened the EEC's symbolic baggage. The first impulse given to a 'Citizen's Europe' was expected to foster a sense of belonging to a shared community.

The *Tindemans Report* (1975) is also of great importance, headed by another Christian Democrat, as were most of the initiatives of the first decades of European integration (Guth and Nelsen, 2014: 5). The report is perhaps the most visible antecedent of the European Union prior to Maastricht. Tindemans proposes a "Europe of the Citizens" including elimination of borders, unification of passports, a common educational space, the strengthening of the European Parliament, monetary union, etc. It is also a text littered with objective elements. For example, as with the DIE, it takes for granted the existence of a European civilisation (although it points out that it forms part of a wider civilisation) or the existence of a common heritage of all Europeans (which are values, culture, a world vision, etc.). European identity is expressed in several passages as a factual reality, both for non-Europeans and for Europeans (a reality that requires, however, both internal and external support). On the other hand, despite referring to a "history of unification of Europe", it was considered that such history was now at a key turning point and therefore was a history yet to be written. The Tindemans Report by insisting on "Europeans' common destiny" (a destiny that, like identity, should be seeded in the will of both European leaders and citizens), a "European society" (that exists, but also must be built along the lines of "our values") and even a "European reality", represents the most evident multi-conceptual objectification of a hypothetical "supranation" to date.

In 1984, at the Summit of Fontainebleau, in addition to economic measures, the EEC decided it was time to draw closer to citizens and to create/consolidate a European identity. With this in mind, the Adonnino Committee was created, this being the first push towards the "Europe of the Citizens" and explicitly mentioning the need for "strengthening the image and identity of the Community" (Adonnino, 2014:19). The Committee was the precursor to the flag, the hymn and Day of Europe, elements that clearly imitate the symbolic repertoire of Nation States. Emphasis was also put on the need to intensify cross-border contacts at different levels (commercial, work, education, research, culture, etc.) to foster knowledge of more than one language, and other types of measures that would be of help in the construction of a European "us" (Adonnino, 1985; Guth and Nelsen, 2014:5).

Despite the focus on the citizen and the far-reaching elements of the Adonnino proposal at the time, the creation of identity was carried out from above and in a centralised manner (although it should be mentioned that the debate on participation in and the legitimacy of institutions had not reached today's feverish pitch).

In addition, in 1988 The Council of Europe decided that the educational systems of Member States should adopt a European perspective in order to continue fostering the idea of a common heritage and history. This included the publishing of books such as *Europe: A History of its Peoples* (Duroselle, 1990. London: Viking). That book speaks of over 5,000 years of the history of a European people (Karlsson, 1999: 65). This civilising Continental perspective was already being adopted after the Second World War, when for example "independence wars" of Gauls or Germanics "gave way to Romanisation presented as a process of European integration based on common civilisation and culture" (López Facal, 2010: 13). In general, historical explanations that are markedly national began to be rewritten in school textbooks, and a common European narrative began to take shape based on Greco-Roman tradition, Christianity and the feudal system of The Middle Ages, The Renaissance, The Enlightenment, The Industrial Revolution, and Liberal revolutions. This integrative perspective, which was meant to contribute to the prevention of conflict among European States, imposed a Eurocentrist vision that affirmed an "us" versus "them" (Asian or African),

which on occasions is made invisible and in others represented as antagonistic, in a similar way to what educational plans had done previously at the national level (López Facal, 2010: 14 and 23).

At the beginning of the nineties, the signing of The Maastricht Treaty (together with the recent fall of The Berlin Wall and the possibility of expansion to the East), was an inflection point in the bet on a European identity (Moes, 2008: 3). Steps toward a political union had already been taken and there was growing interest in and research on European identity, although more instrumental conceptions (civic-political or "post-national" ones, as noted by Innerarity and Acha, 2010: 74) were also becoming commoner.

The Treaty of the European Union (European Commission, 1992) states that the new institution is founded on the principles of "liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental liberties and the rule of law" (Article 6) and defines the legal status of European citizenship, granted to individuals from any of the Member States. It can be seen as a major step towards boosting a sense of belonging based on making democratic values effective, and as an instrument for empowering the internal dimension of 'Europeanness' (as opposed to merely drawing distinctions between the EU and the rest of the world). Aside from the success in achieving those aims and although the civic-political vision was the dominant one, the drafting of the text showed that part of the political spectrum saw the Christian tradition as being of overriding importance. To this extent, one can say the model was a "communitarian" one (Bekemans, 2012; Tsaliki, 2007: 159) and its cultural vision continued to play an important role.

This role is marked in references to "a common cultural heritage" or to a "cultural heritage of European significance", which nonetheless was meant to be compatible with the cultural traditions of Member States. The existence of a "history of the peoples of Europe" is recognised, which since 1988 must be presented in a unified sense in text books. In the same way, there is an explicit reference to "European identity", not in the sense of what Recchi and Salamonska (2014: 512) call "belonging" but rather in the sense of an identity of difference and contrast with respect to other territories in the international context. This idea goes even further in the following statement: "the Union [should] assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of common foreign and security policy, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy". Other references are also made to a "European identity in terms of security and defence". This, in addition to the restrictive definition of citizenship, is what has caused some authors to affirm that the TUE "establishes a unitary base for *exclusion,* rather than a coherent set of criteria for *inclusion*" (Tsaliki, 2007: 168), in terms of how to distinguish Europeans from the rest of the world, rather than laying the bases for the confluence of people in Europe.

Apart from the texts included in this study, various documents surfaced in the mid-1990s that focused on European identity. These documents shaped the conceptual debate and continued to highlight culturally-based objective elements in defining what it means to be European. The first of these is the *Charter of European Identity* (1995), prepared by the lobby of the European Federalists at the request of the ex-President of The Czech Republic, Vaclav Havel, and which saw Europe as a "community of destiny" whose values have been built on the "historical roots in classical antiquity and Christianity, (…) developed during the course of The Renaissance, The Humanist movement and The Enlightenment", although the type of identity suggested is closer to a civic-political conception.

A year later, the EU celebrated a monographic meeting on European identity in Coimbra (Jansen, 1999), which also combined cultural and civic-political conceptions of identity. An example of the first is offered by Gilbert Trausch (1999: 26). From positions we could consider *perennialist* (Smith, 2005), he affirmed that European elites have acknowledged

this identity since The Middle Ages, even though its countries warred with one another until 1945. Yet the meeting also included talks about "European constitutional patriotism" (Eriksson, 1999: 66) — something that should be seen in the tumultuous world following the fall of The Berlin Wall and a context of ethnic conflicts. This new concept did not involve abandoning the idea of an 'us' versus an 'other' with competing interests (USA, Russia, China, etc.).

Before the dawn of the new millennium, it is also worth highlighting the appearance of the book *In From The Margins* (ETCD, 1997), edited by The Council of Europe and with a monographic focus on the importance of culture for development and for the formation of systems of symbolic meaning. As pointed out by Tsaliki (2007: 160), underlying this work is the need to define European identity based on cultural heritage, and in the future, based on "a common culture of the masses disseminated through an integrated European space in the media". Tsaliki proclaims and puts value on European diversity but also points to unity and specificity as the initial impulses of democratic values.

Returning to the texts concerned in this analysis, the *Laeken Declaration* (2001) is another relevant text for understanding the official position of the EU in terms of European identity. Signed by the European Council of Laeken (Belgium), it laid the basis for the later *Convention on the Future of Europe* (2002-2003), which was then charged with writing the draft of The European Constitution. The truth is that it did not stand out for its support of European identity versus that of Member States but rather the contrary. It is an example of the precautions that later played a role in the boycotting of the Constitution. The section below is paradigmatic of a marked Liberal position on the issue:

> In other words, what citizens understand [*hope for*] is opening up fresh opportunities, not imposing further red tape, (…) better responses to practical issues and not a European superstate or European institutions inveigling their way into every nook and cranny of life.

In any case, as other texts previously mentioned, the idea of common European heritage also underlies this text but in this case, with an especial emphasis and value put on the history of Liberal thought ("Europe, the Continent of human values, The Magna Carta, The Bill of Rights, The French Revolution and the fall of The Berlin Wall…").

This common heritage, which culminates in democratic values, is the identity baggage that the European project confronts in the so called "opposing forces", which include "religious fundamentalism" and "ethnic nationalism". Therefore, there is an explicit clash between the civic-political (positive) and the ethno-cultural (negative). The Laeken Declaration concludes by proclaiming the need to deepen democracy (although without sketching out anything more than a reform of the current delegation modality) and by making public the mandate of a Convention headed by Giscard d'Estaing, a former French President.

This new milestone, the *Convention on the Future of Europe* (2003), developed the work prior to the Constitutional Treaty and pointed to increasing the level of participation of European citizens in the decision-making process. The rejection of the European Constitution (2005) by the French and Dutch among others, forced a revision that culminated in The Treaty of Lisbon. This last treaty, however, has followed the same line as the Convention in terms of the reference to formal strengthening of the role of citizens, especially through "citizen initiatives" (Article 11.4) (Bekemans, 2012).

In terms of the content analysis, The Treaty of Lisbon is similar to The European Constitution, because it first emerged from the embers of the second, and therefore the total number of words is similar, and both texts are those of greatest length given their all-encompassing character. It is therefore logical that the analysed lexemes have a relatively lesser presence but

in absolute terms they do allow a detailed analysis. In the association with European identity or with Europe, common culture and heritage stand out, as in other documents, and are even put forward in a combined way to strengthen the objective basis on which the European construction must rest ("common cultural heritage", "cultural heritage of European significance", as pointed out in the TEU). Along the same lines, culture is associated with history ("history and culture of Europeans"). It seems to us very significant the way in which adjectives are added to heritage in Part II of The Constitutional Treaty (TCE), referred to as The Charter of Fundamental Rights, given that there are references to "spiritual and moral heritage" that the "Union is conscious of", and that this acts as an historical framework for the current and future development of the EU's universal and democratic values. More precisely, the preamble speaks of "cultural, religious and humanist heritage" that precedes these values, which is the only explicit reference to religion in both the TEC and The Treaty of Lisbon (TL) (although, in keeping with the Maastricht approach, it avoids any direct mention of Christianity).

However, in an effort to detect the objectification of European identity, the TCE stands out for its explicit introduction of symbolic elements. Specifically, Article I-8 states that the symbols of the EU are: the flag with the blue background and twelve yellow stars, the hymn based on "Ode to Joy" of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony, the motto "Unity in Diversity", the Euro (and its imprinted architectonic elements, anonymous but recognisable in European culture), and May 9th as The Day of Europe. This is precisely one of the principal modifications between the TCE and the TL, given that it was eliminated from the final text of the TL and only included as a declaration of the sixteen countries that accept the "sense of community" that exists behind these symbols. The other twelve (basically the Scandinavian and Baltic countries in the north, The British Isles, some of the Slavic countries as well as France and the Netherlands) partly rejected the constitutional text on the grounds that the introduction of these symbols could erode their national integrity. The identity-based tension between the new supranational entity and the Nation States became manifest: the steps to reinforce the European identity on the apparently trivial symbolic plane were seen as a threat by some national elites (although this fear was also voiced by the public opinion of some countries; see Fligstein *et al*., 2012).

In addition to the suppression of the above symbolic aspects, the presence of expressions and lexemes that objectify European identity is somewhat lessened in the TL but it still includes mentions of "the cultural, religious and humanist heritage of Europe" and even of the EU as "a society" — a term that had disappeared after its first intense use in 1975 in the Tindemans Report. By contrast, the cycle opened by the Laeken Declaration which culminated in The Lisbon Treaty was characterised by the significant omission of the concept of "European identity", perhaps in an effort to avoid the controversy fanned by symbolism.

Compared to the objectification of Europe or the EU, the TCE and the TL go even further in referring to the culture or tradition of Member States as elements to preserve. In the case of culture, this is usually dealt with as part of a diversity that should not be harmed by the hypothetical uniformity represented by the EU. When it comes to the second lexeme, there are repeated references to the constitutional traditions of the Member States, normally in order to highlight that they are the sources from which European regulations emanate or that their singularity should be respected (in fact, some of the mentions of "tradition" in the TL are found in the annexed individual declarations of States such as The Czech Republic or The Republic of Ireland, which were two of the States opposed to the TCE). Likewise, and related to the notable absence of "European identity", there are some mentions of "national identities" as a way of showing that these are not precluded by the common project.

Hypothetically, progress in defining the European citizen, his obligations and rights and the extension of his participation in decision-making (though still limited) allow for modification of the relationship

between citizen and nation. This provides scope for the settling the question of Europe and the development of a European public sphere, which is compatible with the national framework and the feelings of belonging it fosters (Bekemans, 2012; on the impact of the common judiciary framework, see Carr, 2015). In short, the values developed by the treaties (liberty, equality, pluralism, tolerance, justice, etc.) are meant to be constituent elements of a European identity. However, the cuts to the constitutional text, in some cases bearing on the development of European citizenry, left the progression of identification with the EU in suspense, while maintaining progress for Member States, thanks to the defensive movements that took shape at the beginning of the millennium and that consolidated with the crisis (Přibáň, 2009: 48).

ASSESSMENT

Despite the lack of drastic changes (because the general tone is of the primacy of a civic-political conception combined with ethno-cultural elements) one can inductively identify four stages in our round-up of the texts produced by European institutions:

1. Primitive (1950s and 60s): there is no great concern about European identity, and this is a time of political and even academic dominance of an ethno-cultural vision of territorial identity (although the subjective dimension is considered).

2. Focalisation (1970s and 80s): initial explicit concern about European identity. Combination of the civic-political and ethno-cultural conceptions.

3. Settlement (1990s): identity as a central question. Clear dominance of a civic-political conception, although cultural objective elements persist.

4. Displacement (2000s and 2010s): dominance of the civic-political conception is maintained, with the presence of cultural elements, but European identity disappears from focus due to conflict with some national identities.

To sum up, one can see a gradual advance in the civic-political conception of European identity, with a clear intention to boost citizens' role and to increase legitimacy (at least formally). At the same time, the reaction to the European Union and its identity by forces within Member States have ranged from lukewarm to outright opposition, with some States advocating erasure of any mention of "European identity" and European symbols from official texts (and with them, what would have been the EU Constitution). Despite this, even in The Treaty of Lisbon, the elements objectifying European identity from a cultural point of view have remained and acted as a contrast to a civic-political project and concept. Even as the latter has gained ground, it is precisely the crisis of legitimacy of the EU, in part due to a democratic deficit and the scant weight of citizens in decision-making that hinders full expression of these ideals. Meanwhile, the authors of the preambles to these treaties argued the need to objectively shore up the EU, its identity, publicly assuming a common historical reality (Tsaliki, 2007). These formulations are made precisely to combat the stigma of the artificiality of the European edifice. As occurred in the past with Nation States, there is a recurring temptation to project a perennial discourse that conjures up a naturalised entity in the collective imaginary, that is long-lasting and whose existence is therefore self-explanatory merely through its historical trajectory.

In fact, what is taking place is a combination of the different models of identity construction outlined by Bekemans (2012), both the *communitarian,* with its emphasis on cultural elements, and the *Liberal-Republican* with its focus on a type of civic identity, based on the universal principles of democracy, human rights, the law etc. Even the *constructivist* category can be included because it is a fact that there is increasing interchange among Europeans, and thus a shared space begins to take shape at different levels.

In any case, the European identity still falls short of the vigour of the national identities, it is far from being qualified as a "strong" identity in the sense pointed out by Cathleen Kantner (2006; see also Přibáň, 2009: 44-45), and therefore a flourishing sense of identity that permits solidarity among Europeans is conspicuous by its absence. For instance, the Germans did not feel the need for solidarity with the Greeks in 2010, as was reflected in various surveys in Germany but the sense of national community did make solidarity possible with less fortunate Germans (see Fligstein *et al*., 2012) just at the beginning of a *mini-job era* in this country.

In any case and taking Michael Billig's arguments (2006) regarding "banal nationalism", Europeans are citizens of the EU because of the legal links among the Member States. They have: a map; a flag; a hymn; capital cities; institutions; repeated references in the media and in textbooks; relative collective awareness of belonging to a community of Europeans. After all, France at the end of the 18th Century — one of the paradigms of a modern nation — was in no better shape to become a Nation State than Europe to become a "supranation". For the latter 'dream' to come true, more needs to be done to build this "strong identity", and most of all, the presence of Europe in citizens' lives needs to carry similar weight to that of nations and the States they belong to, making the gestation of a real "European people" possible at some point (2006; see also Přibáň, 2009: 44-45). It does not seem that this will happen in the short or medium term. If anything, Brexit points in the other direction and to a much wider range of possible outcomes.

A new treaty is needed to update the project, taking into account the events of the past decade and the pressing need for democratisation, a requirement without which a European identity — for which universal rights and civil values are so important — will be stillborn.

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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

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Special Issue

Creativity, Cognition and Design

Presentation of the Monographic Issue. Creativity, Cognition and Design

Coordinated by
Dafne Muntanyola-Saura
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This special edition of the *Debats* journal gathers contributions made by the TECNOCOG research group in the "Creativity, Cognition and Design" symposium of the 4th *Ibero-American Congress of Philosophy of Science and Technology*. These symposia focused on understanding the role of creativity in innovation processes. The aim was to debate creativity, which is traditionally relegated to the realms of Art and The Humanities. Faced with analyses focusing on the language of scientific revolutions and crises, and those based on the notion of discovery and scientific progress, there is a growing literature linking scientific and technical innovation to creativity. This issue of creativity in science needs to be tackled from both a theoretical perspective and a practical one (the latter in terms of creativity's real-life application in fields such as Education, Economics, and artistic *praxis*. The monograph thus brings together proposals from researchers in Philosophy and the Social Sciences from various perspectives (especially from philosophical, sociological, cognitive, and design thinking ones). All the contributions in this special edition have a common thread, namely a quest to go beyond the dualism dividing mind and body, given that Putnam's image of the "brain in a bucket" cannot explain the reflective spontaneity that is an inherent feature of creativity. In addition, all the contributions include key new proposals in contemporary Cognitive Science, ranging from Design Sciences to Linguistic Pragmatism, Enactivism, Mixed Cognition, Abduction, and Distributed and Corporeal Cognition.

The first paper — “Design Function in Innovation Processes” by Dr. Anna Estany and Dr. Rosa Herrera — is an example of interdisciplinary collaboration in which Philosophy and Physics work hand-in-hand to establish the role of innovation mechanisms in Design. These mechanisms are of particular interest in so-called ‘design thinking’, which can play an important role in the epistemic development of ‘Pure Sciences’ such as Physics. The paper starts with an analysis of creative concepts, creativity, innovation, and invention. It analyses both Design theory and its application to the systemic analysis of ‘Design Sciences’, and explores the creation and application of simulations as innovation mechanisms in the sciences.

Then, in "Cognitive Models for Gastronomic Creation and Innovation” Dr. David Casacuberta explores how cognitive models of enactivism can help us model the processes of innovation and creativity in *avant-garde* gastronomy and to build bridges to other disciplines so that some of the results garnered from gastronomy can be applied to other epistemic discussions. The paper studies creative development at El *Bulli* restaurant run by Master Chef Ferran Adrià. The lessons drawn from the pioneering restaurant are key to understanding *Haute Cuisine*’s evolution and innovation from the late twentieth century onward. The paper includes a brief reflection on trends in gastronomic aesthetics and why these have been ignored in philosophical analyses until fairly recently.

Doctors Jordi Vallverdú and Alger Sans in "What the #®¥§≠$@ is Creativity?" claim that creativity is of particular importance to researchers in Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence. While it is obvious that creativity is an essential part of intelligence, most studies attempting to explain creativity or even to replicate it have failed. The authors see cognitive processes as following rules or heuristics, albeit in a flexible way (which may even entail a degree of chaos and contradiction) that often leads to a complex context in which multi-heuristics (so-called "mixed cognition") are used. In addition, they introduce a mechanism (abduction) that has generally been little explored in the cognitive academic literature. Using these two strategies, the authors draw on specific cases of creativity to come up with a new, more realistic cognitive paradigm.

In "Creativity, Humour, and Cognition", Dr. Mario Gensoller of Universidad Autónoma de Aguascalientes (UAA) sketches a theory of creativity applicable to the analysis of humour. This philosopher reviews the main philosophical theories linking creativity with humour, conducting detailed analysis of Margaret Boden's classical theory of creativity, and the principle of relevance from the Linguistic Pragmatics of Dan Sperber and Deidre Wilson.

In "Naturalist Methods in the Sociology of Creation: The Case Against Reductionism" Dr. Dafne Muntanyola i Saura explains how the sociological perspective can strengthen critiques of creativity. Naturalist studies on cognition in the Social Sciences, and in the Cognitive Sciences empirically show that creative cognition is part of the institutional context. However, the influential Culturalist Cognitive Sociology (CCS) school of thought reduces creativity to a cognitivist psychological level. The body of the paper comprises

a bibliographic review at the macro and micro levels, taking a comprehensive look at pragmatic and integrated models of creativity. The CCS is critically reviewed and the naturalistic paradigm of cognition is developed to avoid the trap set by reductionist or atomistic approaches. The paper's findings cover the creation and transmission of criteria legitimising cultural consumption.

Last but not least, the special edition includes Algiers Sans' unpublished interview of Paul Thagard, a Canadian philosopher covering creativity, and Emeritus Professor at Waterloo University and a central figure in current Cognitive Philosophy. There is also a Spanish translation of a paper by the Cognitive Anthropologist Ed Hutchins. He is Emeritus Professor in the Department of Cognitive Science at the University of California, San Diego (UCSD) and the founder of Distributed Cognition, a key theoretical paradigm in contemporary Cognitive Science.

The TECNOCOG research group focuses on the relationships between technology and cognition and the impact of these processes on epistemic reasoning. Its projects over the last few years include: *The design of space in distributed cognition environments: staff and 'affordances'; Repercussions for the Philosophy of Science* "(2009 - 2011); *Innovation in Scientific Practice: Cognitive approaches and their philosophical consequences*" (2012-205); *Creativity, Revolutions and Innovation in the Processes of Scientific Change* (2015-2017); *Epistemic Innovation, The case of the Cognitive Sciences* (2018-2021).

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Creativity, Humour, and Cognition

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ABSTRACT
This paper explores some aspects of the scientific study of creativity by focusing on intentional attempts to create instances of linguistic humour. We argue that this sort of creativity can be accounted for within an influential cognitive approach but that said framework is not a recipe for producing novel instances of humour and may even preclude them. We start by identifying three great puzzles that arise when trying to pin down the core traits of creativity, and some of the ways taken by Cognitive Studies in this quest. We then consider what we call 'creative humour', which exhibits the core features of the aforesaid creativity. We then explore how a key cognitive approach to human communication can account for creative humour. We end by drawing lessons and highlighting limitations to cognitive approaches to creativity.

Keywords: linguistic humour, creative humour, incongruity-resolution, relevance theory .

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INTRODUCTION

In 'The Hesitation Ramification', an episode of the popular sitcom *The Big Bang Theory,* Dr. Sheldon Cooper is searching for a Unified Theory of Comedy. He deems this pursuit a mere intellectual curiosity, since he describes himself as 'hysterical'. Envisaging such a theory, one can imagine it would not only provide a deeper understanding of human humour, but it would yield the advantage (especially important for someone like Sheldon) of allowing one "…to elicit laughter from anyone at any time (unless they're German, 'cause that's a tough crowd)". As it is often the case in the show, one is left wondering exactly how Dr. Cooper's endeavours are doomed to fail, whether due to a lack of ability, a flaw in execution or even whether the goal itself is a wild-goose chase.

One can readily accept that a unified theory is not a precondition for creating humour. The main question we address in this paper is whether developing such a theory would help in creating humour.

In broad terms, this paper explores a paradox concerning the scientific study of creativity. The result is an outline of the 'paradox for a theory of creativity'. A scientific theory should convey information about the phenomena it covers. If there is a theory, it follows that the phenomena are not novel. Furthermore, it is widely believed that an explanatory theory should render its outcomes predictable. Put another way, its outcomes should be unsurprising in the light of the scientific explanations given. Yet both novelty and unpredictability seem to be the hallmarks of creativity. It would thus seem that creativity cannot possibly be explained by a scientific theory. Although we deem some aspects of the paradox to be grounded on misconceptions about scientific theories, here we stress those linked to creativity. To tackle these issues, we focus on a narrower target by addressing attempts to intentionally produce creative instances of linguistic humour. If one can find a theory explaining this kind of creativity, there may be hope for a full-blooded cognitive explanation of overall creativity. We argue that much of what is interesting about humorous creativity can be accounted for within the framework of an influential cognitive approach and by producing algorithmic inference patterns (whether conscious or not). This, however, does not mean that such an approach will "elicit laughter from anyone at any time." It is highly unlikely that anyone will hit upon "a fool-proof recipe for generating humor stimuli of all varieties" (Hurley *et al.*, 2011, p. x). Indeed, a theory on humorous effects could even preclude them because everyone knows a common way to kill a joke is to explain it.[1] We therefore try to show that the 'paradox for a theory of creativity' is based on an illusion that — like The Cheshire Cat — ends up vanishing.

To support our thesis, we will first identify three great puzzles that arise when trying to naturalise creativity. After explaining each of these puzzles, we outline ways in which cognitive studies have tried to solve them. In a second section, we focus on the links between creativity and humour. Although there is much of empirical interest on this score, we shall confine discussion to what we call 'creative humour'. After a ready-made characterisation, we will show how creative humour displays the core features of creativity identified earlier. The third section shows how a major cognitive approach to human communication can account for creative humour. Although cognitive studies of creativity have much to offer, we end by drawing lessons and highlighting some limitations for a robust naturalisation of creativity as a phenomenon for enquiry by the discipline.

NATURALISING CREATIVITY

Creativity is one of Man's hallmarks as a species. We engage in creative tasks in many key areas such as Science, Engineering, Art, Design, Gastronomy, Entertainment, Sports, and a host of other practices and activities, in which the term 'creative' is applied to agents, processes, and products. Moreover, creativity appears to be a solely human trait; when it is extrapolated to inert physical processes, there seems to be an assumption that rational agency is somehow involved. Although acknowledging its special features, a successful naturalisation of creativity would yield an understanding akin to that found in scientific scrutiny in other fields. To gain such understanding, we must be able to show that creativity involves physical entities and mechanisms that can be embodied within a systematic theory. However, there seem to be special hurdles to recognising creativity as a phenomenon within the natural order. We go on to identify three such hurdles to naturalizing creativity: (1) *semantic diversity; (2) normativity*; (3) *unpredictability*. After discussing them, we outline some ways in which these hurdles might be overcome.

1 Thus, one could agree with the *New Yorker*'s cartoonist Robert Mankoff, who — retrieving E. B. White quip — points out that "analyzing humor is like dissecting a frog. Few people are interested, and the frog dies of it" (2009, p. ix).

The first challenge for coming up with a scientific theory of creativity is to pin down what the subject matter of such a theory should be. The term 'creativity' is associated with a vast array of meanings. Being creative seems to involve fluency, flexibility, divergent thinking, innovation, discovery, originality, spontaneity, genius, wit, ingenuity, shrewdness, imagination, insight, acumen, and so forth. It can be argued that 'creativity' belongs to a large semantic family with countless relatives. Thus, the term 'creativity' seems to exhibit a semantic diversity that makes it ill-suited for scientific theorising. As Stokes and Paul pointed out:

> We find creativity not only in art but also in science, theorizing of any sort, engineering, business, medicine, sport, gaming, and so on. At least two worries may be developed accordingly. First, given the complexity of any one of these individual domains, we might worry that there are simply too many variables to allow for a clear explanation (…). The second worry concerns generalizability. Even supposing that we could explain the creative achievement of some artistic master, any such explanation will have to be so specific that it will fail to generalize to artistic creativity, or creativity in other domains like science or gaming or whatever. In short, given the variety of creativity (and the complexity of the varied creative achievements), identifying a general explanation, in the form of a set of cognitive and behavioral features, may seem entirely improbable (2016, p. 320).

Although this might seem a case of rampant ambiguity, there is at least one constant element in most conceptions of creativity, namely, they all appear to involve some kind of *novelty* (Cropley, 2011, p. 511). However, being novel is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for being creative.

Normativity constitutes the second challenge to drawing up a scientific theory of creativity. Let us consider the case of novelty without creativity. This can be illustrated by considering drug patents. In some countries, drug prices can only legally be raised if pharmaceutical companies can prove that the drug has been modified, thus justifying the need to recoup the cost for the development of new drugs. Thus, drug patents can be extended so long as companies make changes to the product. Yet many observers consider companies abuse the system, making trifling changes to existing drugs just so they can re-file the patents — a practice known in the industry as 'evergreening' and 'product hoping' (Ward, Hickey and Richards, 2020, pp. 1-2, 19-24). Legally, the companies do not have to prove that the new drug is any better than the old formulation, merely that it is not worse. Although such cosmetic modification is legal, it is clearly not creative. This is why some argue that companies should not be allowed to extend their patent rights by using such a ruse given that novelty without value is hardly creative. This raises the question as to why we value *some* novel ideas but not other. What is valuable may vary across the spectrum of human interests. Naturalising the value of creativity involves at least three steps. The first step is to identify our goals. The second is to show how those goals are useful. The third is to explain how 'creative' achievements meet those goals. On these lines, full naturalisation of normativity would require the properties expressed by evaluative or normative terms (in this case, the term 'creative' to be natural or to depend upon natural properties).

The third hurdle is that creativity does not seem to fit into the natural order of things. For something to be creative, it is usually suggested that it should not be caused or conditioned. A common way to spell out this apparent feature of creativity is to invoke the quasi-esoteric acceptance of an inexplicable source of inspiration (we can trace the lineage of this idea back to Plato). However, we think that this way of understanding the nature of the challenge can lead to confusion. That is because it relies on the assumption that a naturalistic theory should always have predictive power. If it fails to provide accurate predictions, non-natural explanations may be at fault. Another way to state the problem recognises that the phenomena dealt with by a theory of creativity should somehow be *unpredictable*. This challenge

acknowledges that, while it is quite possible that a theory lacks predictive ability, it may still provide *bona fide* naturalistic explanations (as, for example, does Evolutionary Biology). The challenge lies in demonstrating such theories' robust explanatory power while saying why they do not serve for making predictions.

There are some promising ways in which these challenges have been addressed by cognitive studies of creativity. Regarding the first one, it has been argued that the concept of creativity is an *integrative* or *inclusive* one. The complexity and polysemy of the concept imply that when we address different perspectives, we find that they overlap and interact with one another. If the concept of *creativity* were not an inclusive one, we could not refer to it as a conceptual category (Estany and Herrera, 2016, p. 96).

With regard to the normativity hurdle, several attempts at naturalisation have been made. Nevertheless, creative instances could only be assessed in relation to a vast array of human interests. Why is a creative instance valuable? Why do we seem to value creativity in general? This second issue may deepen our knowledge on the first one. Given the complexity of individual domains, creative instances may lead us to conclude that there are simply too many variables to allow us to come up with a clear explanation. Nonetheless, we can find a promising path from novelty to normativity by drawing a distinction between someone who is psychologically creative (P-creative) and someone who is historically creative (H-creative): "…some people repeatedly produce ideas highly regarded as valuable — and which, so far as is known, no one else has ever had before (…) Most people, by contrast, produce only moderately interesting ideas, many of which are already known by other people" (Boden, 2009, p. 237). Although, what we regard as interesting and valuable varies, there are many different ways for something to be praised as valuable, and historical creativity is very hard to gauge. One way of unravelling this problem is to first understand psychological creativity (for this is at least necessary for historical creativity) and then understand how someone comes up with a wholly new idea.[2]

Regarding the third hurdle, it has been argued that creativity is compatible with determinism and therefore with naturalistic explanation (Kronfeldner, 2009). Psychological creativity seems to involve some kind of originality and spontaneity and thus seems to be independent from social learning, experience and prior knowledge. Nonetheless, as Kronfeldner shows, this independence is compatible with determinism. While creativity appears to be opposed to specific causal factors, it does not exclude causal determination. Thus, as we pointed out earlier, the third hurdle is not an insurmountable one. Additionally, Boden (2009) has pointed out that different kinds of creativity operate within the framework of a shared conceptual base or within conceptual spaces and thus creativity is not at odds with restrictions. Moreover, as Boden suggests "…exploratory creativity, the existing stylistic rules or conventions are used to generate novel structures (ideas), whose possibility may or may not have been realised before the exploration took place" (2009, p. 241).

As we saw above, although novelty is a recurring element in the various definitions of creativity, seizing on a given example does not prove the link. Fortunately, Boden provides a useful definition that allows us to capture the main features mentioned so far, without raising further issues on the aforementioned three hurdles. She defines creativity as "…the ability to come up with ideas that are *new*, *surprising*, and *valuable*" (Boden, 2004, p. 1). The label 'ideas' is meant to be a catch-all term covering a vast array of feats, including poetic images, scientific theories, works of art, culinary dishes, design solutions, and

2 As one of the reviewers for this paper pointed out to us, coming to terms with this aspect of the puzzle of normativity requires taking into account several key components of the social dimension. While we do not underestimate the significance of these steps towards an overall scientific understanding of creativity, further remarks on this inquiry into the depths of historical creativity are beyond the scope of this paper.

winning strategies. Explaining creativity under this definition would involve surmounting the hurdles to solve what we term 'the paradox for a theory of creativity'. This definition could also be useful for assessing apparent instances of creativity and — as we will see below — will let us draw distinctions between humour in general and creative humour in particular.

CREATIVITY AND HUMOUR

Research on the links between humour and creativity has been undertaken from neurological, psychological, cognitive and philosophical standpoints. Some recent studies have explored the neural correlates of creativity and linked them to humour. The creative tasks investigated commonly range from narrative generation (Howard-Jones *et al*., 2015) to jazz improvisation (Limb and Braun, 2008). However, the researchers unfortunately discovered that the cortical regions associated with creativity were not linked and varied depending on the activity involved. Yet Dietrich and Kanso (2010) observed the common involvement of the prefrontal cortex. Meanwhile, Amir and Bierderman (2016) argued that a one-dimensional comparison between creative and non-creative control conditions might be ill-suited for showing the brain functions involved in creative ventures. Furthermore, for them the neural correlates of real-time humour creation had been too little explored. They showed through neuro-imaging that greater comedic experience is associated with less activation in the stratum and medial pre-frontal cortex but with greater activation in the temporal association regions.

Psychologists and cognitive scientists had found several links and some correlations between humour and creativity since the 1960s. Getzels and Jackson (1962) studied how highly creative groups made more use and valued humour more than non-creative ones. Gordon (1962) showed that people involved in developing creative problem-solving systems reported that sense of humour is a trait consistently present in trainees who are comfortable in dealing with analogies and associative forms of thought. Treadwell measured the ability to create humour and related that ability to other measures of creativity, and concluded that the "…study of humor appears likely to be a useful approach in the study of creativity" (1970, p. 57). For a variety of researchers, humour can be considered an aspect of creativity (Amabile, 1987; Arieti, 1976). In fact, the way researchers measure creative skills usually includes valuations of humour (Davis and Subkoviak, 1975; Torrance, 1966). Others considered humour as creative expression (Koestler, 1964; Maslow, 1971). For Murdoch and Ganim, "… humor seemed to be sufficiently integrated to be considered a subset of creativity", and that is why "…the two could be productively studied within similar conceptual frameworks" (1993, p. 66). Some researchers tend to treat sense of humour as a positive trait (Beermann and Ruch, 2009; Hong, 2010). For Ziv (1976) a humour-filled atmosphere promotes creative performance and people who were required to apply their sense of humour commonly use non-traditional thinking, which enhances their creativity. The Hungarian-British author and journalist Arthur Koestler (1964) posited a strong correlation between humour and creativity: for him humour, scientific discovery, and artistic creation are forms of creativity that all involve the same cognitive process, which Koestler called 'bisociation'. He coined this term "… in order to make a distinction between the routine skills of thinking on a single 'plane', as it were, and the creative act, which (…) always operates on more than one plane" (Koestler, 164, pp. 35-36).

There is another link between humour and creativity that has also prompted research interest, namely that humour can be an instance of creativity. Thus Chan, Chen and Lavallee have pointed out that "… humor not only facilitates creativity but may also be a display of creativity in and of itself" (2013, p. 610). Not all instances of humour are creative but some are. As we saw in the previous section, creativity seems to involve novelty, surprise and value. So, if some instances of humour involve creativity, they would need to be at least novel, surprising and valuable.

Theoretical approaches to humour — whether creative or not — have a long history. Philosophers took an interest in humour from the outset. Several philosophers (such as Plato, Aristotle and Hobbes) gave us insights on the *laughing-at* phenomenon. Superiority Theories (STs) of humour were mostly looking for the psychological causes of laughter and amusement: advocates of STs "…said that when something evokes laughter, it is by revealing someone's inferiority to the person laughing" (Morreall, 2009, p. 7). A vast quantity of instances of humour fit well under STs: "We often laugh *at people*. The implied superiority is what explains the well-worn excuse: I'm not laughing *at* you; I'm laughing *with* you" (Hurley *et. al.*, 2011, p. 41). Here is a cruel joke about lawyers that exemplifies STs:

> Four surgeons were taking a coffee break and were discussing their work. The first said, "I think accountants are the easiest to operate on. You open them up and everything inside is numbered".
>
> The second said, "I think librarians are the easiest to operate on. You open them up and everything inside is in alphabetical order".
>
> The third said, "I like to operate on electricians. You open them up and everything inside is color-coded".
>
> The fourth one said, "I like to operate on lawyers. They're heartless, spineless, gutless, and their heads and their asses are interchangeable" (Hurley et. al., 2011, p. 41).

STs are searching for a causal explanation, not for a teleological explanation, a cognitive account, or a conceptual analysis (although some specific STs may cover some of these aspects). For example, Plato thought that laughter elicited by humour targets a given vice: unawareness. We laugh at people who do not know themselves and think that they are better than they really are. It is in this sense that laughter can be understood as a form of *abuse*. Similarly, Roger Scruton (1982) sees the laughing-at phenomenon as a device for the devaluation of the object of laughter in the subject's eyes. As far as Plato was concerned, laughter had no place in a well-ordered society because it undermined co-operation and tolerance. He also thought that laughter overrode rational self-control. His pupil Aristotle partially shared this perspective: he defined humour as a form of abuse and conjectured that comedy began as invective (Carroll, 2014, p. 6). In brief, for Aristotle "…humor is the recognition of a failing or a piece of ugliness, resulting from an implied comparison between a noble state of a person or thing and an ignoble state" (Hurley *et. al.*, 2011, p. 41). STs can also explain cases in which one laughs at oneself. Thomas Hobbes, the paradigmatic defender of STs, famously remarked: "*Sudden Glory*, is the passion which maketh those *Grimaces* called LAUGHTER; and is caused either by some sudden act of their own (…); or by the apprehension of some deformed thing in another." (1651, p. 43). Therefore, when we laugh at ourselves, "…we do so putatively from a present perspective of superior insight that sees and savours the ridiculous absentmindedness of the person we once were" (Carroll, 2014, p. 9). Finally, Henri Bergson, drawing upon STs, saw laughter as a social corrective.

STs face major challenges and limitations, namely: (a) feelings of superiority are not a necessary condition for laughter; (b) the recognition of our superiority to others does appear be a sufficient condition for laughter (as Francis Hutcheson memorably pointed out, we realise that we are superior to oysters but we do not laugh at them); (c) we can laugh at comic characters superior to us; (d) it is hard to explain in terms of feelings of superiority why we laugh when we are teased in a friendly fashion; and (e) often the source of laughter has nothing to do with issues of superiority and inferiority (Carroll, 2014, pp. 8-16). Consider the following joke: "Theater sign typo: Ushers will eat latecomers" (Hurley *et. al.*, 2011, p. 41). Jokes like this are very hard to explain under STs. Additionally — as Hurley, Dennett and Adams suggested — this account of humour faces a core weakness: "although it provides a generic reason underlying much (if not all) humor, it does not provide a *mechanism* of humor, and thus also doesn't provide a reason for the reason!" (2011, p.

42). Nonetheless, STs have the virtue of covering many humoristic instances: for example those that make fun of foolishness. STs can also cover the value of humour pointing out that laughter is pleasant, and the pleasure we feel is elicited by the recognition of our actual superiority over the object of laughter.

Release Theories (RTs) of humour mostly looked at the value of laughter and comic amusement. Why do we spend so much time and money consuming humour-based products? Noting the purpose of humour, RTs claim that what fulfils this purpose is what we call humorous. Prompted by the Earl of Shaftesbury, Freud and Spencer (and maybe Aristotle in the lost second book of his *Poetics*), what RTs stress is "…that tension from thought can build up, and when this tension is released by a positive emotion that results from further thought, the energy is transformed into (or spent by) laughing" (Hurley *et. al*., 2011, p. 44). For Shaftesbury, the natural free spirits of ingenious men will find out other ways to slip from their constraints and revenge themselves on those who constrain them (Morreall, 2009, p. 16). In Freud's version, "…certain events create repressed sexual and/or aggressive energy, and when that tension is undone in a dramatic way (suddenly or surprisingly), rather than gradually, the nervous energy is released, and relief ensues in the form of humor" (Hurley *et. al*., 2011, p. 44). Despite the appeal of RTs, which explain the prominence of sexual and aggressive content in humour, RTs cannot explain logical humour. Simple puns and grammatical traps do not necessarily include aggressive or sexual tension.

Incongruity-Resolution Theories (I-RTs) of humour mostly looked for the mechanism(s) eliciting laughter and comic amusement. Strongly championed by psychologists, philosophers and cognitive scientists, I-RTs tell us that "…humor happens whenever an incongruity occurs that is subsequently resolved" (Hurley *et. al*., 2011, p. 45). Also, incongruity is a relational notion: "It presupposes that something is discordant with something else. When it comes to comic amusement, that *something* else is how the world is or should be" (Carroll, 2014, p. 18). A classic example would be this one:

> O'Riley was on trial for armed robbery. The jury came out and announced, "Not guilty".
>
> "Wonderful", said O'Riley, "does that mean I can keep the money?" (Hurley *et. al*., 2011, p. 46).

I-RTs explains comic amusement elicited by this joke pointing out that O'Riley response is incongruous with being found not guilty.

Let see another one:

> A somewhat heavy man goes into a pizza parlour and orders a pie. The man behind the counter says, "Do you want it cut into eight slices or four?" He thinks for a second and says, "Well, four. I'm on a diet".

I-RTs explain the comic amusement elicited by this joke pointing out that our common heuristics can go wrong in certain circumstances. Some I-RTs could add that the value of this humorous instance lies in highlighting a glitch in the way we think — something that helps our cognitive wellbeing.

Championed by Hutcheson, Kant and Kierkegaard, I-RTs have many advantages. They have practical use value: they provide us "…with a useful heuristic for the future comic research by guiding us toward the kinds of variables we should attend to when investigating specimens of invented humour such as comic narratives", and "…with an eminently serviceable method for discovering the secret to the humor one encounters daily in the form of jokes, comic asides, cartoons, sitcoms, and so on" (Carroll, 2014, p. 2).

However, it is unlikely that STs, RTs and I-RTs can fully capture the nature of humour. Nonetheless, we agree with Carroll in that "…using the incongruity theory as a heuristic may pave the way for superior successor theories" (Carroll, 2014, p. 2).

For our current purposes, we can work from a characterisation like this: comic amusement is an emotion that is aimed at particular objects, such as linguistic and intentional jokes, which meet the

criteria posed by I-RTs, where such appraisals then lead to enjoyment and a sense of levity which itself correlates with increased activation of the reward network in the brain's limbic system. The general name for all those objects that give rise to comic amusement is humour.[3]

We shall focus on linguistic creative humour. Specifically, we address *linguistic* creative humour as the production of verbal *stimuli* that set out to cause comic amusement. In creative humour, novelty, surprise, and even value, could be related to cognitive aspects of the producers and consumers of humour. A humorous instance of creativity seems to require the search for solutions linking disparities in an original way that sparks surprise (Kellner and Benedek, 2016; O'Quin and Derks, 2011; Rouff, 1975). Therefore, the humorous novelty could be understood as a type of *combinational creativity* where familiar ideas are combined in unknown ways (Boden 2004, p. 3; 2009, p. 240; 2016, p. 68). The new humorous combination elicits, as Boden points out, a statistical surprise whose object is what was previously considered unlikely. Yet even this improbability is intelligible, therefore valuable. As Boden concludes, the value of a creative instance depends on judgements of relevance (2016, p. 68). It is important to take into account that, in several cases, humorous effects ('finding something funny') involve some element of surprise: incongruity resolution; hence, creative humour, insofar as it requires bringing about incongruence, involves 'crafting surprise'. It follows that the paradox of a theory of creativity would disappear if the creative humour is not merely based on repetition of a social model or habit). This is so because such creative humour would clearly involve the elements ofnovelty, surprise and value.

COGNITIVE MODELS OF CREATIVE HUMOUR

We are now in a position to frame our initial question concerning the prospects of naturalising creativity in a more bounded way. From now on, our concerns will be confined to the main manifestation of creativity that we labelled 'creative humour' in the foregoing section. We will explore to what extent this kind of creativity has been brought within the scope of a systematic understanding, involving physical entities that exhibit it through recognisably natural mechanisms. Several (perhaps complementary) approaches from psychology have tackled various aspects of humour production (relating to personality, social interactions, developmental stages, abnormal behaviour, and so forth)[4]. Here though, we shall focus on theories of the cognitive aspects of creative humour. Furthermore, the range of humour output we consider is confined to that conveyed by language. To assess and support our main contention (namely that that linguistic creative humour can be accounted for within a cognitive framework) we shall first present the main general tenets of Relevance Theory [RT] (Sperber and Wilson, 1987; 1995; Wilson and Sperber, 2004). We then go on to outline how the theory has been applied to research humour in general and the intentional production of linguistic humour in particular. We note some of RT's accomplishments, promising avenues, and limitations.

Relevance Theory as a cognitive account of human communication

Although it is not the only cognitive approach currently on the market, RT has much to offer as a theoretical framework. According to Sperber and Wilson, RT's "aim is to identify underlying mechanisms, rooted in human psychology, which explain how humans communicate with one another" (1995, p. 32). RT seeks to provide an empirical psychological theory that can account for human communication and cognition, making use of some assumptions from (and searching to achieve integration with) Evolutionary Biology. It presupposes that "human cognitive abilities are a part of nature; (…) adapted as a result of natural evolution" (Sperber and

3 We take the general lines of this characterisation from Carroll (2014, p. 5).

4 For a contemporary overview, see Gibson (2019).

Wilson, 1995, pp. 116-117). As part of our evolutionary endowment, RT posits the existence of a cognitive mechanism (which might not be a solely human one) that focuses our attention on what might be relevant but that makes us ignore stimuli which are not.

It is worth noting that, by claiming that human "… cognition is a biological function" which "tends to be geared to the maximisation of relevance", RT does not seek to provide a full description of its "process of Darwinian natural selection (or other evolutionary forces that may have helped to shape it)" (Sperber and Wilson, 1995, p. 261). Instead, it is mainly deployed as a theory at the functional or computational level of explanation (Sprevak, 2016, §4; Bermúdez, 2006; 2014). Put another way, it purports to describe the tasks performed by an organism and their ecological purpose. It may also shed light on the algorithmic descriptions of the cognitive processes at work.[5]

The main mechanism posited by RT is called "cognitive principle of relevance". It depicts the human cognitive system as wired to look for relevance and dismiss irrelevance, being able to (unconsciously) rank different processing outputs (e.g., interpretations) produced by the same stimuli. The notion of 'relevance' here is a technical one. It can be applied both to: (1) external stimuli and; (2) internal representations arising from an individual's cognitive processing of an input at a given time, and in a context that yields background information that is expressed in the form of his assumptions. Thus "it makes no sense to talk about the relevance of an ostensive stimulus on its own", instead "relevance is a notion relative to an individual, in a particular context, at a particular time" (Curcó, 1997, p. 169). In addition, there are degrees of relevance and it all boils down to maximising benefits (positive cognitive effects) while minimising costs (mental processing load).[6]

Cognitive relevance presumably plays a crucial role in achieving communication. This does not require a previously shared code, though it may use one. Rather, it can be seen as an attempt to convey someone's informative aims followed by successful recognition of the message by the target audience (i.e. the communicative goal is achieved).[7] RT holds that ostensive communication requires that the communicator provide an ostensive *stimulus* (i.e., direct evidence of his intention to provide information). This might "create precise and predictable expectations of relevance not raised by other inputs" (Wilson and Sperber, 2004, p. 611), triggered by the so-called 'communicative principle of relevance', which states that "every ostensive stimulus conveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance" (Wilson and Sperber, 2004, p. 612). The communicator has the further task of making "…correct assumptions about the codes and contextual information that the audience will have access to and be likely to use in the comprehension process (…) so that all the hearer has to do is go ahead and use whatever code and contextual information come most easily to hand" (Sperber and Wilson, 1995, p. 43).

Under this view, even if communication involves an elaborated, conventionally shared code such as a natural language, there are significant gaps between the communicator's overt ostensive stimulus (the speaker's

5 Thus, it could be argued that RT is also (aiming for) an explanation at the algorithmic level, insofar as there is also an attempt to codify, in a finite number of steps, how the organism can perform the task. However, thus far at least, an exploration of the physical changes in the organism corresponding to those algorithmic steps —what would be the implementation level of explanation— has not yet been pursued or even envisaged.

6 Although our presentation of the cognitive principle of relevance is spelled out in terms of costs and benefits, assumptions and hypotheses, the main tenets of RT do not require this framing in terms of rational choice theory [RCT]. Interestingly, the relevance-theoretic framework can manage without conceiving inference from such an individualistic approach. We thank one of the anonymous referees for pointing this out. However, for expository purposes, in what follows we use the RCT lingo for an expedient exposition.

7 As many naturalistic theories of linguistic meaning that assume that intentionality of thought is explanatorily prior to that of language, insofar as they "take mental representation to be basic and linguistic representation to be derivative", RT assumes that representation in public language is (partially) explained by "the representational powers of mental states" (Papineau, 2006, p. 175).

utterance) and what he intends to communicate ('what he means'). "These gaps are filled by inference" (Yus, 2016, p. xvi). Although guided by the cognitive principle of relevance (following the path of least resistance and looking for the most significant cognitive effects), the inferences involved in comprehension are split into non-sequential stages or 'sub-tasks' in which the recipient (the audience or hearer) constructs and compares "…anticipatory hypotheses about the overall structure of the utterance being processed" (Curcó, 1995, p. 31). These include: a "hypothesis on explicit content (explanations) via decoding, disambiguation, reference resolution, and other pragmatic enrichment processes"; a "hypothesis on the intended contextual assumptions (the premises involved)"; and a "hypothesis on the intended contextual implications (the implied conclusions)" (Wilson and Sperber, 2004, p. 615). Communication is achieved when the inferential process leads the hearer to recover the message that the speaker wanted to convey.

A relevance-theoretic account of linguistic creative humour

One of the first attempts to apply the framework of RT to an account of humour in communication was undertaken by Maria Jodłowiec, who tried to "… characterise pragmatic mechanisms (...) involved in the production and comprehension of verbal jokes" (1991, p. 242). As shown by Francisco Yus' (2017) recent overview, many other studies have followed this relevance-theoretic orientation, both pursuing a similar goal or exploring kindred subjects such as: (a) the perception of something as humorous (whether intended or not); (b) possible classifications of humour; (c) kinds of constraints and effects involved in humorous comprehension; (d) humorous ironies and narratives; (e) conversational humour; (f) the translation of humour. We will not dwell on many aspects of these interesting subjects. Part of what is expected from RT as "a pragmatic theory of verbal humour" is that it "should be able to predict what kind of utterances and texts will be humorous and [explain] why" (Curcó, 1997, p. 165).

We will confine our attention to a relevance-theoretic explanation of intentional linguistic creative humour. A special feature of such an explanation — unlike some other linguistic approaches to the subject — is that it takes a decisively cognitive shift. It claims that "rather than assuming that being humorous is a property of texts, and hence concentrating on their structure, (…) what we need to understand to characterize verbal humour are the mental processes [involved] when humorous effects are derived" (Curcó, 1997: 165). As we stressed in our characterisation of 'creative humour', the intentional production of humorous effects (insofar as it is a creative process) should bear the hallmark features of creativity: it must be novel, have some value, and spark surprise. As we argued, some of those features are achieved by creative humour (stemming from surprise triggered by the incongruity-resolution account; value whether as cognitive debugging or as emotional relief). Accounting for those features in a systematic understanding that is in keeping with the natural sciences would amount to naturalising creativity.

RT provides a useful framework for systematically unifying what the production of novel instances of linguistic humorous incongruities requires. In cases of intentional production of linguistic humour "the hearer has been forced [by the speaker…] to interpret the utterance responsible for the humorous climax as consistent with the principle of relevance, [in a way that] contradicts some other assumption either explicitly conveyed by an immediate utterance, or manifest in the accessible context of interpretation" (Curcó, 1997, p. 30). Thus a surprising incongruity is produced by design, with the initial information presented by the speaker. The comedian's interaction with the audience triggers his listeners to make specific anticipatory hypotheses, in which he exploits the cognitive relevance mechanism. These anticipatory hypotheses, created relying on the mind-reading ability of the speaker to set the hearers' interpretation on a specific cognitive path, generalise expectations concerning the type of information to follow; "however, people often encounter new information (…) that deviates from expectations" (Wyer and Collins, 1992, p. 665). Thus, in linguistic creative humour the speaker sets up a resolvable incongruity by violating expectations of relevance, intentionally triggering the audience to revise their

ideas in the light of a new piece of information. Here, the speaker exploits his ability to guess what hearers are thinking in order to 'reverse-engineer' their inferential strategies and how they assimilate information. Since the inferences involved in comprehension require several non-sequential stages or 'sub-tasks', humorous incongruities may arise due to several non-equivalent factors, such as: the resolution of lexical and syntactical ambiguities; determinations of reference assignment; disambiguation; free enrichment and conceptual adjustment. This process can be structurally described in terms of lexical and syntactic calculations. Nevertheless, the main cognitive mechanism is usually tweaked through contextual information for the inferential strategies that the speaker believes are most likely to be used by his listeners (as we saw in the examples of I-RTs).[8] However, in order to achieve the surprise required for creative humour, at least some aspects of the inference should be unanticipated by the audience; otherwise the whole thing would not be funny. Thus, RT shows how (notwithstanding the relevance-based algorithmic processing of information) creative humour makes people laugh by spawning novel, unpredictable psychologically incongruities whose resolution turns out to be (by design) cognitively valuable for the intended audience.

We have seen that RT promises to uncover the cognitive mechanisms used by speakers to intentionally produce creative instances of linguistic humour. We assumed that a theory explaining this kind of creativity might hold out hope of a fully-fledged cognitive explanation of overall creativity. Nevertheless, it seems that linguistic creative humour as portrayed by RT can be explained as a cognitive phenomenon. Unfortunately, it turns out that linguistic humour is highly dependent on the speaker's ability to steer the hearer's inferential strategies and his access to context along predictable paths to 'solve' an incongruity. This makes it unlikely that such a theory of creativity would have any predictive value. On the positive side, it does reveal a naturalistic mechanism for humour, embodying the unpredictability of outcomes and explaining their cognitive value. Thus, the apparent paradox for a theory of creativity vanishes.

8 For the reconstruction of several case studies using the theoretical framework of RT, see Curcó (1995; 1997) and Yus (2016; 2017).

CONCLUSIONS

In this paper we explored some aspects of the scientific study of creativity by focusing on examples of linguistic humour. We argued that this sort of creativity can be accounted for within the framework of a valuable cognitive approach but that does not yield a recipe for producing novel humorous situations. We first identified three great puzzles that arise in attempting to naturalise creativity. After having explained each of them, we outlined some promising ways in which they have been addressed by cognitive studies of creativity. In a second section, we focused our attention on the links between creativity and humour. Then we restricted our discussion to what we called 'creative humour'. In the final section, we showed how an important cognitive approach to human communication can account for creative humour.

If Relevance Theory does explain linguistic creative humour, being able to intentionally produce humorous linguistic episodes could depend on being able to systematically elicit amusing incongruities. However, the information required for creating some kinds of linguistic humour might only be available to someone who takes part in and is in the midst of conversational contexts. If this is indeed the case, it would be impossible for the information to be anticipated or generalised in the way that Sheldon Cooper's Unified Theory of Comedy seems to require "…to elicit laughter from anyone at any time". These remarks should give us some pause for thought on what (not) to expect from a naturalisation of creativity. On the one hand, such an explanation may not entail predictive or implementation capabilities. On the other hand, the fact that creativity appears within a systematic theory involving physical entities and mechanisms might be an indication that its explanatory power relies precisely on something that precludes being able to forecast its outcomes.

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Naturalist Methods in the Sociology of Creation: The Case Against Reductionism

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ABSTRACT
The Sociology of Culture has much to say when it comes to the ever-changing general consensus on what constitutes legitimate culture and definitions of creativity. The naturalistic studies on cognition in social and cognitive sciences show this empirically (Bourdieu, 1979: Becker, 1982, 2002; Sennett, 2012; Author, 2014). Creative cognition is part of an institutional context. However, the influential culturalist branch of cognitive sociology (CCS) reduces creativity to a cognitivist psychological level (Lizardo and Strand, 2010). We start from the conjecture that the Sociology of Culture can draw on the naturalistic paradigm of cognition to explain creativity without falling into reductionist or atomist positions. The authors take the diversity of theoretical-empirical proposals into account in identifying the starting points for focusing the debate at both the macro and micro levels. The body of the article comprises a literature review which, while not exhaustive, offers a full picture of the pragmatic and integrated models of creativity. The studies analysed present inter-subjective processes of creation and the transmission of variable legitimate criteria concerning cultural consumption such as categorisations, evaluations and aesthetic judgments. The sociological perspective offers scope for strengthening critical tools for examining creativity.

Keywords: sociology of culture, legitimacy, taste, ethno-methodology, Lizardo, Bourdieu.

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INTRODUCTION

We need space to think, debate, read, and create. Here, the Sociology of Culture plays a major role in the ever-shifting consensus on what constitutes legitimate culture and definitions of creativity, meaning that the discipline has a lot to say on the subject. Creative cognition is not just a local psychological product but part of a social context. The Sociology of Culture sees creativity as a phenomenon structured by factors such as gender, social class, and the national framework. Naturalistic studies of cognition in the Social and Cognitive Sciences

empirically demonstrate that this is so (Bourdieu, 1979: Becker, 1982, 2002; Sennett, 2012; Muntanyola-Saura, 2012, 2014, 2016). We use the term 'naturalist' in the sense found in the philosophical tradition that considers knowledge as a given reality of human and social activity. This is the basis of the sociological perspective and, more specifically, of well-understood Social Constructionism. Yet the influential Culturalist Cognitive Sociology (CCS) school reduces creativity to a cognitivist psychological level (Lizardo and Strand, 2010). CCS sees decision-making as an individual activity that is unconscious and that follows rules that are not directly shaped by social factors. It is assumed that people react automatically to social stimuli in an unsystematic, unreflective fashion. As a result, the CCS perspective considers socialisation and the linguistic and conceptual content of thought to be matters of secondary importance.

This paper starts from the conjecture that the Sociology of Culture might take advantage of the naturalistic paradigm of cognition to explain creativity without falling into reductionist or atomistic positions. The present diversity of theoretical-empirical approaches is taken into account to pin down the starting postulates in each case and to focus the debate at both the macro and micro levels. The paper's goals are to: (1) argue the social construction of creativity; (2) define the socio-historical origin of creativity in three cultural change processes; (3) present the main theoretical schools in Sociology formulating a naturalistic analysis of creativity; (4) gather contributions with a view to understanding specific micro-scale creative practices. The body of this paper therefore consists of a bibliographic review that, while not exhaustive, does cover pragmatic and integrated models of creativity.

THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF CREATIVITY

Is creativity an individual or a collective practice? The object of this article is the envelope of creativity — that is to say, the production context of activities that we deem to be creative. A discussion of which neural design makes creativity possible is something that lies beyond the scope of this paper but there are several examples of best-selling neuro-scientists who have addressed the topic, for example Dennett, 1995; Damasio, 1999; Ramachandran and Blackeslee, 1999; Gallese, Keysers and Rizzolatti, 2004. Neither shall we delve into psychological abilities, such as attention or perception either facilitating or hindering that 'Eureka Moment'. Instead, we shall deconstruct the following three strong notions of creativity: (1) the universality of what is considered creativity; (2) the romantic ideal of the creative individual; (3) the reification of creative practice.

First of all, we define creativity as an activity that takes place in the social world, far removed from notions such as instinct, motivation, and inspiration, all of which are psychological processes. From a sociological standpoint, we use the term 'legitimacy' to refer to those social activities accepted and conveyed by the dominant social institutions, and labelled as normal and desirable (Berger and Luckmann, 1995). Creative practice is the legacy of professionals from both the artistic and scientific worlds. Yet creativity is clearly not the sole preserve of these professionals: Merton (1945) stresses that scientific creativity is not only an intentional product but may also arise from happy chance. Furthermore, creativity is not a scarce commodity but rather as Becker (2017) notes, is an inherent feature of social practice in any institutional setting. Joas (1996) puts it slightly differently, arguing that creativity does not exist without the inter-subjectivity of socially organised action. Yet it is also true that some professional practices are socially legitimised as creative while others not. From a sociological standpoint, this gives scope for exploring the conventions for deciding what constitutes art — as Becker (1982) also states. In Bourdieusian terms, not every creative practice is likely to be considered cultural capital.

We could also talk about associated terms such as innovation and entrepreneurship, which link creativity with technology in the first case and with private enterprise in the second. For example, if one uses the search terms 'creativity' and 'innovation'

in Google, two hits come up on creativity and schooling, the third covers a Post-Graduate Degree on Entrepreneurship, Creativity, and Interdisciplinary Innovation — a course taught by Barcelona University's (UB) Business Studies and Economics Faculty. The Post-Graduate programme is presented thus:

> Competitiveness often involves the ability to devise and manage interdisciplinary projects that spawn new markets and provide key differentiation to consolidate projects. This graduate programme delves deeper into the links between creativity and innovation. The overall aim is to impart the basic knowledge, skills and competencies to develop innovative projects through collaborative work and the use of creative tools.

As Becker (1982) so compellingly argues, the labelling process lets us perform this semantic deconstruction. Therefore, creativity here is a competence acquired in a formal education environment linked to the Capitalist market with the aim of boosting business competitiveness. It is a conception legitimised by the university's curriculum, which enshrines a vision that is far removed from artistic notions of creativity. Therefore, the first key idea is that the polysemy of creativity is the product of processes for building social legitimacy.

The second idea is that the social imaginary associates creativity with the ivory tower of the romantic genius, the artist who shuts himself in the studio and is creative despite others, not thanks to them. This was the great myth of modernity, which Paul Feyerabend (1987) attacked, arguing that it is a misconception that has persisted since the nineteenth century. The philosopher was the author of the famous treatise *Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge*. In that work, Feyerabend showed science as an opaque, individualistic institution. Years later, in *Creativity: A Dangerous Myth* (1987) — a lesser-known paper that condenses an alternative view on the subject — he argues that modern creativity does not spring from a social vacuum (confined, as it were, to a given artist's or scientist's brain). According to Feyerabend, creativity as a practice occurs under certain material and historical conditions, with a random component of a procedural and a cumulative nature. Feyerabend comments on the case of Renaissance craftsmen who worked within a given political structure — the Tuscan cities. These craftsmen were funded by a patron and their social worth was gauged by their mastery of design, materials, and tools. What is the modern equivalent? Schools and universities should foster the creativity of those who work or study within their walls. The *Escola 21* [Schools 21] plan for teaching renewal and the growth of free schools is an example of public awareness of the need for settings that nurture creativity through proper training of teachers, teaching methods, and resourcing.

The third main idea is that we cannot freeze creativity and give it just one meaning. That is because in practice creativity must always be seen in relation to a given society, moment, and age. We cannot pin down the ability to create, to be free, to imagine, or to have new ideas to any one curriculum, architectural style, or trend. Feyerabend does not deny the existence of taste or aesthetic judgment. However, he does stress that reifying cultural output from a given period and taking it as a model is a mistake often made in both academic and lay circles. Reification affects other central concepts in the Social Sciences, such as culture. Here, Mario Bunge distinguishes between an empirical conception and an idealised construction of these cultural practices:

> The culture of an advanced society is made up of a large number of subsystems, such as professional groups, the film industry, churches and publishing houses. This (sociological) characterisation contrasts with the idealised concept of culture as a collection of bodiless objects, such as Morality, Art, or Religion per se without regard to the people who produce or consume culture or to their beliefs, artistic mores, and religious practices (Bunge, 2018).

Over time, the ways artists work, present themselves, and the sources of their legitimacy have all changed, as have the forms taken by family relations and Capitalist

production. The myth of individual creativity begins with the Cartesian dualism between body and mind, matter and spirit, thought and sensation, reason and intuition. As Bruno Latour (1986) states, a 'new man' did not suddenly emerge at some point in the 16th Century. The choice of any given cut-off point is wholly arbitrary, as one can see through the historical comparison of professional settings. Thanks to the contributions made by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1979, 1984, 1994), we can see just how far the tools for legitimising artistic decisions are professionally constructed. A contemporary artist learns to justify the quality of his work when he knows how to sell it to a potential buyer such as a gallery. To promote himself, he must use the terms that are accepted and shared by those who are part of this field. There is a way of doing this that is learnt by working in the art world, and it takes the form of a *habitus*, a way of looking, thinking and saying. For example, in everyday life a regular book-buyer will walk through a bookstore, touching the books, looking at them, weighing them up, all behaviours indicative of searching for a certain book, a way of talking to the bookseller, and so on. Thus creativity is an activity that takes shape over time and space, in a changing way, following a socially-defined *habitus*.

BRIEF SOCIO-HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PROCESSES OF CULTURAL CHANGE

The most established sociological approach in Western popular culture is the critique of 'mass culture.' Although the concepts of 'mass society' and 'mass culture' have older roots, they did not play major roles in the analysis of culture and society until the 1930s — roles that were only consolidated until after The Second World War. American and European cultural elites strongly resumed the critique begun in the nineteenth century and based on the perception of a modern world that has diluted the secondary social institutions between the masses on one side and centralised power structures on the other. Prominent members of the Frankfurt School believe that the individual in 'mass society' is alienated and isolated, and is thus prone to being politically manipulated by an authoritarian leader and of being culturally nullified by the machinery of the "cultural industry" (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1972/1994; Ariño and Llopis, 2017). The split between High Culture and popular culture leads to the principle of social hierarchy and to a desire for distinction. This debate is currently at a key juncture in the three processes of social transformation discussed below, namely: commoditisation [turning a good into a commodity]; democratisation; individualisation.

(1) The commoditisation of the cultural industries in the 1950s and 60s marked the collapse of the first project of cultural democratisation, whose goal was to expose the masses to Culture with a capital 'C', raising their cultural horizons through public policies. This idea, which at the practical level meant providing schooling and easier access to High Culture, still survives in cultural and artistic circles, legitimising a cultural hierarchy. Yet audiences are becoming more heterogeneous and the market more stratified. Cultural products such as cinema appeal to different publics. This has led to market niches and products catering to different population segments defined by class, status, cultural capital, gender, race and so forth. Thus, the act of cultural consumption becomes the greatest act of social integration. Lipovetsky (2007) defines the values that are starting to take root as those of 'hyper-modernity', in which consumption defines who one is. That is because one defines oneself by what one buys and consumes. Going a step further, the same author together with Serroy (2015), argues that current consumption models have built an ethical and aesthetic duality: on the one hand a speeding up of consumption and life driven by technological progress; on the other, a call for 'down-sizing' in economic, cultural, and emotional terms.

(2) The process of democratisation in the sixties and seventies highlights the limitations of policies fostering broader public access to cultural resources. The consolidation of the

commoditisation process did not erase social hierarchies or lead to real democratisation. These shortcomings brought criticism on the true scope of access to culture. As a result, modernity suffered a crisis in the late sixties. Bourdieu (1979), among others, evidenced the overlap between cultural and social hierarchies, sex, and age. This critical view questions the notion that 'upper class' tastes are the only legitimate ones, and links the various patterns of cultural consumption to the stations individuals occupy in the social structure. Bourdieu's contribution is a blow to the democratic ideal of culture that had held sway up until then. He revealed the limits of population culturalisation policies, whose impact was much more limited than hoped for by those who drew them up.

The authors of British Cultural Materialism (Williams, 1958, Eagleton, 2000) criticise Liberal Neutralism by stating that culture is above all a normative way of imagining society. Cultural Materialism, moreover, stresses that culture is a material activity rather than an intellectual one. It is a way of giving meaning to the world and the place we occupy in it rather than an end in itself. Instead of 'the masses', there are discourses because cultural forms grow, transform, and diversify. The pessimism of Adorno and Horkheimer (1972) contrasts with the more optimistic view taken in emerging Cultural Studies (Hall and Jefferson, 1975; Stuart Hall, 2007). Here, the Cultural Materialism school of thought argues that creativity exists and works both materially and symbolically as part of the processes forging learning, knowledge, and status.

(3) The progressive individualisation of cultural practices led to an explosion of lifestyles and artistic activities. This process of changing the forms of knowledge, interaction, and being together began with the hedonism of the sixties. These developments in turn drove a host of reflections on the cultural consequences of globalisation in the relationship between power, information and knowledge, and cultural hybridisation (Regev, 2013). Such changes also go some way towards explaining the explosion in the sheer range of tastes expressed on social networks and framed in 'identity' terms. In the field of activism, there have been proposals for seeing cultural democracy through the lens of pro-common or open knowledge movements, and criticisms of the naive drift towards Internet 'cyber-fetishism' (Rendueles, 2013). Yet technology's scope for facilitating access to knowledge is insufficient to sweep away cultural elitism. For this to happen, changes are needed in the social conditions of knowledge production, accompanied. Such changes need to be accompanied by institutional policies for narrowing the digital divide in access to the Internet — (a hot in the scholarly debate on digital literacy).

CRITICAL REVIEW OF CULTURALIST COGNITIVISM

This section covers the theoretical paradigms of Culturalist Cognitivism, which we consider crucial to understanding the current debates on the legitimacy of creative practices. Indeed, creativity lies at the heart of the clash between reproduction of the hierarchy of cultural capitals and the individualisation of tastes. As Natalie Heinich (1999) notes, avoiding authoritarianism and populism means renouncing the universalism of cultural and artistic production. That is, the bourgeois ideal of art must be renounced for art's sake. Since the 1970s this point led to focus on groups (the so-called iconoclasts): rejecting 'legitimate' culture (1999); consuming non-public culture (Jacobi and Luckerhoff, 2012); or that were inactive in the cultural field (López-Sintas *et al*, 2014). Vandenberg *et al*. (2018) analyse the culturally 'illegitimate' practices of Rotterdam's popular music scene, drawing on Bourdieu's field theory and Lizardo and Strand's (2010) dual processing model to this end. The study sought to test whether the dynamics of field distinction take place from the musical orientations verbalised in the survey, or, in the authors' words, as "most common implicit dispositions".

Leaving aside the descriptive nature of the proposal, this type of research reproduces a confusing cognitivism. The opinions gathered by the survey administered to individuals consuming 'illegitimate' culture were detached from the institutional mechanisms of a relational nature that precisely define their value as a cultural practice. In such an approach, the mechanism of Bourdieu's distinction and reproduction is atomised and the social conditions of legitimation processes are ignored. The definition of legitimacy and illegitimacy, which is the relational product of field conditions in Bourdieu, is reified in this study. The categories or labels of social affiliation are not questioned because the focus of analysis is no longer sociological, becoming psychological and substantialist instead. One of the consequences of this approach is a rigid view of cultural legitimacy in which a dual processing model is harnessed to reproduce a reductionist paradigm. Despite tackling the study an apparently interdisciplinary way, the authors' culturalist view of Cognitive Sociology leads them to analyse creativity in psychological terms. This influential school in Creativity Studies lies at the reductionist end of the reductionism/relationism spectrum, while Becker, Bourdieu, and other authors of the naturalistic sociological perspective at the other end. Lizardo (in Brekhus, 2015) considers Bourdieu's concept of *habitus* to be a psychological one. He argues that culture is inconsistent, fragmented in its uses and stems from subconscious habit. Yet to claim that everyday knowledge is neither a linguistic nor a symbolic process, and is detached from the process of socialisation is mistaken on two grounds. We can talk of biological mechanisms, such as intentionality (Searle, 2004), second-order reflexivity (Premack, 2004) and conceptual projection (Kirsh, 2009) as factors conditioning *habitus*. Yet Lizardo's socialisation version (Brekhus, 2015) is a pale version of this idea, in which actors *only have a set of freely structured skills, heuristics, routines, and superficial habits that help them navigate (and select) the best strategic actions within an outsourced institutional structure that assumes the least possible "systematicity" at the actor level, with most of the systematicity projected onto the external environment* (Lizardo, 2010: 208). Leaving aside that the term 'systematicity' is a purely descriptive one, it is hard to say what level of analysis it covers. The reasoning here is cognitivist, as it falls into a scholastic fallacy, as Bourdieu (1994) would say. The fallacy lies in seeing cognitive processes as the psychological outcome of norms (such as the aforementioned habits and routines) instead of placing such processes in their historically variable contexts. As Lizardo explains later in the same paper, *rule following* is not linguistic, it is a process based on unconscious mental states. Here, the classic American philosophy authors such as John Searle (2004) and Hubert Dreyfus (1996) brilliantly reveal the fatal flaw in this argument. They point out that every unconscious mental state (following the connectivist principle appearing in Hume's empiricism) should become conscious thought at some point along the way. Since Lizardo denies this possibility, it follows that the heuristic, psychological, individual and mental rules he says lie at the core of our culture and cognition simply do not exist.

The links that Lizardo (2004) forges between Bourdieu and Piaget are relevant and contribute to his heuristic musings on Bourdieu's *oeuvre*. However, in the same paper (Lizardo: 2004, 395) he states that *habitus* is an abstract principle, without contextual specificity, a transposable matrix. It is language that recalls the programming principles of GOFAI (Good Old-Fashioned Artificial Intelligence), that is, the classic models of behaviour-based AI. In other words, Lizardo's cognitivism opens a chasm between neuronal and psychological cognitive processes even though there is none in real life. In the words of Searle (2004), neurons (mirror and others) cause intentional states. It is thanks to the cognitive mechanism of intentionality that we orient ourselves to action and creative judgments. Thus socialisation lies in this interaction between the neural level and the social setting, while the psychological becomes an irrelevant ghost. This is an issue that Cognitive Science has already resolved yet Lizardo seems to be unaware of the fact. This error translates into a superficial interpretation of the process of socialisation and cultural transmission. Brekhus (2015: 18) says that Lizardo considers that direct instruction and socialisation are unnecessary because practices can

be transmitted and collected unconsciously through the mirror of others.

On the same page, Lizardo summarises Bourdieu's contribution to the interdisciplinary field between Neuroscience, Cognitive Science, and Cultural Sociology in the following terms: *These scholars emphasise bodily habits in largely subconscious responses to the environment rather than considering socialisation and language as the main ways in which culture is internalised***.** This statement falls into the reductionism of confusing neuron interaction with psychological mental states, when in fact it is a relationship between the neural apparatus and the processes of social interaction. By contrast, Berger and Luckmann (1988) spend over 30 pages in *The Social Construction of Reality* to comment on passages from Alfred Schütz, the New School's social phenomenologist missing from Lizardo's argument. Schütz concisely defines this process of practical, fragmented, and prescriptive knowledge that underpins all cognitive interaction. Berger and Luckmann state that "Schütz mainly focused on analysing the structure of the world of common sense in everyday life" (1988: 31-32). The mechanism of this distribution can be studied through sociological methods.

In short, studies on 'illegitimate' tastes, following Lizardo's cognitivism line, fail to question the definition of survey items as indicators of cultural practices. This perspective leaves out other reflective and relational aspects such as the aforementioned ones. Bourdieu's (1984: 47) perspective, in his own words, is relational and opposes narrow reductionism and atomism:

> First, one needs to avoid the tendency to think of the social world in a substantialist way. The notion of space itself embodies a relational notion of the social world: in which 'reality' lies in the mutual exteriority of the elements comprising it. Beings whether they be individuals or groups, exist and subsist in and through difference, which is to say for as long as they occupy relative positions in a field of relationships. Although this field is invisible and hard to empirically demonstrate, it is the most 'real' aspect of our world, underpinning the behaviours of individuals and groups.

Other well-known authors in the field of the Sociology of Culture, such as DiMaggio (1987), propose a compendium of possibilities for interpreting artistic classifications without stating the blindingly obvious. More recently, Johnson, Dowd, and Ridgeway (2006) claim the need for a systematic analysis of de-legitimisation as a social process. Lamont (2010), along with Vlegels and Lievens (2017), analyses the processes of social construction of artistic and musical categories based on classification schemes.

What we raise here is the need for a paradigm shift that does not seek to define creativity in substantive and attributive terms. Creativity is not a property associated with rigid social groups but rather is a relational mechanism. This is an argument already made by Bourdieu in the social sphere and (as reflected in the Anglo-Saxon tradition) is the basis of studies on Popular Culture. Indeed, Raymond Williams 'Cultural Materialism and Stuart Hall's Cultural Turn have highlighted the notion of Popular Culture as the basis for other kinds of legitimacy. It is a question of a hierarchy of legitimacies: The British sociologist Simon Frith (1987) (who was earlier closely linked to the Stuart Hall School of Cultural Studies) discovered the central role played by British Art Schools in this regard. He found that the schools did a great deal to consolidate the artistic careers of musicians such as Bowie or visual artists such as Hockney. Frith's work shed light on the links between the practices of these artists at their creative zenith and the factors of class and cultural capital among students at these schools.

THE MICRO-SOCIOLOGY OF CREATIVE JUDGMENT

Marcel Duchamp, the founder of contemporary art in 1917 with his 'ready-made' (a urinal provocatively titled 'Fountain') coined the phrase "Art is a way of looking". In 1957 Duchamp defined artistic and creative experience as a form of relationship,

without going into the substantial content of what is considered a legitimate work at a given place and time. For decades, Cultural Studies has been interested in the meaning of practices involving technology use, forming part of so-called 'cultural circuits' (Du Gay, 1997; Frith, 1986). Becker (2002) claims there is a need to innovate in the quest for new cultural and artistic realities stemming from the widespread adoption of digital tools and related technologies. At the same time, technology can be analysed in terms of gender articulation according to axes of class, race, or ethnicity (Armstrong (2011).

Cifariello (2017) analyses creativity in the distribution of musical forms mediated by technology as an object of study in itself. In short, it is a question of following what already appears in Marx, and which Rosenblum (1999: 174) expresses thus: *All the post-production economic and social processes feed back into production itself, forming part of the overall production/distribution system*. On the one hand, the artistic process depends on market exchange, distribution and consumption relationships. On the other hand, artists need to control the process of exchange, which involves entering the art market. Micro-analyses of everyday life (DeNora, 2014) and international comparisons of conceptual and classification categories (Fourcade, 2010) seek a practical grasp of the social categorisation of criteria and taste as classification evaluation processes. This experience is complex and, above all, collective. Moschetta and Vieira (2018) interviewed users of Spotify's music-streaming platform to analyse their new music discovery and consumption practices. They claim that while users exploit the programme's algorithms to listen to recommendations online, their first benchmark is the advice and personal recommendations of family and friends, thus the construction of musical taste remains purely social.

In addition, a direct relationship between body and music has been established over the last decade (Muntanyola-Saura, 2014, 2016). A dance sequence emerges from a host of creative and communicative micro-decisions by all those taking part in the rehearsal (that is, both dancers and the choreographer). More phenomenologically, Sennett (2012) spoke of the creativity of luthiers, giving a detailed description of their craft in the workshop, explaining their work process as a succession of both informal and embodied gestures, and formal habits. He explicitly cites the 'embodied cognition' paradigm noted by Dreyfus (1996), Clark (2008), and Gibbs (2006). He says: *I will try to show how manual work can instigate dialogue-based social behaviour* (Sennett: 2012: 199). Explaining how bodies interact, and determining the proximity between the mind and its biological envelope are guiding principles of current cognitive research.

To understand the construction of creativity we must therefore enter into the dynamics of interaction and communication underpinning the creation of expert categories and judgments (Teil, 2004; Hennion, 2005; Lena and Peterson, 2008; Fourcade, 2012). We use the term 'expert' in a cultural materialist sense, which is to say free from its usual elitist and individualistic social connotations. That is why we consider an expert to be someone who acts and speaks based on the terms that have been built up and conveyed within a given social sphere, such as the music scene (DelVal *et al*., 2014). We also move away from Essentialism by considering that expert practices and discourses change and transform depending on time and place.

This way of analysing contextualised and objectified creative practices is part of the ethno-methodological tradition. It is a methodology that has been analysing interaction processes in various institutional settings (such as hospitals, restaurants, museums, classrooms, and police stations) ever since the 1980s (Cicourel, 2002; Lieberman, 2013, DeNora, 2014, Fele, 2016, March, 2017). Ethno-methodology's starting point is to consider that judgment, evaluation, and categorisation processes are neither more nor less than spontaneous expressions of individual preferences. These judgments take place in an institutional setting, and in a specific geographical framework. There is nothing more real than what people have agreed to. What is central (from the pragmatic perspective) is the definition of the situation. Every process of knowledge and communication follows rules of

interaction that we can observe and analyse, and that stem from the same context. Individual perceptions of the cultural object are shared, presented to the 'Other', and adjusted in a process of reciprocity that can lead towards consensus or dissent. In both cases, final judgments are inter-subjective products about subjective experience itself.

The blogging perfumers in Alac's paper (2017) develop a public language and do so by filtering and sharing their individual experience. Bloggers take the ineffability of smell as a challenge, engaging with others in an act of collective creativity. The best thing about taste or aesthetic judgment is that it transcends subjectivity by publicly sharing individual experiences within a specific vocabulary that legitimises what is being said. I attended the Venice Art Biennale last Autumn. The famous Italian pavilion designed by the artist Cuoghi presented religious figures with flowers in varying states of decomposition. The smell of flowering spores along with the varying temperature levels and the visual effect of the decomposition led to an intense experience. The whole thing proved spellbinding for the lay and expert audience, which enthused about the exhibition and took photographs. Shared comments were made about individual experiences of the installation.

The dialogue is selective. That is, when we talk about art or food we do not share all the properties of what we are contemplating or enjoying (Fele, 2016). When we are at a concert we do not blurt out all our feelings, thoughts and views to the person next to us but instead only make a few spontaneous but selective comments on our experience. In our view, the end result is that these socially validated and communicated comments may, for example, take the form of photographs shared on social networks. Indeed, most of the time conversation at work is of a multi-modal nature. In my own work on dance (Muntanyola-Saura, 2014), dancers use the term 'listening' to describe their own networking endeavours in duets and trios. They refer to a communicative posture that goes beyond speech and whose components include gaze, gestures, space, and rhythm.

We follow our own systems of relevance (Schütz, 1972), which are the product of socialisation processes based on past experiences with family and friends. Yet at the same time, the nature of the exchange, the other's willingness to listen and the sequence of the conversation shape the discourse. Creative judgment occurs at this juncture, during the conversation and does not necessarily pre-exist at the neuronal or individual level. The aesthetic act is one of shared attention, as Hennion (2005) states when talking about wine-tasting, and includes moments of inspiration and musical emotion (Green, 2016).

The ethno-methodological object, in short, appears at the moment we make a value judgment on our creative experience which, as Hennion (2005) shows, revolves around the act of paying attention. According to Lieberman (2013), participants in tasting events are not only interested in describing the taste of coffee. What they want is to share experiences, categorise and evaluate to go beyond the flavours they have already identified. They want to appreciate a given taste or nuance in greater depth, learn what it is, how to recognise it, and how to describe it. This participatory learning process raises the level of expertise. Hennion (2005) argues that taste is not socially determined but instead is an activity in which the creativity shown depends on many factors (for instance, moods, technological mediations, music circles).

CONCLUSIONS

The *leitmotif* of this paper is that taste judgments and creative decisions are conditioned by the positional play of consumers in relation to cultural capital, social class, sex, and age, among other factors. These factors not only construct and legitimise but also induce complexes and demobilise, fostering elitism and populism. Socially, creativity is identified with cognitive processes that take place in artistic and scientific contexts, or in the aesthetic and taste judgments made in everyday life. Taste is a form of

discrimination, enshrining our ability to analyse, identify, recognise, and name what we perceive.

We cannot ignore the dynamics of distinction in what Bourdieu terms 'reproduction'. When the amateur perfumers studied by Alac (2017) mocked professional vocabularies, they were distancing themselves from a group of leading experts in terms of symbolic resources and cultural capital. This is a defence mechanism against the hierarchical structure of society. In this sense, there is a growing awareness of the influence of commercial interests, power, and social hierarchies in our judgments. This in turn leads to general suspicion of any hierarchy of knowledge or cultural practice that manages to legitimise itself, as well as contempt for and distrust of any notion of expertise or specialisation (Dreyfus, 1996). Recent debates over what has been called 'political populism' and 'post truth' are the fruit of these dynamics.

Creativity does not happen in a vacuum but in a specific institutional context. The institution to which we belong shapes not only the subjects we talk about but also how we talk about them. Language becomes sacred in terms of a respected vocabulary because it is linked to a social system of relevance (Schütz, 1972). The experience of creativity is not only internal but necessarily made public. This phenomenological combination leads to a change of attitude that underlies collaborative formulate criteria for cultural appreciation. Any social process involves learning, which from a Cultural Sociology perspective is rooted in primary and secondary socialisation. Learning involves specific stages, from beginners to experts, which are not random and require different criteria of cultural legitimacy and shared attention. The studies we present here collect inter-subjective processes of creation and transmission of more or less legitimate criteria on cultural consumption, categorisations, evaluations and aesthetic judgments. Sociologically, we need to know more about the attributes of the practice considered creative: the position of its producers in the social structure from whence they speak, their socialisation, their professional experience. There are theoretical precedents not only in the ethno-methodological tradition but also in the various relational approaches discussed in previous sections. In addition, a real relational stance needs to incorporate methodological and paradigmatic changes, and delve into the creative practices in their production context. Ethnographic analysis of how we pay attention to creative objects does not focus on specific attributes but rather on the dynamics of interaction and conversation. The criteria for evaluating and classifying what is good and what is bad, what has quality and what does not (and in what terms) are no longer the monopoly of experts, as we can see in the explosion of amateur bloggers, writers, photographers, science outreach, and 'likes'. It seems too that more conversation is needed if we are not to succumb to yet more marketing and populist amateurism. Here, the sociological perspective can protect us from manipulation by honing the critical tools of creativity.

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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

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What the #®¥§≠$@ is Creativity?

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ABSTRACT
Creativity is The Holy Grail of the Cognitive Sciences and it is very important for researchers in the Computer Sciences and AI fields. Although all attempts to explain and replicate intelligence have so far failed, the quest remains a key part of their research. This paper takes two innovative approaches. First, we see cognitive processes as involving rule-following and as flexible, even chaotic, heuristics. This first concept uses a multi-heuristic concept without any complexes as mixed-cognition. Second, we propose abduction which, though seldom employed in this specific debate, is nonetheless a good way to explore creativity. Using both strategies, along with analysis of specific human creativity cases, we suggest a new cognitive paradigm that is both more realistic and truthful than hitherto. The idea is to offer a new way to achieve more powerful, complex artificial reasoning systems.

Keywords: creativity, abduction, mixed-cognition, constraints, triggers, multi-heuristic.

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To read this paper's title (whether in Catalan or in English), your mind has performed a creative act and has ingeniously grappled with the words it contains. Yet the truth is you have not improvised at all, even within the limited probabilities that your mind has analysed in choosing some words instead of others.

In this paper, we want to offer a raw picture of creativity. We will work with an amalgam of elements that are linked with one another in an erratic, disparate, anarchic fashion. In short, we will analyse an atypical concept of creativity to argue the case that the concept cannot be reduced to any given general pattern or model.

We consider that the information involved in the 'creative' process interacts in different ways, depending on the circumstances. We thus face a paradox, namely that there is no method that explains how to be creative. However, one can analyse what creative people do and explore the studies analysing them. Furthermore, one can talk about those moments when creativity emerges. This creative ability is not something that we merely indulge in for pleasure. That is because creativity often gives us our only chance of surviving in a hostile environment.

"HOUSTON, WE HAVE A PROBLEM!"

Let us recall this now immortal utterance by the Apollo 13 astronauts and ponder its meaning. The words teach us two things. The first is humans' amazing ability to creatively tackle and solve unforeseen problems (King, 1997). The second is that we are creative whether we want to be or not. While the words actually spoken were "OK, Houston, we've had a problem here", their meaning remains the same. External pressures force us to be creative in dealing with unforeseen events and in striving towards clear goals. Yet we can be creative in any circumstance. While not everyone is creative all the time (most people are creatures of habit and routine), it is something that is a hallmark of our species.

That is why there are no patterns for sparking creativity. Yet there are 'constraints' that facilitate the emergence of creative processes. Here it is worth noting that people combine many methods and heuristics in a wholly opportunistic and often unconscious fashion. We are not only rational agents but also natural problem-solvers who adapt to many conditions.

What makes the human mind even harder to fathom is the way it adapts to different settings and its ability to choose or combine many strategies or rituals (Currey, 2014) —an approach often termed 'heuristics'. Currey's recently-published book on the subject comes up with the innovative *blended cognition* concept to explain this ability (Vallverdú and Müller, 2019).

From an evolutionary perspective, humans have had to adapt and react to a wide variety of events. There are any number of problems we need to find answers to yet in many cases we lack sufficient information to be sure of making the right choice or are overwhelmed with information or have to make a decision on the spur of the moment. These intuitive ways of solving the various scenarios have been negatively labelled as 'biases¡. Yet from a technical standpoint, such intuitions are vital for our survival. Being able to take decisions and act without having all of the pieces of the puzzle has helped us survive. That is why there are many projects underway that aim to create chip-based and computing approaches to simulating this behaviour. Of course, one also needs to ascertain the scope and value of the approach used and the implications of its bias. Even common sense is a cultural product — something that is evidenced by code-switching among bilingual speakers (Kharkhurin and Wei, 2015). These metaphorical and ontological situations can contribute to the creation and design of new heuristics. For example, three-dimensional understanding of temporal events is very different at the metaphorical level between cultures: (a) horizontality perspectives, in which English understands future = forward / past = backward; Aymara future = behind / past = in front; (b) from verticality: Mandarin Chinese future = descending / past = ascending. This means that morphological cognitive mechanisms (Casacuberta *et al*,, 2010) are influential but not coercive, which means one should be wary of taking a naive realistic approach to cognition and creativity.

As well as the evolutionary perspective (which conditions our minds' morphology and actions), one needs to consider the cultural contexts — schools, families, social settings, and other learning centres all shape our strategies, producing as it were a 'grammar' and a way of reckoning that fits our skills at any given moment. For instance, with regard to Physics, what we study and know of the material world varies

greatly depending on whether we are in the 5th year of Junior School, the 2nd Sixth Form year, or the last year of a degree course.

This raises the issue of what constitutes a science and in the end justifies it. Even though we may not understand the science's foundations, we can still understand its rules. In other words, we learn these rules in parallel with their justification. Here one might note that it took Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead almost 379 pages to prove the mathematical foundations of addition in their three-volume monster-work *Principia Matematica*, yet children are schooled in 'adding' from a tender age (Wittgenstein, 1967: §§1-3). In other words, we learn to the extent that we understand the coherence that governs the things that are added (their temporality, mass, etc.), without having to logically justify the process involved.

The most fascinating insight yielded by the heuristic approach is the revelation that we combine dozens of trial-and-error techniques every day. We do not apply the same decision-making rules to what to have for breakfast, the best way to get home, choosing what to study, choosing a mate, or deciding whether to buy a house or rent. We have limited time to choose from among a host of options so our decisions end up being shaped by character, general context, and our acquired skills. Thus, we can see ourselves as contradictory beings: Slaver-Christians, scientists who are religious believers, or even Kantian Nazis (Vallverdú, 2019). We live in a multi-heuristic environment, where we show ourselves to be opportunists in action. In this context, the fundamental question lies in how we can choose.

THE MECHANISMS THAT ALLOW US TO CHOOSE OPTIONS: CONSTRAINTS/TRIGGERS

Given the host of mechanisms and options at hand for coming up with diverse strategies and actions, what — in creative terms — are the mechanisms that let us manage and draw upon this cognitive wealth? An optimal, widely-accepted approach is one that conceives of the process in terms of constraints and triggers. Both represent the operational bivalence of morphological and cultural aspects in drawing the bounds (and thus the constraints) of our reality while letting us use triggers to re-draw them and in so doing, changing our conception of the world.

The strength of this approach is that it allows us to address the logical and cognitive relationship of our reasoning to various degrees of materiality. This is so because on the one hand it lets us account for the interaction between the various agents. On the other hand, it sheds light on the interaction with the technological and other devices providing the information that shapes our concept of reality, which we round off through our web searches. The notion of constraint is rooted in psychological research on creativity (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996), whereas a trigger involves the incorporation — whether logical (Aliseda, 2006) or simply cognitive (Gabbay and Woods, 2005) — made by research on abductive reasoning.

Some aspects of who we are can be ascribed to 'nature'. These are well-nigh fixed because they form part of our individual morphology. Our character, such as the A1 mutation that creates fit and persistent people, or the constant restlessness aroused by the DRD4 gene ('The Wanderlust Gene') is the most basic system for assessing reality, and can also be affected by neurochemical variations (the rise and fall of neuro-transmitters such as dopamine, serotonin, and norepinephrine (Vallverdú, 2016). Other aspects of our character can be ascribed to 'nurture'. These include culturally acquired strategies, and even humour. This brings to mind a personal experience. Several years ago, our university research group solely focused on creativity. In many sessions we had to discuss certain aspects of Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi's work. Given that we knew no Magyar, we had no idea how to pronounce his name. In one session, researcher David Casacuberta made a great contribution by explaining a phonetic mnemonic rule so that we could get it roughly right: "Chick sent me high".

Aside from laughter, a socially cohesive fact, we learned an easy way to refer to the author. The idea and rule is

still etched on our memory to this day. Casacuberta's creative act proved highly effective and cognitively 'cheap'. The role of the unconscious work performed by the mind is also a factor in understanding certain highly creative processes, such as Kekulé's dream idea in relation to the chemical structure of benzene or the profound mathematical discoveries made in dreams by Indian mathematician Ramanujan. There are other environmental constraints, such as chance in an operationally 'controlled' context that makes us aware of an anomaly or unexpected fact — something that sparked many scientific discoveries (Roberts, 1989). Penicillin, X-rays, saccharin and many other discoveries were the result of such 'happy accidents'. The importance of the controlled context recalls Picasso's idea in relation to inspiration, which came to him while he was working. If many hours are spent on a given job, certain options open up to the researcher, which would explain why many experts often work independently on the same ideas. That said, it is a 'winner-takes-all' game in which the runners-up are consigned to oblivion.

Another group of cultural factors has to do with formal tools: natural language, specialised language, and the various systems for quantifying reality. Thanks to these tools we can think about reality and categorise it. Depending on the characteristics of the language used, one or more possibilities then open up, helping us think about and change our world (Schroeder and Vallverdú, 2015; Vallverdú 2017; Vallverdú and Schroeder, 2017). Western classical bivalent logics, which considered a proposition only true or false, did not fit the changing reality of the world. Although the temporal logics of the second half of the twentieth century remedied this shortcoming, ancient Buddhist thought had beaten them to a solution centuries before with the tetravalent logic of the *Catuṣkoṭi*.

Thought is impossible without words but using them draws the bounds of reality. As a result, words let us study certain things but not others. Creation is based on these tools and in some cases allows one to overcome them. We think that there is a need for metaphor in scientific thought. Yet poets transcend the reality of language, revealing previously hidden aspects simply by making freer use of syntax and semantics. At the same time, the language we use to understand our setting also conditions how we see the world and ourselves (Huang and Jaszczolt, 2018), and creates a cultural eco-cognitive environment that we can analyse in the creative traces of our history, such as archaeological objects (Criado-Boadoet *et al.*, 2019). The Cognitive anthropologists specialising in language have furnished a lot of evidence in this regard (think of the classical, well-studied Sapir-Whorf hypothesis). Some cultural psychologists have also made important contributions on these issues (Nisbet, 2004).

All these elements are hard to conceptualise through simple categorisation. One way to do so and use them precisely is by incorporating constraints into abduction research and show how they operate with triggers. This perspective lets us put the two elements on the same footing by seeing them in terms of the agent's cognitive strategies in his interactions with his setting. At the same time, such an approach helps blur the boundary between the two elements.

WHICH MECHANISM IS BEST FOR CHOOSING FROM AMONG MANY OPTIONS?

In the film *Star Wars: Episode II - Attack of the Clones* there is a scene in which Master Yoda is giving a lesson, where some *Padawans* are working on intuition. Using force, they try to stop the laser shots of the training drones with their light sabres even though their training helmets hinder them from spotting the drones. Suddenly, a bewildered master Obi-Wan comes in for advice. The problem that bothers him so much is that he cannot find a planet that a friend of his described to him because the files of the Jedi Order do not include the star system it belongs to ("I'm looking for a planet described to me by an old friend. I trust him. But the system doesn't show up on the archive maps"). Like Obi-Wan, Yoda is also surprised that the described planet cannot be located.

However, when Obi-Wan puts the file in the map reader, a change comes over Yoda, who no longer sees the problem in the same way. A set of systems and an anomaly can be seen in the projection, which Obi-Wan states thus:

> This is where it ought to be ... but it isn't. Gravity is pulling all the stars in this area inward to this spot. There should be a star here ... but there isn't.

Like Le Verrier with Neptune, Yoda already knows where the lost planet is, namely where there is nothing. Obviously, Obi-Wan's bewilderment does not lie in the concentration of matter and the possibility of a body attracting it, but in the fact that the planet that should emerge from the map does not. This is obvious in context because, unlike Le Verrier, he can check with all his senses whether or not there is a planet in that place (it is amusing to imagine Le Verrier piloting a Jedi starfighter to fly to Uranus and check the existence of Neptune). In addition, he is not surprised by Yoda's abduction of an existing planet as an explanation. That is why Yoda finds the situation so intriguing:

> Most interesting — gravity's silhouette remains, but the star and all its planets have disappeared. How can this be?

That's when one of the Padawan boys, in the purest style of Chevalier Auguste Dupin, states,

> Because someone erased it from the archive memory.

Yoda nods and remarks:

> Truly wonderful the mind of a child is. The Padawan is right, go to the centre of gravity's pull and find your planet you will".

In this scene we can ask the following questions: Why does Obi-Wan need to talk to Yoda?; How important is the latter in the scene?; How valuable is the Padawan's explanation? We are faced with a brilliant exercise in maieutics, where there is a dialectical relationship between the questions, producing a pedagogical outcome by yielding a possible if surprising explanation. As in the *Meno*, there is a management of information from ignorance (partial in Obi-Wan's case and utter in the Padawan's), through the questions of the only one of the three (Yoda) who knows what the other two do not but who cannot find the solution on his own.

It precisely when the Padawan gives his answer (that the data must have been erased), revealing Obi-Wan's partial ignorance. Even so, Obi-Wan objects:

> But Master Yoda, who could empty information from the archives? That is impossible.

Yoda, who has seen the light after the Padawan's childish but brilliant answer concludes thus:

> Is not. It dangerous and disturbing this puzzle is. Only a Jedi could have erased those files but who and why harder to answer. Meditate on this I will (sic).
>
> [As *Star Wars* fans know, Yoda speaks English like the green alien he is].

We thus see a situation in which the degree of knowledge being investigated by the group does not matter nor is the riddle solved by information other than that given. Here, the creative process is reduced to combining information in new ways to solve the conundrum. The Padawan's seemingly ingenuous comment opens the door to new research.

This *Star Wars* scene is relevant because it mixes different factors and actors. Basically, the personal paradigm of problem analysis is suppressed. This brings different kinds of knowledge into play to tackle the apparently unsolvable enigma. For example, as has already been said, Obi-Wan acts under the constraint of not having considered that a member of the Jedi Order may be a traitor. On the other hand, the constraints that lead the Padawan to suggest deletion of the records act as the 'trigger', broadening the range of possibilities and escaping the impasse by pointing to a new line of enquiry. In this paper, we advocate abduction as the operational basis of our reasoning, letting us constrain and trigger information, generating options from which choices can then be made.

Defining abductive reasoning is a tricky task. Attempts to account for this concept in a full-length description have been abandoned for some years. For now, the trend is to adopt a definition that fits well with the specific field to which it will be applied, while conserving the essential features of reasoning that were established at the beginning of this century. These features emerged from debate on the subject, giving rise to the interpretation represented by the non-explanatory GW scheme (Gabbay and Woods, 2005) and the explanatory AKM scheme (Alchourrón, *et al*., 1985, Aliseda, 2006, Magnani, 2009, etc.), in which there was broad consensus that abductive reasoning *is a process by which something that would be rejected under the classical approach might well be accepted by resorting to other kinds of reasoning* (Gabbay and Woods, 2005, Magnani, 2015, 2016, 2017).

Magnani's EC model commands fairly broad support when it comes to a definition of abduction. The model is based on drawing up a definition from the context (Aliseda, 2014[1]) to the point where some of the features formerly seen as basic are considered circumstantial — for example, whether abduction is an explanatory model (AKM) and should preserve ignorance (GW) (Magnani, 2017). This development has done much to defuse the debate while allowing issues that used to be considered unsolvable to be examined locally. An example of this is IB(A)E[2] (Harman, 1965, Schurz, 2008, *et al*.), which can now be understood contextually and applied computationally as abduction in which inference (or reverse deduction) yields the best explanation (Kakas, 2017).

This has made it possible to focus abduction research on how a problem unfolds in a given context without fretting over its essential characteristics. In other words, one can concentrate on what is given in any circumstance. Here, an abductive process is a reasoning that generates something new (fill-up) and that, among the options, allows one to choose one or more over the others (cutdown) and to identify any other kinds of knowledge yielded when a result is checked or compared in some way.

Unlike deduction, abduction broadens the result rather than yielding a necessary one. Unlike induction, this broadening is tentative. Here, one should distinguish the usual meaning of 'tentative' from the one it is given in this debate. Here, 'tentative' refers to the characteristic to be captured in the debate on abduction, and lies in added epistemic value shedding light on the reasoning. The insight gained is that the reasoning operates *as if it were* classical knowledge inasmuch as we use it as part of our epistemic baggage but without there being a one-to-one correspondence with it. In this case, one cannot make inferences from probabilities or generalisations. The latter role would continue to be played by induction, dealing with the traditional stage of verification and provisional validation found in the Natural Sciences. That is why abduction's epistemological value is one of the most controversial topics in the current debate. Indeed, Hintikka has highlighted abduction as the fundamental problem in contemporary epistemology (1998-9, 2007).

This problem arises from not bearing in mind the operations involved in abduction — a tendency that stems from 'The Inherited View of Science' in which there is a dichotomy between the context of justification and the context of discovery. It is widely held that justification is what can be explained (captured) through formalisation, while discovery is the set of psychological processes that combine in an anarchic (heuristic) way and as such, cannot be formalised. These heuristics are not considered to form

1 This is an excellent example of what I mean given that Aliseda continues to defend his AKM model but now focuses it on medical diagnosis. In an earlier publication ([A. C.] Rodríguez, *et al*., 2008), Aliseda considered that diagnosis represented abduction and that this could be formulated in terms of the AKM model.

2 Inference to the best explanation

part of knowledge in general (Popper, 2002[3]). This view stems directly from Frege's dichotomy between logic and psychology, in which he considered that a theory could only refer to those elements that could be described (Niiniluoto, 2014, 378). These boundaries are inherited from the distinction between analytical and synthetic (Putnam, 2002), which in the final analysis makes it impossible to describe the world other than in a way that is based on a hierarchy of specific parameters.

This inherited view draws directly from the kind of systems seeking to explain a given phenomenon. That is why they prove hopelessly unsuitable when they are applied to other kinds of descriptions of the world. An obvious example is the question of value, which is relegated to the realm of pseudo-psychology or, worse, to a type of 'intuitionism' — in short, such an approach cannot describe anything in the world (*ibid*.). However, even at the time there were dissonant voices defending a neglected view (Aliseda, 2006: 39). These voices argued that the explanatory models offered were unsatisfactory because they failed to: (a) explain the paradigm shift (Kuhn, 1996, Feyerabend, 2010); (b) consider the theoretical burden in explaining the observed phenomena (Hanson, 1971-2[4]); (c) the reality of research practice (Lakatos, 1976); (d) account for technological advances, as noted in Simon's critique of the then-emerging computing field (1977). This is interesting for two reasons. The first may not bear strongly on what concerns us here but it is this: Simon was an Economist and this discipline was and still is a controversial one within the Philosophy of Science. Reading Hanson, Simon states that if there is no logic to introducing new things, then there is no way to do so (*ibid*: 378). Yet Simon also felt that there might well be some underlying logic that lay beyond our ken, and that it could be captured through computing. Here, computing seemed a way of representing the heuristics that had been so blithely consigned to the realm of psychology and seen as irrelevant to the foundation of knowledge. He also thought that the use of computing might well change the status of some of the sciences, such as Economics.

All such discussions end up reaching the same conclusion, namely that neither classic Western logic nor a purely epistemological approach can give the whole answer. Abduction offers a way out of this impasse by re-introducing the psychological into logic but without underestimating it. Obviously, the most recent examples are those that make up the current spate of research, which seeks to capture the abductive element from sundry branches. Yet its goal is always the eminently practical one of finding out what kind of reasoning is involved in acquiring knowledge and how this can change.

The first aim is perhaps the classic one stemming from Peirce's pragmatism (CP: 5,348[5]) which sought to complete the transcendental aesthetic (Kant, 1961: 34[6]). This, in short enshrines the practical aspect of Pure Reason's architecture, postulating that experimentation is an action in which one interacts with the world.

The naturalised version of this interpretation lies in avoiding reductionism (Magnani, 2018) and instead seeking an ambit for those elements we currently see as psychological and that play a role in the most conscious (and least common) kinds of reasoning. Here, abduction helps in representing the most primary perceptual stages (Shanahan, 2005) where our minds are modified through interaction with

3 One should note Aliseda's warning (2006: 12) on the bad translation of the original German in the English version in which *Logik der Forschung* [Research Logic] was translated as The Logic of Scientific Discovery. [Translator's Note: The full German title was Logik der Forschung. Zur Erkenntnistheorie der modernen Naturwissenschaft, which could be translated as: *Research Logic. Towards an Epistemology of the Modern Natural Sciences*]

4 A good exposition and analysis of *Theory-ladenness* can be found in «Estany: 2011».

5 Reference taken from "Aliseda, 2006: 170", who cites directly from "Hookway, 1992: 18".

6 Reference taken from "Dilman, 1973: 2".

and manipulation of the environment (Magnani, 2018[a]), acquiring and generating knowledge in the process (Hintikka, 2007: 11). Yet this proposal can be read in the light of the EC model, thus preserving the application context. Those sciences that lost credibility when classical explanatory methods were applied gain epistemological status under the new approach, noteworthy cases being Archaeology (Shelley, 1996[7]), Medicine ([AC] Rodríguez, *et al*., 2008, *et al*.) and Psychoanalysis (Sans, 2019)[8], yielding new, unforeseen outcomes.

From this perspective, one can go further so that when the first perceptual stage and/or an unexpected fact calls for another kind of reasoning, abduction may ride to the rescue by embodying tentativeness to grapple with the creative process. Whether it is to conceive of a possible union of facts, or deal with an explanation emerging unexpectedly, abduction may spawn creativity by incorporating tentativeness. Given that abduction has often been linked to hypothetical reasoning (Harman, 1965, *et al*.), we can grasp Łukasiewicz' argument (1970) that states that creativity is present in all reasoning — for example, when capturing the facts of the world through generalisations, laws, and so on.

Nevertheless, this creativity operates more intensely in cases where other methods of reasoning cannot account for the fact, namely, when generating hypotheses (which we easily grasp as possibilities). Łukasiewicz understands the generation of hypotheses through reduction[9] (*ibid*: 7), whose creativity would differ from say deduction (which reconstructs) whereas reduction constructs. Thagard (1988) also sees abduction as a bridge between justification (hypothetical-deductive) and discovery (psychological). For him, abduction is the way to generate hypotheses (*ibid*: 51-52) from a concatenation of active rules that lead from the *explanans* to the *explanandum*. As with Harman's lemmas (1965: 91), Thagard's active rules are the gnoseological content that allows relationships to be made that cannot be glimpsed solely by making associations or generalisations. The result of the abduction is a projected-truth, which is determined by the plausibility of the same hypothesis. This plausibility arises from different constraints. Some of these are as obvious to us as the enumeration of observable cases. Yet other constraints are not so apparent and thus much less account is taken of them within a given cosmology. Le Verrier — the astronomer who posited the existence of Neptune — furnishes a good example of the latter. The planet was merely a hypothesis until Arret and Galle observed it (Grosser, 1979: 117). It is interesting because the reasons why it was considered a projected truth (Sans, 2017: 85-88) were: (1) the high plausibility of the hypothesis born from existential abduction (Thagard, 1988: 54), and (2) it was based on a harmonic conception of the Cosmos[10] plus a set of mathematical calculations.

However, this relationship between abduction and creativity is the same as other abduction theories insofar as it cannot give a clear answer to generation (fill-up) and choice of hypotheses (cutdown). That is why we seek to understand the creative path taken by the individual in the community, in which generating and choosing options is a shared activity. In this sense, one needs to discard the notion of a creative individual who is cut off from others or who is 'divinely' inspired (Feyerabend, 1987). That is because we share in one another's actions in managing the flow of information we receive throughout our lives. It is this sharing that spurs creativity. Because of this, the conceptual elements with which we build our systems can be broken down and combined as we see fit *(ibid*: 704), enabling us to use them in whatever way yields the best results.

7 Feyerabend (2018) began archaeological studies to justify his criticisms of the concept of process that the inherited vision has given rise to. His views on the subject have been vindicated.

8 This makes us think of Rivadulla and his argument for improving the inherited view by appropriating pragmatism (Rivadulla, 2015: 23-46).

9 Reduction is the term traditionally used to translate the passage in Aristotle (1995: 25, 20-35) in which he speaks of *ἀπαγωγή(apagōgē)*, which is to say, of abduction.

10 This was how 'planet' was thought of at the time.

WHAT IF CREATIVITY IS IRRATIONAL?

We can extract several ideas from the ground covered so far: (a) creativity is an evolutionary mechanism; (b) there is no single model for explaining creativity; (c) cultural constraints both allow and limit creative capacity. So, can we consider the possibility of formalising creativity? The answer must be no, but this should not make us believe that creativity is ineffable. While there are machines that have overtaken humans in mental challenges such as chess (IBM's *Deep Blue*) or Go (Google-*DeepMind*, *AlphaGo* and *Alpha Zero*) by following certain strategies, none of them have shown themselves capable of efficiently applying their 'mental schemes' to all the problems affecting humans. Nor can the machines reprogramme themselves and decide between computational systems, from a naturalistic perspective of algorithmic cognition (Zenilet *et al*., 2018). At the same time, causality disappears, lost in an indecipherable welter of opaque data (Pearl and Mackenzie, 218).

There are interesting strategies employing deep learning, genetic algorithms, and multivariate logics that can be formalised in artificial systems yet it is not possible to programme a synthetic creativity (Vallverdú, 2013). Just as epistemologists (who take cognition into account) consider that humans make approaches that are 'sufficiently reasonable' (Elgin, 2019), artificial approaches to creativity must consider computing design, and variable constraints that allow systems to glimpse a certain creative horizon. Here, machines have to pay the same price that we do by venturing into the realm of fallibility and uncertainty, making irrational bets driven by intuitions. In any case, the computational paradigm goes first through a characterisation of human cognition as it relates to creativity.

A viable approach lies in the characterisation of abduction parameters from the cognitive EC proposal (Magnani, 2009), which tries to characterise how the environment affects us when it comes to generating knowledge. In other words, it looks at the role that context plays in determining how hypotheses are spawned as we interact with those around us. Every step determines the path taken, with each twist and turn leading to new opportunities. Within all the parameters, the key thing to bear in mind is that abduction generates a state of uncertainty *vis-à-vis* a fact we cannot account for by other means either because we lack previous experience or because it is presented to us in a way that it different enough for us not to recognise it for what it is (Aliseda, 2006: 46). This sparks emotions and sensations that impel us to apply different strategies to grapple with the uncertainty. Although these strategies are hard to conceptualise, abduction theories have worked on the element of surprise — a line of enquiry whose beginnings go back to Peirce (CP 5.188-189, 7.202, *et al*.). One way of grasping this concept in the modern world lies in capturing surprise as an event that violates pre-existing belief (Gabbay and Woods, 2005: 82). Another classic trigger is ignorance, which can be traced back to the Socratic method of dialectically nudging the agent towards knowledge by showing ignorance. In contemporary terms, the difficulty lies in assigning epistemological value to this state of 'unknowing'. The characterisation of abduction yields the aforementioned 'tentativeness', which conserves a measure of ignorance. Here, one should note that ignorance is never total. On the one hand, this lessens the element of surprise because we are less taken aback when what is shrouded from our sight is revealed. Put another way, there is a heuristic relationship between the elements making up the context and the surprised agent. We refer to everything cultural and circumstantial that: (a) makes the surprise possible; (b) helps to solve the problem. We must also bear in mind knowledge of our ignorance — something that impels us to fill the gap in our knowledge.

All these facts interact with the context in the quest for an answer yet they are also constrained insofar as the same culture and material factors that help form hypotheses also place limitations on testing them.

CONCLUSIONS

So far, when we have talked about creativity we have only done so from a human cognitive perspective yet it is a skill that can be found in other biological species

ranging from mycetozoa (slime moulds) to insects and all kinds of animals, notably chimpanzees (Sawyer, 2011). As an open topic, approaches to creativity still start from resolutions to specific problems where other proposals crop up along the way and that better guide the debate. We propose a solution that does not fall into the trap of identifying one element with another. This is because we see each process as having an identity all its own, with each aspect affecting the outcome in a given way. We have presented this from an eco-cognitive point of view in which it is taken for granted that the person plays at least an essential natural part and almost always a social part (a Mowgli or Tarzan would only play the first part). This is why one needs to interpret the signs that let a human being act in a conscious fashion and to learn things from our fellow men. Robinson Crusoe and Chuck Noland [the film character of *Cast Away*] owed their language and culture to a Desert Island. These elements let one draw and delimit a given reality (constraints) that also contain the key (triggers) to widening those bounds. This is done by combining the host of codes differently (multi-heuristically, in a blended fashion). We have identified abductive reasoning as the basic element of our cognitive apparatus when it comes to generating and choosing different responses, many of which can be considered to be creative. At the same time, for this reasoning to operate, constraints and triggers are needed. These are extracted from the many ways of combining diverse (heuristic) pieces of information.

It is interesting to see the extent to which rational agents perform tasks by combining multiple theoretical and action management patterns. This rationality involves situated, contextual adaptation by each individual in tackling the problem he wants to solve. A degree of fallibility and lack of completeness only spurs alternative ways of seeing reality. Creativity does not mean recombining a finite number of concepts in a game played with unchanging rules. On the contrary, it involves an ability to create new meanings even if one has to resort to novel ways of processing information.

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Design Function in Innovation Processes*

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ABSTRACT
Some words emerge at a given moment to catalyse ideas and give new meaning to old terminology. *Innovation* and *design* are two such words. Innovation has traditionally been linked with the Applied Sciences, especially technology, whereas advances in the Pure Sciences tend to be termed *discoveries*, *inventions*, or *creations*. However, for decades now, innovation has been a *leitmotiv* in all fields of scientific knowledge in both the Pure and the Applied Sciences. Design has also emerged from the niche it once occupied for decades (and even centuries) at least insofar as its impact on the History of Science and of Philosophy is concerned. In fact, design's introduction into the academic world has gone hand-in-hand with Art and its impact on our daily lives. This paper analyses innovation processes in both the Pure and the Applied Sciences to discover how far new design theories over the last few decades have influenced innovation in fields such as Epistemology and Technology. We focus on Design Epistemology and methodological innovation, specifically in connection with design simulations and methodological models. We also look at the underlying design technologies and the key role they play in innovation processes.

Keywords: design epistemology, innovation, computer simulation, methodological model.

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Certain words emerge at a given moment to catalyse ideas that previously had other meanings. Two examples of this are the words *Innovation* and Design. Innovation has traditionally been associated with The Applied Sciences, especially technology, while changes in The Pure Sciences used to be classified as simply discoveries, inventions or creations. However, over the last few decades 'innovation' has been applied to all areas of scientific knowledge in both the pure and the applied sciences (Estany and Herrera, 2016).

Design has also emerged from the niche it once occupied for decades (and even centuries) at least insofar as its impact on the History of Science and of Philosophy is concerned. In fact, Design's introduction into the academic world has gone hand-in-hand with Art and its impact on our daily lives. It is hard to chart this shift but maybe The Industrial Revolution (with its mass-production methods) played a key role in Design's penetration into all fields of knowledge. The goal of this paper is to analyse innovation processes in both the Pure and the Applied Sciences to reveal the extent to which Design in recent decades has shaped innovation in fields such as Epistemology and Technology. While innovation can be approached from many perspectives and disciplines, we shall focus on the relationship between Innovation and Design. To this end, we will concentrate on: (1) Design Epistemology — a new perspective that entails innovation in the epistemological field; (2) simulation and methodological design models. In tracing these two strands, we shall consider Pure, Applied, and Design Sciences. Technology underlies all these scientific fields, playing a key role in innovation processes. Here, one needs to see the role played by design in technological innovation, and how it is reflected in artefacts and system modelling.

First, an overview is given of the main features of the concepts of innovation and invention. Second, the penetration of Design in sundry fields of knowledge is examined together with the Epistemology of Design and kindred concepts. Third, we delve into the role played by simulations in scientific research as epistemological innovation, and its practical applications. Fourth, we present McCrory's design methodology scheme, based on the proposals made by Herbert Simon in his work *Las Ciencias de lo artificial* (1996), and by the philosopher Ilkka Niiniluoto on Design Sciences, found in his paper "The Aim and Structure of Applied Sciences" (1993). Fifth and last, we propose a design culture as a framework for a comprehensive approach to invention and innovation. Each of these issues might merit a paper on its own but limitations of space means that we shall confine ourselves to a strategic overview. Many authors have written on these subjects. Our citation list is necessarily selective, focusing on those we consider to be most relevant to this paper's scope.

INNOVATION AND INVENTION

One might say that the world revolves around innovation. There is no theoretical or practical field that does not involve innovation — business, labs, cuisine, sports, the Arts, and Science, to name but a few. There is also a plethora of technological changes that occur in the Motor, Health, Energy, and Communication industries. Innovation covers achievements in Applied Science and to solving practical problems just like invention, ranging from the wheel and writing to the printing press and the telephone.

As a starting point we link innovation to Applied Sciences and changes in Pure Sciences to discoveries and creations. That said, the meaning of these concepts has changed within the framework of the philosophy of scientific practices and there are references to innovation in the descriptive sciences and discoveries in design sciences. For example, Brown (2009) refers to conceptual innovation in Physics (Galileo) and Chemistry (Proust and Dalton) yet these scientists were usually considered discoverers. Brown argues that Design is a way of approaching scientific dynamics from a less disruptive and more gradualist perspective. Nancy Nersessian (2009) refers to conceptual innovation as the changes that take place in some of the most important episodes in the history of Physics. In general, the idea

of discovery in the descriptive sciences is understood as the contribution of new, substantive knowledge that boosts Man's ability to explain the natural and social world. Brown and Nersessian draw on this concept to re-label what were formerly considered 'discoveries' as 'conceptual innovations'.

The idea of innovation is clearly polysemic, thus a conceptual analysis is needed to find a common denominator among its features. We shall see that the definitions below, which are taken from Estany and Herrera (2016)[1], cover the Applied and Design sciences, although this is not made explicit. Some of these definitions draw a distinction between invention and innovation.

- 'Invention' (creation of a new idea) and 'innovation' (first use of a new idea) are both closely related to the word 'technique' (Edgerton, 2013).
- Innovation is the generation, acceptance and implementation of new ideas, processes, products and services (Shavinina, 2003).
- Innovation is defined as the set of original actions aimed at providing solutions to previously unsolved problems, in a unique and creative way (Renzulli, 2003).
- Invention is a breakthrough advance and innovation is its updating (Florida, 1990).
- Invention is the creative origin of a new process, which facilitates innovation with an impact on social, economic and financial processes (Hindle, 1986).
- Innovation occurs when some individuals produce new solutions and relevant members of this domain adopt these solutions, considering them valuable variations from common practice (Bailey and Ford, 2003).
- The term 'innovation' has two somewhat different meanings. The first refers to the invention, creation or discovery that provides something really new and useful. The other meaning is the adoption of what an individual or an organisation finds novel (Coates, 2003).
- Innovations are interactive processes that generate something new, transformative and valuable in certain settings and systems (Echeverría, 2017).

The common feature of 'innovation' and 'invention' as integrative concepts is the ability to solve practical problems. Many authors expand on this point, including the following:

- Nickles (2003): Novelty has to be useful, since both 'innovation' and 'discovery' refer to achievements. Sintonen (2009): "Applied research is the search for knowledge where the goal — according to the authoritative characterisation of made by the OECD some 30 years ago — is to use the results of basic research or even to discover new knowledge that may have immediate practical application".
- Renzulli (2003) points out that "science's goals tell us that one of the main purposes is to add new knowledge to our understanding of the human condition but in a field of applied knowledge in which there are practical applications."
- Marinova and Phillimore (2003) stress technological innovation, which they distinguish from social, educational or organisational innovation.

From this characterisation of the concepts of 'innovation' and 'invention' we shall see what all aspects of design can contribute to understanding innovation processes, ranging from methodology and epistemology to what Nigel Cross calls 'Design Culture'. Here we shall analyse some of the design models that are especially relevant when it comes to innovation.

1 The references to these definitions are taken from Estany and Herrera's book (2016), especially Chapter 2 of the same. Here, the book by Shavinina, L.V. (ed.) (2003) — *The International Handbook on Innovation* published by Elsevier Science Ltd. has also been taken into account.

THE EMERGENCE OF DESIGN

There are many diverse reasons why Design has been so strongly linked to Art and applied to everyday settings while making very little impact on the academic world. Here, we can say that the emergence of Design is a multi-causal phenomenon that ties in with the idea of innovation and that has seeped into new fields.

Industrial innovation is a field where design is crucial and present in a host of industries (furniture, cars, Information Technology, and so on). Here, the most widely-used concept is that of Design Thinking, which has been approached from varying perspectives and applied to many areas. One of the first issues is how to define it. The sheer polysemy of Design Thinking makes it hard to define from an essentialist perspective. It should be seen more as a theoretical framework whose common denominator is human-scale design.

Lockwood (2009) defines Design Thinking as human-centred innovation that stresses observation, collaboration, and swift learning. It is about applying a designer's sensitivity and methods to solve problems in a wide variety of contexts (business, commerce, leadership, public and private services, etc.). One of the examples provided by Lockwood (2009) — ski clothing — exemplifies Design Thinking. One of the key requirements of such clothes is protect the skier from the cold making tough demands on the materials used to make them. Innovation in ski fabrics stemmed from the collaboration among sundry professionals, especially designers, engineers, and entrepreneurs. These roles do not necessarily have to be played by different people but all three perspectives must converge in the product's manufacture. In this specific case, Lockwood himself contributed to the design and the commercial side given that he had studied Business Management for his bachelor's degree. The engineer furnished vital knowledge of the materials and insulation specs. Regarding users, the new garments were tried out by keen skiers. It just so happened that one of the people given the job of evaluating the product's commercial scope was a keen skier himself. To sum up, innovation involves diverse aspects that must be borne firmly in mind. Any novelty features are the outcome of participation by the main stakeholders, in this case: engineers, designers, users. Profitability also needs to be weighed up by any company engaging in innovation.

Vogel (2009: 5) considers that Design Thinking can bridge the gaps between intensive production focusing on profit, costs, and human-scale production. He notes that The Industrial Revolution created scope for mass-producing a host of products ranging from cars to washing machines, and from furniture to buildings. This spawned two main approaches to Design. One focused on industry, represented by the likes of Carnegie, Rockefeller, J.P. Morgan and Ford. The other sought to follow in the craft traditions represented by the likes of Charles Rennie Mackintosh, Frank Lloyd Wright, and Gustav Stickley. Vogel (2009: 5) cites the architect Peter Behrens and The Bauhaus School as examples of design thinking that tried to meld the two approaches.

Victor Papanek, in his book *Design for The Real World* (2014), advocates a Design approach fostering socially responsible production. He accuses designers of only pandering to well-off consumers. It is thus important to assess user satisfaction for any kind of product, taking into account parameters such as usability, accessibility, understanding, and experience.

When it comes to the emergence of Design in the academic field, one can say that both socio-political and ethical-moral factors lie at the core of practical knowledge. If theoretical frameworks can be found to address these phenomena, there would be a rational explanation of the elements affecting Science and their impact on society. One of these theoretical frameworks is furnished by what has been termed Science, Technology and Society (STS). Although this field is not usually linked to Design, it covers many aspects of science and technology's impact on society and thus dovetails with the idea of Design Thinking. Regarding the links between Innovation and Design, practical knowledge, and problem-solving, the criteria for good design all provide the underpinnings for the convergence of innovation and Design Thinking processes.

DESIGN IN THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL FIELD

The notion of design has now reached Epistemology, a field that at first sight seems far removed from the analysis of practical situations. That is because Epistemology, as a branch of Philosophy, seeks to discover the rational foundations underlying our beliefs. Moreover, applying Design to the epistemological field yields a new vision to that offered by Classical Epistemology. This requires conceptual clarification of the expressions used to describe the relationship between Design and Epistemology.

Bengoa (2011) makes a number of points regarding the practical application of Science. He argues that the Epistemology underpinning the doctrine and foundations of scientific method fits ill with the diverse objects populating our field of knowledge, rendering a sole approach impossible. In reality, he refers to constructed objects or artefacts, and wonders whether an epistemology of constructed objects can be based upon parameters other than the traditional ones. To this end he draws a distinction between an Epistemology 'for design' and one 'of design'[2]. Regarding the former, Bengoa says this has to do with "a science of knowledge that helps the designer." The latter, he argues, has to do with "an epistemology used by the designer to grasp the nature of his own design." The first definition fits in with an Applied Science epistemology. Yet the second definition seems unclear unless we interpret it as "an epistemology that uses design itself to shed light on reality." The idea is that design theories are a model for epistemology, both in their grounding of The Pure Sciences and The Applied Sciences. It could be objected that this approach is a vicious circle. We argue that it is indeed a circle but not a vicious one involving feedback between knowledge, artefacts and design. Starting from these two notions of the relationship between Epistemology and Design, we shall analyse a series of proposals bearing on the two meanings proposed by Bengoa.

The two expressions capturing Bengoa's two meaning are: (1) *Epistemology of Design* [the 'for' Design sense], and (2) *Design Epistemology* [the Epistemology 'of' Design sense]. Yet as we shall see below, most authors use both terms interchangeably without formally distinguishing between them.

D. Mahdjoubi (2003) in his paper *Epistemology of Design* classifies Design as an activity, as planning, and as epistemology. Here, activity means thinking about what the product will be like; planning means organising the steps for manufacturing the product; epistemology means the relationship between the analytical methods needed in the Applied Sciences (as opposed to analytical scientific methods). Mahdjoubi notes that the analytical methodology has shortcomings in tackling Applied Science. This deficiency has spurred synthetic methodology, with Design Epistemology offering a way of remedying said shortcomings, especially in fields such as Engineering.

Under the title *Design Epistemology*, D. Karabeg (2012) proposes Design as the alternative to tradition. This questions traditional epistemology, which does not slot in with an approach based on innovation as the main plank of scientific research. The key idea is what he calls *postulating epistemology.* The term means accepting the notion that epistemology goes beyond just the quest for the basis of truth and meaning.

2 This may seem to be playing with words but in fact there is a deep distinction that needs to be made. A parallel that might help us here is the distinction that Bengoa draws between "The Ethics of Neuro-Science" and "Neuro-Ethics". That said this comparison is a metaphor since Neuro-Science is based upon foundations and empirical results — things still lacking in Design Theory. Continuing with the metaphor, "The Ethics of Neuro-Science" studies the ethical implications of the advances made by neuro-scientists, and the nature of professional practice in the field. By contrast, "Neuro-Ethics" takes Neuro-Science as the basis for grasping and explaining social, moral, and philosophical decisions in the broadest terms. Another analogous distinction is that between "The Philosophy of Cognitive Sciences" and "The cognitive focus in the Philosophy of Science". The former refers to philosophical analysis of The Cognitive Sciences, in the same way that we think of The Philosophy of Physics, Chemistry, Biology, The Social Sciences, and so forth. By contrast, the latter concerns Science models anchored in The Cognitive Sciences — an approach pioneered by R. Giere.

Here, Karabeg's concept is not so different from Mahdjoubi's, even though the former calls it *Design Epistemology* and the latter *Epistemology of Design*. Thus Karabeg strengthens a perspective within an academic research framework that is an alternative to traditional approaches. If we consider the alternative for Pure Science, it would constitute what we call 'epistemological innovation', which would imply new ways of representing knowledge as changes in epistemological values (or at least, their prioritisation). In this respect, while remaining faithful to Karabeg, this epistemological innovation would be squared with Design models. Unlike traditional epistemology, the proposed approach to Design is more dynamic, allowing the incorporation of new elements emerging from the research.

Regarding the main features of Design Epistemology, Karabeg (2012), highlights what he calls *wholeness*, which he defines as "the feature that characterises a healthy, fully-developed organism, or a complete, wholly functional mechanism. All these parts work in concert so that they meet their purpose, ensuring the whole works well and can even fulfil its goals in broader spheres" (Karabeg, 2012: 3). This would imply 'trans-disciplineship" materialising in federative knowledge such that any phenomenon could be approached from different angles in a kaleidoscopic fashion.

Given the features that Mahdjoubi and Karabeg attribute to the relationship between epistemology and design, the keys seems to lie in: (a) an alternative to tradition and analytical epistemology, and (b) a commitment to synthetic epistemology in the Design field, bringing science closer to the designer's mental framework.

Design Theory is another concept that bears on the Epistemology of Design, which L. E. Östman (2005) addresses in his paper *Design Theory is a Philosophical Discipline: Reframing the epistemological issues in Design Theory*. According to Östman, Design Theory is neither a Social nor a Natural Science but rather a philosophical discipline that uses a pragmatic framework. It is not a question of pinning knowledge down to simple truth but of tackling problems and fostering understanding through clarification, reasoning and criticism. These statements constitute the basis of his proposal, focusing on the knowledge needed for practical problem-solving.

Thus we can say that the core of the relationship between epistemology and design — let us call it *Design Epistemology* — is thinking with the mindset of the designer, taking Design Thinking as a framework. In fact, the critique of Analytic Epistemology is not new and began in the 1950s, although the paradigm shift came a little later with Thomas Kuhn's (1962) *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, which established the pillars of 'inherited conception'. The historicist period was followed by the Sociology of Science and the Sociology of Knowledge and now we are in the era of the cognitive approach to science and technology. That said, the latest twist does not mean that the earlier lines of thought have vanished for they both co-exist with the latest approach and to some extent complement it. One can see the Epistemology of Design as gathering some of the criticisms of Analytical Epistemology with an eye on Applied Science and problem-solving.

COMPUTATIONAL SIMULATION AS AN INNOVATION IN THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD

Simulation has been greatly neglected by philosophers of the so-called 'inherited conception' school in their musings on Science Methodology. From Hempel to Kuhn, we have analysed scientific theories, laws, and explanations in a quest to determine how these kinds of knowledge advance our understanding of the world. The question is whether a simulation really broadens our knowledge of the world. That is why it is important to approach computational simulation (both with regard to its theoretical constructs — highly influenced by Physics and Maths — and to its practical part, for instance in predicting avalanches). In this sense, the Epistemology of Design is a good framework for innovating in methodological models,

for which computational simulation provides an excellent tool.

In the Natural Sciences, one needs to grapple with problems that are inaccessible at the human level. For instance, in Astronomy, one paradoxically needs to know tiny details of The Cosmos' workings notwithstanding The Universe's vast scale. Another is the thorny Three Body Problem — a theoretical construct of The Solar System (or any other planetary system) in which the gravitational interactions of the bodies are essentially the same, no matter how many planets one considers. This treatment vastly simplifies the calculations involved. This result (which is far from obvious) has been reached after centuries of scientific thought. If we think of the idea in more general terms, we can see that it is the germ of modelling and the computer simulations that followed in its wake.

There are often phenomena at non-human scales (much smaller or much greater than ours) that are hot candidates for simulation-based approaches. Yet simulations are also valuable in purely human problems where ethical or other considerations prevent practical experimentation.

Modelling is the main analytical approach used in the study of matter, in the sciences of mathematical structure and in The Life Sciences. The models draw on mathematical thinking that is adapted to Physics reasoning, describing observations in a stripped-down form, peeling away the superfluous data to reveal their essential or structural characteristics and reifying them.

In this sense, a good theory describes a broad domain of phenomena based on simple models and makes testable predictions yielding reliable results.

Computational simulation as a methodological innovation involves two processes: the creation of models and the simulations based on them. Computational simulation is associated with the use of computers in scientific work. The simulation and the earlier creation of models are useful for grappling with problems that lie beyond Man's abilities and/or outside his experiential frame.

Computational simulation allows one to tackle those problems that Classical Epistemology cannot. The latter's limitations stem from its basing on very rigid models (such as the Concept of Theory or Hypothetical-Deductive Explanation), which are central to Logical Empiricism. Basically, Classical Epistemology is the wrong tool for dealing with the sheer complexity of many phenomena. This does not mean that scientists have limited themselves to a simplification of the scientific method but rather that they have to consider unexpected alternatives in order to fully test their ideas. Physical-mathematical models and simulation in the Natural and Social Sciences are used to throw up such alternatives.

Computational simulation supported by physical-mathematical models

Structured computational simulation on the scaffolding of Physics-Maths models has commonly been used over the last few decades. In fact, this approach was greatly consolidated in Science (including Computer Science and The Life Sciences), technologies and Engineering in the second half of the 20th Century.

The model occupies an intermediary position between the observer and the observed object[3], providing information that spurs knowledge (yet without falling into the trap of directly identifying the model with the object so modelled). It is important to avoid this trap because the world is independent of what we can say or think about it. As stressed above, the model is an idealisation whether by excess or default, not reality itself. The model boils down to a rationalisation or a coherent logical system (albeit one formulated in mathematical language).

3 'Object' is used in a broad sense to designate phenomena, process and thus both the known physical world and imaginary worlds. Objects tend to be built from questions and other intermediary elements.

Computational simulation in the Social Sciences and Humanities

The Humanities take a non-mathematical, discursive approach to knowledge; their studies and analyses are usually conducted using natural language, citations and comments to steadily delve into the content and to develop it.

This working method cannot be used to verifying mathematical methods themselves. Thus there is no scope for formulating modelling in terms of equations, general mathematical logic, and 'proofs'. In this respect, the sheer variety of objects cannot be mathematically modelled as a whole and so there are no universally applicable rules and 'laws' for conducting computational simulations. This shortcoming might be tackled in some research situations by taking an intermediate step as a kind of 'bridge'.

Collaboration between historians and students of Brownian Motion in a fluid has yielded productive collaboration. In an effort to model social conflicts, accurate historical data is being compared with data provided by Brownian Motion experts, and certain patterns of behaviour in human movements are being found in diverse kinds of social conflicts, revealing certain similarities with the Brownian Motion exhibited by atoms. This motion can be expressed in terms of the same equations and can thus be computationally simulated. In fact, *ad hoc* papers are already appearing on the subject. Although such research is still in its infancy, the results to date are encouraging.

TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION IN SCIENTIFIC WORK

The powerful technology of our age is constantly nurtured by feedback from myriad sources, fostering new considerations and interactions between Man, machine, and the world they belong to. This process leads to more questions and a quest for answers. Why is it that we find technology so fascinating? What drives us to seek solutions to the puzzles posed? We take this environment (which is built up in a linear, cumulative fashion) for granted, scarcely pausing to think about the huge positive impact it has on our lives. Is it the sheer emotional attraction of novelty that enthrals us or do we vaguely sense that it puts the world at our fingertips?

Sceptics wonder whether over-exposure to and worship of technology are devaluing reflective knowledge, Science, and what was hitherto considered real progress. Yet might it be that we have found a new, authentic form of the same knowledge?

Perhaps that is why we seek to give robots some vestige of 'emotions' in an effort to make them seem more like us.

The example given below (avalanche simulation) fully falls into one of the design goals, namely coming up with a solution to a real-life problem.

An example of computer simulation: Avalanches

An avalanche is a mass of snow and ice that careers down the side of a mountain, creating an icy blast of wind that bulldozes and buries everything in its path — rocks, trees, pretty Alpine villages, and unwary skiers.

Avalanches are caused by the build-up of the layers of snow laid down with each snowfall. The snow is the sum of these layers, each one with different density and stability characteristics determined by weather, freeze-thaw cycles, compression from overlying layers, ambient temperature, aspect, gradient, wind, and so on. Strong winds and thawing commonly trigger avalanches.

Avalanches can cause a great deal of damage, hence the need to analyse the risk at any given moment and so protect lives and property.

The interest in assessing avalanche risk goes back a long way. Mountain folk at the beginning of the 20th century described different types of avalanches, which they classified to predict their path and how much damage they might cause. They also tried to identify those conditions most likely to lead to avalanches,

and strengthened buildings to protect life and limb.

Before the simulation is computed, one first needs to precisely determine and formalise the physical phenomenon to be studied to come up with the numerical model. Snow's fluid-like interactions are highly complex and thus very hard to model. That is why it takes the powerful Navier-Stokes equations used in fluid mechanics to model avalanches. To get the first approximations, average behaviour is considered without going into fine details because these make little difference to the predictions and their reliability.

The complementary terms typical of avalanches are introduced into these Navier-Stokes equations, modifying the mathematical structure and thus shaping the solutions found. Some specific elements of the equations are crucial for describing how the avalanche unfolds.

Observation of real avalanches and computational simulations can be compared. This is a highly active field of research with intense interdisciplinary links among key actors: engineers, physicists, mathematicians, computer scientists, snow and avalanche experts. This challenge sparks interest in many fields — not only at the scientific one because of the pure mathematics and physics involved but also in sports, geological, and environmental spheres, among others.

The simulation of avalanches not only seeks to gain a better understanding of how nature works but it also has practical applications. In this respect, simulations make additional use of the mathematical models and methods traditionally used in Physics. In this case, the aim is to solve problems through a Design Thinking approach.

METHODOLOGICAL DESIGN MODELS

Methodological Design Modelling is a field that affects the approach used in the Applied Science in that it seeks an alternative to Analytical Epistemology. The classical scheme of the scientific method (Figure 1) consists of testing a hypothesis. If the prediction is borne out, the knowledge obtained is added to the body of general knowledge. In practice, methodological processes are more complex and consist of several stages, especially when a new problem arises or when procedures need to be changed because no valid result is obtained. However, the scheme in Figure 1 continues to reflect the general idea of hypothesis testing. Despite this, researchers in The Applied Sciences have questioned whether the classical scheme is the best one for their fields. This dissatisfaction with the classical approach helps explain why Design Studies methodologies have emerged.

The Design Sciences are the result of a process of scientification and mechanisation of The Arts when it comes to practical skills and activities. Simon (1996) points out that the traditional model of Science offers a misleading image of fields such as Engineering, Medicine, Architecture, Economics, Education, etc., which are interested in 'design' insofar as this achieves a practical purpose. In other words, these disciplines are less interested in the nature of things and more in resolving practical problems.

Engineers are not the only professional designers. The intellectual activity involved in making material artefacts is not so very different from prescribing drugs, drawing up a new sales plan for a company, or a welfare policy. Conceived in these terms, Design is at the heart of The Applied Sciences and reflects the professionalisation and modernisation of the craft skills of old. Engineering, Law, Architecture, Education, and Medical schools orbit and are institutionalised by the Design process.

Various approaches to Engineering Methodology have been proposed, including ones by Gerald Nadler (1967), M. Asimov (1974), A.D. Hall (1974) and R.J. McCrory (1974), among others.

Despite the differences among them, all models exhibit a set of features and positions on Design Methodology that are in keeping with the practical purposes for

Figure 1 **Representation of The Scientific Method according to McCrory (1974: 160).**



which they are intended. Thus, Nadler points out that designing consists of coming up with processes to yield useful results, and of drawing on knowledge, laws and theories based on research and/or the descriptive sciences to this end. Asimov considers that Engineering Design is an activity that seeks to satisfy human needs, particularly those that have to do with technological aspects of our culture. Hall distinguishes three dimensions in any Engineering system: (1) time; (2) the problem-solving procedure; (3) the body of facts, models, and procedures defining a discipline, profession, or technology. Although we can find the equivalent of these three dimensions in the other models, it is the third dimension that is especially valuable for defining the identity of a professionalising discipline. Defining a discipline gives substance to a host of professions, turning them into university degrees and institutionalising them.

Last but not least, McCrory sees Design as drawing upon scientific knowledge for practical ends, not as the source of said knowledge. Here, the designer's role might be considered similar to that of an artist insofar as it gives rise to new creations. The idea is that state-of-the-art scientific knowledge and the needs constituting non-technical input (shaped by social, economic, geo-political factors, etc.) converge in Design.

In this model, the design is not included in the non-technical input but it makes sense to add it and take it into account at the second design stage. In this

Figure 2 Design Method flowchart as set out by McCrory (1974: 162).



stage, we focus on the desired outcome, whether it be an artefact, a drug, an aeroplane or a study plan. In particular, it is important that the design bears future user needs in mind.

THE CULTURE OF DESIGN BETWEEN THE SCIENCES AND THE HUMANITIES

Based on what we have said about innovation and its impact on the epistemology and methodology of Science, *Design Culture* (as Cross calls it) seems the best framework for tackling innovation and invention processes in which theoretical and practical elements converge. The approach is one that provides a new, integrating perspective of Science and The Humanities.

Cross (2006) in his work *Designerly Ways of Knowing* sees the discipline as a form of knowledge linked to the Epistemology of Design and to Design Thinking. One of the key ideas in his proposal is that Design

should constitute a third culture after The Sciences and The Humanities, and be part of the general education system rather than just the preserve of certain professions.

Thus, just as there are ways of approaching phenomena from The Humanities and from The Sciences, one can also tackle them from a Design perspective (as per Cross' *Designerly Ways of Knowing*). Cross points out some differences between these three cultures regarding the object of study, the method followed and the values enshrined. In Design's case, the object of study is the artificial world. Among the methods he cites is finding patterns. Design's main values are practicality, empathy, and fitness for purpose.

Other key features of 'designerly ways of knowing' are: the manipulation of non-verbal codes in material culture; the connection between doing and thinking; the relevance of iconic modes of cognition (2006: 11). Regarding design skills, Cross highlights the following: solving ill-defined problems; adopting solution-focused strategies; using abductive reasoning, and non-verbal/graphic means to represent knowledge (2006: 20). All these characteristics are at the core of innovation and invention processes.

Drawing on Science and Design concepts, he distinguishes three forms of connection between the two, corresponding to different senses:

(a) Scientific Design covers any field but tends to focus on Industrial Design, for which the designer uses scientific knowledge.

(b) Design Sciences are those whose goal is not to describe the world but to transform it. They cover Engineering, Medicine, Education and Information Sciences, among others fields.

(c) The Science of Design is the body of design theories applying a given practice to a product and drawing on scientific method to do so.

It should be noted that Cross made it clear that *The Science of Design* was not the same thing as *Design Science*. We can ask whether Cross' distinction is a fruitful one for clarifying the broad, complex design field. The first thing that should be said is that, in practice, both concepts are intertwined in any design activity, product, or process. Yet because this is a relatively new field, it is important to conduct an initial conceptual analysis from an academic standpoint.

We can say that Design Culture seeks to create a framework for developing many of the kinds of things discussed in this paper. Indeed, the very idea of the role played by Design in innovation would make little sense without such a framework. Furthermore, the three forms of connection between Science and Design highlighted by Cross (namely Scientific Design, Design Sciences, and The Science of Design) give meaning to the goals and their development.

CONCLUSIONS

We have seen that Design permeates all scientific and cultural spheres in the conceptualisation of the natural and social worlds. Even so, we sometimes forget that the social world is part of the natural one. Design offers a new perspective for approaching the complexity of the real world. When it comes to innovation, Design Thinking provides a scaffold to build on human interests and skills to ensure innovation is fit for purpose. These conclusions, although concise, are of great significance for current thinking and for philosophy in regarding the meta-conceptualisation of knowledge. Given the huge challenges Mankind now faces, Design's practical vision of knowledge and its commitment to solving problems will have a big impact on the way.

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Cognitive Models for Gastronomic Creation and Innovation

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ABSTRACT
Based on the reflections of super-chef Ferran Adrià and his team at el Bulli restaurant, this paper explores how certain creative mechanisms, techniques and procedures surrounding avant-garde gastronomy can be analysed from an enactivist model of cognition in order to: (1) understand creativity in the kitchen; (2) characterise culinary innovation processes; (3) establish whether some of these processes are general enough to be re-used in other fields and so broaden our theoretical understanding of the processes and mechanisms involved in creation and innovation. We present those features that are specific to gastronomy as a creative process to distinguish them from others that are generic enough to form part of a larger family of creative processes. The paper seeks to present new perspectives on both subject-specific and generic creation processes in *haute cuisine*.

Keywords: confection, avant-garde gastronomy, creativity models, Ferran Adrià.

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INTRODUCTION

This article explores '*avant-garde* gastronomy' from the perspective of enactivism in order to shed new light on innovation processes. The goal is to discover whether these processes can be generalised to other disciplines and thus advance our theoretical understanding of creativity and innovation mechanisms. Master Chef Ferran Adrià's creative gastronomy at *el Bulli* restaurant and his subsequent theoretical reflection in his *el Bulli Lab* research are analysed in this paper as a case study upon which our proposals are based.

In the first section, we describe the evolution of gastronomy and its study. The second section argues the theoretical relevance of gastronomy as an object of philosophical study. The third studies *el Bulli* from

an enactivist perspective. The fourth and final section discusses how the ideas presented shed new light on innovation and creativity.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY OF COOKING

Gastronomy meets all the criteria for being an Applied Science. The kitchen is where a host of raw materials go through physical and chemical changes to yield the final product (Castells and Perelló 2010, McGee 1984, Myhrvold 2011). However, historically speaking, gastronomy and the Applied Sciences have shunned each other. In the past, cooking was based on previous experience, and recipes and techniques were the product of trial and error. There was no scientific review or comparison of cooking outcomes. Yet one can find centuries-old cooking techniques that tie in well with theoretical models in Chemistry and Physics, as well as age-old beliefs that do not stand up to scientific scrutiny (López-Alt 2015).

The first attempts to forge a 'Kitchen Science' were made in the 19th Century with researchers such as Appert — who described methods for preserving food (Appert 1810) — and Accum, a chemist interested in poisons and Forensic Sciences, author of the first treatise on chemistry in the kitchen (Accum 1821). A work of particular note was Savarin's *The Physiology of Taste* [*Physiologie du goût ou Méditations de gastronomie transcendante*] (Brillat-Savarin, 1828), which became the first discourse on scientific gastronomy. In his work, he tried to establish the physiological bases of our senses of taste and smell, and the chemistry of food processing.

In the twentieth century, the first author to passionately argue the case for a relationship between that science and gastronomy was the Hungarian Physicist Nicholas Kurti. He was a forerunner of the current trend of merging technology and gastronomy. Kurti gave his famous lecture "The Physicist in The Kitchen" in 1969, in which he demonstrated the culinary scope of a vacuum machine and a microwave oven, among other things.

In the same year, Herbert Simon published his book *The Sciences of the Artificial*, which established Design as a science. Simon's theories sparked the quest for systematic methodologies covering many design-related disciplines, such as Architecture, Engineering, Urban Planning, Medicine, Computer Science, and Management.

Following Dorst (2006) and Cross' (2007) ideas on design, one could say that gastronomy is a kind of 'design space' in which a chef has to solve poorly-defined problems to come up with a good solution. The difficulty is compounded by the fact that the problem itself is a constantly changing one and is framed within a complex feedback process. However, up until the turn of the 21st Century, there was no sustained attempt to analyse gastronomy from a Design Sciences angle.

In the 1980s, Harold McGee's (McGee 1984) encyclopaedia of food and cooking fostered dialogue between Science and the culinary art, building a paradigm from which it was possible to cook in a way that followed the scientific method. This gave scope for seeing cooking as a theoretical system based on sound scientific knowledge, to wit: molecular gastronomy, a term coined by Hervé and that was later taken up by Kurti (2002, Kurti 1980). Another key text is the *Guia científica i gastronòmica* [Scientific and Gastronomic Guide] (Fundació Alicia i *el Bulli* Workshop 2006), which drew up the first scientific classification of food products used in gastronomy.

However, these proposals tended to over-stress the Science, turning cooking into something akin to engineering and forgetting the 'creative' aspect of the craft — a problem alluded to above in Nigel Cross' comments.

Nathan Myhrvold tried to strike a balance between scientific and artistic creativity in these new culinary methods. He called the new trend 'modernist cooking' and wrote no fewer than six volumes on the subject in a systematic study of the effects of different techniques and technologies on food (Myhrvold 2011). However,

he also strove to do justice to the creative and non-deterministic aspects of cooking. In Spain, Pau Arenós tried to strike a similar balance between art and science and in 1999 coined the term 'techno-emotional' cuisine (Arenós and Jardí 1999) to capture the blend of artistic inspiration and scientific method needed.

The two standard terms used to refer to this new paradigm — *molecular gastronomy* and *techno-emotional cooking* — have their strengths and weaknesses in shedding light on the nature of cooking. The term 'Molecular Gastronomy' reveals the scientific side to this discipline, pointing to chemistry as the key science. However, the term may mislead one into thinking that it only deals with finding new chemical reactions to come up with food textures. By contrast, the term 'Techno-emotional cooking' stresses the idea that gastronomy should not blind customers with science and jargon but rather surprise them with new emotions, letting them experience food in ways they could never have imagined. In speaking about his first time at *El Bullí* restaurant, Adrià said it came down to 'raping diners' palates' (Adrià 1998). The 'Techno' part of the term points to the need for new devices, techniques and technologies. However the term also leads the layman to think merely in terms of frivolous gadgets and 'tech' systems to present dishes in the strangest ways possible.

The Sensory Sciences are another important discipline when it comes to analysing gastronomy from the Design Sciences angle. The Psychology of Perception or Human Physiology is as relevant to gastronomy as it is to design (Korsmeyer 2002, Lyman 2012). Consider the concept of 'food-pairing'. Such research combines statistical analysis and Cognitive Science to draw up a methodology to discover which foods combine well and which do not, and seeks to go beyond traditional combinations. A clear example of this research is The Food-pairing Project (Robberechts *et al*., 2015), a food technology company at the forefront of Gastronomy, Computer Science and Digital Advertising. There is also the Barabasi-led project of establishing food-pairings by analysing common ingredients in recipes (Ahn *et al*., 2011).

WHY ONE SHOULD RESEARCH GASTRONOMY. MYTHS AND REALITIES

Gastronomy generally gets short shrift from the Sciences and Humanities. When examined from the standpoint of Aesthetics and other branches of Philosophy, the analysis is usually blatantly hostile. We only need to remember the insults that Plato dished up for cooks and peasants in *The Republic*. For Plato, food is a kind of necessary evil, and the less we talk about it the better.

This disdain is surprising since it is at odds with the daily routine of eating and cooking, and with the interest that gastronomy sparks in the general public. This ignorance and indifference is based on deeply-rooted prejudices.

Aesthetics of the minor senses

First, we have the idea that taste is a lesser sense that has no bearing on a study of the human condition. This prejudice sees taste as a primordial, animal sense that is too lowly to have the slightest epistemic or aesthetic relevance. The traditional taste categories — *salty*, *sweet*, *bitter*, *sour* and combinations thereof — do not allow the building of any conceptually relevant theoretical models.

Yet this vision is merely a self-fulfilling prophecy. It is the Platonic obsession with focusing on the pure world of thought and avoiding the body that causes us to lack detailed vocabulary to describe taste and explore its meaning.

Western culture lacks credibility when it comes to theorising on taste — something laid bare by the fact that we had to wait until the 20th Century to grasp the idea of *unami* — a new taste, associated with detecting proteins and substances such as monosodium glutamate. To draw a comparison with another sphere, it would be as if no art critic or vision theorist had ever spoken of violet until the twentieth century. We had to wait until 2010 to confirm something we already knew from experience, namely that fat is a flavour (Stewart *et al*., 2010, Keats and Constanzo 2015). We also had to wait until the

21st Century for competent theories to emerge on how the sense of smell works — something that is a great deal more complex than just assuming that we have receptors in the nose for each type of molecule (Hawkes and Doty 2009).

The economics of molecular cooking

A more recent though lower hurdle to gastronomy being taken seriously by The Humanities is the characterisation of *avant-garde* cuisine as elitist and thus part of the wealthy classes' social capital. In other words, consuming *Haute Cuisine* is a sign that one belongs to the Upper Class. Being seen going into a Three-Star Michelin Guide restaurant, bragging about the experimental cuisine, and calling the chefs by their first names as if they were bosom pals is a form of social capital and show that one has money to burn on fripperies (Eloire 2018).

The main thrust of this argument is to stress the Social Capital aspect of such consumption and the eye-watering prices charged for such cuisine. The people dining at these *avant-garde* restaurants — we are told — are paying through the nose for the ingredients, for getting on the waiting list, and for wallowing in the exclusiveness. The sky-high prices to dine at these places effectively bar the general public (Eloire 2018). Yet the accusation of price-gouging is largely unfounded. It is true that some restaurants and chefs take their customers for a ride, creating spuriously 'exclusive events' and including products of no gastronomic value (such as the use of gold leaf) in the kitchen a pretext for overcharging. Yet in general, the prices charged by *avant-garde* restaurants are not excessive (Sunday 2013, Christensen and Pedersen2011). The main reason for the high prices is the need for many highly-trained staff to serve a fairly small number of diners. In some restaurants, there are more people working in the kitchen than there are diners. In *el Bulli's* case, the restaurant actually ran at a loss. Where its Master Chef Ferran Adrià and his team really made their money was from associated events, conferences, workshops, and so forth (De Solier 2010, Sunday 2013). As Carme Ruscalleda said in an interview: "A tasting menu is not overpriced, whereas charging €7 for a toasted cheese-and-ham sandwich is daylight robbery" (Sarrias 2019).

As for the objection that *avant-garde* cuisine is nothing more than a way of showing off, one should note that the link between 'Social Capital' [conspicuous consumption] and aesthetic and cultural practices is no less exclusive than *Haute Cuisine*. Attending Art auctions, having one's own seat or box at an opera house, and buying artworks at a swish gallery are just a few examples of the same phenomenon. Yet this does not stop The Humanities from systematically studying the visual arts and opera. It is true that there is a hard core of Upper Class diners frequenting Michelin three-star restaurants to flaunt their social status. Yet there is now a growing number of ordinary customers who are genuinely interested in new gastronomic experiences rather than in *Haute Cuisine* as an exercise in one upmanship (Opazo, 2016). Similar market forces are at work at Bayreuth. There, the wealthy show up to show off. Meanwhile, a host of run-of-the-mill Wagner fans also turn up after having scrimped and saved for months to enjoy *The Twilight of the Gods* [*Götterdämmerung*], burning through their hard-earned cash. The link between *avant-garde* gastronomy and Social Capital must be studied but it should not be solely confined to this aspect.

A big part of *Haute Cuisine's* exclusiveness stems from the lack of mechanisms for reproducing the experience. Until the advent of sound reproduction technologies in the 20th Century, enjoying classical music was clearly a minority experience. We must also distinguish between 'elitist' and 'minority' consumption patterns. The dodecaphonic music of Schönberg and Alban Berg leaves most people cold. One needs a well-developed knowledge of music theory to enjoy it (and even then, it is not everyone's cup of tea). Yet we would not say that it is elitist music but rather music for minorities. (Vilar 2018).

Finally, one of the reasons why *avant-garde* restaurants are now in the limelight is because gastronomy has largely been ignored in the past. It is only now that The Humanities are beginning to properly study

gastronomy and recognise its worth (Vilar 2018) (Vilar and Jaques 2010) in a way reminiscent of the attention lavished on the visual arts. Yet one does not need to venture into an *avant-garde* kitchen to study gastronomy as a creative act.

ENACTIVIST ANALYSIS OF CREATIVE PROCESSES IN MOLECULAR GASTRONOMY

This section is the result of my participation in the *Sapiens* project (originally called *Decoding*) in *el Bulli Lab* and the description of the results of the methodology in Adrià and Pinto (2015). I therefore describe the projects at the time without delving into further results of the *Sapiens* project. Those wishing to delve deeper can consult the following interactive presentation produced by Ferran Adrià and *Ara* newspaper: https://interactius.ara.cat/sapiens/en [English version]

One of my tasks in this project was to establish cognitive enactivist models that could shed light on the creative processes in molecular gastronomy. In this paper I review how such models provide a better understanding of the creative processes at *el Bulli* and how they might be transferred to other settings.

What is an enactivist cognitive model?

By enactivism we mean a way of understanding the Cognitive Sciences other than through computational or representational models, and that sees cognition as a dynamic process in which subject, body and setting continuously interact to create cognitive models that we cannot simply place in the brain but that are also the result of this continuous interaction between mind, body and environment (Thompson 2010, Noë 2015).

An enactivist cognitive model thus functions as an extended mind system where the cognitive process solves a problem in a way that does not merely stem from brain computation but also from a process of analysis that extends to the environment.

Hutchins (1995) gives a simple example of this idea: Imagine a queue of customers at a bakery waiting to be served. Those in the queue are told roughly how long they can expect to wait before reaching the front. This lets each customer decide whether he wants to stay in the queue or leave. The place in the queue establishes the order in which customers will be served (assuming they do not lose patience and leave). The cognitive process does not stem just from the baker's mind or from customers' reckoning of the time to reach the front but rather from the interaction of all minds, customers' bodies, and a given spatial form (to wit, a queue).

Enactivist cognitive models are very recent. Enactivism — or the third generation of the Cognitive Sciences — began with the publication of *The Embodied Mind* in 1991 yet it has only recently taken root in The Humanities.

This fact is key to grasping the lack of interest in gastronomy discussed earlier. A classical cognitive perspective focusing on a brain that knows when the context is irrelevant finds it very hard to understand cooking, which is a highly context-dependent activity involving interaction between individuals.

Taking a Cartesian approach makes it very hard to grasp how gastronomy really works at the phenomenological level. Historically, the idea was to start from the brain as a taste-processing machine and thus reduce gastronomic pleasure to a set of computations.

However, there is no need to reduce the phenomenological experience of gastronomy to the sense of taste. Clearly taste sensations may arise when we ingest something, for example orange juice. Yet these cannot be limited to a combination of sweet, salty, bitter, sour and *umami* otherwise one could create any possible flavour by blending these five tastes — a proposition that is clearly absurd.

This though is precisely the reductionist approach taken by the neuroscience of taste. Take the famous study by Morrot *et al*., (2001) where some *sommeliers* were tricked into believing they were tasting a 'red

wine'. What they had actually been given was a white wine reddened with a dye. Many commentators saw this experiment as evidencing 'socialisation' of gastronomy and as proof that the supposed wine experts knew nothing. Yet the issue here was not the experts' knowledge given that sommeliers are not mere molecule detectors but rather human beings with multi-sensory skills. Accordingly, they make holistic judgments based on taste, aroma, appearance and so forth. The same phenomenon would explain why people say that a more expensive wine tastes better than a cheaper one. This occurs even when they are tasting exactly the same wine, albeit one poured from differently-labelled bottles.

From an enactivist standpoint, we can grasp the confusion that surrounds words describing taste and how it relates to chemical receptors on the tongue (Noë 2015). Yet taste is actually a multisensory experience that includes the sense of smell and touch. Here one should note that spicy or astringent flavours arise from the tongue's sense of touch, not its chemical receptors. One also needs to include sight (this sense actually plays a basic role in any taste experience). Hearing is a less important sense but comes into play in gauging how crunchy a food is.

Thus tasting involves a combination of taste, smell, touch, and is not confined to food's interaction with the tongue's chemical, receptors.

It is also worth noting that although we are well into the 21st-Century, there is still no well-defined vocabulary to describe aromas and tactile sensations. Thus there is no comprehensive list of aroma types. Researchers are currently working with classification schemes that are drawn from the world of perfumery but that are neither consistent nor systematic.

Ferran Adrià is a chef who has radically changed gastronomy over the last half century. His research is always driven by a desire to innovate. During Adrià's time running his *el Bulli* restaurant along with his creative team, the focus was always on "a return to creation" (Adrià 2015). Work at the restaurant was always organised on a sound scientific footing. Research lab principles and purpose were adopted, rigorously drawing on observation, experimentation, research, making hypotheses, creating models and techniques. These were the basic ingredients for reviewing and questioning gastronomy as a discipline in order to drive constant change and improvement. Today, any internationally recognised chef will readily acknowledge his debt to Ferran Adrià. (Opazo 2012, 2016).

We should not see molecular gastronomy, and especially the *el Bulli* project, as a kind of objectification and scientification of the kitchen in which inspiration and intuition are banished — something apparent in the standard reviews of the molecular gastronomy project (see Cousins *et al*., 2010, Hegarty and Antun 2010). Rather, gastronomy involves being just as creative as other forms of cooking. Resort to science and technology does not render gastronomy a mechanical process but rather facilitates creation and innovation.

Once *el Bulli* closed, Ferran Adrià decided to conduct systematic research on creativity itself with a view to finding a method that would facilitate innovation and creation in any discipline. The project was originally titled *Decoding* and sought to formally reconstruct the creative processes and mechanisms of various disciplines but with a clear stress on cooking. Nevertheless, the idea was to look at other disciplines to pin down which parameters were universal and which only applied to a given discipline. The idea was to 'decode' various strands such as: (1) recipe creation; (2) restaurant interior decoration; (3) cocktails; (4) contemporary dance; (5) business administration. Later on, the *el Bulli* Lab team changed the project name to *Sapiens* but the goal was the same — namely to come up with a kind of logical reconstruction of the world [*Der logische Aufbau der Welt*] (Carnap 1928) albeit one confined to creative processes.

The project began with Ferran Adrià's findings from analysing his own creative path. Right from the outset at *el Bulli*, Adrià and his team analysed the

various creative processes and structures, examining menus, product sheets, preliminary ideas for new dishes, the database of tests, recipes that did not work, and so on. The way *el Bulli's* team works is easily understood from an enactivist perspective. One of these findings runs counter to the romantic notion of the creative genius who basically invents whatever he chooses. The reason the notion is false is because culinary creativity is heavily conditioned by the physical, chemical and organoleptic properties of foodstuffs, the technologies of the day, and time and staff constraints.

This rigorous approach lets Adrià establish some basic parameters for developing his 'decoding process'. Regardless of whether one is trying to innovate in cooking, video art or the design of racing cars, there are a number of generic conditions that can help or hinder the creative process. However, these self-same constraints make creativity possible in the first place. That is because without constraints, one could conjure up any texture and flavour from any ingredients at will. Under such a scenario, coming up with the desired dish would be as routine and unremarkable as churning out widgets. The fact that things do not work like this in the real world is what creates the need for Master Chefs capable of harnessing their experience to find new ways to innovate.

It follows from the *Sapiens* project and the research patterns of the enactivist model that creative processes in cooking are distributed thus there is no ultimate creative genius responsible for the dish — a fiction assiduously promoted by the popular press. Instead, dishes are a team effort by chefs, 'sandwich students' (no pun intended), producers, distributors, and diners. On the other hand, no creative process takes place in a vacuum (not even cooking) so we must include other disciplines that may inspire the creative process on the one hand, and historical and environmental conditions on the other.

Let us look at the historical conditioning factors first. Behind the aforementioned food-pairing, the fact that certain food combinations work in the kitchen while others do not is the result of a historical process. It would be a mistake to think that food-pairing is something that is part of our brain circuitry. Rather, it is the product of an enactivist process in which mind, body, and environment work together.

The culinary canon stems from the adoption of certain recipes as a standard, the result of a combination of sundry climatic, technological, social and even religious factors. If we believe that onions, aubergines, peppers and tomatoes are a good combination, it is not simply because of their molecular compatibility but because of centuries of history that have kept them together. The new label for Adrià's project (*Sapiens*) is a tribute to Harari's book of the same name (Harari 2014) and thus recognises the great role played by history in the creative processes of gastronomy.

The creative processes in *Avant-garde* cuisine have a strong interdisciplinary component. The Roca Brothers '*Roner* or *Rotoval* [basically a distilling apparatus for food aromas] is the result of applying Physics and Chemistry principles to the kitchen. The inclusion of Ferran Adrià in the *Documenta Art Biennial* (Todolí and Hamilton 2009) is explained by the Master Chef's tributes to the visual culture of the 20th Century with dishes such as *Molls Gaudí* [Mullet à la *Gaudí*] (Adrià 1998).

Another key feature of the *Sapiens* model is that it gives the chef more time to be creative. This is why Adrià chose to keep *el Bulli* closed for six months and to serve only dinners, giving the *el Bulli* team enough time to do new tests and experiments, seek inspiration elsewhere, travel to find new techniques, ideas and products, and so forth. Restaurant logistics are also key to linking each stage of the maintenance programme, ensuring a smooth, trouble-free flow. The schedule kept the restaurant open without cognitively over-burdening the team, giving it as much time as possible to spend on culinary creativity.

Probably the most important element of the *Sapiens* methodology is that it maximises efficiency of

productive and creative processes, subjecting these to rigorous analysis, examining them in depth and ensuring that they all 'gel' (Maes 1994). A key result of these micro studies is that each discipline has its own creative mechanisms that cannot automatically be applied to another discipline. A detailed reworking is needed, reconstructing the specific connections between the objects, products and methods in each case. For instance, although one might posit that the creative mechanisms in graphic design and cooking are similar (insofar as they both deal with the suitability of certain combinations), this is insufficient. If we really wish to grasp the relationship between 'food-pairing' and 'colour-pairing' we need to analyse and systematise the mechanisms at work in each case and their respective psychological and historical bases. Deeper consideration reveals that whether two flavours or two colours combine well or not are independent processes notwithstanding their superficial similarities.

The *Sapiens* analysis also shows that limitations do not hinder creativity but on the contrary spur it. Creativity is Mankind's response to certain constraints imposed on it by historical and environmental forces. It is only by grasping these limitations that we can come up with truly creative answers. This ties in with Cross' scheme for visualising seemingly intractable problems and then deciding how far one is willing to go in questioning the limitations they seemingly pose. In classic cuisine repertoires, it is very hard to find dishes that are completely black. Is this non-existence the result of something intrinsic in the nature of these foods? Is it a cross-cultural psychological fact or is it the result of historical and social processes? Once we understand this phenomenon we can consider whether it makes sense to make a dish where all the ingredients are black and, if so, how it should be produced. This decision in turn spawns new problems: Should the dish be served on a black plate?; When should the menu be served?; Are other sensory accompaniments needed?

Sundry enactivist cognitive processes will be involved, which are briefly listed in the table below, which compares traditional and molecular cuisines:

Table 1

Problem	Traditional Cuisine model	Molecular Gastronomy model
Record recipe	Ambiguous text based on shared experience	Scientific writing of a recipe, exact quantities, etc.
Decide on the right combinations	Intuitive knowledge based on shared tradition	Systematic historical and biological knowledge that explains these intuitions
Innovate in techniques	Intuitive use of new utensils (pressure cooker, microwave, etc.)	Use based on simple science and the capabilities of new utensils
Innovating in technologies	Trial and error	Ask engineers to use their scientific knowledge to come up with new technologies (rotaval, roner)
Innovate in combinations	Trial and error	Combine chemical, neurological and historical knowledge. (Food-pairing)

CONCLUSIONS

Although at first glance there seems to be a big gap between traditional cuisine and 'molecular gastronomy', in reality the latter is nothing more than an attempt to systematise cooking by drawing on the experimental sciences, cognitive models, chefs' hunches.

Understanding gastronomy therefore requires an enactivist perspective in which mind, body and environment interact through endless feedback loops. Gastronomy is also a multi-sensorial system in which the expectations and knowledge of diners and chefs play a key role. *El Bulli Lab*'s *Sapiens* project is a perfect example of this kind of research, which starts from the kitchen setting to pin down generic mechanisms that can be transferred to other disciplines.

One of the key findings to emerge from this methodology is that limitations spur creativity as we try to overcome them. Kant's dove hopes to fly better in an airless space but discovers this supposed constraint (air) is a precondition for flight. Likewise, the limitations imposed on us by each discipline are what lets creativity take wing.

These limitations differ in each discipline both in terms of the factors inherent in production processes and in what has historically been seen as an acceptable outcome and which has not.

That is why a study of creativity cannot hope to find generic mechanisms that will work in any setting. Put another way, we cannot mechanise creativity as a generic process or expect to find a global formal model governing it. What we can do is systematically identify which mechanisms either help or hinder creativity by earmarking more time to the creative process and by lightening the cognitive burden stemming from other activities.

We can think of *Sapiens* as a Wittgensteinian exercise revealing that 'creativity' is a term loosely bandied around in many settings. This is why it is pointless to seek universal laws spanning all disciplines. Instead of trying to draw up universal, immutable laws governing creativity, we should look for generic protocols that help people spend more time and thought on the creative process.

At the same time, *Sapiens* shows that creativity stems not from a genius inspired by The Muses but from a team effort in which creation is a collective, distributed affair (Hutchins 1995). Here creativity arises from a tightly-co-ordinated team, working with sundry technological tools, and shaped by environmental and cultural factors.

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València — Sustainable Food World Capital. A Social Sciences Vision

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ABSTRACT
The declaration of València as the World Sustainable Food Capital in 2017, based on the market-gardening system of l'Horta — an area girding the city, has put key subjects such as sustainable production and healthy eating on the public agenda. The process leading up to the declaration (which is in part a heritage-based project) has been fraught with contradictions and conflicts stemming from the city's political, economic and identity dimensions. Examining this process from a Social Sciences angle is of value not only in drawing lessons but also for spawning debating forums in which solutions can be proposed.

Keywords: nutrition, sustainability, heritage, identity, València.

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VALENCIA AND ITS KEY FEATURES

The drive to ensure a food system that meets sustainability criteria reflects a position similar to that concerning The Welfare State. Poor nutrition is increasingly being seen as a public threat. This concern (together with the growth of ecological and other movements) have spawned a great deal of information on such issues, fostering public awareness of the threats posed by Climate Change and the need for society to farm and consume foodstuffs in socially responsible ways. While this is a world-wide phenomenon, it mainly affects The West — especially in urban areas — and is leading to major shifts in eating habits by certain sectors of society.

The food sustainability paradigm has mainly been applied to production systems based on small to medium-scale local distribution and marketing channels. These operate at a much smaller scale than the mass-production, global trade systems found in most of the foodstuffs industry.

Much of this driving force springs from society, which shapes information sites, and forges networks and new consumption habits (López García, 2011. Yet institutions also play a role, fostering initiatives ranging from the global level to the local one. One such initiative is the Milan Urban Food Policy Pact (2015), better known as The Milan Pact. It is the first international food protocol to be carried out at the municipal level with the involvement of the FAO, to assume and implement the Sustainable Development Goals of the 2030 Agenda, The Paris Agreement and the UN's Food Security Commitments of 2016. In this sense, The Milan Pact forms part of the corpus of Western hegemonic values and intentions, laying the foundations for action in this decade:

> Work to develop sustainable, inclusive, resilient, safe and diversified food systems, to ensure healthy and accessible food for all in a framework of action based on rights, in order to reduce food waste and preserve biodiversity and, at the same time, mitigate and adapt to the effects of climate change (Milan Pact, 2015).

The declaration of Valencia as the World Capital of Sustainable Food in 2017 must within the framework of this institutional initiative, through which the city would not only become the venue for The Annual Meeting and Summit of Mayor's for The Milan Pact but would seek to lead efforts to put the Pact into practice.

The choice of Valencia stemmed from the unique nature of the city's long-established market-gardening area, which partly reflected the new 'sustainability' paradigm. Valencia's traditional horticulture formed part of the historic model of irrigated areas ringing cities around the Mediterranean basin (López García *et al.*, 2021: 37). Yet the traditional market-gardening found around the city had been despised for decades and seen as hindering Valencia's modernisation and progress. The Milan Pact stressed: seasonal, 'kilometre zero' agricultural produce; efficient use of water and other resources; short distribution and marketing channels; small-scale commercial networks; a cuisine based on seasonal rhythms; rational consumption. These strands all served to highlight the many merits of Valencia's *Horta* (Rodrigo *et al.*, 2016).

That said, we should not lose sight of the fact the initiatives are of an institutional nature and based upon a top-down view of part of Valencia's heritage that has re-packaged the *Horta* in 'sustainability' terms. One can thus say that it is largely a question of 'old wine in new bottles'. What was lacking was institutional legitimacy, now driven by international recognition, and the consequent process of social (re)appropriation.

However, beyond the Valencia Council's commitment to sustainable food production, the designation of the city as the 'World Capital' in this field must be seen as part of a two-pronged global login. One of these prongs reflect the weight of the so-called "economy of intangibles", or "Capitalism without capital" (Haskel and Westlake, 2017), which has put intangible assets at the forefront of neo-Liberal dynamics. In Valencia's case, the policy of holding major events has been one of the main expressions of this trend (Santamarina and Moncusí, 2013). This policy led the city to host The America Cup in 2007, Formula 1 between 2008 and 2012, The European Capital of Sport in 2011, and The City of Running in 2014. A forthcoming event is The World Capital of Design (2022). The second prong is the 'heritagising' fever defining Western societies within the framework of globalisation and advanced modernity (Prats, 1997; Frigolé, 2014). Indeed, this heritage boom cannot be divorced from the requirements of the neo-Liberal economy exploits heritage as pretext for driving yet more consumption (Heinich, 2009; MacDonald, 2013; Moncusí, 2013; Del Marble and Santamarine, 2019). This fruitful interrelationship between heritage, 'authenticity' and the market explains heritage mania now touches the most mundane of everyday practices, including food.

HERITAGISING FOOD AND SUSTAINABILITY

Treating food as 'heritage' in much the same way as say a work of art or a building is something new. It reveals the way the concept of heritage underwent a sea change in the late 20th Century.

The 1980s saw a new era of modernisation, accompanied by a crisis of identity stemming from incipient globalisation. It was under these conditions that the concept of heritage became more flexible, taking account of hitherto little-explored variables such as ¡immateriality' and the diversity of agents (Hernández *et al*., 2005; Smith and Akawa, 2009). In 2003 UNESCO enacted the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage. For the first time, intangible cultural expressions are officially recognised as part of world heritage. However, it was not until 2010 that food was put 'on the menu' with the listing of French Gastronomy, Traditional Mexican Cuisine, and The Mediterranean Diet.

UNESCO presents The Mediterranean Diet together with its associated food production/consumption patterns and socio-cultural practices as well worth following (Medina, 2017a). As Sandro Dernini, Secretary-General of the International Foundation for the Mediterranean Diet (IFMeD) and an expert from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), points out:

> The Mediterranean diet is part of our lifestyle and identity, enshrining the diversity and vitality of our culture. The diet has constantly developed throughout our history (…) giving the Mediterranean people a sense of identity and continuity (Dernini, 2008: 288).

The FAO, — the leading international institution in its field — sees sustainable food in broad terms, covering such things as: (1) nutritional value; (2) economics (food that is accessible, economically fair, and can be easily produced); (3) ecology (low environmental impact; (4) eco-friendly and that can feed future generations; (5) socio-culturally sound (governance paradigm, common goods, and respecting agricultural and culinary traditions).

The effects of the heritagisation of food and the practices surrounding it have been felt both by both locals and visitors. In this case, residents have seen their cuisine 'commercially repackaged' and given new angles, while tourists have been offered 'local products' as part of the holiday experience. The underlying driving force is the same in both cases:

> Tourists and, in general, consumers today are more aware of what they consume and how this ties in with the local environment. This has boosted demand for the consumption of local products (…). To this one can add the ethical discourse and sustainable values based on the region, landscape, local culture, local products and authenticity as fundamental elements of gastronomic tourism (…), driving greater demand for this type of tourism (Leal London 2015, through Medina, 2017b: 110).

On the 26th of May 2015 Spain passed its Act for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage [*Ley 10/2015*], Under the Act, cuisine is considered one of the heritage elements meriting protection and promotion. The same can be seen in the Valencian Government's Tourism, Leisure, and Hospitality Act [*Ley 15/2018*]. Article 24 of that Act recognises cuisine as a key tourist resource, stating:

> For the purposes of this Act, the following are all considered to be tourism resources of prime importance: large festivals declared to be of tourist interest; beaches; congress centres and trade fairs; national and international sporting and music events; the region's cuisine; agricultural and industrial landscapes, their uses and the ethnological values they enshrine; spas and spa waters; items declared by UNESCO as 'Heritage of Mankind' and of cultural interest; nature and conservancy areas (Chapter 2, Article 24).

The City of Valencia is positioned within this 'Mediterranean Diet' heritage framework, drawing on the city's rich culinary tradition and its world fame as the home of the *paella* [a rice and seafood/meat dish]. While it is true that cuisine (especially rice-based dishes) has been a key element on which

Valencia's international food image has been based, it is interesting that the *Horta* (the city's market-gardening ring) was the main reason for the city being chosen as the World Capital of Sustainable Food. Thus, the Declaration of Valencia (2017) stresses the need to foster sustainable production linking "social protection systems to small family producers, boost access to healthy, sustainable diets, reduce food waste, and prepare for climate change".

The city's candidature prospered and Valencia became the global focus of sustainable food in 2017.

VALENCIA, WORLD CAPITAL OF SUSTAINABLE FOOD

In 2017, a wide range of activities took place in the city, combining the official 'Food Capital' programme with initiatives already under way: conferences and round tables on agro-ecology, gastronomic fairs, local eco-markets, publications, information, and so forth. As a policy forming part of the first and second *Nau*[1] government, there was agreement between the Valencian administrations (municipal, provincial and regional tiers, in collaboration with The State), Valencian public universities, the media, and civil society (the last including leading entities defending the *Horta* area, such as *Per l'Horta* and the Centre for Rural Studies and International Agriculture (CERAI). These parties all pulled together to build a network and prepare the groundwork for the later joint declaration of Valencia as World Capital.

The Valencian Language Academy nicely captured the spirit of the venture in *Amb molt de gust* (2017), a publication made for the occasion [the Catalan title is a play on words, meaning both "With pleasure" and — more literally — "With a great deal of taste"]:

> Sustainable food is seen as an inter-disciplinary concept embracing many fields and strands, such as: Health; Education; Agriculture; Individual and Collective Rights; Regional Planning; Commerce; Social Inclusiveness; Transport; Energy; The Environment; Sustainable Use of Natural Resources; the survival of local produce against a background of urban growth; Social and Economic Equity. In this sense, Valencia seeks to lead best management practices when it comes to: (a) fostering healthy food; (b) ensuring sustainable use of natural resources; (c) squaring urban growth with a thriving market for local produce; (d) fostering social and economic equity. All in all, the push for fairer, more ecological, rational food policies in urban areas drives change and enhances citizens' lives (AVL, 2017:5).

The institutional and media finishing touch to this scene-setting was the summit of Milan Pact signatories in October 2017. The event was attended by over three hundred mayors, associations, public administrations, companies, and universities supporting the Valencia Declaration (Milan Pact meeting, 2017).

Throughout the process, Valencia dug into its past and regional roots to come up with a story to fit The Milan Pact narrative. This was accompanied by demands that stressed some features at the expense of others, skating over or 'censuring' anything at odds with the storyline. The declaration of the city as the World Capital of Sustainable Food ties in with heritagisation, which in this case was applied to the traditional market-gardening system, and to the resulting landscape and local food and socio-cultural practices. As in any heritagisation process (Sánchez Carretero, 2012), the Declaration spawned its own paradoxes, contradictions and conflicts.

FRICTIONS AND PARADOXES OF THE WORLD CAPITAL OF SUSTAINABLE FOOD

One can identify two stages in the development of the 'Food Capital' angle driving heritagisation in Valencia.

1 Translator's note: So called because the coalition partners negotiated the political accords at the Nau, the former site of the University of Valencia campus and now a complex of municipal facilities.

The first stage spanned from 2016 to 2018, focusing on the Declaration and the implementation of the first steps. It covered a wealth of initiatives, with a spate of meetings, institutional summits, and stakeholder gatherings dealing with food management tools and processes. The media component also played a key role, highlighting strong commitment to the event.

At first glance, it might seem that the initiative was linked to the holding of 'mega-events' – a policy characterising Valencia's 'pork-barrel' politics and sleaze in the early 21st Century. Yet delving deeper and taking a broader time frame reveals a second stage starting in 2019, with two milestones in the consolidation of Valencia' position as the Capital of Food Sustainability. The first milestone was the setting up FAO's World Center for Sustainable Urban Food in Valencia (CEMAS) in 2019. The initiative is part of the trend in recent years to strengthen cities' role (and weakening that of Nation-States) in shaping Mankind's future (Sassen, 2015). The UN's Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), is leading a shift towards municipal governance of food and organic production policies. This is apparent in the CEMAS Mission Statement as stated on its website:

> The World Centre for Sustainable Urban Food is a joint initiative between Valencia City Council and the FAO, and its purpose is to identify, classify, disseminate and raise awareness of the major challenges facing cities in properly feeding their populations.

The second milestone was the restoration of the *Horta* Metropolitan Council [*Consell Metropolità de l'Horta*][2] in 2019. Although the Council currently wants to play a key role as a supra-municipal entity in dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic, it could also lead a transition to sustainable food and farming in metropolitan areas. Here, the institutionalisation of metropolitan initiatives is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for managing Valencia's market-gardening area as a single productive eco-system and thereby overcoming local administrative boundaries.

The Valencia Declaration has been accompanied by a lot of media ballyhoo and showmanship. Yet the Declaration has also served as an institutional and social watershed, driving policies fostering more sustainable production and consumption. However, the international agenda set for the Capital of Sustainable Food sits uneasily with the area's present approach to food production, creating friction. This is something that deserves critical analysis.

From the outset the storyline for Valencia was not spun around food itself despite the nature of the FAO declaration. Instead, it stressed the production system. Although food and production are intertwined, in the Valencian case the focus was on the productive aspects of market-gardening regardless of whether the output is ecologically based. Here, sustainable food and food practices were seen as necessary but secondary considerations. This contradiction reveals the first of Capitalism's paradoxes, which directly bear on public awareness policies and the principles of sustainable food.

The World Capital Declaration has launched a spate of initiatives to foster local consumption and vegetable-growing. From the institutional standpoint, there are several municipal strategies for putting The Milan Pact's principles into action (Valencia City Council, 2017). These involve setting up a whole network of entities and initiatives for shaping the first part of the process as well as the narrative on Valencia as the Capital of Food Sustainability. At its core lies the setting up of the Valencia City Council's Board for Agriculture, Sustainable Food, and Market-Gardening under the aegis of The Department for Agriculture, Market-Gardening, and Villages. Its aim is to raise the institutional profile of matters bearing on the sector. That said, the corporation's web site admits that the Board only has limited resources at its disposal. The Board's main role is to support 'sustainable food' initiatives arising from civil society, academia and the private sector. Other bodies and

2 To grasp the political conflict in the Horta Metropolitan Council, see Martín Cubas and Montiel (2011) and Farinós et al. (2018).

initiatives pulling in the same direction include: the long-standing Municipal Agriculture Council (CAM); 'Flights to Valencia'; the Local Observatory on Food Sustainability (OLSA) (2017), and the Municipal Food Council (CMA) (2017). Here one should note the CMA was set up through public consultation to decide how the Council should be governed. Valencia's Food Strategy 2025 (2018) also emerged from the same consultation process. One of the fruits of the alliance with civil society was the Horta Citizen Observatory (OCH) (2017). This was founded and is run by the *Per l'Horta* group, an association defending the importance of the market-gardening areas since 2001[3]. It was also in 2017 that the Valencia City Council joined the Ecological Agriculture Network of Cities, which brings together local entities, technical staff, and associations.

More direct initiatives have been taken in addition to purely institutional ones. For example, a big boost has been give to the city's traditional *Tira de Comptar* — basically a huge farmers' market — whose roots go back to the 12th Century when Valencia was under Arab sway. The initiative was undertaken in collaboration with *Mercavalència* [Valencia Produce Market]. Valencia's townsfolk thus have access to prime, fresh local produce at keen prices and can cut out the middlemen. Over the last few years, the City Council has done a great deal to promote the *Tira de Comptar*, driving its modernisation and highlighting its role through innovation projects such as *Las Naves 2020*[4]. An identifying label (APHORTA) was created for produce from Valencia's market-gardening area to win over consumers[5].

One might also mention events such as *De l'Horta a la Plaça* [From The Market Garden to The Town Square] and *Bonic/a Fest* [6][festival programme at municipal markets].

Without detracting from the positive impact of these events, it is worth asking whether such festivals merely titillate consumers with short-lived 'fun and leisure' offerings but fail to change their ingrained shopping habits. Here, the City Council shows little interest in public awareness campaigns to educate consumers and drive real change when it comes to food. There have been some efforts in this direction but they have been timid ones. Here, one can mention the 'Sustainability on a Plate' pilot project, trialled at three municipal schools by CERAI, a leading Valencian agro-ecology entity. The project ran from 2016 to 2017 and sought to "draw up a sustainable food strategy for school canteens". The outcome was a guide for use by such canteens (CERAI, 2021). Yet at the broader level, little has been done to educate the general public with a view to re-shaping consumers' eating habits.

Meanwhile, a small portion of the citizenry has either found or created its own forums for fostering learning and group awareness on the subject through associations, consumer groups, urban gardens, organic shops, and travelling markets (López García, 2011). Here, there is a confluence of ideas on sustainability, ecology, and climate change, and growing interest in responsible consumption, healthy lifestyles and quality of city life (Farinós *et al*., 2018). Such ideas had already begun to take root among the city's middle classes (whether financially or culturally defined), providing fertile ground for the declaration of Valencia as the world's Sustainable Food Capital.

That said, one should also note that the commitment to eco/organic produce may also clash with the

3 One should note that the web sites of some of these bodies and projects had not been brought up to date when this paper was written. We therefore have no way of knowing whether they have continued their activities.

4 ECOTIRA. Pilot Project for setting up an ecological purchasing centre at *Mercavalència* [Valencia's wholesale produce market], led by CERAI.

5 There is a lack of data on the selling and impact of products with this eco-label.

6 These events have been held annually since 2016 and have drawn large numbers, except in 2020 when the festival was cancelled because of the COVID-19 pandemic.

farming practices used in Valencia's market-gardening areas. Although the area has points in common with traditional farming approaches (focusing on local, seasonal produce), it is often hard to square with intensive farming catering to a generalist market. It seems that the approach focusing on ecological produce for self-consumption stems more from the labour and productivity crisis affecting Valencia's *Horta* than a quest for ecological sustainability. As some authors have noted, shifting from industrial farming systems to more eco-friendly ones and to organic produce is anything but easy. (López García *et al*., 2021: 3). In any event, the idea of turning the area into an ecological zone should be the stuff of future debates.

This economic dimension highlights the difficulties faced by the *Horta* market-gardening area, namely: a small-scale production system[7]; an elderly population; scant modernisation; little in the way of R&D and innovation (Farinós *et al*., 2018; *Pactem Nord*, 2018); failure to adapt to global markets and Capitalist practices. That said, public administrations and business are trying to make up lost ground, take generational replacement into account, and boost both the quality and reputation of the *Horta de València* brand[8]. Right now, there is a drive to modernise the *Horta*'s farming methods, and its distribution and marketing channels. The shift towards sustainability has begun with farmers in the *Horta* area (López García *et al*., 2021).

Against this background, one might ask what is driving Valencia's new-found status as the Capital of sustainable food. The answer may well be a shift away from a general market-gardening system and towards an ecological system combining protection and 'consumption' of the *Horta*'s heritage, stressing the area's special features. The 2019 FAO declaration of the area's centuries-old irrigation channels as part of Globally Important Agricultural Heritage Systems (GIAHS) should be seen in this light.

However the underlying issue is whether Valencia's status as World Food Sustainability Capital is really shaping a change in the food paradigm or is just a way of protecting the area. Here, one should note that there was a change in policy on the *Horta* following the 2015 municipal and regional elections. From then on, the institutions made a much greater commitment to conserving the area, with the Regional Plan for Valencia's Market-Gardening Area (2018). This change was marked by greater institutional commitment to conservation of the *Horta*, culminating in the Market-Garden Regional Plan (2018), the Market-Garden Development Plan (2019), and above all the Market-Garden Act (2018). These initiatives took a strongly protectionist approach and were accompanied by a spate of sectoral public policies covering economic, labour, cultural, and farming spheres. The policies have been accompanied by studies on the present state of the *Horta* and proposals for remedial action. Many of these initiatives helped lay the foundations to the declaration of Valencia as the World Capital of Sustainable Food. Yet several events over the last few years since Valencia won 'Capital' status reveal a political paradox that is one of the starkest and deepest contradictions found in the heritagisation process.

For Valencia, 2019 proved to be a frenetic year, marked as it was by: the widening of the V-21 highway; the passing of the *Aloraia* General Plan (PGE); the resurrection of the *Benimaclet Est* Integrated Action Programme (PAI); the debate on extending the northern section of the Port of Valencia; continued vacillation on the ZAL scheme [logistics park] in Southern Valencia. All in all, the welter of schemes and proposals fostered a kind of socio-political schizophrenia. The raging political debate revealed that much of the 'empowerment' and 'conservation' discourse was just so much hot air.

7 According to data from the Valencia Council Statistics Office, roughly 1.2% of the population of the City of Valencia work in agriculture, livestock farming, hunting, forestry, or fishing (Ajuntament de València, 2020).

8 At present there is only one Origin Label (D.O.) for produce from Valencia's Horta and that covers Valencian Chufa Nuts [*Xufa de València*]

Without going into current administrative bickering and power-grabs, the bottom line is that Valencia's *Horta* has led to fierce resistance, with each of the regional and municipal political parties drawing its own battle lines. The reason for such stiff resistance is that the future of market-gardening in Valencia is not a given, notwithstanding myriad planning regulations, Valencia's status as 'World Capital of Sustainable Food', or even government by parties traditionally defending such activities. It is little wonder that citizen campaigns to protect the market-gardening have sprung up under the *Salvem* banner ['Save It']. The same slogan was used back in the 1990s when property speculation changed the face of the city (Sorribes, 2001; Gómez Ferri, 2005; Cucó, 2009; Vizcaíno, 2012). Those earlier battles gave way to heritage-based discourses to defuse the conflict.

The most recent case of public activism sparked by this conflict is the battle to save the *Forn de Barraca* building in the *Alboraia* market-garden (Olmos, 2020). The old farm building, dating from 1906, was later pressed into use as a bakery. Its demolition as part of the V-21 Highway widening scheme poignantly symbolises the conservationists' defeat by those bent on 'progress'. During the 1990s property boom, the hegemonic discourse was one of untrammelled economic and urban growth to lay the foundations for a utopian future. Fast forwarding to today, the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis has cruelly revealed the fatal flaws of a city model based on major events, property speculation, and political graft. Despite greater awareness of the market-garden's importance from identity, environmental and food perspectives, the *Forn de Barraca* was levelled by the bulldozers. The building's disappearance shows the growing threat to an increasingly fractured market-gardening area despite all the lofty-sounding principles trumpeted during the proclamation of Valencia as the world's food Capital.

In addition, Alboraia's General Plan (PGE) (2019) sparked public protest by those seeking to save the market gardening area. Defence associations, such as *Alboraia, Horta i Litoral* and *Per l'Horta* heightened perceptions of a plot to build on the *Horta Nord* area. Likewise, the resurrection of the Benimaclet Plan, which would involve bulldozing traditional orchards and allotments (Boix *et al*., 2019), has set many associations and neighbourhoods on the warpath. The debate on the northern extension of The Port of Valencia still rages unabated and the fate of the scheme remains unclear. The dangers posed by global warming, the need to protect the area's heritage, and the quest for a sustainable model for tomorrow's cities are further strands in this new stage of public activism.

Finally, protests over plans for a Logistics Park [ZAL] in *Horta Sud* continue to simmer (Lafita, 2020). The plan began in the late 1990s, leading to the expropriation of the houses and farmland of over 200 families in the south of the market-gardening area. The plan was tackled in a halting, piecemeal fashion and has yet to be completed. The idea was broadly to cement over the area and turn it into a logistics zone serving the Port of Valencia. From the *Salvem la Punta* [late 90s campaign to conserve the *La Punta* market garden] to the current conflict over the ZAL, the area has been the worst affected by major infrastructure projects, and in particular from the works for diverting the course of the *Túria* river (Florin and Herrero, 2018; Vizcaíno *et al*., 2017). This tide of new development was only partially stemmed through the Herculean efforts of local folk and farmers.

While these wounds still fester, Valencia is wrapped up in its status as World Capital of Sustainable Food and is bent on persuading the outside world that it is wholly committed to preserving the *Horta* even though the facts suggest otherwise. The process surrounding the designation of Valencia's 'Food Capital' status has been fraught with contradictions. In this context, heritagisation has eased tensions and highlighted the market-gardening area's many benefits, whether in terms of production, consumption, or landscape conservation. Yet in using the *Horta* to highlight Valencia's 'Food Capital' role, it seems that the heritagisation angle has paid more attention to building identity than to conserving the farming

system itself. The discourse projects a whole set of almost mythical ideas on the *Horta,* appealing directly to many of Valencia's most dearly-held symbols of identity. The 'Food Capital' promotional video (Valencia City Council, 2017), the main PR weapon in Valencia's candidature, epitomises this media approach. Music and an over-the-top, almost 'epic' narrative are interspersed with loving images of a heritagised triad of the Valencian landscape: sea, the *Albufera* [a coastal wetland bordered by rice paddies], and the *Horta* [market-gardening area], with the last given pride of place. The landscape and labouring in the fields are idealised, hiding conflict and offering a sugary vision that dovetails with the heritage discourse. In this sacralisation, the *Horta* and its produce are presented as treasures to be conserved for generations as yet unborn, and the peasants as "humble but proud" workers of this latter-day miracle. Markets are passed off as wondrous "offerings" [in an almost quasi-religious sense]. The video thus pulls all the emotional strings and exploits every stereotype in the book.

The symbolic universe depicted in the video enshrines part of the City of Valencia's collective imaginary. Landscape is a key element in the construction of regionally-based identities. In Valencia's case, since the late 19th Century there has been broad consensus on what these 'identifying' landscape elements are, namely: the *Horta*; the *Albufera* wetland; the coastal rice paddies.

Over the last few decades, other parts of the city have also been promoted as symbolic areas — largely driven by new interests (especially property speculation), and new policies (mega-events and cultural buildings) driven by the onslaught of Neo-Liberalism (Santamarina and Del Mármol, 2017). These new drivers focus on the historic centre, overlooking the traditional landscape at best, and subjugating and destroying it at worst. Yet the market-gardening area lingers on in the popular imaginary albeit in a very sketchy way. This is the rub because at the social and institutional level, the *Horta* is treated as little more than a stage upon which to prance and pose. The area is little known by city-dwellers and visitors alike, and is threatened by powerful property development and other business interests.

In short, heritagisation played a key role in the declaration of Valencia as the World Capital of Sustainable Food, and whose effects are still being felt today. As is so often the case, heritagisation cuts both ways. On the one hand, it appeals to common spaces, mobilises the public and fosters a sense of belonging. On the other hand, it hides reality and the paradoxes, frictions and conflicts that are inherent in any process of heritagisation. In Valencia's case, these problems stem from market-gardening methods and the threats facing the *Horta*.

CONCLUSIONS

The declaration of Valencia as the World Capital of Sustainable Food has highlighted many of the paradoxes underlying the city's politics, economics, and identity. These paradoxes need to be seen against the background of long-lasting forces at work in Valencia.

This situation is compounded by two global contradictions that shed further light on the 'Food Capital' venture. First, the 'Food Capital' project has been approached in an administrative, non-ecosystemic fashion, focusing wholly on the city. This perspective means that the *Horta* is again being dealt with in a fragmentary fashion, with all of the limitations that implies. Second, the value set upon the local market-gardening area is determined from global premises — something that is all too common, adding insult to injury after decades of ignoring or even denying the cultural value of the *Horta* ecosystem.

This *top-down* process tends to blur the *Horta*'s problems regarding its denizens lives, farming practices, consumption and distribution patterns, property speculation/rezoning, and environmental degradation.

That said, there is still a ray of hope for the *Horta* given that public administrations may still do the right thing and meet social demands. The popularisation of sport and the building of sports facilities is an encouraging precedent in this regard. On these scores, Valencia has recognised the growing public interest in sports activities and in design and has acted accordingly, fostering thriving businesses in both spheres. Enlightened policies on Valencia's *Horta* might also be successful.

From our committed but critical position on these matters, we believe that the Social Sciences should not only shed light on the issues at stake but also reveal the extent to which public policy discourses and practices measure up to the problems. The heritagisation process stemming from the declaration of Valencia as 'the World Capital of Sustainable Food' reflects an ideological discourse on the need to restore and enhance Valencia's market-gardening area while taking into account the current global dynamics of food and environmental stewardship. Yet in our view, this requires deep reflection on just what Valencia's *Horta* represents and why we want it. It is a debate on which the Social Sciences have much to contribute.

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- Citations/References must appear in parentheses, including the surname of the author and year; for example, (Bourdieu, 2002).
- When the year of publication of two works by the same author coincide, distinguish them with lower case letters after the year; for example, (Bourdieu, 1989a).
- If there are two authors, their surnames should be joined by 'and': (Lapierre and Roueff, 2013); when there are more than two authors, the surname of the first author should be followed by 'et al.' (Bennet et al., 2005), although in the final bibliographic references must include all the authors.
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- **Two to five authors:** Rainie, L., and Wellman, B. (2012). *Networked: The New Social Operating System*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- **More than six authors:** Follow the first six authors by 'et al.' in the reference.

- **Journal article:**
  - **One author:** Hirsch, P. M. (1972). Processing fads and fashions: An organization-set analysis of cultural industry systems. *American Journal of Sociology*, *77*(4), 639-659.
  - **Two authors:** Bielby, W. T. and Bielby, D. D. (1999). Organizational mediation of project-based labor markets: Talent agencies and the careers of screenwriters. *American Sociological Review*, *64*(1), 64-85.
  - **Three to seven authors:** Dyson, E., Gilder, G., Keyworth, G., and Toffler, A. (1996). Cyberspace and the American dream: A magna carta for the knowledge age. *Information Society*, *12*(3), 295-308.
- **Book chapter**: DiMaggio, P. (1991). Social structure, institutions and cultural goods: The case of the United States. In P. Bourdieu, & J. Coleman, (ed.), *Social theory for a changing society* (pp. 133-166). Boulder: Westview Press.

  Pamphlets, monographs, manuals, and similar material are considered as books.
- **Internet references:**
  - **Online documents:** Raymond, E. S. (1999). *Homesteading the noosphere*. Accessed on the 15th of April 2017 at http://www.catb.org/~esr/writings/homesteading/homesteading/

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  - **Online journal articles:** Ros, M. (2017). La «no-wash protest» i les vagues de fam de les presoneres republicanes d'Armagh (nord d'Irlanda). Una qüestió de gènere. *Papers*, *102*(2), 373-393. Accessed on the 15th of April 2017 at http://papers.uab.cat/article/view/v102-n2-ros/2342-pdf-es
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