DEBATS

■ ## Special Issue
"Imagined Communities
in the 21st Century.
A Homage to Benedict
Anderson"

■ **Contributions** Craig Calhoun,
Albert Moncusí, Àlvar Peris, Mariano M.
Zamorano, Enric Castelló and Marc Sanjaume

■ ## Special Issue
"Culture and State: Creative
Autonomy, Political Struggle
and Instrumentalisation"

■ **Contributions** Vicent Dubois, Pierre-Michel Menger
and Juan Arturo Rubio-Arostegui *et al.*

■ ## Miscellaneous

DEBATS — **Journal on Culture, Power and Society**

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All of the papers in the Special Issue (Quadern) and in the section on research articles (Articles) have passed an initial editing check. A subsequent 'double-blind' examination is carried out by at least two academic reviewers specialising in the subject.

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New debates

Debats [Debates] journal was launched in 1982 by *Institució Alfons el Magnànim* [a regional umbrella organisation of Valencia's scientific and cultural institutions — IAM for short]. Back then, Spanish democracy was beginning to take its first steps after almost four decades of Fascist dictatorship. At the time, it was vital to strengthen democratic culture and to look to Europe to learn from its experience. *Debats* made notable contributions to both tasks. Without a doubt, it was a breath of fresh air in a society weaned on economic and intellectual autarky. One only needs to read the first issues to appreciate *Debats'* commitment to cultural renewal. The editorial in the very first issue was a statement of intent: "*Institució Alfons el Magnànim* provides a robust framework for serious research and it looks beyond Spain's borders with a serene yet critical gaze. The *Debats* journal seeks to reflect this approach to culture and knows no frontiers. It confounds those who would confine our concerns to the purely local level. We shall strive to deepen theoretical discussion, pooling information and fostering critical debate to gain more precise knowledge on social movements and phenomena in The Valencian Country, Spain, and in the wider world."

Debats has played a key role in achieving these aims and has become part of our cultural heritage. Its issues, together with books published by IAM, make up an important collection: over one thousand three hundred books and journals since 1982. This number is swelling by the day given that we have begun cataloguing our old collection (1947–1982). We want to make the most of this valuable heritage and to this end, we shall scan journal issues covering the period 1982–1995 and make these available to researchers and to the general public on our web site (indeed, *Debats* deserves a Special Issue of its own). Later on, we shall repeat the process for issues spanning the period 1995–2015.

Debats has been published without a break since 1982 and at the time of writing has reached one hundred and twenty nine issues. I should like to thank all those who have contributed to this continuity of thought and deed. I now present Issue 130, which contains much that is new but is written in the same critical spirit as hitherto. In fact, one of the journal's founding aims was also to "look at current

affairs". The new *Debats* journal shares this aim, placing emphasis on culture in its broadest sense — that is to say, bearing in mind links with politics and the economy. After all, such links make up what sociologists call 'societies'.

The aim is to ensure the new *Debats* publication has the rigour expected of a peer-reviewed Scientific Journal (with articles reviewed by anonymous experts in their fields). This should ensure that: (1) it will contribute to international scholarly debates at the highest levels; (2) its papers and articles will be indexed and highly-rated in leading databases. Yet we also aim to venture beyond university ivory towers to reach a wider public. While we run the risk of falling between two stools, we believe it is our duty to try to combine intellectual rigour and research with dissemination and public debate. IAM — now rechristened in homage to IVEI as *Institució Alfons el Magnànim-Centre Valencià d'Estudis i d'Investigació* [IAM-CVEI] — is part of a public administration and serves citizens by facilitating their legal access to culture in all its forms.

To achieve these ambitious aims, we have a new team: a new Director, a new Editorial Board, and a new Scientific Council that combine experience and drive. We hope our readers will value our efforts. The very first issue of *Debats* was mainly in Valencian [a regional variant of Catalan]. In successive issues, Valencian slowly faded out. This issue of *Debats* is in Valencian but we shall retain *Debats* in Spanish [Castilian]. We shall also publish an annual edition in English. If we wish the journal to have a reach beyond Spain yet still respect citizens' rights, there is no option but to take a multi-lingual approach. Furthermore, *Debats* has been given a new look by the Valencian designer, Juan Nava. Each issue has illustrations to make the publication more attractive to readers and to make a modest contribution to cultural creation.

The story continues. Societies are dynamic and we must observe them, reflect on them and think about them, and of course discuss them. Welcome to the new *Debats* journal for the 21st Century.

Vicent Flor
Director of Institució
Alfons el Magnànim

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Presentation of a Special Issue: "Imagined Communities in 21st century. Homage to Benedict Anderson"

Co-ordinated by
Joaquim Rius-Ulldemolins
UNIVERSITAT DE VALÈNCIA / INSTITUCIÓ ALFONS EL MAGNÀNIM

The Social Sciences and The Humanities often resort to metaphors to refer to complex phenomena that are hard to describe in words. These metaphors often evoke an image, making the idea more vivid in the reader's mind. Some of these metaphors become misleading or out-of-date but others help generations of thinkers and researchers ponder an every-changing social setting. One of these valuable metaphors is *imagined communities* — a term coined by Benedict Anderson. That is why it proved easy for the purposes of this Special Issue to find researchers who have used this metaphor in their work. These researchers come from different backgrounds and are drawn from different disciplines. Yet they have all used a term coined in the 20th Century to analyse diverse social and geographical dimensions, applying the metaphor to the 21st Century. Benedict Anderson's remarkable intellectual contribution deserves to be remembered, if only for the concept of *imagined communities*. This Special Issue pays homage to Anderson's work. His passing in December 2015 was very saddening.

The concept of *imagined communities* is not an empty shell (unlike many terms found in intellectual circles today, in which media-friendly catch-phrases abound). Anderson's superb book of the same name (currently translated into Valencian and Spanish) — plus other books and articles — centre on *the nation* as one of the defining features of modernity. Here, Marc Sanjaume's contribution springs to mind. He shows how nations are 'imagined', a term that does not mean invented or falsified (as is the case of a particularly virulent strain of Spanish nationalism that is passed off as 'State' patriotism). Sanjaume refers to other nationalisms in his paper. Anderson came up with a methodology that can be used in various geographical and historical contexts, such as the development of literature and a publishing industry as a tool for building a national 'imaginary'. His approach was highly innovative, opening a new path for research on the development of national maps as a novel, iconic way of representing political, economic and social organisation. It still holds sway today. Wide use is made of Anderson's methodology in Communication Studies, as Enrique Castellón shows us through the key role the media play in constructing national imaginaries.

Quadern, a Special Issue on Anderson's concept of *imagined communities*, opens with an article by Albert Moncusí: "Imagined Communities — Against the Tide? The Questioned Political Protection of Nationalisms". In this paper, the author discusses the case of the Cerdanya valley [in the Catalan Pyrenees, spanning the Franco-Spanish border]. Three dimensions of Anderson's concept are explored: (1) the nation's limits; (2) the

limits to sovereignty; (3) what Anderson calls 'the communion of strangers'. Moncusí highlights the fact that despite the emergence of alternative discourses, the nationalist [Nation State] grammar remains intact. The second paper in the Special Issue is by Àlvar Peris: "Imagining the Nation through Television Fiction: Memory, Proximity and Daily Life". The title is largely self-explanatory. The paper looks at TV's role in socialisation, shaping daily life, and at the same time, creating a sense of belonging. That is why television is now probably the most important channel for constructing and conveying national identities. The next paper — by Mariano Martin Zamorano — is titled "Imagined Community and Governance in Catalonia's Cultural Activities Abroad: Between Social Participation and Corporativism". Zamorano highlights the importance of the narrative of national cultural roots for the construction of imagined communities. The author also studies how cultural initiatives overseas become a powerful instrument for domestic national cohesion and the projection of *soft power* abroad. The Special Issue closes with a translation into Valencian of an article by Benedict Anderson: "Western Nationalism and Eastern Nationalism. Is there a difference that matters?" The text shows off Anderson's magnificent prose, erudition, critical faculties and deep analysis, which eschews 'old chestnuts' and facile criticism. Nationalism is characterised in the article as a structure of thought and deed that is widely shared throughout the world (and not only in Europe) and that has its positive sides (such as the Utopian ideas forging fraternal links and shared projects over the last few centuries).

The *Quadern* [Special Issue] also contains: two articles in the 'Viewpoint' section, one by Marc Sanjaume and one by Enric Castelló: Lorenz Khazaleh's interview of Benedict Anderson; and a fascinating foray into autobiography by Benedict Anderson [Selective Kinship: A Family History, with Omissions], here translated from English for the very first time. In passing, I would like to seize this presentation of the Special Issue to mention that our *Debats* [Debates] journal has received a major make-over and begins a new stage in its history. The new *Debats* will combine academic rigour and intellectual innovation, and foster debate on ideas in Valencian society. The new *Debats* journal has been given an attractive layout by Juan Nava and features suggestive illustrations by Luis Demano. This new graphic design highlights the content and we hope that this will make the journal interesting and attractive for both old and new readers of the journal.

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Joaquim Rius-Ulldemolins
Valencia, 2016

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The Importance of *Imagined Communities* – and *Benedict Anderson*

Craig Calhoun

LSE — LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

C.Calhoun@lse.ac.uk

ABSTRACT

Benedict Anderson's remarkable book *Imagined Communities* reshaped the study of nations and nationalism. Strikingly original, it broke with previous over-emphasis on the European continent and falsely polarized arguments as to whether nations were always already in existence or mere epiphenomena of modern states. *Imagined Communities* stimulated attention to the dynamics of socially and culturally organized imagination as processes at the heart of political culture, self-understanding and solidarity. This has an influence beyond the study of nationalism as a major innovation in understanding 'social imaginaries'. Anderson's approach, however, maintained strong emphases on material conditions that shape culture, and on institutions that facilitate its reproduction — from newspapers and novels to censuses, maps, and museums.

Keywords: *nation, nationalism, Anderson, social imaginaries*

Corresponding author: Craig Calhoun. Professor Craig Calhoun. Director of LSE. 1st floor, Columbia House. LSE, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE.

Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities* was published in 1983, giving a breath of fresh air to a discussion of nationalism that hadn't seen really major new ideas in at least a generation. Analysis was mired in old debates over primordial identities vs invented traditions, nationalism as cultural inheritance vs reflection of modern state-making, mere false consciousness vs powerful political factor. To the extent that each of these dichotomies posed a forced choice, Anderson took the side of the second. But more powerfully, Anderson subverted the dichotomies themselves, asking why newly made traditions should feel primordial, how modern state-making was able to produce a world in which cultural identities seemed powerful enough to be killed or kill for, and how constructed identities both rested on political economy and shaped social relations.

Even while affirming the historical novelty of nationalism, Anderson challenged the illusion that it was somehow simply an error. That illusion had roots

in the Enlightenment and wide reach in Marxism. It had long distorted political analyses. Anderson entered the debate in sympathy with an argument Tom Nairn (1977) had just offered. Nairn's positive point was that nationalist movements in Britain were not to be dismissed and indeed could be progressive. He was himself a Scottish Nationalist, and his point was partly a defense of republicanism both in the narrow sense of a challenge to monarchy and in the broader sense of rooting in a polity in an active and relatively equal citizenry. But Nairn also offered a critique of "classical Marxism's shallow or evasive treatment of the historical-political importance of nationalism in the widest sense" that captured Anderson's sympathy and imagination (2006).

Anderson tried to completely restart the discussion. He argued that nationalism had different historical origins (Spanish colonies in Latin America) than Eurocentric authors had suggested. He argued that nationalism should be compared to religious constructions of identity and community as much as to other political ideologies. He focused attention not on the normative-ideological question of whether nationalism was better than class consciousness but on the explanatory question of why communist countries might go to war with each other, understanding the conflict largely in nationalist terms. He asked how nationalism worked as a matter of symbol, social relationships, and categories of consciousness.

Above all, Anderson presented nationalism as a way of imagining and thereby creating community. The nation "is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship" (Anderson, 2006: 9). That this is in some regards an artificial imagining does not make it less powerful. The comradeship is felt, even if it is in tension with the inequalities and sectional divisions. And "ultimately, it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings." (Anderson, 2006: 7). This is what is symbolized in the tombs of Unknown

Soldiers — the identity of each with his fellows and his nation that takes priority over an individual name (Anderson, 2006: 9). National identities are indeed made — invented — but they are not for that reason simply false any more than any other act of creativity.

More than a few readers thought Anderson's title suggested a contrast of imagined to real communities, but it would be more accurate to say that Anderson thought all community had to be imagined — at least "all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these)." (Anderson, 2006: 6). What scholars must examine is not so much the truth or falsity of national imagining, but the different styles and forms in which nationhood is rendered, and the material and practical conditions for the production of national imagining.

This imagining of nations required new tools and forms of imagination — new imaginaries. Anderson himself did not use the term 'imaginaries', which was associated with the socio-psychoanalytic theorist Cornelius Castoriadis (1987). But his work had a major influence beyond the study of nationalism by informing the study of social imaginaries, institutionalized cultural ways of calling realities into being and constituting practices. Charles Taylor's influential account of how a distinctive set of social imaginaries constituted the modern was directly indebted to Anderson (Taylor, 2004; Gaonkar, 2002, Calhoun *et al.*, 2015).

For Anderson, the question was how community — or solidarity or identity or indeed society itself — was imagined and through this imagination given shape and solidity. Part of what he wanted to show was that nationalism and national identity had underpinnings in real material conditions. He introduced the idea of print capitalism, for example, to show how a specific form of capitalist enterprise supported the development of national languages and communication within them.

Reading the newspaper gave common news content to the discussions of a nation, but also a ritual demonstration of a kind of belonging. Each person who read the morning paper over tea or coffee could

imagine his countrymen doing the same (and it was initially a gendered imagining). Because publishing was organized as capitalist business, it had a drive behind it. Newspapers extended from early roots serving traders to wider popular circulation. And they produced a vernacular print language that distinguished bourgeois national solidarities from older aristocratic elites. "The pre-bourgeois ruling classes generated their cohesions in some sense outside language, or at least outside print-language" (Anderson, 2006: 76). The older forms of cohesion involved less imagining; they were concrete liaisons and linkages like strategic dynastic marriages. If there was an imagined whole behind this network it was aristocracy not nation.

This is part of what made the Iberian American colonies important demonstrations of the new form of community imagined through language. "In the Americas there was an almost complete isomorphism between the stretch of the various empires and that of heir vernaculars."[1] By contrast, empires in Europe were typically 'polyvernacular'. Making the various local vernaculars languages of states and politics came later in Europe, and the nationalism of the native speakers of the onetime official state language often came last. In the colonies, language provided a common milieu for collective imagining, but not always a demarcation. The distinctions came through further material foundations. Colonial officials inhabited specific administrative realms and moved about in circuits that made them agents of early national imagining. Eventual independence movements were typically not simply negative rebellions against empire, but positive assertions of concepts, models, and even blueprints for new societies. This sense of active project was important to national imaginaries. But it was not simply voluntary; it had material foundations.

In the colonies, nationalism had 'creole' origins. It was not simply the product of indigeneity. To be sure, nationalist ideology in the colonies sometimes claimed

— as it almost always did in Europe — that the nation was always already there before colonial intrusion. But Anderson showed how instead it was formed by the interaction among indigenes and migrants both forced and voluntary, and between officials and ordinary people.

Anderson's account of creole origins challenged the notion that nationalism grew in the West and was exported. It made European colonialism central, rather than the development of nation-states on the European continent. That neither was the whole story may be our conclusion today, but Anderson's strong argument was a much-needed tonic.[2] Much of the power of Anderson's analysis came from its own re-imagining of understandings of nationalism that had become taken for granted, almost doxic in Western discussions.

The central role Anderson ascribed to colonial administrators both foregrounded Europe's colonial projects and suggested an unanticipated consequence. It also discounted the notion that European intellectual elites created nationalism by creating vernacular literatures. Anderson agreed about the importance of literature, of course; it was the notion of indigenous self-creation that he doubted. Literature had its importance partly by means of introducing new kinds of narrative structures through novels the entwined many stories in a complex whole.

Alongside newspapers, novels were other cultural support for national identity produced and circulated by print capitalism. Again, Anderson concentrated not just on common content, but on form. Modern novels also relied on and reproduced vernacular language. In addition, they typically involved the entwining of

1 *Imagined Communities*, 77.

2 Anderson did not take up the complex place of subalterns in this story, in particular the place of 'natives' coopted into colonial rule. India might have informed his argument differently, as Partha Chatterjee suggested, arguing especially that modularity should not be exaggerated in a way that deprived multiple nationalisms of authentic agency and self-creation in their different historical contexts (Chatterjee, 1986).

multiple plot lines and thus modeling the situation of multiple biographies in national narratives. They did not just impart a message — though some did that by celebrating national heroes or national tragedies. They cultivated a way of imaging that in turn supported the integration of self and nation. This was neither arbitrary nor an illusion. It was a way of constituting the nation through shared imagination.

Nationalism was not a false consciousness of capitalism, but a reality — a socio-cultural formation — of its own produced by a key but previously neglected dimensions of capitalism. Print capitalism was a form of business enterprise that not only shaped and circulated culture, but a part of capitalist production. It helped produce the national units that throughout the history of capitalism have been basic to the organization and protection of capitalist business, exploitation, and defense of property and advantages.[3] Novels and newspapers were prime exemplars of the 'infrastructure' of national imaginaries in Anderson's original book, and both grew on the basis of print capitalism.

Perhaps the most remarkable demonstrations of the material underpinnings of imagination — culture — came in Anderson's discussion of census, map, and museum in the second edition of *Imagined Communities*. Each of these three instances, involved institutionalizing a bundle of artifacts and practices that shaped how identities, solidarities, boundaries, and relationships were imagined. The lines dividing pink and grey spaces on maps reinforced the idea that the face of the earth was naturally composed of countries; the rendering of internal geographies as at least interconnected if not integral spaces gave each of those countries a solidity. The very outline of national borders presented the nation mnemonically as a shape that could be reproduced on stamps and posters — and cocktail coasters — and both stand for the whole and anchor it in imagination. As a device for making the nation recognizable, it was infinitely reproducible — just like iconic photographs

of historic sites, perhaps even better. Censuses counted and categorized citizens (and sometimes denizens); they organized them into grids of occupational or religious or property-holding identities. They not only aided the administration of countries; they offered representations of the populations that facilitated imagining nations as organic wholes. Museums join censuses and maps as material organizations for the imagining and therefore production and reproduction of nations. They are both vehicles for representing nations to themselves and as means of situating nations amid other tokens of the same type. These could be arranged in evolutionary hierarchies or rendered more as equivalents. The smaller ethnicities or peoples within nations could be properly presented as components, just as the world's various nations could be the primary identities for locating the places where artifacts were found or artists nurtured.

Finally, Anderson complemented his numerous accounts of the social and material conditions for cultural imagination with a crucial recognition of the role of forgetting. Memory fits perhaps obviously in the series of ways in which national solidarity and identity are reproduced. Anderson was hardly the first to stress its importance. A whole industry of history and commemoration produces national memory — and gives more particular memories in a national frame. Schoolchildren learn their national story. Vacationers visit the sites of historical battles. But this is not all memory. As Anderson taught us, it is also forgetting. When English schoolchildren remember William the Conqueror as a great Founding Father of the English nation they crucially have to forget that William spoke no English and was precisely the conqueror of the English as well as the progenitor of a reimagined England (Anderson, 2006: 230).

Anderson's book became a classic in several disciplines. By training, Anderson is a political scientist and the influence of *Imagined Communities* was large in that field. It came, though, at a moment when comparative politics was being recast by rational choice analysis and other attempts to reduce context-specific theorizing and attention to culture in favor of more universalistic and often reductionistic

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3 Immanuel Wallerstein's analysis (2012) stresses the centrality of capitalism's organization on an increasingly global scale, but in relations among states — mostly national states.

models. Ironically, the field of international relations, in which a kind of instrumental realism had long held sway, was moving partly in the other direction, learning (increasingly after 9/11) to grasp the importance of cultural construction, the role of religion and the politics of identity, without sacrificing a hard-headed and mainly state-centered analytic approach. *Imagined Communities* informed the constructivist movement and also helped to correct for the overwhelming Eurocentrism of the field. Indeed, *Imagined Communities* also informed discussion in another branch of political science, the quasi-autonomous sub-discipline of political theory. Debates in political theory were caught for a quarter-century in a dispute between liberals and communitarians in which attempts to clarify what community meant loomed large. Anderson's book was centrally important to arguments like Charles Taylor's (2004) about the way in which community reflected shared social imaginaries.[4] Anderson's book became at least as important in sociology, anthropology, geography, literature, and history.

This impact on a range of disciplines is important to note because no discipline was the proximate source of Anderson's classic analysis. Rather, *Imagined Communities* was produced in dialog with two different and very important interdisciplinary fields. It was the product of area studies scholarship and Southeast Asian Studies in particular. And it was the product of Marxist analysis, especially as this flourished as an international, interdisciplinary field from the later 1950s through the early 1980s.

Anderson's book famously took its point of departure from war between Asian communist societies, war that according to theory should never have happened. But if this was a challenge to the dominant Marxist

dismissal of nationalism, it was framed nonetheless partially in Marxist categories, in response to questions that had dogged the international working class and postcolonial movements.

The early chapters of Anderson's book famously and controversially located roots to nationalism in Spanish colonial rule of Latin America. This was perhaps surprising for a specialist on Indonesia, to which the book would return at some length, but it is a reminder that area studies scholarship was never simply the sort of narrow particularism decried by its detractors. It was always a comparative enterprise, exploring similarities and differences among histories and contemporary configurations, and always concerned with connections among different parts of the world — whether because of the commonalities of colonialism, the connections formed by trade, or the contexts shaped by shared civilizations, trade, and ideas. Anderson's account of nationalism fits squarely in this tradition, emphasizing the "modularity" of the idea of nation once established. For Anderson, nationalism and national identity was less a matter of lineages and more of creativity, production and reproduction, and modularity.

Much of the importance of *Imagined Communities* — and of Benedict Anderson — has to do with intellectual innovations he offered in seeking to understand nations and nationalism. True to his Marxist roots, he examined in a way few had before the material conditions of production of national thinking. He made contributions to the tool-kit of cultural analysis that are important for a range of other questions. We might, for example, ask about the imaginative constitution of business corporations, curious creations of contracts, and state recognition, and popular acceptance. Corporations are imagined, not just 'concrete' in Anderson's expression.

But it is also the case that Anderson offered one of the most compelling arguments of his era as to why nationalism could not be consigned to the dustbin of history. "The reality is quite plain: the 'end of the era of

4 Use of the phrase "social imaginaries" has suggested to many readers a debt to Cornelius Castordiadis though in fact there is little link between Taylor and Castordiadis. Anderson is a more important and more proximate source for this theme in Taylor's thinking (filtered partly through a very productive reading and discussion group in the Center for Psychosocial Studies. Gaonkar (2002).

nationalism', so long prophesied, is not remotely in sight. Indeed, nation-ness is the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time (Anderson, 2006: 21).

Not every student of the subject was persuaded, but Anderson was right. Indeed, the years after the 1983 publication of *Imagined Communities* saw the flourishing of a wildly optimistic view of post-national globalization and cosmopolitanism. We have the advantage of hindsight in seeing that this ignored many of the reasons for the resurgent nationalism of our own day. Anderson not only warned against the naïve dismissal of nationalism, he reminded us that it offered a mixture of good with bad, real belonging with illusions of greater than real equality. He helped us make sense of a world in which nations are real and really matter.

Nations sometimes matter for bad reasons and in bad ways. They matter because people under pressure from globalization seek the reassurance of a local identity. They matter because people are convinced, often by demagogues, that outsiders are a threat, that migrants are stealing their jobs, or that foreign capitalists are undermining native businesses. But they matter also for good reasons. They matter because a sense of belonging together is basic to investments in shared institutions and social welfare. They matter because however problematic it currently is in practice, electoral democracy flourishes primarily in nation-states.

Anderson refused to prejudge the good and the bad of nations. He noted the importance of nationalism in both nasty wars and national liberation movements. What he analyzed was the protean power of a way of imagining life together different from a dynastic realm or a religious community but like each able to reorganize human relations in a range of different settings. Underestimating nations and nationalism is a mistake. So is universalizing or eternalizing them. Anderson gives us tools for a more nuanced understanding.

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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Craig Calhoun is an American Sociologist specialising in sociological theory and in nationalism. He was Director of the world-famed London School of Economics and Political Science between 2012 and 2016 and has had a long career in directing academic and scientific institutions. He is the author of numerous books and articles, particularly noteworthy ones being *Critical Social Theory* (published by Basil Blackwell in 1995), *Nations Matter: Culture, History, and the Cosmopolitan Dream* (published by Routledge in 2007) and *Nationalism* (published by Open University Press and University of Minnesota Press in 2001). This last book was translated into Valencian by the Afers publishing house in 2008.

Imagined communities against the tide?
The questioned political projection of nationalism[1]

Albert Moncusí Ferré
UNIVERSITAT DE VALÈNCIA

moncusi@uv.es
ORCID: 0000-0003-2604-4098

ABSTRACT
This article deals with the validity of Anderson's definition of imagined communities and the future of imagination typical of nationalism. It is based on bibliographic review and research on the case of Cerdanya. Three questions of Anderson's definition are revised: the limitation of the nation, its supposedly inherent sovereignty and the sense of community among unknown people. In this last point, the text focuses also on the consequences that imagined community is embodied for known people every day. It concludes that the production of local identities and dynamics in global, local and regional level represents a challenge for the political projection of imagined communities. Nevertheless, that production is not absolutely questioned. Denationalisation dynamics are produced in sovereignty and delimitation becomes more porous but it carries on the cultural production of community limits by education, army and communications. In addition, some global alternatives to national communities arise, but the nationalist grammar remains intact as a base of community categories and identifications.

Keywords: *Nation-state, culture, power, territory, globalisation, ethnicity*

This is a curious force in history: at the same time it is an illusion, a powerful affirmation of authority, a cultural artifact, a present absence and an absent presence, a principle of unity that masks institutional disjointedness. At bottom, the State has always been rooted in work-in-progress. There is no time or place in which the State has been fully realised (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2000: 323)

I lived in Puigcerdà, the capital of the Catalan and Franco-Spanish county of La Cerdanya, in the Pyrenees. I undertook an ethnographic study back then and

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during later visits. The purpose of the study was to see the impact on the county's residents of the Franco-Spanish border that runs through the valley[2] and the superimposition of the collective categories and identities they were invited to share. The magnificent study carried out by Peter Sahlins (1993) helped guide me. The by-line for my study was "The Construction of France and Spain in La Cerdanya", foreshadowing my thesis that the international border and its marches played a key role in the construction of the Nation-State. My study (Moncusí, 2005) revealed the continuity of a process that was deeply marked by wars in the first half of the Twentieth Century and the political, social and economic changes that came in their wake. Somewhat paradoxically, the implementation of the Schengen Accords heightened La Cerdanya residents' awareness of the border. Yet this was a paradox in appearance only for the process of building the EU had not involved any substantial transfer of sovereignty by Member States. This point had already been clearly demonstrated by various authors — Mann (1993), Connor (1994), Llobera (2003), who revealed the fears and suspicions of Member States. Furthermore, the process was felt in different ways on each side of the Franco-Spanish border as a result of historical vicissitudes, differences in political organisation, regional loyalties, and the civic and cultural links between population and State. One of the key comparative elements was the consolidation of a virtual Catalan State on the southern side of the border. Even so, the inhabitants of La Cerdanya showed considerable skill in exploiting the various cultural codes to turn the territorial division to their advantage.

I returned to La Cerdanya in December 2015. The first trans-national hospital in Europe had been set up near Puigcerdà's town pond and just a stone's throw from the Franco-Spanish border. The flags of Catalonia, the EU, France and Spain fly from the building. The hospital is jointly managed by the Catalan Government (60%) and the French State (40%). It opened its doors

in September 2014. My earlier work had revealed two difficulties that might arise in the project: the prejudices of French users and administrative problems.

During the defence of my doctoral thesis, one of the jury members — Dr. Joaquim Pais de Brito — asked me about death and its ritualisation in the county. I had not attended any burials and as a result my ethnographic studies had not shed any light on death rites in La Cerdanya. I recalled the question because another issue arose in connection with the dead during my last visit. What happens when a French or Spanish citizen dies on the other side of the border? Does having the border nearby help when repatriating the corpse or does it instead highlight the contradictions of living in a border area? Someone who worked at the hospital told me that the latter was the case. The hospital was built in Spanish territory, close to the border with France. Yet for a Frenchman who dies in the new hospital, the hundred yards or so that separate Puigcerdà and Bourg-Madame [La Guingueta] on each side of the border might just as well be the four thousand leagues that lie between Paris and Dunedin (New Zealand). That is because repatriation of a corpse is a bureaucratic nightmare.

This instance reveals that the Nation-State is still alive and kicking in a world that facilitates movement and has the potential for scrapping borders (Castells, 2000; Appadurai, 2001; Abèlés, 2008). The hospital puts La Cerdanya at the cutting edge of EU political construction, posing administrative challenges to the two Member States in making the EU relevant to their citizens' daily lives. When the hospital opened its doors, the Press echoed concerns about the need for specific procedures for repatriating corpses, police measures for interrogating suspects admitted to hospital, the registration of births and the administration of medicines (*El Periódico* newspaper, 5/09/2014; *La Vanguardia* newspaper, 19/09/2014). The hospital managers were called upon to adopt a practical approach to overcoming bureaucratic hurdles. Here, one should note that the inhabitants of La Cerdanya have a long history of grappling with Spain and France to allow cross-border movement and use of resources.

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2 Translator's Note: Prior to the Treaty of The Pyrenees (1659), Catalonia included Rosselló (Roussillion). The treaty sundered Catalonia along a new Franco-Spanish border running through The Pyrenees — a cause of bitter resentment to this day.

'Spain', 'France' and 'Catalonia' configure what Benedict Anderson termed "imagined communities", which the author defined as "inherently limited and sovereign" (2005: 24). Anderson considered that the members of an 'imagined community' feel the bonds of kinship even though they do not know one another. That said, under certain circumstances collective imagination may have shortcomings as a basis for a given notion of 'community'. The modern formula of Nation-State was built on this collective imagination that had cultural roots (often a common language) and political, social and economic articulation of the territory. That said, the institutional structure of the Nation-State is both unfinished and questioned. The construction of collective identities requires an effort in terms of cultural and social representation that has often flown in the face of cold reality (Pujadas, 1993; Hall, 2003). This conflict is particularly sharp in the case of national identities, given their abstract nature and how they link with the State's political engineering. 'Imagined communities' find themselves under stress in places such as La Cerdanya, where it seems the process of building a nationalist imagination goes against the tide. The purpose of this paper is to Anderson's premises to explore ways in which the collective imagination may turned into a dream that is rendered either more or less realisable. First, we tackle the limits to a nation's sovereignty and then discuss the bonds between strangers and the consequences of a community in which people still know one another. This leads to acknowledgment that Anderson's ideas apply to the production of local identities and fascinating conflicting global, regional and local dynamics.

THE LIMITATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY — CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

One can say that any community is imagined but in the case of a nation, such imagination is particularly plausible as an umbrella formula for the modern State. The script that binds together State and nation has guaranteed the durability of the political framework in the form of a hegemonic government. Nationalism was built on a useful ideology for maintaining order and was reinforced by the fact that it constituted both a political doctrine and the basis for identity (Guibernau, 2004). The issue lay in defining what 'order' meant, with the premise that whatever might happen should be subject to State control. The nation's survival coincided with State power and required obeying the Law and loyalty to the State's interests (Bauman, 2002). Under such conditions, the State institutionalised the 'imagined community' to furnish limits and sovereignty.

Biology and culture as challenges

With regard to limitation of the community, it was necessary to produce a State-sized society. This often involved the use of violence in sweeping away regional differences and identities and imposing a notion of State (Pérez Agote, 1993). Consolidation of a Nation-State depends on social consensus on the bonds forged. Nationalists think of the nation as a collective individual, a kind of super-organism with its own soul, history and destiny that renders it unique and that takes cultural form. The existence of the nation is considered by its subjects as something that is natural (Handler, 1984). It therefore gives rise to a process of mythification through natural history and institutional action that turns life into an 'imaginary' [here, the term is meant as a noun] because it is based "on the projection of the individual's life on a collective narrative framework, acknowledging traditions as the remnants of time out of mind" (Balibar, 1991: 93). The imaginary takes form in the aspirations and struggle of a people who have the State as a horizon. Shared norms, values and behaviour become key in this construction. As Balibar (1991) noted, an ethnic community is built on a race or language as defining elements.

In the 19th Century, the question of race was either explicitly or implicitly part of the discourse of European nationalisms and was considered the bedrock on which a national community should be based. Race remained a key factor until Nazism made people realise the appalling consequences of taking the idea to extremes (Geulen, 2007).

Post-war genetic research soon revealed the shaky foundations of racial classification schemes (Lalueza, 2002). Before that, laws on citizenship were based on blood ties, while national anthems were stuffed with naturalist metaphors (Comas d'Argemir, 1996). Institutional racism was practiced in keeping with that cultural racism (Wieviorka, 2009). Since then, Nation-States have shifted their engineering of national identity towards other criteria. Bourdieu (1985) and Gellner (1988) show that language not only came to play a special place as an instrument of group communication and cohesion but also helped articulate an internal market, communication with government and delimitation of a people.

In his conception of 'imagined communities', Anderson (2005) recalls that the limitation of a nation is linked to modern roots, such as: (1) the disappearance of Latin as the only written language and as the expression of absolute truth; (2) the belief that society owed its existence to a higher power enshrining the Laws of Nature; (3) that historical and cosmological time were one and the same. Scientific discoveries, political, social and economic changes, and the development of communications worked a transformation. Among these changes, Anderson highlights the role played by the printing press which, combined with Market Capitalism, quickly spread vernacular languages. The use of these languages in newspapers, literary works, operas, songs, dictionaries and the creation of Language Academies fostered national construction in various European countries. Similar processes took place in South Africa and Turkey. In the best cases (France and Great Britain), the illiteracy rate was 50%, and in the worst, 98% (Russia). Thus readers and consumers of this cultural output were former aristocrats, clergy, bourgeois industrialists, merchants and civil servants. The last of these made up a growing segment as the States they served also grew. Teaching the masses reading and writing helped spread populist nationalism. In parallel with these developments, an official nationalism was created by the ruling classes to legitimise their power as representatives of the nation (even though in many

cases the countries were monarchies). Sometimes the elites strengthened their position by exercising power over national education and the army to expand national sentiment (Hungary being a case in point). Others used opposition to a threatening minority (the case of Siam between 1910-14, which repressed the Chinese the State had earlier brought in as skilled workers and who were leading strikes).

The symbolic reproduction of the nation was made possible in the 20th Century (and in some cases, in the 19th Century) by censuses, ID documents, passports and maps, which represented the imaginary on paper. Schools, together with the printing press, spread a mythical view of history that ignored the fact that William the Conqueror — the supposed founder of England — did not speak English and that he conquered a people who would end up worshipping him. The official history also left out less glorious episodes, such as The Saint Bartholomew Night Massacre in France. Other episodes were 'doctored' for popular consumption — for example, The American War of Succession, which was really a war between 'pseudo-States'. A shared cultural world was also forged through the Press, internal migrations and military service, which fostered common beliefs, customs and values (Weber, 1976). In La Cerdanya, for instance, good communications contributed to nationalisation on the French side of the border in the first quarter of the 20th Century, notwithstanding the area's small, dispersed school system (Moncusí, 2005). In fact, France was much more successful than Spain in forging a sense of nationhood. While French efforts commanded a degree of civil support, Spain failed in its attempts to emulate the French model (Álvarez Junco, 2001). Furthermore, Spanish nationalism had a strong language-based ethnic component — especially during the Franco dictatorship (1939–1975) (Archilés, 2014), During Spain's Fascist dictatorship, the country's ethnic diversity was dismissed as folkloric regionalism. Spain, on the other hand, was vaunted by the regime as an unquestionable, indivisible unit (Saz, 2014). The Second Article of the 1978 Spanish Constitution kept this formula [at the Army's behest], stating "The indivisible nature of Spain as the country of all Spaniards". Indeed, some authors see The Spanish

Constitution as an ethnic discourse insofar as it attempts to dictate what constitutes national identity (Serrano, 2008).

There is also another cultural vector — what Billig (2006) terms "banal nationalism" and that constitutes a daily affirmation of nationhood through discourses, practices and symbolism. This includes things such as opening hours, language, ethos, and bureaucratic procedures — all things that affect citizens' daily lives and that are easily observable in border areas (Moncusí, 2005). In these areas, one sees a particular kind of cultural reaffirmation and acknowledgment when it comes to dealings with the police (Moncusí and Ruiz, 2002).

Globalisation means that people who live immersed in a national world can also be part of a global one and that a trans-national or world-spanning imaginary may arise (Appadurai, 2001). This cultural output and identification may question national identifications. However, the linguistic imaginary of a Nation-State is used by groups outside the country to imagine the nation. Language underpins wider, more abstract loyalties (with the exception of supra-national organisations — for example, NGOs and social movements). Such organisation have not replaced the nation (Appadurai, 2001). In this respect, the Nation-State continues to be a practical artifact for culturally constructing the Nation's bounds.

The transcendental dimension of the nation: rituals and traditions

National communities have been imagined as being delimited by biology and particularly by culture. However, their existence has also been underlined by rituals and traditions to which transcendental importance is attributed from time to time. Hobsbawm and Ranger (1988) show that nationalism manifests itself in the invention of traditions in the sense that these create a set of practices governed by explicitly or tacitly accepted rules, and a symbolic ritual that — through repetition — fosters certain values and rules of behaviour and imply continuity with the past. Unlike custom, tradition is taken to be unchanging, fostering a sense of community and

legitimising the power of the State. Tradition symbolises social cohesion and a sense of belonging to shared elements. These elements cover such things as flags, national anthems, dances, stories and language. Public scene-setting is particularly important. As Guibernau (1997) shows, this scene-setting is not the sole preserve of State nationalism but can also be used by nationalisms against the State.

Leaving aside the question whether these 'traditions' are artificial or not, they help forge links between a cultural group and the State. Indeed, traditionalism attempts to make the nation transcendental and set it on a pillar. Eriksen (1993) took a similar line in explaining the birth of Norwegian nationalism at the end of the 19th Century. The urban middle classes travelled to the country's remote valleys and mountains in a quest for the essence of Norwegian traditions. Elements of peasant culture were lauded as enshrining national culture after being re-interpreted and placed in an urban political context as part of an effort to show that 'Norway' was a world apart. The nationalist ideology argued that in the past, townsfolk and yokels had been part of the same group and distinct from the Swedes. Nationalism brought together rich and poor, workers and Capitalists. Up until the end of the 19th Century, Danish was the language in official use and carried the most prestige. In the early 20th Century, this was replaced by vernacular Norwegian, standardised from local dialects. It can therefore be said that the language was partially invented, becoming a symbol of cultural unity and a practical tool for the new Nation-State. The role played by folklore in nationalism towards the end of the 19th Century can be found in many other cases, as can be seen from Llobera's (1994) historical review. As Santamarina (2013) shows, the notion of Mankind's heritage in today's globalised world has supplanted the nationalist idea of 'heritage' yet is rooted in it. UNESCO has channelled this process with its 'Heritage of Mankind' initiatives in which States play a leading part but no longer the sole one.

One should also recall the ritual aspect of monuments and institutional commemorations as national representations of collective political bonds (Abélès, 2008). Police on the

streets and in border areas also play a role. As Moncusí and Ruiz (2002) showed, globalisation may lead to much freer movement across borders.

Rituals, traditions and monuments reveal the religious and civil nature of nationalism (Llobera, 1994), offering paths for mobilisation and social action that may lead to change or at least suggest it is possible. As Albert and Hernàndez (2011) showed, this may lead to either sharing of official political positions or to collective opposition to them. This is not only true of official commemorations but also of sports and festivals that strengthen community values, defining the nation and the role men and women play in its construction and reproduction. This is an aspect that is often forgotten in studies on nationalism (González, 2013).

Territorial sovereignty in question

The sovereignty of the modern Nation-State is eminently territorial. The State deploys forms of power and control over a territory, promising security to those it recognises as full citizens and maintains order within a legal framework (Bauman, 2002). That said, the sovereignty goes beyond jurisdiction to embrace culture and membership. That is because while the State's legitimacy and power is rooted in its territorial claims, the nation — or rather its citizens — produce and recognise other aspects such as language, race, and religion that are not necessarily rooted in the nation's territory (Appadurai, 1999). This last aspect rests on the community demarcation based on culture, biology and tradition and is what has best adapted to a global context whether through trans-national policies covering expatriate citizens, the political organisation of emigration, constitutional redefinitions that incorporate ethnic minorities and/or institutional racism and the expulsion of non-citizens. Here, the thrust of the State's actions is to maintain the nation's powers both at home and abroad. It is worth mentioning cases where sovereignty is questioned from within — for instance by independence movements. Nation-States may respond in various ways. Barring putting tanks on the streets, Nation-States may respond in one of two ways. The first is to provide democratic channels for

redefining territorial and/or political relations. The second is to use what might be termed 'Legal Fascism', using the Law (and especially the Constitution) to maintain the *status quo*. Here, the Constitution is treated as if it were an expression of an unchanging (and unchangeable) order of things (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2000).

Yet the financial and human flows stemming from globalisation have rendered the borders of Nation States much less meaningful. Both flows beg the question whether the modern Nation-State's territorial control is anything more than an elaborate fiction. At the same time, the world seems to be ever less organised on the basis of clearly-defined cultural and territorial units. National society is being replaced by a global one that does not have the State as its reference point. In parallel, sovereignty is fragmenting in ways that often reach far beyond the State (Beck, 1998). No Nation-State is self-sufficient in military, economic, cultural and social terms. Moreover, the very notion of such self-sufficiency in today's world is increasingly absurd. As a result, institutions are taking the place of Nation States and in so doing, forming a network of interrelationships whose actions are unpredictable (Bauman, 2002).

The contemporary Nation State faces global flows that relentlessly drive supra-national institutions and decentralisation. Furthermore, political control of the Media in a highly-globalised world is a mirage (Castells, 2000). Yet despite everything, politics is renationalising, with States stressing their sovereign right to control their borders (Sassen, 2001; De Lucas, 2015). The refugee crisis in Europe tragically reveals this process in the form of expulsions and the raising of barbed wire and walls. Here, one should note that barbed-wire fences have been around for some time now — for example, in Ceuta and Melilla [two Spanish enclaves on the North African coast]. The fact that the refugees are fleeing from war and Islamic fundamentalism makes the cruelty of 'Fortress Europe's' defences starker. Yet the policy of expulsions as part of deals struck with third countries and the use of force against those who want to cross borders

are nothing new. Draconian measures have been systematically applied over the last few years (De Lucas, 2015). One significant development is the implementation of 'outsourcing' of the control of migratory flows in third countries whether of origin or transit. This control involves the deployment of advanced technology and mobile controls. In addition, sovereignty has been redefined by the Schengen Accords with regard to readmission and the setting up of FRONTEX[3]. This co-operation leads to multi-national police operations of dubious legality and blurred jurisdiction. It is evidenced by the sub-contracting of policing duties (Casas-Cortés *et al.*, 2015).

While Nation States seem to have answers to migratory flows, the same cannot be said for control over monetary policies, financial markets and income redistribution. As Comaroff and Comaroff (2000) noted, many authors highlight the way market forces place the Nation State in crisis, driving capital and manpower flows that overwhelm a country's border controls. The Nation State cannot regulate either the market or employment and although it still has a role to play in neo-liberal Capitalism and globalisation, it can do little to shape the global economy. The State has lost its monopoly in monetary policy and its ability to tax citizens and corporations. Much falls outside the scope of the Nation State, with trans-national communities and social movements playing a key role, the universalisation of Law and Justice (with supra-national courts and arbitration), violence that spans borders and all kinds of organisation through the Internet. The globalisation of capital is the *sine qua non* for waning State sovereignty (Bauman, 2002).

The present economic crisis reveals some of the challenges facing the Nation State. Austerity measures and budget cuts have been imposed by supra-national entities. National sovereignty is now so straitjacketed

by multi-level governance that some might think the Nation State has become a basket case. In the EU, Member States often find their sovereignty questioned and thus seek to strengthen their position with nationalist arguments. The modern State is interlinked with regional and global spheres (Abélès, 2008). At the global level, power is being decentralised and the world's great cities are 'denationalising'. Paradoxically, the State takes an active role in legislative decisions at this level, creating a field in which public and private sectors intertwine. In this respect, sovereignty has become decentralised and denationalised, with companies and global financial markets calling the tune (Sassen, 2010). There are supra-national players that strongly influence local and trans-local spheres and that help build global imaginaries through non-State networks. This is the case of global cities, entities, corporations and NGOs, whose power comes at the expense of the State's formal monopoly of power within its borders. Cities in particular weave close-knit economic relationships that foster non-territorial loyalties based on projects that may even run counter to State policies (Sassen, 2004). New forms of networked governance take root, with a strategic redefinition of national scale in relation to local, regional and international scales. Cities and city-regions play a leading part in this process and try to strategically position themselves in capital-accumulation circles (Brenner, 2009). This protagonism by city-regions such as Catalonia (with Barcelona at its heart) and The Basque Country (with Bilbao as its base) fosters agreements among cities and with the private sector and supra-national entities (Calzada, 2015). Multinationals are also centres of power. According to Beck (1998), in 1997, 53% of the world's wealth came from such companies. A study reveals that five years ago, no less than 40% of the world's wealth was concentrated in just 147 multinationals (Vitali *et al.*, 2011). The main elites are transnational. Under these circumstances, States are relegated to the role of linesmen, watching the game from the sidelines and flagging foul play (Bauman, 2002). As a result, States no longer play the social role that hitherto legitimised their authority and with it, sovereignty (Sassen, 2010).

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3 Translator's Note: European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union.

STRANGERS AND KINSHIP

The kinship of strangers is a third feature that Anderson established to define 'imagined communities'. This means fostering a kind of harmony and across-the-board kinship with those belonging to the same nation and who have a certain loyalty towards the political entity it represents. We have already seen the importance of language, culture and the media in Anderson's theory. One can say that the construction of imagined communities has grown greatly. Appadurai (2001), for example, has shown that new communication technologies forge today's imagined communities, which now transcend the Nation State and the Press which (according to Anderson) helped shape it. Social networks broaden the scope of daily knowledge, helping spread values and discourses. As Abèlés (2008) suggests, Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) — especially networks — offer dense channels for strengthening the sense of belonging to an ethnic community in which the use of slang and jargon have boosted awareness of differences. Sassen (2010) recalls that trans-national affinities emerge at the fringes of global movements. From this point of view, community feelings reach far beyond borders. One could argue that this is where world citizenship or post-national citizenship is at home, fostering phenomena such as an international regime of Human Rights (Sassen, 2010), whose impact is boosted by social networks. That said, the hordes of refugees seeking succour casts grave doubts on how real such 'citizenship' is (Bauman, 2002).

Nationalism maintains its ability to represent imagined communities, in part thanks to new technologies. The kinship of strangers is still an option today. That said, the role played by acquaintances should not be underestimated. Associations, intellectuals, artists, workers, consumers, producers and people in general most interact with those whom they know. In principle, nationalism is an ideology and movement that is led by elites but that also has a mass following (Pérez Agote, 1993). This following arises through the posing of conscious demands and/or mindless daily reproduction of national categories, practices and discourses. Civil Society drives State-linked nationalism

whether through identification or through opposition (Llobera, 1994). Nationalism is expressed in both the real world and in the virtual one (social networks). While interacting players do not necessarily know one another, acquaintanceship may boost emotional identification. For example, in the case of Catalan Nationalism, the unfavourable judgment handed down by Spain's Constitutional Court on the 2010 Statute of Catalan Autonomy was a watershed in citizens political positioning, greatly broadening support for Catalan independence (Nagel, 2014). Many Catalans felt humiliated and frustrated by the judgment (Clua, 2014) and this found vocal expression at all levels — local, associations, and friends and family. After the judgment, the lone-star Catalan independence flag fluttered from street balconies and flag poles in many Catalan towns and villages, bringing new life to the movement. It is worth noting Castells' (2000) analysis of the boost given to Catalan nationalism even though his comments are made in the context of regeneration of the Spanish State. On this occasion, regeneration took the form of plans to improve economic, social and political prospects that sprang from citizen participation in the civic construction of a new country (Clua, 2014). Utopian plans were laid by civic and other groups in each town and village. Friends and family encouraged one another to turn out *en-masse* to well-organised demonstrations that have left their mark in the social media.

Nationalist feelings have been patent at the local, daily level in La Cerdanya for years. Transactions among subjects form the basis of collective identification processes, focusing on categories that organise interaction and society (Barth, 1969). In La Cerdanya, narratives and daily interactions have sustained a nationalist grammar and reproduced symbolic borders daily (Moncusí, 2005 and 2011). Daily interaction is key to building a sense of belonging that is not only based upon relationships but also on experience of governing bodies. This experience comes either directly through personal familiarity with red tape and bureaucrats or indirectly through the media. Furthermore, different paces of life and symbolic worlds are created as a result. These worlds are not necessarily at odds but they do

reveal ways in which the freedom of their denizens is clipped. As has been seen in other cases (for example, Castelló 2001), collective identities are based on plausible daily relations (for example, speaking only to those who share one's mother tongue).

The people of La Cerdanya are past-masters at slipping across the border whenever it suits them and at nagging the Spanish and French States to solve local issues. As a result, they now use paths between villages on both sides of the frontier, operate a municipal ski resort, regulate water use from an irrigation channel, and have set up and run a trans-border hospital. This was all made possible by demanding France and Spain review their sovereignty and act in consequence. This has sometimes spurred cultural, political, social and economic dynamics with nationalist overtones. Social and Cultural Anthropology shows that politics embraces the values binding a national group. This ensures that its members can maintain a shared organisation when it comes to the exercise of power and its ritualisation (Abèlés, 2008). Maintaining the imagined communities constituting nations means emotionally charging and conferring value on shared cultural elements. However, daily life requires reaching and maintaining agreement on what values are required to stay united. La Cerdanya is a case in point, revealing a fascinating blend of opposed and superimposed national feelings and the need for social organisation. There is daily affirmation of imagined communities and references to categories and national identities limiting freedom of action. While the two Nation States (France and Spain) have both left their mark on the valley, there have been plenty of difficulties and contradictions along the way. Oddly enough, this has ended up creating a border area with shared values.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
The delineation of the limits of nations as imagined communities continues through culture, rituals and traditions. Biology (in particular, births and descendants) is ever-present in the legal ordering of States through the definition of who are citizens

and who are not. One can say that the nationalist imagination and its emotional potential remain intact are reproduced in both real-world places and in networks through reaction to daily events. They are elements that Anderson highlighted in his seminal work. By contrast, the sovereignty he said was inherent in nations is today widely challenged by: the financial world; population mobility; government organisations; international bodies. The modern State as a formula for manifesting territorial sovereignty is being questioned. While the State still tries to impose control and make its power felt, this now involves other countries and foreign entities. How do Nation States meet these challenges to their sovereignty (1) within their borders (plans for secession); (2) beyond their borders (supra-national and corporate); (3) in the marches (frontier areas that require greater flexibility and/or greater vigilance)? In the first case, the main resort is to the Law (in particular The Constitution as a fetish), using the army [which, in Spain, has a predilection for *Coups d'État*], exerting international pressure, or even opening negotiations. In addition, the State also relies on strengthening national unity through rituals for the masses (in which Sport plays the leading role). These are formulas for appealing to a symbolic universe replete with transcendental values to bolster power and the illusion of the Nation State. Faced with external threats, the Nation State hinders the entry of foreigners (whether by fair means or foul) and has informal channels for granting citizenship to those who have put down roots in the country. The State may become a fetish to exorcise the evils of globalisation and internal rebellion as a way of wooing voters and national public opinion. It can also be used to paint a utopian future but given today's context in which neo-liberalism and Capitalism hold sway in the financial and policy-making fields, this is a tall order. In border areas such as La Cerdanya, one can see the role played by local populations in State policies and by Nation States in culturally engendering identities. Yet one can also observe the paradoxical role played by national categories in community organisation. Imagined communities have a bright future ahead of them but their limits and sources of inspiration are likely to change with the times.

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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Albert Moncusí Ferré was awarded a PhD in Social Anthropology by Universitat Rovira i Virgili (URV) and is a faculty member at the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology at Universitat de València (UV). He was Guest Researcher at Queen's University of Belfast, Laboratoire d'Anthropologie Urbaine (CNRS) and COMPAS (Oxford). Moncusí has conducted research on frontiers and national identities, ethnological heritage, migrations, and inter-ethnic co-existence.

Imagining the Nation through Television Fiction: Memory, Proximity and Daily Life

Àlvar Peris Blanes
UNIVERSITAT DE VALÈNCIA

Alvar.Peris@uv.es
ORCID: 0000-0002-2323-2766

ABSTRACT

This paper reflects on the importance of television (especially TV fiction) in the imaginary of Nations. With this end in view, we first look at the role played by television as an instrument of socialization, as well as its ability to consolidate and naturalise an imaginary based on the dissemination of various ideological representations of reality. Second, we explore the ritual function of television and its incarnation in daily life, routines, and the family setting of the broad masses. It is a dimension that studies on the nation and nationalism are increasingly taking into account as central factors in the process of national construction — especially regarding the fostering of a sense of belonging and in imagining an abstract community. Last but not least, we focus on television fiction because it makes up the lion's share of the programmes in most TV stations and is probably the most relevant narrative we can find in contemporary societies. Among the various discursive strategies shaping this definition of the nation, we examine the construction of the story of the nation's past and present (in which the stories are set within nationally-defined regions and spheres) and the tactical resort to cultural and linguistic proximity.

Keywords: *television, national building, ideology, daily life, TV fiction*

Corresponding author: Àlvar Peris Blanes. Universitat de València, Facultat de Filologia, Traducció i Comunicació, Departament de Teoria dels Llenguatges i Ciències de la Comunicació. Alvar.Peris@uv.es

INTRODUCTION

The media perspective has been part and parcel of studies on national phenomena for several years now (Özkirimli, 2005; Eley and Suny, 1996). However, this has not always been so. It is true that authors such as Karl Deutsch (1996), Ernest Gellner (2001) and Miroslav Hroch (2001) placed greater or lesser stress on communication in the construction and consolidation of the nation in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Nevertheless, it was the new approach adopted by Benedict Anderson — for which he coined the term 'imagined community' in the 1980s (1983) — that really changed the field. Anderson's insightful term revealed that nations are what they are thanks to a plethora of cultural, discursive and representational materials used in national management. These materials give collectives meaning and enable one to grasp their existence and the world they dwell in. These processes

are deployed in many directions, which depend on the orientation given by these materials. Understanding Nations as 'imagined communities' swept away the old paradigms, charting a new way forward. The term also facilitated new theoretical approaches to the concept of nation because, among other things, it acknowledged the nation as a narration. Indeed, this definition of the nation became influential some years later on (Bhabha, 1990). From this perspective, the nation is the result of a historical, contingent process and is merely the product of constantly shifting stories and discourses. It is not homogeneous and unchanging but rather is something that is in a constant state of flux. One might say that the media play a leading role in representing today's social world. If we accept this premise, it seems reasonable to argue that media discourse plays a key role in the contemporary configuration of nations. Indeed, some researchers — such as Schlesinger (1991) — go so far as to refer to nations as 'communicative entities'. Yet others openly speak of "mediatic nations".

Among the media, television's traits make it key in providing the elements with which people imagine Nations. These include: the use of the narrative strategies found in popular literature and folklore; elements of oral tradition; TV's role as a mass-consumption product that is part of the lives of many. Such things make it "a cultural practice more than simply a technology", in Raymond Williams' (2003) words. It is "the bard of modern times", as Fiske and Hartley (2003) would say. In the rest of the paper, we shall delve into the relationship between television and the construction of the imaginary of Nations. In doing so, we will stress television fiction because: it: is one of the major entertainment genres; commands the greatest loyalty among viewers; most contributes to consolidating certain discourses on and representations of national phenomena.

TELEVISION'S IDEOLOGY, MYTH AND RITUAL POWER
There can be no doubt that media culture has become the dominant culture today. It is an economic force for socialization, capable of replacing traditional institutions such as the school, church, the family, and even the State when it comes to generating thought, value and taste. In particular, it plays a key role in creating identification models. In this light, we can infer that the media plays a leading role in the formation of a society's and a collective's imaginary. According to Castoriadis, this imaginary goes beyond the purely psychoanalytical realm to allude to a set of symbolic networks, and a 'magma' of significant texts and daily practices that are not false (for they have not been invented out of thin air) but are not real either. This is because societies at any given point in their history decide what they are and what their place in the world is. Put another way, "we cannot understand a society without a unifying factor that gives it meaningful content and that is woven through symbolic structures" (Castoriadis, 2003a: 278). From this perspective, one of the main features of the social imaginary is that it means nothing and everything at the same time (Barthes, 1994). It lies in the realm of what is implicit, what is taken for granted, and the symbolic. As a result, social institutions are articulated as social actors, 'representing and expounding society', as Castoriadis puts it. The national phenomenon can also be understood in this way, that is to say, an imaginary meaning that is shared by society through a myriad of things that are collectively represented, reflected, regulated, and fêted as being 'national' (Castoriadis, 2003b: 317). Nations therefore become symbolic spheres (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 2002; Carey, 1998).

For Montserrat Guibernau (1997: 125–131), the use of symbols is a common strategy for forging awareness of belonging to a community. It is a signal of mutual recognition that distinguishes a national "us" from a foreign "them", tracing invisible frontiers that are cognitive in nature. At the symbolic level, national identity is something that makes us aware of belonging to a nation (Schlesinger, 2002: 36). The symbol cannot be deduced and is not natural. Rather, it is the result of a significant activity that remains implicit, enshrining the value that members of a community wanted to confer on it at a given moment. Symbols unite the population by using shared elements on the one hand, and by hiding or down-playing differences to the point where these disappear altogether. This is how nations

and the sense of belonging they engender have swept the board because they bring together people of different cultural and social origins. However, their success is not (nor cannot be) absolute. This is because in any society, there are people who do not feel represented by national symbols and choose to stay on its fringes. Yet others have been excluded during the building and modelling of national society. Furthermore, symbols (and the concept of the nation itself) are constantly evolving. This leads to their reinterpretation and even recreation to prevent them becoming merely decorative. meaningless stereotypes.

By contrast, if the symbols representing the nation remain static or are interpreted in a limited, unvarying way, they cease to be useful for mobilising national feeling among the masses. In such cases, symbols become little more than dusty relics. Guibernau (1997: 128) notes that symbols need to be refashioned for new contexts and for each age. He adds that new symbols also need to be found to maintain and boost national cohesion.

There is unanimous agreement that media discourse shapes symbolic material, nurturing the social imaginary of contemporary societies (Abril, 1997). Edgar Morin had an inkling of this in the mid-twentieth century, when he saw the imaginary as lying at the heart of the mass media scene (1962). This link has strengthened over the last few decades, with media culture now regulating most social relations. The media may also have a retroactive impact on imagined communities. This is because the media not only construct material on which the imaginary is based but disseminate it in an intensive fashion. In so doing, they turn the imaginary into a sphere that is highly charged with symbolic meaning. In particular, television is probably the most widely-used tool for managing collective awareness thanks to its ability to mobilize whole constellations of symbols and discourses on the national scene day in, day out.

Clearly, television's representation of this symbolic material is not neutral because it stems from a given view of reality. Put another way, when we represent

the world around us, we always have an angle from which we see things. In this respect, one can say that all representations are ideologically-tinted because they are necessarily based on personal interpretation. This subjectiveness can be seen in the selection of subjects for discussion, their protagonists and a host of other aspects. The set of symbols and representations of the nation shown on TV are similarly affected. That is because they depend on the vision given of one's Nation and of foreign ones. Indeed, here one of the most important questions concerns who or what has been included in this representation of the nation. By the same token, one also needs to ask who or what has been left out and why. From Foucault, we know that power is a social phenomenon found and exercised in all walks of life. It can be seen in the daily practices of individuals and institutions, and circulates through all levels of society and social relations. One can therefore say that a culture of representation is also a culture of power. In all likelihood, this means that the representations of the nation imposed by the various television channels in a given territory coincide with those of the dominant nation. This marginalises other nations and/or minority/ subordinated cultural identities or even renders them invisible. This circumstance obliges one to explore key concepts of critical theory following the re-readings made by Neo-Gramscian authors in British Cultural Studies (Hall, 2003, 1998). These key concepts include ideology and — above all — hegemony. One of the main features of hegemony is that it allows one to represent particular interests as collective ones, such that protesting against said interests is considered contrary to 'Common Sense' or 'abnormal'. Thus a whole set of symbols, values and beliefs that are deeply ideological can be taken for granted and banished from debate. The process is similar to the one where a symbol is transformed into a myth, defined by Roland Barthes as a historically-contingent semiological structure that naturalises ideologically-rooted notions. The myth does not attain this aim by hiding or avoiding reality. Rather, it achieves it by turning the semiotic process into an unchallenged fact such that texts cannot be interpreted in any other way (Barthes, 1994: 224–225). Barthes considered that in today's Culture

of the Masses (in which the mythological and national dimensions are heightened), nations find staunch allies in the media, which naturalise interpretations of national origins, symbols, traditions, heroes and heroines, and give them a sense of normality and authority at any given moment in history. Cinema has been and continues to be a powerful audio-visual tool for conveying national myths. Yet the very nature of television makes it especially good at naturalising ideological representations of reality and hence at coming up with new myths (Fiske and Hartley, 2003). Sometimes television is referred to as a 'shaman' (Dayan and Katz, 1995) because of its hypnotic, gregarious, 'tribal' gifts. Here, one can say that television today plays the role of the 'fireside storyteller' of yore.

'Ritual function' (Imbert, 2003; Fiske and Hartley, 2003; Kellner, 2002; Abril, 1997; Silverstone, 1996) furnishes the best explanation of television's co-operation with the 'symbolisation of order' (Abril, 1997: 159). According to Gonzalo Abril (1997: 172), ritual gives myth effect. Thus the myths (and oral narrations in general) of our culture constitute a cyclical ritual both at the 'story' level (what is told) and 'discourse' level (the telling). Both story and discourse legitimise and justify the myths. Myths thus take form through ritual processes, which in turn shape how myths are experienced and give meaning to our world. In doing so, these processes create a framework for both creating and maintaining an ideologically-rooted sense of security. In the first case, April (1997): 168) explains that from the cultural anthropological point of view, the ritual efficacy of television is based, among other things, on giving form, tempo and order to daily life. In addition, television takes pride of place in people's living rooms and hence in their daily rituals. This ritual function acquires special meaning from the perspective of socialisation and of obtaining normative consensus (especially on matters bearing on the 'nation'). In this respect, the importance of television lies not only in its remarkable capacity to ideologically represent the nation but also in the way it forms part of a daily, family cultural ritual. Precisely because it is part of the daily grind, it naturalises many of the nation's representations, discourses, traditions and symbols.

Hence the need to delve into the relationships between television, daily life, and national construction processes.

DAILY LIFE AND THE NATIONAL FAMILY OF VIEWERS
For some time now, studies on the nation and nationalism have begun to focus on the cultural forms found in daily life as one of the key factors in the process of National Construction. Here, special attention has been paid to the sense of belonging in an 'imagined community' and how this is consolidated (Eley and Suny, 2015: 81). The nation's building blocks are not only built official practices of an institutional nature but also the mundane experience and daily routines that mark our lives and forge links with others within shared frames of time and space. Eley and Suny argue that we are 'national' when we: vote; watch the Six o'clock News; follow national sport; see the repeated iconography of landscape and history in TV advertisements; lap up the visual references in films depicting the nation's daily life and politics (2015: 96).

Social order is one of the foundations of daily life. In general, people need to follow routines and traditions, and pursue myriad activities in organising their daily lives. Repetition and sequences foster confidence and stop us falling prey to the 'chaos' represented by uncertainty (Silverstone, 1996: 16–17)[1]. Above all, making life routine can also take collective form. The nation is strengthened through this collective desire to maintain a degree of social order. Here, the nation takes on a normative nature, symbolically enshrining daily practices and behaviour. The pace and routines of daily life are structured in temporal and spatial terms. Our decisions shape our daily lives but nobody would deny that external factors also

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1 De Certeau (1988) and others (Highmore, 2003; Lefebvre, 1991) have, by contrast, been more interested in highlighting how daily life is also a suitable sphere for creation, the disruption of order and appropriation. Without denying this possibility, we should like to stress the habits, routines and rituals that people perform in an unreflexive fashion and that have a gregarious, alienating component.

have a bearing on our behaviour. For example, both technology and the media shape our daily habits, as several authors have pointed out (Morley, 1996; Giddens, 1993). Television is the medium that most affects the lives of the masses throughout the world.

Clearly, television can mean different things to different people. Indeed, it can mean different things in the life of an individual or even different things at a given moment. For example, it may be the main source of: information; knowledge: entertainment; even sensationalism and titillation. This "Colonisation of the most basic levels of social reality" (Silverstone, 1996: 17) forces us to think very carefully about television and analyse it and from various angles. Television is deeply rooted in our daily lives. As Gérard Imbert (2003) puts it, "Television is a celebration of the ordinary". Political, economic, and social phenomena seen on TV are taken as facts. This makes television a powerful tool for ideological transfer that cannot be ignored or belittled. Here, TV gives us both the best and the worst of worlds, depending on the use we make of it. The way the nation is represented is also influenced by television. It therefore behoves us to examine such representations. Over time, television has become a central object in the symbolic and material universes of modern societies and has far-reaching affective and emotional implications.

 Over the years, first radio and then television have adjusted to major shifts in the daily routines of their audiences (Morley, 1996). Here, TV reception should be seen as a central routine because it is now an integral part of daily life. David Gauntlett and Annette Hill (1999) showed that the first thing many people do when they get home is to switch on the telly. Many watch a given programme while they have lunch or supper. Others forget TV when they break with their daily routine and become hooked once they go back to the daily grind. Clearly, not everyone has the same daily routine and viewing habits. Yet the link between the two is stronger than one might think. There are peak viewing hours too — with the biggest audiences in the evening. This is what the Americans call 'Prime Time'.

As a result, TV programming is based on most people's habits. However, many people also organize their daily lives depending on the programme schedule. In other words, there is a dynamic interaction between programming and viewers' fitting their habits to what is on 'the box'. This mainly happens because of the cyclical weekly scheduling of TV programmes. The schedule is then split into daily and hourly slots. While newspapers are published every morning and magazines every week or month, TV channels schedule their programmes at certain times of the day and/or on certain days. This schedule is repeated week in, week out, throughout the season. Thus on the one hand, the viewer knows everything about his favourite series, the weather bulletins, quiz shows and what is on the next day (as do hordes of other viewers). On the other hand, the serial, repetitive nature of television content turns viewing into a ritual, a habit that creates a sense of security, trust and proximity — one might almost say familiarity between the viewer and the TV broadcaster.

Some years ago, James Lull (1988) argued that cultures had their own "sense of time", which influenced the way TV was watched. As Carey wrote: "Nations do not only exist in historic time but also in media time" (1998: 44). One only needs to look at programme schedules to see how these vary between countries, even within The European Union. In Spain, Prime Time is more or less between 9–10 p.m. and Midnight. This is when the late-night news and the star product of the day (be it a fiction series, a film or other entertainment programme) is broadcast. By contrast, The United Kingdom's Prime Time begins between 6 p.m. and 7 p.m., which is when people have supper. Viewer behaviour patterns vary in other parts of the world, for example in Japan and India. This 'national synchronisation' has been commented on by Tim Edensor (2015, 2002), who reveals patterns that are more important than one might think.

At the same time — as Gauntlett and Hill (1999: 129) argue — television routines are the embryo of many social relations. Many viewers consume certain TV products, especially fiction series and 'reality'

shows. They then talk about these to their workmates, classmates, friends and family about what happened in the episode shown that day or week. However, this viewing also helps drive conversations of a social, political or moral nature, strengthening individuals' commitment to their own nation. Television has no rival when it comes to building collective imaginaries that people can recognise and identify with. Despite the advent of new digital devices and the Internet, no other medium can speak to so many people at the same time as television. In fact, potentially all members of a nation can watch the same programme at the same time, allowing citizens to imagine themselves as a whole. These 'sacred, daily rituals of belonging', in which the national sphere enters the private one leads to what David Morley (2000: 107) calls the "national community of viewers". However, this nationalising process (as with others) creates tensions and resistance.

This issue directly takes us to what is familiar and predictable — categories that are equally part of the nation's daily life. According to Morley (2000: 3), the articulation of the 'domestic family within the 'symbolic family' (here, 'the nation') is heavily influenced by the media and communication technologies. That is why it is worth tying micro-structural analyses on households, families (and the domestic realm in general) in with contemporary debates on the macro-nature of the nation and cultural identities. The 'household' has often been considered a field in which memory (and hence identity) play an important part. This identity can express solidarity and unity or aloofness and lack of integration. In an age of 'de-territorialised globalisation' (Giddens, 2000), such notions are in a state of continual flux. The movement of people from one land to another for whatever reason (whether from free will or under duress) is changing what we think of as 'home'. In any case, the media (especially television) play a key role in the home. Despite everything, the home still has powerful connotations of welfare and safety.

The fact that the television set usually occupies pride of place in people's living rooms shows that 'watching the box' is an important household ritual. Little by little, the television set has become a symbolic object in the home. While other bits of household technology also have symbolic meanings, 'the telly' is special. The TV set has almost become a 'totem'. It is generally given prominence in a leisure area of the home (usually the living room). Indeed, the distribution of the living room furniture is usually dictated by where the TV is placed. This is why the television has become a key contemporary reference point in homes and a consumer status symbol on a par with the car, fridge and washing machine (Hartley, 2000). As Morley (2008: 232) again notes, television has become a fetish, given an ethereal, almost magic meaning, capable of drawing one's attention even when it is switched off. This kind of veneration has been watered down over the last few years given that many households now have more than one TV set. Nowadays, almost every member of the family has his or her own TV set. This means the telly has penetrated into places that were formerly unthinkable — such as bedrooms. This, among other things, has utterly changed the way people watch TV. In the past, it was watched in family as a highly social activity whereas today, many people watch it on their own. This social change has been boosted by technology (for instance, by smartphones and tablets). At the same time, television continues to be part of the home. Thus one might watch certain programmes, channels or presenters with certain people to give one a feeling of 'being at home' in the national sense.

Television has therefore become a basic element of the family system. One should note that 'the family' has often been used to metaphorically refer to the nation. One might therefore say that the nation's imaginary as a 'big family' takes form through television (among other symbols), which acts as a mediating nexus. In this sense, television links home life to the collective life of the nation. Naturally, when television brings the outside world into the home, it may also destabilise this imagined nation or at the very least, make it more complex and harder to pin down. In any event, most TV representations orient social relations, and

cultural and linguistic frameworks. The spatial and time perceptions in these representations basically continue to be national ones. One of the most powerful weapons for engendering a feeling of a fictitious 'national us' is to incorporate ideological elements on the nation in those programmes that are watched daily. This makes those elements appear normal and a matter of 'common sense'. 'Banal Nationalism' — Michael Billig (2006) — or "Daily Nationalism — Edensor (2002) — take on special meaning in television fiction. Such entertainment may appear innocent and seem to have little to do with forming identities and even less with the nation. Yet the truth is that such television fantasies have been shown to have enormous impact on both the building and dissemination of national projects.

NATION AND TELEVISION FICTION

Fiction is one of the main television genres, forming the backbone of TV network schedules around the world. This applies to both generalist and specialist channels. As Manuel Palacio states, "From the very beginnings of television, fiction has been one of the key elements for social and cultural legitimisation of the medium" (2001: 143). In general, TV fiction builds huge audiences, giving networks a great deal of social and financial clout. Fiction series are at the heart of a network's production and marketing strategies and are a key to its audience positioning. Indeed, networks bet so heavily on TV fiction that they only broadcast it to Prime Time audiences. The fiction format determines when a programme is broadcast. The programme may be a daily one (the case of soap operas and series), a weekly one (as in the case of most series) or one-offs and 'specials'. Going beyond the importance of daily serials in building a national imaginary, Dayan and Katz (1995) argue the importance of TV events in national construction. Furthermore, television fiction creates both an industry and a market. Networks outsource their production, helping to build a home audio-visual sector. TV fiction is often sold abroad (sometimes with foreign viewers in mind), greatly boosting

profits and yielding cultural 'benefits' by helping to project the nation in a given way overseas.

In any event, if there is one reason why television fiction has such a big impact on contemporary culture, it lies in the remarkable way it configures the public sphere and the collective and national imaginary. This is so because the very nature of the medium means that TV plays a 'story-telling' role (Tous, 2010). We agree with Milly Buonanno that TV fiction is "The most important narrative corpus of our time and maybe of all time" (1999: 59). In this respect, we do not share the post-modernist vision of the demise of the great narratives, at least with regard to the nation. In our view, the establishment of narrative models and canonic myths in the culture of the masses (especially in their most popular versions) turns TV fiction into a decisive sphere for formulating the kind of nation that will end up being the hegemonic one. Very little has been written on the link between television fiction and the construction of the national imaginary. Given the evident importance of this topic, we find this dearth of material wholly unjustifiable (Peris Blanes, 2015, 2012; Rueda Laffond, 2014, 2011; Rueda Laffond and Galán Fajardo, 2014; Galán Fajardo and Rueda Laffond, 2013; Castelló, 2010, 2007; Castelló, O'Donnell and Dhoest, 2009; López, Cueto Asín and George Jr., 2009; Dhoest, 2009; Rueda Laffond and Coronado Ruiz, 2009, Buonanno, 2009).

In many of these studies, a link is made between the main narrative strategies and themes used by TV fiction to imagine the nation. These are summarised below. First, there is TV's ability to churn out fiction that employs a sentimental, public discourse on the past, replete with photogenic landscapes and hammed historical figures. The end result is soap opera on the nation's present for consumption by a broad audience. Second, TV fiction puts the action in a given, well-defined space that lies within the national borders. Third and last, the kind of representation of a nation's cultural and linguistic traits speaks volumes on the national imaginary. All these features reveal the importance of grappling

with the concepts of 'nation' and 'national identity' through TV fiction.

Practices concerning memory and mythology of the present

Historical fiction is one of the most prolific fields when it comes to building a national imaginary. The reason lies in such fiction's ability to weave tales that serve up the temporal continuities the nation wants. This idea is expressed by 'media memory' — a term defined by various authors (Rueda Laffond and Coronado Ruiz, 2016: 8). The concept is an ambiguous, many-faceted one that stresses the way the present weighs heavily in representing the past. The stress on the present not only shows up in anachronisms but also arises from a mish-mash of factors influencing the configuration, circulation, and (mis) appropriation of myths, symbols and traditions for use in the present. This public discourse on the past, whether it be critical or legitimising, forms part of the politics of memory in which television (especially TV fiction) plays a key mediating role. It is a deeply controversial issue because political and ideological interests are at work that usually bear on the national imaginary.

During the Franco Dictatorship in Spain, the focus was always on ensuring that TV fiction never questioned the regime's nationalist interpretation of history. That is why Spanish TV fiction stressed the adaptation of literary classics that did not rock the boat and that were similar to what was being turned out by other European TV networks at the time. In any case, the symbolic national universe peddled from the neo-Fascist beginnings of the dictatorship proved so powerful that much of it survived General Franco's death. With the transition to democracy, TV fiction had to adapt to a new political and social context with the creation of new national cultural myths that were in keeping with democratic discourse. This was the case of *Curro Jiménez* (TVE, 1977–1978/1981). The Spanish series depicted a man of Order, with a moderate political and social discourse that enshrined a "patriotism without politics" or a "national populism" (García de Castro, 2002: 83) that Spain's rulers were keen to put across at the time. The attempt to get to grips with Spain's bloody not-so-distant past seems to have been renewed in recent years with the heated debate on the territorial model of the

Spanish State and far-reaching legislative changes (for instance, the Historical Memory Act). Among other series produced in this context were: *La Señora* (TVE, 2008–2010) and the follow-on *14 de abril. La República* (TVE, 2011), with were set in 1920s and 1930s Spain; the soap opera *Amar en tiempos revueltos* (TVE, 2005–2012), a long-running series covering the period of grinding poverty and political repression following The Spanish Civil War (1936–9); *Águila Roja* (TVE, 2009–2016), focusing on Spain's Golden Age; *Hispania* (Antena 3, 2010–2012), covering Iberic Celt Viriat's struggle against The Roman Empire. These are some of the most mythifying episodes of the official, popular memory in creating a common past for the Spanish nation.

The first series was based on Queen Isabel of Castile and her grandson. Its historiographic and political treatment followed the 'official' (or 'Castilian') version of Spain's history, with Isabel and crew being depicted as the founders of what would later become today's Spanish State. Specifically, the Isabel series (which dragged on for three seasons) banged away at the idea that the union of the kingdoms of Castile and Aragon was "a good thing" because it saw off Catalonia's bid to manage its own affairs. The 'message' of a strong, united, imperial Spain running through the series *Carlos V. Emperador* also seemed intended as a dreadful warning to those living in the less-than-glorious present. In general, these television fiction series allow one to imagine a national link that remains unchanging. A particularly significant case here is the *El Ministerio del Tiempo* (TVE, 2015–present) series. This is one of the big surprises sprung by Spanish State Television. It features a team of bureaucrats (the country has more than most) who belong to different periods of Spain's history and whose job is to make sure that no changes are made to (Spanish) history as we know it. The Ministry has a labyrinth of tunnels that link the present to any period in the past. It as if 'being Spanish' were a natural condition of those living in this territory over the millennia (Rueda Laffond and Coronado Ruiz, 2016).

In addition, there are TV fiction series that are based in the present and which provide a "popular historiography of national daily life" (Buonanno, 1999: 267). A first

group comprises series dealing with social customs. These productions create an immediate ideological discourse on events in daily life. They therefore focus on the affective, family aspects of the home as an imaginary place projecting a vision of the nation (Medina, 2008; Huerta Floriano and Sangro Colón, 2007). A paradigmatic example of these folksy series giving form to the national imaginary during the dictatorship was *Crónicas de un pueblo* (TVE, 1971–1974). During the 1980s, a fair number of series were produced that sought viewer identification through the realism of their characters and situations. These series provided the first representation of the social changes in Spain at the time. One of the best-remembered ones was undoubtedly *Verano azul* (TVE, 1981), considered the first Spanish family series reflecting the customs and values of the period. Others were *Las chicas de hoy en día* (TVE, 1990) and *La mujer de tu vida* (TVE, 1991–1992), which represented the democratising, modernising spirit of the period. This new kind of TV fiction sought to legitimise the 1978 Spanish Constitution as a foundational myth and the new social and collective imaginary. This trend was consolidated with the arrival of private TV stations in the early 1990s, with series such as *Farmacia de Guardia* (Antena 3, 1991–1995) and above all, *Médico de familia* (Telecinco, 1995–1999) — a series that was hugely popular and that forever changed the way Spanish networks created TV fiction.

A second group of fiction series tried to portray daily life in a more realistic way — warts and all — avoiding the sugary vision conveyed by other productions (Castelló, 2007: 108–109). Here, one can speak of realism rather than the folksiness often found in comedies, family series and historic series. In general, these 'realistic' fiction series are confined to one genre and they commonly reflect professional spheres (such as policing, the medical profession, journalism). In the Spanish case, these themes were adapted from American fiction series. Examples here are *Turno de oficio* (TVE, 1986), set in a Law Firm, and *Brigada Central* (TVE, 1989–1990, 1992), which follows events in a police station.

Then came *El comisario* (Telecinco, 1999–2009) and *Hospital Central* (Telecinco, 2000–2012), one of the longest-lasting series and that was most in touch with

what was happening on the street. Their purpose was to instil citizens with certain values and attitudes regarding a wide range of issues, conflicts and topics of public debate in a rapidly-changing society. Thus these series covered issues such as immigration, rising drug abuse among the young, criminal gangs, abortion, euthanasia, religion, incurable diseases such as AIDS and cancer. In doing so, they provided media guides on what the nation should be thinking and doing.

The nation's spheres and territories
According to Edensor (2015), people's feeling of belonging to a nation is strongly conditioned by spatial dimensions, both in terms of symbolic landscapes and famous places on the one hand, and in more mundane contexts on the other (daily places such as streets, shopping centres, public buildings and so forth). Naturally, this does not mean that these places remain unaltered but rather (as with culture), they are in state of flux, changing as the world does. We do not share the views of those scholars who consider that TV treats space in a 'de-territorialised' fashion, robbing places of their symbolic meaning so that they no longer act as identity markers (Imbert, 2008: 83–84). We accept that home interiors have become more homogeneous and globalised over the last few years. The same process can be seen in other areas such as bars and cafeterias (in the 'IKEA style', as Gérard Imbert puts it), which have acquired new meanings as places of socialisation. Yet nobody can deny that the concierge's room in *Aquí no hay quien viva* (Antena 3, 2003–2006) or the mansion in *Downton Abbey* (ITV, 2010–2015) are spaces that refer to the Spanish and the British imaginary, respectively. In any case, the territorial representation of a nation is not limited to interiors. City and regional locations are also liberally used to show us the setting to enrich the many local references that pepper the dialogue and crop up in the characters' deeds and travels. Enric Castelló (2007: 162) explains that one of the purposes of exterior shots is to show viewers what the nation is like.

If one takes Spanish television fiction as an example, one can quickly see that Madrid plays an overwhelming central role in both family and historic series (Rueda

Laffond and Coronado Ruiz, 2016). This presence may be more implicit (given that sitcoms have virtually no exterior shots) or more evident (for example in series in which Madrid is simply another member of the cast). It is highly likely that most Spanish producers of fiction are based in the Capital but this is a lame excuse for having Madrid hog the limelight if the aim is to integrate the whole of society in the same national project. The British, for example, have long grasped that one cannot set all fiction series in London. Both public and private channels make an effort to place their stories in other cities and areas of the country. The series *Coronation Street* (ITV, 1960–present), for instance, told the story of a working-class district of Manchester — a city thousands of viewers visit each year to discover the streets that inspired the series. TV3 [the Catalan Public Broadcasting Corporation] also makes an effort to set its series in various parts of Catalonia so that nobody feels left out. This explains why groups have citizens have not complained that Barcelona is over-represented (Castelló, 2007: 163–164) — something that shows that it is no easy task to decide what represents the nation. That said, there are signs that Spanish TV fiction is slowly getting the message. For example, over the last few years there have been series such as *El Príncipe* (Telecinco, 2014–2016), set in a district of Ceuta, and *Mar de plástico* (Antena 3, 2015–present), set in the market gardening area of Almeria. Some other series have also opted for a wider geographical representation of Spain.

Rueda Laffond (2011: 27) argues that spatial representation in historical fiction should not be evaluated purely on the basis of sets or locations where the action occurs. He believes that the narratives and metaphors explaining certain events and collective processes also need to be weighed in the balance. Here, TV fiction evokes historic locations as frameworks into which myriad symbols are stuffed (often in a way similar to that found in fairytales). Series such as Isabel and *Cuéntame cómo pasó* (TVE, 2001–present) are good examples of this. Laffond maintains that the 'historic areas' proposed by the media story-telling become 'exceptional' locations because of their protagonism, allowing past events

to be selectively treated from the standpoint (or bias) of the present (Rueda Laffond, 2011: 30). The author sees these TV representations of historic locations as a "geography of memory" that plays a decisive role in configuring hegemonic meanings of the past. Once again, Madrid is at centre stage in political and memory terms, in which attempts to 'fix' the national history (in more than one sense) has long been a theme in Castile's age-old obsession with centralisation. Another notable aspect in this televisual "geography of memory" is invocation of the national spirit, which has even been reflected in the title of some TV productions (Mikos, 2009). This is the case of Hispania, whose story is that of the struggle against a foreign invader, and *Plaza España* (TVE, 2011), a sitcom full of stereotypes, set in a Castilian village during The Spanish Civil War.

At the same time, spatial location can also be linked to the trotting out of stereotypes based on proximity strategies and materials recognised by viewers. The inclusion of ordinary, daily areas in the historical narrative makes it easier to deploy and condense broad-spectrum appeals to community consensus based on supposed national affinities and differences. Here, one can employ Rueda Laffond's (2011: 37) idea of "ordinary common ground" in the representation of the daily aspect of historic space . In this case, the series *Amar en tiempos revueltos* is interesting because it takes place in an imaginary Madrid square that "has played a dramatic, historic role in symbolising ordinary Spanish folk as a whole" (Rueda Laffond, 2011: 32). The representation of the home as the centre of the action is a defining characteristic of series such as *Cuéntame cómo pasó*. Here the home of the protagonising family (Alcántara) is in Madrid, which once again is the key location. In the series, historic fiction is liberally mixed with the family context, following a 'demotic turn' (Turner, 2010). This provides a nostalgic, kid-glove treatment of a past that can easily be identified by most people and that seems both close and accessible. This "topography of normality", in Rueda Laffond's words (2011: 37) again puts citizens at the centre of historic events, portraying the socialisation patterns of a new collective political culture.

Cultural and linguistic proximity

One of the narrative strategies most used by TV fiction to win viewers' hearts is to use elements of "cultural proximity" as defined by Joseph Straubhaar (2007). Such elements lie within a clearly national framework. TV fiction's 'banal nationalism' is a stew cobbled together from: the frequent appearance of national writers, politicians and singers in the stories; the 'pat' reinterpretation of the cultural traits associated with these celebrities; a social context rooted in daily life and larded with stereotypes. If we take the Spanish case as an example, one can see that the vast majority of TV fiction enshrines what Rueda Laffond and Galán Fajardo have termed "the cultural essence of Spanishness" (2014: 11), dwelling on the habits, customs and other cultural quirks associated with 'Spanish national identity'. That is to say, folklore, bull-fighting, Flamenco music and dance, religious festivals and so on. There has also been a spate of recent TV films on Spain's so-called 'High Society', the Monarchy, those who formed the elite during the Franco dictatorship, bull-fighters, singers of 'Spanish' songs and so forth. As Rueda Laffond and Coronado Ruiz (2009: 101) point out, such stuff puts a new gloss on the symbols and 'identity' of a deeply conservative mental universe". These productions can be split into two main groups. On the one hand, there are those protagonised by Spain's political and social elite during the last thirty or forty years. Such series aim to highlight "the history of the present from the angle of national memory" (Rueda Laffond and Galán Fajardo, 2014: 18). Examples are *23-F. El día más difícil del rey* (TVE, 2009) [on the failed coup d'état in 1981] and *Adolfo Suárez, el presidente* (Antena 3, 2010). On the other hand, there are fiction series on show business celebrities. These exercises in hagiography milk popular nostalgia for all it is worth. Examples include *El joven Raphael* (Antena 3, 2010), *Carmina* (Telecinco, 2011), on Carmen Ordóñez, and *Mi gitana* (Telecinco, 2012), on Isabel Pantoja, among a host of others. They all give a rose-tinted vision of Spain during the dictatorship. This telly vision of the past is light years removed from the debate on the need to modernise Spain promoted by certain political and social sectors. While such nostalgic bunkum draws many viewers, it also turns a lot of people off.

One should also note Spanish fiction's gift for portraying the way vulgar folk live, act and speak. This is something that has a long tradition in Spanish literature, theatre and cinema. Indeed, for some scriptwriters, producers and experts, it is a distinctive feature of Spanish TV fiction (Cabana, 2007; García de Castro, 2002). This approach to TV fiction is particularly marked when it comes to comedy such as *Los ladrones van a la oficina* (Antena 3, 1993), inspired by a work by Jardiel Poncela, and *Hostal Royal Manzanares* (TVE, 1995–1998), with Lina Morgan as the protagonist. There are also more recent series aimed at a broader family audience, such as *Los Serrano* (Telecinco, 2003–2008), Aída (Telecinco, 2005–2014) and *La que se avecina* (Telecinco, 2007–present). These go overboard when it comes to slang and highly stereotyped characters. In general, the scripts are based on situations that are shared by most of the audience, making them instantly recognisable. Clearly, humour is a powerful element for procuring cultural and national proximity. Yet one can only exploit its full scope when a group shares the same reference points. In any case, popular narrative (which is characterised by simplicity and dwelling on the nitty-gritty of daily life) is also one of the hallmarks of historical TV fiction in Spain. This focus on daily life goes hand-in-hand with an appeal to viewers' memories and nostalgia and is often accompanied by the kind of melodrama one sees in soap operas.

In addition, there is the language issue — something of considerable importance in those regions that have more than one official language. If we take the Spanish case, the amount of Spanish TV broadcasting in languages other than Spanish [Castilian] is virtually zero and reflects nothing of Spain's considerable cultural and linguistic diversity. Various recent studies exploring the role played by Spanish TV fiction in national construction reveal the way Castilian monolingualism sweeps all before it (Rueda Laffond and Galán Fajardo, 2014). For example, it is symptomatic that in series such as *Isabel*, in which the Crown of Aragon is the protagonist, there is not a single character (not

even a court servant) who uses Catalan as his or her mother tongue — in itself, a gross distortion of historical fact. This was probably not King Ferran's case, given that he came from an Aragonese family (Trastàmara) that had Castilian as its mother tongue. The Borjas [Borgias] are a different kettle of fish. This family of Valencian origin gave Rome two popes: Calixtus III and Alexander VI. It that as well as using Latin, it seems they communicated with one another in the Valencian dialect of the Catalan of the period. This absence of Catalan from Spanish TV fiction is also scandalously apparent in productions such as in the mini-series *Ojo por ojo* (TVE, 2010), set in the revolutionary Barcelona of 1920, *Habitaciones cerradas* (TVE, 2015), also set in Barcelona (this time between the end of the 19th Century and the present). There is also the case of Aida Folch a character in *El Ministerio del Tiempo*, a Catalan burgher in late 19th Century Barcelona who always speaks in Castilian even (incredibly) to her Catalan kith and kin. When it is easier to hear Thai (without subtitles) spoken on a Spanish TV fiction series than it is to hear Catalan, Basque, or Galician — which is the case in the series *La Embajada* (Antena 3, 2016) — one knows which way the wind is blowing when it comes to defining the nation on the TV screen. Apparently, most viewers find the absence of Catalan, Basque and Galician 'normal' in Spanish TV fiction series — something that reveals how narrow (and narrow-minded) this general cultural conception of 'modern' Spain is. It is more than likely that were these languages to be used with subtitles, it would foster greater appreciation of Spain's cultural and linguistic diversity. This in turn would spur greater recognition and comprehension of 'the other'.

CONCLUSIONS

Some argue that communication technology — specially satellite, cable and the Internet — are boosting TV offerings and will break the shared view television has provides hitherto. This, they insist, will weaken the nation as an imagined community and feeling of belonging to a nation. The corollary, so goes the argument, is that this trend, together with the fact that many homes already have several TV sets, will fragment audiences and make TV viewing increasingly individual. This phenomenon ties in with the growing separation between the television system and the Nation State. With the ability to access contents from other networks around the world at any given moment, TV consumption is more conditioned by the viewer's preferences than by national programme schedules. Media globalisation has broken the television ritual of 'national communion' because it is increasingly hard to gather with one's fellow-countrymen for a given broadcast at a given time. Put baldly, technology and access to global content are crossing the symbolic bounds of the home and hence of the nation.

While we readily accept that consumption patterns have changed but we do not share the views set out in the foregoing paragraph. All the indications are that television will remain open, catering to both generalist and specialist audiences and continue to attract the lion's share of viewers each day in most countries. Indeed, some broadcasts (mainly of sports events but also some fiction series and other programmes) are capable of drawing huge audiences — something that makes us believe that television will continue accounting for much of the nation's viewing habits. In this respect, television content continues to draw viewers' interest, regardless of whether the programme is watched live on a TV set or 'on demand' on a computer screen or other device. Perhaps the 'shared' aspect of viewing will become less important as a result but most audiovisual content consumed is still offered by TV networks. The perception is that if we want to take part in a common social life, one has to see certain TV programmes that establish the national agenda and subjects of debate. Here, TV fiction continues to have a big impact on the population. That is why TV stations need to take a responsible attitude when representing the nation through their fiction series. The extent to which these series reflect our national imaginaries will depend largely on how programme narratives are written and told.

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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Àlvar Peris received his PhD in Audiovisual Communication from Valencia University (UV), where he has taught since 2003. His lines of research are the analysis of audiovisual contents and formats and the media construction of identities. Dr. Peris is the author of numerous scientific papers in scholarly journals, and has published monographs and collective books on Cultural Studies and History.

Imagined community and governance of Catalonian cultural action abroad: midway between corporatism and social participation

Mariano Martín Zamorano
UNIVERSITAT DE BARCELONA

martinzam@hotmail.com

ABSTRACT

Benedict Anderson (1993) defined nation as "an imagined political community — and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign", and stressed the importance of cultural roots for the establishment of this national consciousness. Cultural diplomacy, organized by nation-states since the early 20th century and politically structured on the basis of this sovereign and imagined space, sought to extend the influence of countries through the promotion of national culture on the international scenario. This article examines, by contrasting Anderson ideas, the impact of nationalism on the organization of a corporatist structure for the governance of Catalan foreign cultural action between 1980 and 2014.

Keywords: *cultural paradiplomacy, Catalonia, governance, nationalism, imagined community*

INTRODUCTION

Bendict Anderson (1993, 23) defined nation as "an imagined political community — and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign." From the stance of a critique on materialistic reductionism but, likewise, idealistic primordialism, he stressed the importance of analysing cultural roots if we are to understand the construction process of the many forms of territorial national power that ensued during modernity. As of the nineteenth century, this social construction of political nationalism, linked to the official cultural heritage, has been mirrored by the systematic political actions undertaken abroad by national associations. The first private associations abroad, integrated by liberal elites and, to a lesser extent, other nationalist sectors mobilized by the workers movement, sought to sustain the colonial

power or strengthen their regional networks by spreading their language and national heritage (Paschalidis, 2009). Thus, the evolution of foreign cultural policy is linked with numerous strategies to build international hegemony, founded upon a certain concept of nation.

With respect to Catalonia, since the democratic transition, the internationalization of culture and transnational actions aimed at disseminating the political demands of the region, were based on a nationalist perspective. The latter aimed to recover the progress made during the Second Republic in these issues, the otherness of this territory and its society as compared to the other cultures of Spain, and its association with other regions and countries of central and northern Europe. On the basis of this discourse, an area of cultural action abroad

grew with relative autonomy, both with respect to other areas in the regional administration and in relation to the cultural diplomacy of the State (Petit Bozzo, 2010). In this respect, with its institutionalization in the nineties, this policy incorporated into its governance numerous associations and institutions devoted to projecting Catalan culture within a national context, which had emerged within the context of political dispute in the years following Franco's death. For example, this was the case of several social organizations in the sector that the *Consorci Català per a la Promoció Exterior de la Cultura* (Catalan Consortium for the External Promotion of Culture, COPEC) took on board after its creation in 1991.

Later, however, with the foundation of the l'*Institut Català de les Indústries Culturals* (Catalan Institute of Cultural Industries, ICIC) and the *Institut Ramon Llull* (IRL) in 2000 and 2001 respectively, this aggregation process of actors playing in the international projection of national culture underwent numerous changes in corporatist mechanisms. This renewal of cultural paradiplomacy promoted diverse tensions between the public and private members of the socio-institutional framework. These were primarily related to the new role that the *Generalidad* (Catalan Government) took in this activity and its subsequent protodiplomatic turn[1].

There are manifold reasons for this general evolution of Catalan cultural foreign policy, but they have a clear link with the various political forms adopted by nationalism in the region. The "political power" of nationalism and the force of the sovereign state as a project embarked upon the "freedom of the nation" (Anderson, 1993, 25) have had a clear impact on the socio-political organization of Catalan cultural paradiplomacy; however, this phenomenon has not been properly analysed. Indeed, within a predominantly statist theoretical framework, focused on military and economic disputes, cultural diplomacy has been neglected or considered as a trivial area of diplomacy (Bélanger, 1994, 423, Mark, 2008: 5). Moreover,

the subordinate nature of sub-state elements and dynamics disapproved of by national models in the arena of cultural policies (Johannisson, 2010; Schuster, 2002) contribute to the fact that currently cultural paradiplomacies still constitute a scarcely studied and loosely established phenomenon. In this respect, the case of Catalonia calls into question the functionalist theories explaining the construct of national power, which assume the nation to be a capital of political legitimation of the concentration of state power and an instrument of domination of the political and economic elites, as well as neorealist theories, which relegate the power of ideational and agential elements in foreign policy to the background (Vilanova, 2007).

Based on an approach proposed by Anderson regarding the cultural nation, and on fieldwork conducted between 2012 and 2014, this article will examine the incidence of nationalism in structuring a field of corporatist governance, which characterized the foreign cultural action of Catalonia between 1980 and 2014.

FOREIGN CULTURAL POLICY AND NATIONALISM

The term 'cultural diplomacy', institutionalized in the early twentieth century and whose most representative historical exponents are the *Alliance Française* (1923) and the Goethe Institute (1921), currently has a host of definitions. According to Milton Cummings, cultural diplomacy is about "the exchange of ideas, information, art and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual understanding." (Cummings, 2003, 1).

By contrast, Arndt has distinguished between 'cultural diplomacy' and 'international cultural relations': "cultural diplomacy can only be said to take place when formal diplomats, serving national governments, try to shape and channel this natural flow to advance [elusive] national interests", which are difficult to define (Arndt, 2009, 31). As the authors suggest, it is a range of actions for the external dissemination of culture, arts or the symbolic heritage of a social group, involving systematic government intervention.

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1 Duchacek (1990) has defined paradiplomacy as the use of foreign policy by the sub-states with the aim of obtaining independence.

Currently, cultural diplomacy is characterized by the proliferation of actors involved at different scales and levels, as in the case of cultural paradiplomacies, *i.e.*, those foreign cultural activities undertaken by sub-state governments (Mesado i Jardí, 2008; Bélanger, 1997). Besides, given the importance of the cultural sphere in today's globalized world (Morató 2007), it ranks as one of the fundamental instruments of national construction and promotion on the international stage. Likewise, reflecting its complex relationship with domestic policy, the importance of strengthening national systems of culture has been highlighted as a requisite for apposite external projection (Saul, 1994). This area of action, subject to the propositional dynamics of governments, involves governments of a nation, as well as their entrepreneurs, artists, migrants, etc. However, this exchange is relatively defined, in each case, by official definitions of culture and of nation, operationalized by governmental institutions and agents.

But what role does nationalism play in shaping foreign cultural policy? Beyond the various theses posed by functionalism[2] and idealism[3] to explain nationalism, several authors have focused their attention on analysing its socio-historical forms of construction. They have highlighted the importance of social movements in the accumulation of power and national symbols (Hobsbawm, 1991, 19; Hroch, 1994, 47; Anderson, 1993, 193). In this respect, according to Eric Hobsbawm: "Nationalism comes before nations. Nations do not make states and nationalisms but the other way around."(Hobsbawm, 1991, 18). In a proximate stance, for Anderson the extension of literacy together with the advent of the printing press and the construction of Republican power, were three facets of modernity that fostered national consciousness (Anderson, 1993 65).

But Anderson also noted the capacity demonstrated by the ruling elites, throughout modern history, to promote and provide certain directionality to this political power, following various geopolitical strategies (Anderson, 1993). In this respect, the author carefully analyses the importance of fostering an official narrative regarding the nation's colonial expansion processes or, to the contrary, national defence against external agents (Anderson 1993, 147).

Hall said that nationalism acquired new manifestations in the twentieth century, from being a support element of national sovereignty (*raison d'état*) to also become as a factor of national self-determination. In this respect, several authors have explained the uses of foreign cultural action undertaken by sub-state nations, and the importance of nationalism to explain the birth, legitimisation and advancement of cultural paradiplomacy (Lecours and Moreno 2003, p. 3; Michelmann, 2010). Here, cultural action abroad is presented as an instrument shaping the imagined nation to which Anderson refers, while, at the same time, it is an activity "shaped" by its political and economic bases. Our analysis of the governance of cultural paradiplomacy of Catalonia reveals a constant theoretical and factual tension between cultural nationalism, which takes various socio-political forms, and the political manipulation and institutionalization of national identities. By the latter, we refer to various forms of nationalism "from above"; the advance of government control dominating multiple areas operating in legitimisation, defence and normalization of the constituent elements of the cultural nations.

2 Within this theoretical framework, the emergence of modern nationalism relates to the emergence of an industrial society in the eighteenth century, which, unlike agrarian societies, had to be politically centralized in order to function. Thus, the public education system — and subsequently the cultural one — favoured the systematization of the relationship between the productive industrial forces and the workforce, considering the spread of the national ideal as a mechanism justifying the concentration and organization of political and economic power (Gellner 1997, 18).

3 In contrast, nationalist theory from the perspective of the idealism, Elie Kedourie states the existence of what he calls nationalist doctrine. It "holds that humanity is naturally divided into nations, that nations are known by certain characteristics that can be ascertained, and that the only legitimate type of government is a national self-government." (Kedourie, 1998, 1). Within the context of this thesis, as of the nineteenth century the state instated a series of cultural elements and common interests that had existed in various forms since ancient Rome. Therefore, the principle of all sovereignty resides in the nation itself and, all this which is essentially based on a common culture, is the foundation that supports the whole. The individual cannot be understood, therefore, outside his/her national context or outside the entity he/she naturally integrates (Kedourie, 1998, 33).

GOVERNANCE AND FOREIGN CULTURAL POLICY

Since the nineties, traditional models of government in cultural diplomacy, which are centralized and subsumed to the strategy of foreign policy, have given rise to new patterns of governance. This implementation model of public policy and of theoretical analysis emerged from the crisis of the Weberian model of government, of a vertical kind and focused on applying the norm (Peters and Savoie, 1995, 389). The same proposes the existence of two interrelated processes of governance in public management: the essentially hierarchical and those structured on the basis of the continuous opening of numerous institutional areas favouring social intervention. However, while the bottom-up governance model was assimilated, in some cases, to greater democratic quality of the Liberal State, due to community intervention in public policy, Peters (1995) has pointed out some drawbacks of this reduction: among other derivatives, this recognition by the State of the shifting social reality could encourage excessive compartmentalization of government bodies, the inefficiency of government action and also the ambiguity of the public regarding the Law (Peters, 1995).

Within the study of contemporary cultural diplomacy, we should consider how the complex process of structuring government expresses the balance between political representation (respecting the principles of equality and legal rules) and its openness to social participation. In this respect, governance in current cultural action abroad also exhibits various corporatist trends that limit community participation. Corporatism has been characterized as a model of government with: a) a strong and leading State, b) with certain restrictions on the freedom and activities of interest groups, and c) the incorporation of these interest groups within and as part of the state system, responsible for representing the interests of its members and for helping the state to manage and carry out public policy (Wiardi, 1996 8). As Wiardi points out (1996: 15) this governance model has been part of various political regimes, ranging from liberal to totalitarian, in which the social groups involved may have a relationship with the State ranging from absolute control over part of it, to contractualism.

Our approach to cultural diplomacy, based on Anderson's analysis of nationalism seeks to clarify the processes and mechanisms of articulation of the same nationally/socially, in as much as certain relationships of co-operation and conflict are established between the representative and the represented. For Villanueva, to represent culture abroad means to concentrate on how nations act in representing themselves abroad, operating to promote the interests of those who belong to the national culture of the country (Villanueva, 2007, 24). This process of building policy is based on different dynamics that include the acts of diplomatic agents (Arndt, 2005) or the strategic agenda of producing this "cultural cutback abroad" undertaken by governmental management. From the historical standpoint, one may notice a general trend towards centralization, autonomization and expansion of the area, and then in the seventies, towards the inauguration of mechanisms bestowing a greater pluralism and capacity for socio-political interaction. However, on the other hand, there has been the emergence of a corporatist and privatist dynamic, which means that this representation has been constituted on the basis of geopolitical and economic precepts that form part of the foreign agenda, through various public-private alliances of elites (Villanueva, 2007, 65).

In this respect, cultural representation through foreign policy has particular mechanisms related to social participation processes. As Villanueva indicated, entering the dimension of cultural diplomacy agencies, while the bottom-up structure has been the reference of the idealistic trend in international relations, the top-down one (or diplomacy of elites) has been subsumed in concepts of national interest and acted on corporatively in accordance with its definition (Villanueva, 2007, 46). These modes of relationships between regional socio-political processes and cultural diplomacy have been highlighted in different characteristics of the policy. Mellisen (2005, 13) refers to public diplomacy in terms of the reference to domestic policy in two ways: the local intervention of citizens in the formulation of foreign policy (participatory approach) or the explanation of diplomacy and the objectives of foreign policy to the local public (explanatory approach). In this regard,

note has also been made of the importance that foreign policy plays the role of "explaining the world" to the citizens of origin (Sharp, 1999). It has also been noted that cultural diplomacy can transform domestic policy to "incite the compliance with our own national image abroad and strengthen the pride in achievements of a country" (Higham, 2007, 139). By contrast, it has also been warned that cultural action abroad can act as a tool for handling domestic policy and disputes, such as in the case of advanced protodiplomacy in Quebec (Mark, 2008, 71; Bélanger, 1994). In short, according to these different perspectives, cultural diplomacy would play the role of channelling the various local interests, explaining their modes of intervention and foreign response to the same, and fostering social internal cohesion, thereby becoming an instrument of socially constructed sovereignty.

INSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION OF CATALAN CULTURAL PARADIPLOMACY

The first stage of Catalan cultural paradiplomacy spanned the period beginning with the first term of the CiU (Convergència i Unió) government in 1980, until 1987, when it created the *Subdirecció de Relacions Exteriors i de Protocol* (Office of External Relations and Protocol). This first period coincides with the phase of Spanish cultural policy that Bouzada (2007, p. 305) defines as the phase of "construction of identity". In the Catalan case, this was framed within the context of the reorganization of the cultural governmental structure which involved, among other things, transference of civil servants and equipment from the State to the regional administration. At that time, the conservative CiU government was promoting cultural action abroad, mainly targeting Europe and Latin America, consisting of isolated and uncoordinated actions, with predominantly patrimonial features from in terms of their sociocultural proposal. It was mainly a public cultural paradiplomacy, i.e., aimed at approximating relations with social organizations outside Catalonia[4] (Departament de Cultura, 1983, p. 14),

which in many cases had been mobilized in resistance to Franco's dictatorship.

As of 1987, Jordi Pujol's government began to develop a new policy of cultural paradiplomacy, a trend which grew in the early nineties. The action outside the Catalan administration was to be driven by Spain's integration in the European Union (Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla and Figueroa, 2008, 12), which gave rise to different uses of this "window of opportunity" to promote Catalonia on the European map (Gasòliba, 1987, 48). Moreover, the prominent urban, social and economic transformations that occurred after the election of Barcelona as the venue for the 1992 Olympic Games, favoured the implementation of new and more effective forms of sub-state projection abroad. Thus, greater stability and potential of the political-institutional scenario granted cultural paradiplomacy, now bestowed with "mid- and long-term design and planning of action abroad", with a strategic base for growth (Villalonga, 1992, p. 213). Then we were to witness the establishment of new public agencies devoted to this policy. One of these was the *Consorci Català per a la Promoció Exterior de la Cultura* (Catalan Consortium for the External Promotion of Culture, COPEC), set up in in 1991, which exclusively tackled this task, focusing to a great extent on the management and international promotion of culture for the Catalonian government. The targets of this policy were extended, with priorities being "Europe, the United States, Japan and Latin America." (García and Segura, 1995, p. 44).

As of 2000, in its final stage Catalan cultural paradiplomacy received a strong boost. The new strategy was aimed at modernizing its projection abroad and, in this context, fostering the "Catalonian brand", somewhat overshadowed since the nineties due to the branding of Barcelona. Then they created different areas of management, designed from a rationale that sought to meet the diverse challenges presented by globalization. Cultural paradiplomacy was to be equipped with new institutions and, simultaneously, the scope of international action of the Department of Culture was to be extended. In this context, the *Institut Català de les Indústries*

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4 For example, with the creation of the *Servei Permanent de Casals Catalans* in 1980.

Culturals (Catalan Institute of Cultural Industries, 2000) and the *Institut Ramon Llull* (2001) were to make an appearance, providing Catalonia with the capacity for cultural action abroad difficult to compare with that of other sub-state entities. Thus, there was an increase in the use of cultural industries and digital platforms as instruments of international cultural promotion. This line of action would intensify with the change in regional government in 2003. At this point, the new left-wing administration[5] would make progress in structuring foreign policy by establishing relationships, organizations and offices in several countries[6]. This renewed structure and significant legal redesign of this area under the new Statute of Autonomy (*Estatut d'Autonomia*, 2006), helped strengthen Catalonia's international presence, with milestones such as the Frankfurt Book Fair or becoming the capital of the Union in the Mediterranean. (Villarroya Planas, 2010, 11). However, different events, such as the resolution of the Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional, TC) on the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia (Estatut d'Autonomia de Catalunya) in 2010 and political effects of the economic crisis which had begun two years earlier, supported the reduction and rationalization of the system, as well as the adoption of strategies aimed at achieving greater autonomy in this matter, within the framework of growing parliamentary consensus about holding an opinion poll (*Consulta*) on independence[7].

5   We refer to the triumph after 23 years of a coalition government, the so-called Tripartite, with the left-wing parties: *Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya*, *Ciutadans pel Canvi*, *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* and *Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds-Esquerra Alternativa.*

6   These organizations came to form a network of more than two hundred centres representing this region abroad, in various institutional forms and different strategic sectors.

7   It was entitled "popular consultation, not a referendum, on the political future of Catalonia" and was convened in September 2014 through the adoption by the Catalan Parliament of an Inquiries Act and the subsequent signing of a decree by the President of the Catalan government, calling for it to be held on 9th November 2014. During the same month, it was provisionally suspended by the *Tribunal Constitucional* (Spanish Constitutional Court, TC).

CORPORATIST GOVERNANCE OF THE CATALAN CULTURAL PARADIPLOMACY

We should distinguish the aforementioned strategic and sectoral diversification processes of the Catalan cultural foreign policy and the many dynamic forces driving bottom-up intervention, of the development that led to the formation of corporatist governance in this policy. As previously stated, during the seventies organizations joined in this task as part of the process of post-Franco cultural "normalization". Social mobilization around the international promotion of culture, nested within the framework of nationalism, was a political asset influencing regional government organization during the democratic transition. But, in many cases, this bottom up movement was to become subject to a gradual transformation that led to the institutionalization of governance in foreign cultural policy in the nineties. In this context came the renewal of various cohesion and co-operation mechanisms between interest groups and actors involved in this framework, reaffirming its corporatist nature (Wiardi, 1996). Since then, one of specific traits of the Catalan system of cultural paradiplomacy is the existence of different public-private entities or associations that take on quasi-governmental functions, a network of relationships that is decisive in cultural activity abroad.

One of the ways of linking State and social organizations in this governance model was the ongoing support of the Catalan government in various social organizations, based in Catalonia, performing cultural actions abroad. For example, the establishment of the COPEC saw the creation of aid for "Grants to organizations for promoting Catalan culture abroad." This concept was established to support various associations and foundations. While in 1995 this line of action accounted for only 2% of the total COPEC expenditure, which was of 318 million pesetas (COPEC, 1997, p.14), these subsidies were to remain active throughout the decade. The table below (Table 1) shows the trends in these subsidies between 1995 and 2001:

Table 1. Number of COPEC grants to organizations for promoting Catalan culture abroad (million pesetas)

YEAR	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Cercle d'Agermanament Occità-Català	1		0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8
Fundació Congrés de Cultura Catalana	2	2	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.6
Institut d'Estudis Catalans	2		2	2.1	——	——	——
Institut de Projecció Exterior de la Cultura Catalana	2	2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	2.2

SOURCE: COPEC REPORTS 1995-2001.

One of the associations in the table above is the l'*Institut de Projecció Exterior de la Cultura Catalana* (Institute for the dissemination of Catalan Culture abroad, IPECC). This association was set up in 1979. It derived from the congress on Catalan culture (*Congrés de Cultura Catalana*) held two years before and represented a backlash to the cultural repression wielded under Franco. This is an entity linked to nationalist militancy through cultural activities abroad. Its goals are "to disseminate knowledge about the Països Catalans (Catalan Countries) worldwide and spread the language, culture, history, traditions, etc., and the Catalan nationhood in all its manifestations." (IPECC, 2012). To do so, it established several lines of action, such as awarding the *Premi Batista i Roca* for works projecting Catalan culture, such as symposia, meetings and seminars about the history and culture of Catalonia worldwide and Europe in particular. In many cases, these actions are undertaken by followers of the Catalan culture in different parts of the world or in co-operation with broadcasters. Many of the founding members of the IPECC are intellectuals and/or work in areas related to Catalan culture, such as historians, poets and writers.

As of the eighties, this institution received support from the *Generalitat de Catalunya* (Government of Catalonia). For instance, it undertook a task to place monuments commemorating Catalan artists, intellectuals or historians abroad, which involved the co-operation of the Catalan Government. As pointed out by its director Nuria Bayó, the former President Jordi Pujol accompanied IPECC in some of these actions: "We have placed three statues, always with

the economic support of the Catalan Government, and our President, Jordi Pujol, went to unveil a bust of our poet Josep Carner at the Catholic University of Brussels" (Bayó 2014, personal interview, 5th March).

The pro-independent nature of the IPECC is reflected in the cultural activities carried out, among which we find its actions in different parts of Europe. The report on a trip to Krakow (*Memòria de viatge a Cracòvia*, 2010) provides details of the program planned for the occasion. The document questions the dearth of emphasis placed on nationalist issues by some of the events in the program, and the lack of respect for traditions. On this subject it states: "The dissemination of Catalonia's desire for independence should be present in events abroad. This was the case of Catalan musicians like Pau Casals, singers like Lluís Llach or athletes like Carles Puyol, etc. If the government does not do it, then at least we should do it ourselves." (IPECC, 2010, 3).

The emergence of the IRL involved the creation of a "counterpart" organisation at the official level. Since then, the IPECC had maintained a constant relationship with the IRL, for example by supporting the IRL in awarding the *Premi Josep Maria Batista i Roca*. For its part, in 2003, the IRL founded the *Premi Internacional Ramon Llull*, through an agreement signed with the *Fundació Congrés de Cultura Catalana*, another of the entities in the table above. Thus, the roles previously "delegated" to the associations were "redistributed" and reconceptualised. Hereupon, with the progression of the economic crisis that began in

2008, the organization stopped receiving public funds and had to be maintained on the basis of private co-operation and some aid granted by the IRL. Regarding this new relationship with the Catalan government, its current director states:

> "In fact we still exist, but nowadays the *Generalitat* undertakes foreign policy. Nonetheless, we are still needed. Because, when the new *Generalitat* was created (in the eighties), they celebrated the events that we still celebrate, such as the *Batalla del Coll de Panissars* (Battle of the Panissars pass). This great battle was won by our *Rei Pere el Gran* (King Peter III of Aragon). On winning this battle, he avenged the death of his grandfather in Muret, and this event should be celebrated. They celebrated it for the first few years, but then political party members, from the opposition, started attending and shouting insults. Now they have stopped attending all these activities still held by the IPECC. And they do not go, but they should keep the memory of Catalonia alive. But whoever comes with us will know all about this battle." (Bayó 2014, personal interview, 5th March).

The Catalan PEN is another reference institution for cultural activity outside Catalonia. The international network of PEN clubs was established in 1921, when there was the foundation of PEN International in England. It emerged in the post-war period as an association of writers within the context of the creation of the League of Nations and the establishment of cultural diplomacy as an instrument of international dialogue. Then, the PEN in England invited writers worldwide to join this initiative. A year later witnessed the foundation of the PEN club of Catalonia, in Barcelona, which was the third in the world. It was brought into being by writers and intellectuals such as Josep M. López-Picó, Joan Crexells or Josep M. Batista i Roca and, ever since, the institution has participated in PEN International meetings.

After its activism during Franco's dictatorship and the return of its leaders from exile, the Catalan PEN was reconfigured and resumed its relationship with the Catalan government. Ever since then, it has been funded by the Catalan Government and by several other state agencies. It has also been closely involved with the Catalan administration in organizing various activities and some of its members have formed part of government institutions. This relationship has been based on the ideology of the institution, which has always held a philosophy aimed at the link between civil liberties and human rights, and to promote the international dissemination and defence of the Catalan language, but also paying attention to the issue of national identity (Subirana, 2010).

Since 2001, as President of the Catalan PEN, Dolors Oller has sought to reconsider its way of working and bring it closer to the approach of its counterpart organizations in the Nordic countries and in England and North America. To this end, besides running tasks related to the Catalan literary world, it also takes new lines of action related to cultural paradiplomacy (Arenas 2014, personal interview, 18th March). Arenas holds that this modification, which coincides with the appearance of the IRL, took place in a context of social and political change:

> "It coincides with a time when, perhaps, there is a drop in the number of volunteers. In other words, as a country, in terms of recovering our institutions, people tend to think "now we have proper institutions that are responsible for protecting our heritage," so we relax as a civil society. And perhaps there was a generation, i.e., the generation that is now in its forties, which did not see the need to join such organizations nor to take proactive actions for culture. Why? Because there are other potential ways of reaching foreign countries." (Arenas 2014, personal interview, 18 March).

From this new position, the Catalan PEN, advisory member of UNESCO and the UN, promoted various lines of action designed to strengthen Catalonia's

position in these supranational spheres and, on several occasions, acted against the Spanish State in defence of linguistic rights in the region. In this respect, it publicly condemned the state of committing "cultural genocide" of the Catalan language, and formally presented the indictment to PEN International to be raised with the UN (Foguet, 2012).

This statement came as a reaction to numerous measures taken to recentralize cultural and educational matters, undertaken by the central Government[8]. The initiative refers to the anti-Franco resistance upheld by writers, editors and intellectuals who had led the institution in exile. For example, on several occasions Batista and Roca reported the persecution of Catalan culture to the UN and UNESCO, as shown in the text "Appeal to the UNESCO on behalf of Catalan culture" (1952) presented in Paris (Subirana, 2010, 320). Within this policy, the organization also joined the groups belonging to Diplocat. The desire expressed by the Catalan intellectuals founders of the Catalan PEN, to represent a distinctive value of Catalan culture as a national culture (Subirana, 2011, 63), was now deployed within the framework of a new institutional project and in a different political context. The same was characterized by the international promotion of the right to choose by the government of Catalonia.

The UNESCO Centre of Catalonia (UNESCOCAT), in another supranational line of action integrated within this corporatist governance, was set up in 1984. One of the main missions of this NGO is to establish and strengthen ties between Catalonia and multilateral organizations[9]. According to its statutes, the association's mission is to "disseminate within the Catalan cultural ideals, documents and activities of UNESCO and made available to UNESCO co-operation of the Catalan cultural community in the areas of

competence of UNESCO i.e., education, science, culture and communication." (UNESCOCAT, 2005, 5). The organization currently comprises four entities: *Fundació Jaume Bofill, Institut d'Estudis Catalans (IEC), Fundació FemCAT* and *Òmnium Cultural*.

Since its inception, the organization has been working with the Cultural Relations Service of the Catalan Ministry of Culture and received financial support from the Government of Catalonia, declared of public utility in 1996. In return, UNESCOCAT has worked under the umbrella of the Spanish Commission for Cooperation with UNESCO, providing information and technical advice to the Catalan Government.

Following this system of governance, UNESCOCAT officially maintained relations with UNESCO, in a consultative role. In 1993, the centre was admitted into this multilateral organization as a "Foundation having official ties with UNESCO," a condition renewed by the Executive Board in 1999 and 2008 for six-year terms. The activity of UNESCOCAT, as an association, enabled it to establish contacts in Paris with members of the multilateral organization, with state delegations and other NGOs worldwide, safeguarding the interest of Catalans. Furthermore, in 2001, the UNESCOCAT participated in organizing the Forum of Cultures, along with the city council and the Government of Catalonia (UNESCOCAT, 2001, 7). This line of action aimed at making proposals to UNESCO and incorporating its policies to regional programs, has increased continuously since the nineties. Thus, the activity of the NGO, focused on defending linguistic diversity, human rights and equity at work, became an "extension" of central and regional foreign policy, facilitating its ties with civil society.

Even though its scope has varied over time, this mechanism of indirect participation in UNESCO has several limitations, given the regulatory and administrative framework of the state, and its ability to act in the supranational context. This circumstance led to several appeals for the modification of Catalan representation mechanisms in the organization of States. For example, in 2001 various Catalan parties

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8 Creating impediments for Catalan schooling in the Autonomous Communities of Valencia and the Balearic Islands, and to the reception of Catalan television in Valencia.

9 This centre was established on the basis of various UNESCO clubs and federations formed by civil society in Catalonia since the sixties (Mesado i Jardí, 2008, p.29)

asked the Spanish government for greater official presence of Catalonia in UNESCO, but did not receive any response to the appeal (UNESCOCAT, 2001, 9). Accordingly, the two tripartite governments pursued different policies that sought to increase the capacity of Catalan governance in UNESCO. As part of this commitment, embodied in the 2006 Statute of Autonomy, and the promotion of policies linked to the organisation's programs, brought the relationship between UNESCOCAT and IRL closer (*Institut Ramon Llull* 2005, 84) and, in this context, in 2007 the UN reclassified this association as an organisation with "a special consultative status".

Despite progress in this governance model of Catalan representation in UNESCO, different actors in the Catalan cultural-political field emphasized the issues linked to its institutional ambiguity and the aforementioned "paradox" of Catalan cultural paradiplomacy connected with the lack of state structures. Baltà, Interarts consultant, pointed out two special characteristics of the Catalan cultural paradiplomacy environment, on the one hand, its sub-state nature and, on the other, the existence of a distinctive language and culture of international relevance:

> "But precisely this mix of special characteristics, some positive and others negative, also magnifies the importance of the role of the civil society. The role which UNESCOCAT had taken on, in its time, for example regarding UNESCO, was beneficial even though it was a strange formula as it continued to be an NGO representing, or wishing to represent, Catalonia. Furthermore, UNESCO is within a context that does not facilitate the recognition of an entity unless it is a state. Therefore, when one is willing to participate, one can make some progress, but there are also certain limits." (Baltà 2013, personal interview, 18th September).

The tensions represented by this model of governance in relation to AGE and its aforementioned refutations at the autonomic level were partially solved by the agreement signed in 2013 between the Catalan Government and the Directorate of UNESCO. Likewise, it extends the powers of the Catalan Government in this organization and facilitates the placement of its own representatives, who act in parallel to the Spanish delegation. This process transpired one year after UNESCOCAT closed (2012) due to the drastic reduction in financial support from the Catalan Government, which is reflected in a reshaping of the relationship between civil society and the Catalan government in cultural action abroad.

Lastly, we should mention the *Federació d'Organitzacions Catalanes Internacionalment Reconegudes* (Federation of Internationally Recognized Catalan Organizations, FOCIR), an organization that includes many of the abovementioned organizations. It was created in 1995 aiming to "strengthen their presence in the area of international NGOs as well as promoting the NGOs that had not yet developed this facet of work." (FOCIR, 2010, 7). The FOCIR has been funded by the Catalan government and these resources were distributed among Federation members towards covering the costs of travel, logistics, training or promotion for over a decade. The Federation established consultancy services to advise those associations acting in international organizations and international networks of civil society, so they could do so as Catalans, thereby covering the lack of state structures enabling them to mediate in the international system (FOCIR, 2010, 7).

This focus emphasizes the importance of the transnational action of social organizations in structuring the new global governance. This framework legitimises governmental promotion of the internationalization of social actors in Catalonia. Nonetheless, at the Conference *VIII Jornades de la FOCIR* (2008), FOCIR Director, Mònica Sabata, stated: "We must be aware, however, that public diplomacy cannot substitute the tasks undertaken by governments and institutions" (FOCIR, 2008). She went on to explain the support of this union between civil society and the Catalan Government in foreign affairs:

"We are a country that has not had the "normal", between quotes, structures of State in foreign issues, because we still lack full competence for international relations. But Catalan society is wise and has always looked towards Europe. Probably thanks to the legacy of President Pujol, who — when we were kids — told us we all had to look to the north, to Europe, and that Europe would be our answer. Some generations have grown up aware of this idea." (Sabata, 2014 personal interview, 4th March).

Several cultural institutions are gathered together within FOCIR, becoming an instrument for promoting public cultural paradiplomacy. But since 2007, the coordination mechanisms between the government and the Federation have been transformed due to the revival of Catalan foreign policy and the creation of the *Secretaria d'Afers Exteriors* (Secretary for Foreign Affairs, SAE). Then the premises of the *Secretaria de la Generalitat* (Catalan Governmental Secretariat) began to take over some of its duties. Likewise, in the context of the economic crisis, FOCIR stopped receiving public funds, which it had spent on fostering the work of the associations at an international level and also decreased public aid for the operation of the organization. For these reasons, the structure and functions of FOCIR have changed in recent years, with it becoming a public diplomacy think tank working in collaboration with Diplocat[10].

CONCLUSIONS
For Keating (1996, 189), from the outset, Catalonia's action abroad constituted a way of affirming national identity, as a policy aimed at promoting economic

development and also as a mechanism to protect Catalan culture. In this respect, also noteworthy is the importance of such cultural action abroad in nation-building processes, undertaken by various state and sub-state political bodies (Lecours and Moreno, 2003, Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, 1991). Furthermore, this policy is a highly effective instrument for the reaffirmation of national territorial ideals, a rhetoric abroad that fosters the structuring of consensus in the international system. Moreover, within the context of sub-state entities, the political and cultural nature of language as well as its importance to identity, have given rise to various processes of social organization aimed at projecting local reality. In this respect, this article demonstrates the ability of nationalist social mobilization to serve as a tool for building governance, facilitating the organization of an autonomic sub-state cultural action.

The corporatist framework of governance of cultural paradiplomacy, analysed here, has been shaped by different alliances between the Catalan Government and industrial associations. These were based on the integration of numerous Catalan claims to government action abroad, mainly seeking to amend the limitations of this sub-state government in the field of supranational action. The strengthening of this co-operation in the nineties through the creation of governance led to a growing coercive interdependence among organizations belonging to this structure. Then the COPEC regrouped and institutionalized the mechanisms of public-private-associative relations while decreasing the dependence of autonomic paradiplomacy with respect to central Government.

The establishment of this corporatist governance in cultural paradiplomacy was promoted by: a) the gradual decentralization of responsibilities for, and administration of foreign affairs in Spain, mainly due to b) the existence of an organized social base dating from the democratic transition in terms of dissemination of culture in the national context; c) the government's willingness to establish a collaborative plan supported by these forces and their support. Given the importance of this relations framework on home policies and supranational activity

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10 *El Consell de Diplomàcia Pública de Catalunya* (DIPLOCAT), derived from the *Patronat Catalunya Món* (World Board of Catalonia), is a consortium created in 2013 by the Government of Catalonia to project Catalonia in the international arena, aiming to show their project as favouring the right to decide. It is composed of several Catalan municipalities, provincial governments, universities and associations.

in Catalonia, it was devised within a strategic action of Catalan cultural paradiplomacy and grew to become an important network of actors in the context of broader governance of Catalan cultural paradiplomacy, a meeting point of international promotion of the arts, cultural industry and heritage in different contexts.

This network of cultural paradiplomacy boosted the capacity for international action of the Catalan government, while also having an important instructive internal impact (Mellisen 2005) and enabled the diversification of its areas of political action. However, it also caused a series of tensions at each stage of Government, due to changes in the role of the Catalan Government in foreign policy and complex definition of common strategies between the government and social organizations. In this respect, governance was reshaped to create a new institutional framework as of 2000, and the new role assumed by the *Institut Ramon Llull*, an agency with more resources than COPEC, its predecessor. Since then it has been reorganized and rebalanced around

the projection of Catalan language and culture within a national context.

While the nationalist dispute within the framework of various cultural paradiplomacy initiatives involved some confrontation between administrative strategies and mechanisms with respect to the central Government, at the regional level it was presented as a social "binder", a quality of the nationalism described by Bruilly (1990). Thus, as indicated by Anderson, promoting national awareness has the potential for socio-political mobilization and the building of sovereign power. As the same author (Anderson 1993, 284) states, heritage and historically accumulated documents help in the construction of a national narrative. The organization of an own foreign cultural policy in itself represents a formal aspiration to be a State, with the convergence of governmental agencies and private and associated actors in a complex bottom up / top down dialectic. Moreover, this policy established an official vision, based on the republican tradition and which portrayed the nation abroad as a distinct entity and (proto) sovereign.

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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Mariano Martín Zamorano was awarded a PhD in Cultural Management and Heritage by Universitat de Barcelona (UB), Cum Laude and with International Mention. He has wide experience in carrying out funded interdisciplinary academic projects — Universidad Nacional de Cuyo (UNC, Argentina), AECID and the European Commission — and has obtained four individual grants (from UNC, AGAUR and UB). Since 2010, he has been a member of the UB's Centre for the Study of Culture, Politics and Society (CECUPS). Zamorano's publications include various papers in leading scientific journals, a book pending publication and a chapter in another book.

Anderson and the Media.
The strength of "imagined communities"

Enric Castelló
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI

enric.castello@urv.cat
ORCID: http://www.researcherid.com/rid/B-2834-2012

ABSTRACT
This is a brief note on Benedict Anderson's influence and more specifically, on his concept of 'Imagined Communities' and its impact on the media. The author reviews the concept in relation to national construction through the media, noting key reasons why Anderson's ideas either took hold or were passed over. The text pays tribute to Anderson's remarkable contribution to the theory of and ideas on national identity and the sway held by culture and media in fostering this identity.

Keywords: *The Media, Imagined Community, Benedict Anderson, nationalism, national consciousness*

Benedict Anderson died in December 2015. His sad demise prompted reflection on Anderson's influence on Media Studies. Broaching this question is a daring enterprise given the many authors who have discussed and drawn upon Anderson's work. Accordingly, this brief paper is limited to divulgation and is in the nature of a collective homage by Media researchers to Anderson's concept of 'Imagined Community'. The impact of his work *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (Verso, 1983) was enormous, especially in the English-speaking world. In Spain, Anderson's contribution was virtually ignored until well after the translation of his book into Spanish in the early 1990s (FCE, 1993) and the more recent translation into Catalan (Afers, 2005).

By contrast, Anderson's work has now become a key reference in any research on the media and their role in national construction.

For scholars of national construction, 1983 was to prove a watershed, with the publication of Anderson's book and two others. The latter two were: *The invention of tradition*, by Eric Hobsbawm (with Terence Ranger), and *Nations and Nationalism*, by Ernest Gellner. The three authors — Gellner, Hobsbawm and Anderson — were to prove a dynamic trio, in effect mounting a three-pronged inquiry into Constructionism and National Identity. Between them, they sparked a genuine debate on the role played by nationalist ideology in configuring nations. The fact that the

debate came at the fag-end of the war-torn Twentieth Century made it no less timely. With the fall of The Berlin Wall (1989) and the disintegration of The Soviet Union, the issue of nationalism was again an issue of burning international importance. To reflect this, Anderson published a revised version of the book (1991). It is this updated version that is referred to here and in almost all recent studies. Hobsbawm then published *Nations and Nationalism since 1780* (Verso, 1990). It was at this point that the Yugoslav Civil War broke out in the heart of Europe.

Why are these works important? I believe it is because they finally lay to rest the myth that a nation is more than an ideological construct and narrative. The power of narrative is configuring identity and a national myth was also underlined in the Eighties and early Nineties by Edward Said and Homi Bhabha (1990) — particularly the latter — in connection with literary and cultural studies. Among the authors mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, Anderson articulated a notion of nationalism that implied a different perspective from that taken by Gellner and Hobsbawm. For the last two, nationalism is an alienating ideology that diverts attention from issues bearing on progress and social conflict — such as modernity and industrialisation — as Sabina Mihelj (2011) has noted. Anderson's ideas are thoroughly modern and rooted in historicism, as we noted earlier (Castelló 2011). They are also highly critical of nationalist ideology.

For example, Gellner considered that 'nationalism' invented 'the nation'. Gellner always stresses the pernicious effects of nationalist politics. Indeed, he finds it hard not to lump all kinds of nationalism together. As a result, Gellner's quest to establish cross-cutting ideas means his analysis is ill-suited for discerning between nationalisms driven by States, by independence movements, or by democrats in their struggle to overthrow authoritarian regimes. In Gellner's writings, the use of the word 'intervention' suggests that the nation is something artificial — even false, alienating and created by an ideology. This view is openly criticised by Anderson in his book.

From another standpoint, Hobsbawm also broadly shares this vision, articulating the concept of "the invention of tradition" and tends to underplay the importance of the idea of a nation and the power of nationalism. While both Gellner and Hobsbawm stress the force of the ideology articulated in their discourses, both authors see "the world of nations" as something that is on the way out.

Anderson sees the nation as a modern, volatile phenomenon, framed by cultural and social dynamics and something that is far from over. Anderson's focus on the concept of 'imagination' on the one hand, and on the substantiation of culture and creative processes on the other, is situated in a dimension that links to cultural studies and the media. Without going so far as to call Anderson post-modern, one can say that the concept of 'Imagined Community' is closely linked to the idea of today's fluid times in which the collective imagination and representation play important roles. Anderson's approach is an attempt to escape from more orthodox visions articulate by Marxism on the notion of the nation and nationalist ideology. Some scholars have linked the wider vision to Anderson's open, cosmopolitan nature and background[1]. For Anderson, nationalism can be destructive but may also be based on social and cultural construction and serve to bind people together. In other words, he rejected the automatic demonisation of nationalism then in vogue. As Özkirimli (2000) explains, Anderson abandoned the idea that nations were simply ideological constructs and put them on the same footing as other 'communities' such as those provided by religion or even kinship. Accordingly, he defined a nation as a political community.

Benedict Anderson's conceptualisation is developed right from the beginning of his book. He defines nationalism and nationality as a "cultural artifact" and the idea of a nation as an "imagined political community, being

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1 Anderson (1936) was born in China and his parents were of Anglo-Irish stock. The family fled to The United States on the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. Anderson specialised in sudies on South-East Asia, where he lived on and off.

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imagined as both limited and sovereign" (1991: 6).[2] The authors argue that such a community is limited because its members are confined to the Nation's territory and thus there are individuals who do not form part of it. Although the Nation's members do not know (and cannot) know all their countrymen, they nevertheless feel like a kind of finite family. The Nation is sovereign because it is a community that came into being to replace the power of kings and royal dynasties. Indeed, Anderson draws a picture in which classical religious communities were replaced by modern nations.

Anderson's brief summary of concepts in the book's introduction was a good way of stating his intentions from the outset. However, in my view, it came to distort the way his book was interpreted. On the one hand, many of the works referring to Anderson's book went no further than the first six or seven pages, using (and something abusing) the ideas set forth in them to justify the Media's task in building a 'national imagination'. Many researchers ignored the rest of Anderson's book, which contained many valuable ideas.

As already noted, many of the main papers and studies on national construction and the Media were limited to referring to the concept of "imagined community" in their theoretical sections. In doing so, they jumped to the conclusion that the Media are tools for creating 'the imaginary'. The power of TV pictures nurtures the concept in studies specifically on television and cinema. In my view, this leaves aside the highly productive debate in Anderson's book on the origins of a collective 'national consciousness'. At what juncture did post-Mediaevil communities begin to think of themselves as nations? At what point did peasants and burghers become aware that they belonged to a national community of 'Frenchmen', 'Spaniards', 'Catalans' and so on?

Anderson's answer is that it came to pass with the invention of the printing press, the emergence of national languages, the abandonment of Latin

as a vehicle for knowledge, and the mass cultural distribution that characterises the modern world. The 'imagined' nation is a modernist construct, not a changeless myth springing from the depths of time. The artifice is not rooted in history but in technology. The availability of a new technology for churning out 'culture' established a national language (relegating other vernacular languages to subordinate status) and laid the foundations for the growth of a national consciousness. Anderson's thought was steeped in anti-colonialism and thus he not only saw national consciousness as an exercise in Imperial political and cultural power but also as an opportunity for subject lands to free themselves because nations think in an organic fashion. In fact, Anderson considers that one of the first 'nationalisms' arose in Creole communities as a reaction to Imperial States.

The scope for creating an 'imagined community' is clear from studies on television (and more recently) on the Internet. Thus the availability or otherwise of the technology is available (TV and the distribution network) to push a given idea of the nation (Catalonia, Scotland, The United Kingdom, France, etc.) has implications regarding the scope for articulating a national consciousness. The concept was applied throughout the 20th Century to 'national consciousness' maps in Europe's Nation States regarding the output of State broadcasting corporations (the BBC, RAI, TVE, etc.). The creation and distribution of a given national 'imaginary' was based on the construction of a given national 'imagined community' that highlighted certain traits (language, history, heroes, symbols and so on) and ignored others.

One should therefore highlight the importance for so-called 'stateless nations' of having access to the technology needed to fashion this 'imagine community' and the distinction that should be drawn in the availability of the technology (for example, a public television channel) and the symbolic content broadcast. Such content may merely be a replication of the 'imagined community' of the Nation State, of an 'imagined community' subordinated to a 'superior'

national community, or even a national community with the same standing as that legitimised by the Nation State). The reader may have his own ideas on which category TV stations fall into, depending on whether they be 'regional' ones in Spain; British ones (both 'regional' and 'national' ones); French regional stations; French and Flemish language channels in Belgium; Spanish-language stations in the US; Russian TV in The Ukraine, and so forth.

Anderson highlighted the role of the popular Press in fostering a national consciousness. The massive daily circulation of these papers meant millions of people shared the same message at the same time. Furthermore, this cultural practice was directly linked to the market. This is why Anderson considered that 'Print Capitalism' created a new way of thinking of a community, creating and 'us and them' situation ('us' being the home market, 'them' being the foreign one). One can speak of a mechanism that created a daily routine. These ideas were complemented by the concept of 'banal nationalism', coined by Michael Billig (1995), who argued that nationalism is consumed daily and almost imperceptibly. What medium is better suited to banalising the national imaginary than television? No other medium can compete with TV when it comes to putting over a powerful message through soap operas, documentaries and drama series.

This said, one should be wary of trying to directly transpose Anderson's analysis to the media and TV. In fact, the author hardly mentions broadcast media (radio and television) as tools in creating such a community. Rather, Anderson's focus is on the birth of the idea of nationhood, not on its reproduction in today's modern media. Proof of this lies in the introduction he wrote in 1996 to *Mapping the Nation*, a collection of texts written on nationalism. In that introduction, he only mentioned the impact of the media as part of a more "media-centric" vision. The contributions in the book covered History, Economics, Geo-politics, Philosophy, International Relations, and even relations between the sexes but not the media. Hence the need to make a sound argument when applying Anderson's ideas to the media.

A common way of bridging this gap is the argument we mentioned earlier, namely, that television is a way of constructing the national imaginary. However, another way that perhaps ties in better with Anderson's work is the idea that a communication system is part of Capitalism's symbolic reproduction; the generation of a cultural industry, marking a leap from 'Print Capitalism' to 'Screen Capitalism'. While Print Capitalism standardised the norms of a common language, Screen Capitalism established the norms of a collective image, a 'banalised' nationalism and at the same time, the whole economic system that lies within in its compass. This dynamic not only implies representations through news programmes and drama but also the establishment of a true 'consumer nationalism', which is articulated through advertising, souvenir shops, sports, musicals, film festivals, video games, emoticons and so on, *ad nauseum*.

As Özkirimli (2000) noted, Anderson's vision of the nation, nationalism and national consciousness has drawn criticism. Some held that Anderson's approach to culture was both reductionist and limited in positing that religious communities and monarchies were replaced by national communities or interpreted through anti-colonial movements. One of the leading scholars debating this issue was Manuel Castells (2003)[3]. He argued that if nations were merely 'imagined communities' constructed to serve the powers that be, they would not (as Anderson argues) be the product of a given history (expressed in common images, language and culture). It is hard to swallow the idea that power is solely exercised by an elite in a top-down fashion in today's inter-connected world. Hence the resistance to accepting the idea that national consciences are fashioned this way.

In addition, use and abuse was made of Anderson's work, especially as part of currents of post-modern thought. The collective imaginary and imagination were heavily exploited in cultural and discursive approaches that were blithely cited by authors such

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3 Here we use the 2007 translation into Catalan of the 1997 English edition.

as Michel Foucault and other post-structuralists. The truth is that Anderson was an atypical thinker who is hard to pigeon-hole — which I believe makes him all the more interesting. While Anderson's view of the nation as an 'imagined community' can lead us to focus more on the discourse as a tool or epistemological sphere, he fits in better with historicist views of identity. His book is a historical survey of the formation of nations and is wide-ranging. The sheer breadth of his approach can be seen in his comments on a wide range of cases, in which he speaks of Imperialism, Racism, national languages, culture, censuses, maps, political power, migrations and so forth. His focus is not the analysis of the cultural representation of the nation and even less a national discourse, even though it is relevant to the construction and transmission of 'national consciousness' through language and culture.

Seen in perspective and following the scholar's untimely death, one must acknowledge the power of the concept of 'imagined community' and the richness of Benedict Anderson's exposition. The seminary work has taken root and promises a rich harvest: research into communication and nationalism is blooming with essays, studies and new lines of thought. While all ideas run their course, Anderson's legacy will be a long one and will foster progress, discussion and debates. His ideas have a great deal to contribute in our modern world for all its technological trappings.

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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Enric Castelló is Professor of the Department of Communication Studies at Universitat Rovira i Virgili (URV) and was awarded a PhD by Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB). He was a Visiting Researcher at Glasgow Caledonian University and Loughborough University. Castelló is a member of the Asterisc [Asterisk] Communication Research Group at URV. He has written various books and research papers on national identity and the media. Castelló is currently co-ordinator of URV's Master's programme in Strategic Communication in the Risk Society.

Anderson and the Imagined Nation*

Marc Sanjaume i Calvet
INSTITUT D'ESTUDIS DE L'AUTOGOVERN
UNIVERSITAT OBERTA DE CATALUNYA

marcsanjaume@gmail.com
ORCID: ORCID: 0000-0001-8723-1618

ABSTRACT
This article is a synthesis of the Theory of Nationalism in Anderson's work and argues its applicability to 'Stateless Nations'. The author's point of departure is the interpretations that have been made of Anderson's definition of nations as 'imagined communities'. Anderson's definition is presented as universal, realistic and capable of embracing diverse facets of nationalism — oppressive or liberating as the case may be. The paper ends with a short reflection on the complexity of The Catalan Lands from an Andersonian point of view.

Keywords: *nation, nationalism, Anderson, imagined, realism, community.*

Corresponding author: Marc Sanjaume i Calvet. Institut d'Estudis de l'Autogovern. Generalitat de Catalunya. Departament de la Presidència. C/ Baixada de Sant Miquel, 8 08001 Barcelona.

Benedict Anderson was not a researcher with just one work to his name. A glance at his list of publications reveals many remarkable contributions and a deep knowledge of history and politics around the world, especially in the colonies. Yet by far and away his best-known and most translated work is *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the origin and Spread of Nationalism*, which was published in 1983 and translated into Catalan by the Afers[1] publishing house a little over a decade ago. This book is a reference work for students of Political Philosophy and Political Sciences alike.

In this seminal academic work, Anderson sets out a general theory of national identity and the phenomenon of nationalism. In his view, nationalism was born out of Capitalism, the Press, the novel and vernacular languages. Thus at the end of the 18th Century, the first national consciousness sprang into being and spread rapidly to Europe and other continents. The break with The Divine Right of Kings, Latin (or the languages of the great religions) and the old concept of the cosmos required a new way of thinking about the community. According to Anderson, this was when the nation was born as a shared story between equals and through the written language (especially the Press and literature). This created a new, extremely powerful political entity — the Nation State. Thus in the Andersonian vision,

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1   See: Anderson, B. (2005) Comunitats Imaginades. Valencia: Afers.

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* This paper is an extended version of an article published in the blog "El Pati Descobert" on the 30th of December 2015.

nations are 'imagined communities' and are the fruit of the march to modernity. For Anderson, the nation cannot predate nationalism, given that the former emerges from the latter to form a community that is shaped by the Press and later by the gradual definition of the bounds of said community.

Another nationalism scholar — Anthony Smith — places Anderson in what he terms Classic Modernism, together with other authors including Gellner, Nairn, Giddens, Tilly, Breully, Hechter, Kedourie (Smith, 1998). This current of thought on nationalism was consolidated in the 1980s and shares the same idea, namely that the phenomenon is a product of modernity (in its broadest sense — the emergence of the State, market economy, public administration and so forth). One should note that this school of thought was influenced by Weber, Deutsch and Simmel, and shared their rejection of perennialism or primordialism (that is to say, the notion that nations are millenarian entities with an adaptive or immutable ontology over time). Such an idea was dismissed as 'romantic' and as merely a mythification of nationalism[2].

The novelty of Anderson's work — which also characterises that of Hobsbawm (1983) — was of offering a Marxist perspective on Classic Modernism. Here, Anderson considered nationalism and nations as cultural artifacts that were mainly based on a narrative that could be analysed. This approach opened the door to a post-modernist critique enabling one to deconstruct nationalism. That said, as Bevir notes, it would be unfair to classify Anderson's theory within the post-modern current, which tends to belittle the importance of nations (Bevir, 2010). First, Anderson had already stated his intention of analysing nationalism in his foreword to *Imagined Communities* — a phenomenon that Marxism had forecast was doomed to vanish. Anderson pointed out the error of such predictions and noted the emergence of nationalism in new States and lands around the world. Second, Anderson's theory basically explains

the emergence and importance of nationalism, and defines the nation as an 'imagined community'. He also revindicated this definition as a category that should be considered a category of belonging in the same way that an individual feels kinship or membership of a religion. Thus the mistake the Marxists made was in considering nationalism to be just another 'ism', as if it were an ideology that was merely a passing fad.

REVINDICATING ANDERSON

The philosopher Joan Vergés (2013) has also highlighted Anderson's radical modernism, which saw the nation as a product of the emergence of nationalism. Vergés has also denounced a mistaken or ill-intentioned reading of Anderson to deny the existence of nations (which are often Stateless Nations). These 'small' nations in the Kunderian sense[3] tend to be given short shrift by the nationalists of the States in which they are straight-jacketed. These State 'nationalists' (often in the guise of would-be cosmopolitan intellectuals) do not shrink from using Anderson as a pretext to label these nations as figments of the imagination.

> Catalonia and The Basque Country as homogeneous cultures are pure invention (an "imagined community" in the words of the anthropologist Benedict Anderson). The rise to power of the [Catalan and Basque] nationalist elites leads to attempts to mould society in their image and to institute a new official culture, repressing dissenting minorities — if necessary by force (Álvarez, 1996).

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2 An amusing and instructive example of this in the French case can be found at: Lluís, J-Ll. (2011).

3 Kundera wrote, speaking of the Czech Republic and its fragility in the centre of Europe: "ce qui distingue les petites nations des grandes, ce n'est pas le critère quantitatif du nombre de leurs habitants ; c'est quelque chose de plus profond: leur existence n'est pas pour elles une certitude qui va de soi, mais toujours une question, un pari, un risque; elles sont sur la défensive envers l'Histoire, cette force qui les dépasse, qui ne les prend pas en considération, qui ne les aperçoit même pas", Kundera, M. (2000).

However, careful reading of Anderson provides no support for such tendentious interpretations. First, for theorists of nationalism, there are no nations that are more 'real' than others. Thus anyone who spends his time scribbling accusations that other nations do not exist because they are 'imagined' must at the very least be willing to accept that his own nation is equally 'imagined'. If this were not the case, we would be dealing with a 'selective' (and hence either a mistaken or ill-intentioned) application of Anderson's theory. Second, the most surprising feature of the confusion (deliberate or not) is that considers 'imagined' to be the same as non-existent. At the end of the day, the setting in which we find ourselves is woven from institutions and shared consensus that are not necessarily either palpable or material. As Vergés says:

> Social reality is spun from shared beliefs (...) and that is the stumbling block for anti-nationalists when they deny that nations may be based on people's beliefs. Such nay-sayers owe us an explanation of how social reality is formed Vergés (2013: 17–57).

The third factor, which in my view is vital for understanding Anderson's vision of nationalism, is his ability to distinguish among the various forms taken by nationalism since its emergence. From a global perspective, linked to his studies of Asia and the colonial world, the philosopher and anthropologist distinguishes various forms of nationalism that have arisen through history. In his view, what drove the emergence of nationalism was 'creolisation', especially in Latin America. This was a kind of revolutionary nationalism that sought to throw of the yoke of the metropolitan power. It was led by the elites in European colonies. This avant-garde led the struggles for freedom, beginning with Britain's American Colonies in 1776 and ending with the Latin American and Caribbean Colonies of other powers in 1830. According to another scholar — Seton-Watson — one should distinguish this nationalism from what he calls 'official nationalism'. While the first was of a revolutionary nature, the

second was led by aristocrats and the metropolitan powers — that is to say, the rulers of the great Imperial States such as the Tsar of Russia. The latter nationalism focused on subjugated identities and their respective popular nationalisms (from The Ukraine to Poland and Corsica), not only adopted by the great Russian, German and Ottoman empires but also by the Chinese and Japanese ones.

The theorisation on the various faces of nationalism and its ability to be either liberating or oppressive depending on the use made of national identity is another aspect of the work by this Chinese-born Anglo-Irish anthropologist. Few men knew the nature of The British Empire in Asia as well as Anderson.

ANDERSON AND US
A third channel for the emergence of nationalist movements and national identities identified by Anderson is what he termed 'linguistic nationalism'. This typically arose in Western Europe, especially among those speaking minority languages repressed by the 'official nationalism' of the great empires. These linguistic nationalism sprang into existence in the 19th Century. The defence of culture and language also turned into political defence under the influence of thinkers such as Rousseau and Herder, spawning a new nationalism:

> Hence enormous energy came to be devoted to the construction of dictionaries for many languages which did not have them at that point — Czech, Hungarian, Ukrainian, Serbian, Polish, Norwegian, and so on. Oral literary traditions were written down and disseminated through print as popular literacy slowly began to increase.These productions [culturals] were used to fight against the domination of the big languages of the dynastic empires, such as Ottoman, High German, Parisian French, the King's English and eventually Muscovite Russian, too (Anderson, 2001).

In *Imagined Communities*, this kind of nationalism is the one that defines us best (together with 'official Spanish nationalism'). Yet the Catalan Lands are a clear example of the complexity of the nationalist phenomenon from both internal and external standpoints. Multiple (and sometimes overlapping) national identities (Catalan, Catalan of the Principality, Valencian, Balearic Islands, and so on) has been the cause of many disputes and clashes but has also been part of their very nature. Fuster spoke of it in these terms:

> The terminology was imposed but could not be invented. The lack of a distinctive name for the Catalan Lands as a whole and for the Principality was to have grave consequences. 'Catalonia' and 'Catalan' were circumscribed to the Principality, acquiring a purely regional meaning. Meanwhile, there was no term that covered all Catalan-speakers. As time went on, the regional nuances of *País Valencià* [the Valencian Country] and *Balears* [The Balearic Islands] became stronger in relation to the Principality. This would not have been a stumbling block to collective cohesion had there been a general, binding name for the whole (...). In the absence of a better alternative, our community came to be called the Catalan Lands (Fuster, 1996: 58).

Fuster's definition and his lament in a way proved Anderson right: nationalism makes the nation and there can be no nation without such a movement (be it creole, imperial, linguistic or cultural). Yet one should also recall the caveat made by Smith (an anti-modernist) who always opposed constructivist excesses. He also argued that the results of mixing the primary elements were unpredictable (elements that he termed 'geological' or, as Fuster would have it, "could not be invented'). In other words, the national narrative did not appear out of nothing but rather from a pre-existing cultural and institution fabric that make they viable, providing the raw materials for an 'archaeology' that allowed the growth of a sense of belonging. Here, we do not mean a previous ethnic base but rather a cultural substrate that was necessary (but not sufficient) for creating the preconditions of a national narrative. This material in the Catalan case was difficult to mix and arose from a highly diverse territorial context. Today, being Catalan seems inextricably bound with the Battle of Almansa and Ramon Llull yet these elements were not determing factors, as one can see from the diversity of political projects that have bloomed in The Catalan Lands over the last few years. As Renan (1882) so nicely puts it: "L'existence d'une nation est un plébiscite de tous les jours".

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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Marc Sanjaume i Calvet. Advisor and researcher at the Self-Government Institute (IEA) and collaborating lecturer at the Open University of Catalonia (UOC). He gained his PhD in Political Theory and took a post-doctoral course at the Quebec University at Montreal (UQAM). He has been on research training programmes at Laval University and Edinburgh University. His research focuses on theories of democracy, nationalism and self-determination.

Special Issue

"Culture and State: Creative Autonomy, Political Struggle and Instrumentalisation"

Culture and State: Creative Autonomy, Political Struggle and Instrumentalisation

Joaquim Rius-Ulldemolins

UNIVERSITAT DE VALÈNCIA / INSTITUCIÓ ALFONS EL MAGNÀNIM

INTRODUCTION

The relationship between State and culture has been a tricky one since the mid-19th Century. Vicent Dubois in his book (Dubois, 1999) reminds us that the origins of cultural policy lay in attempts to clip the State's wings and stop it instrumentalising culture for its own purposes. Indeed, it would not be until the mid-20th Century when the relationship between culture and State would again be presented as an alliance (which we have traditionally termed 'cultural policies'). Philip Urfalino, in his book on the genesis of French political culture (often taken as the birth of this kind of policy action in the mid-20th Century) characterises the new cultural policy as a utopian, reformist project in the social and political spheres (Urfalino, 1996).

The cultural policy drawn up by André Malraux aimed to stem America's then incipient dominance of the cultural industry. US cultural influence was seen as la machine à rêves — a kind of juggernaut that brought out the worst in the masses, letting their brutish instincts run riot. Cultural policy was seen as a way of unifying national society through 'High Culture' and was based on the idea that mere contact with it would enlighten citizens and help pioneering creators in their quest for aesthetic innovation — something that was often poorly understood at the time. Such cultural policy aims were clearly over-ambitious. The first sociological analyses by Pierre Bourdieu and Alain Darbel (2003) revealed that the great cultural

institutions catered to a relatively narrow audience. Cultural policy might raise the profile of new creators and boost middle-class interest but it encountered structural hurdles to fostering cultural participation among the working classes and the young. Furthermore, these grand aims were never matched by the funding and public initiatives needed to achieve them. This created one of the most long-lasting features of cultural policy: the contradiction between grand ritualised discourses and half-hearted practical implementation that involved a fair amount of back-scratching among the elites but did little for the masses.

CULTURE AND THE POLITICAL SPHERE: THE POLITICISATION OF CULTURE

The modern conception of Art began to take shape at the beginning of the 19th century. It was one in which Art was seen as a civilising influence and the artist as a hero who could create something from nothing and subvert the dehumanising machinations of Capitalism (Chiapello, 1998; Moulin, 1992). This process has been considered as artistic criticism of Capitalism — an argument made by César Graña (1964) — was to foster commitment among intellectuals to causes that criticise the system. In supporting these causes, intellectuals use specific accumulated capital (symbolic, cultural capital) to intervene in the political arena (Bourdieu, 2001, 2002). While there have been episodes during the 20th Century of "an aesthetic treatment of politics" — denounced by Walter Benjamin (1983) as a way of instrumentalising the arts to manipulate the masses. Later reaction by cultural sectors to such issues and the cultural policy rolled out after The Second World War prevented such political instrumentalisation by States (Urfalino, 1989, 1996). Yet one could also make the contrary argument by saying that there was undoubtedly political instrumentalisation of the Arts and culture by the cultural services of the Capitalist powers in their propaganda war with the Soviet bloc. Here, 'Western' countries presented their Arts and culture as examples of the social welfare and individual freedom achieved through the Capitalist system. However, this political use of Art sprang from a pre-existing pioneering movement (such as Abstract Neo-Expressionism) and cannot be considered as merely a product of this cultural policy. Rather, it should also be seen as part of the process of aesthetic renovation and the symbolic struggle among groups in the artistic field whose outcome was Modern Art (Bourdieu, 2002). In the 21st Century, the relationship between politics and Art has already shifted, with economic and policy instrumentalisation by development agencies and the financial elites. There is also a different interaction between artists and social movements. It is not so much that social entities use artists to boost the impact of their message on the masses as part of a new aesthetic — something that was the case in the First and Second Pioneering Movements and in May 68 (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2002; Chiapello, 1998). Rather, it is that there is now a re-orientation of part of this Bohemian segment and a

confluence of its aims with new social movements springing from the anti-globalisation struggle in the 1990s and mass protests.

POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY AND THE INSTRUMENTALISATION OF CULTURE

Contemporary sociologists broadly agree that the 1970s marked the beginning of a new period, which has been dubbed 'Post-Modernism', characterised by the waning importance of industry and manufacturing and the waxing importance of knowledge and consumption (Bell, 1991; Featherstone, 1991; Lash, 1994). The key role now played by consumption is paralleled by the expansion of the cultural sphere in society and the economy. Some authors have termed this 'Cognitive Capitalism' (Scott, 2007). In the process, culture's autonomy as a social sphere separate from politics and religion has been eroded and de-activated some of culture's self-referential dynamics (Bourdieu, 1977). In the Golden Age of Artistic Modernity, running from the end of the 19th Century to the mid-20th Century, the artistic sphere greatly influenced the political and economic spheres, as Daniel Bell (2007) notes. Since the advent of today's Post-Fordian society and its post-Modernist dynamics (Bell 1976, Jameson 1986), the artistic sphere has gradually fallen under the influence — if not the thrall — of other spheres such as economics and technology (Morozov, 2013). This last aspect has gained importance to the point where various authors have raised the spectre that a new digital culture will replace all cultural means of production, dissemination and consumption (Lessig, 2005) and that this will lead to deep changes in social and economic organisation (Kelly, 1998).

In any case, one can say that we are witnessing a growing political and economic instrumentalisation of culture (Gray, 2007). In the context of this transformation, the development of a 'creative city' has become one of the political priorities to attract investors and highly-educated, skilled professionals — the so-called 'creative class' (Florida, 2002). This yearning to foster a 'creative city' implies public policies aimed at crafting settings for 'the creative class' and the exhibition of 'creative images' leading to elitist, gentrifying policies (Peck, 2005). A strategy that forms part of the so-called 'entrepreneurial turn' in local policies (Harvey, 1989), stresses urban renewal based on big architectural projects, cultural institutions (Bianchini, 1993), glitzy events (García¬, 2004a), and the creation of cultural industry clusters (Scott, 2000, 2010). In redefining the aims of cultural policy, the agents of economic and tourism development now carry more clout than those nominally in charge of cultural policies. The former have instrumentalised culture in ways that takes precedence over aims such as social integration or promoting intrinsic cultural values (García, 2004b). In this context, the appearance and promotion of new neo-Bohemian districts can be interpreted as changing the functions of central urban areas to meet

the symbolic manifestation of creative industries and by so doing, configure cities as a leisure and consumption space for the new middle classes (Lloyd, 2010; Zukin, 1995).

THE AESTHETICISATION OF POLITICS

In our view, a subject that has received less attention is the metamorphosis of social movements in what is termed 'the aestheticisation of politics'. The term was originally used to denounce the manipulation of the masses by totalitarian States and was coined by Walter Benjamin (1983)[1]. Other authors have used a similar concept, the 'artification' [*artistización*] of politics, to denounce the way cultural legitimisation is used to push bad urban renewal policies (Delgado, 2008) or to banalise political activism (Delgado, 2013). However, we shall use the concept of 'artification' in a similar way to that in Heinich and Shapiro (2012), is describe the expansion in production and consumption patterns in Art and other spheres, and the emergence of new policies and kinds of creativity in new urban social movements. These movements forge a new relationship between culture and technology in ways that reflect the patterns found in ICT [Information and Communication Technologies] and cultural consumption (Ariño Villarroya, 2009). Likewise, culture and technology are seen as a chance to forge new social relationships and free creativity — something that has been termed a 'Cyber-Utopia' (Morozov, 2012, 2013) and as we shall see, defines the political attitude of the urban neo-Bohemians. Cyber-Utopianism idealises the capabilities of cybernetics and thus, by extension, ICT in helping to build an ideal society (Ouellet, 2009).

This neo-Bohemianism thus plays the key role in the convergence between creativity and political activism — a convergence that some have dubbed *Artivism* (Felshin, 1996). So, unlike the Bohemianism of the 19th and 20th centuries, today's creators not only create an alternative urban sub-culture (Fischer, 1995) but also offer hope and projects of a common or a collaborative nature by social groups opposing neo-Liberal urban re-zoning and the advance of 'Cognitive Capitalism' (Novy and Colomb, 2013). Nevertheless, one should note the limits of this *artivism*, which faces difficulties in consolidating projects that go beyond the local sphere, in creating stable organisation and in linking up to other kinds of social movements (Funke and Wolfson, 2014). Yet we should recall that much political thinking is based on the idea of free culture (Lessig, 2005) and the Cyber-Utopianism that legitimises it (Morozov, 2012, 2013). The roots of these ideas may be found in 'Californian ideology', which we can characterise as a combination of Bohemian attitudes, technological

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1 **Translator's Note:** The concept can be traced back to Walter's paper *Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit*, published in *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* in 1936.

utopianism and neo-Liberalism (Barbrook 1996). Such an attitude combines lifestyle and the political views of a Bohemian Middle-Class generation (Brooks 2001) or of workers in creative industries (Lloyd 2010), whose anti-institutional, creative, flexible ethos is consistent with the needs of Post-Fordian Capitalism (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2002).

POLITICS, CULTURE AND SOCIAL CHANGE

Cultural debates have become less and less the preserve of an enlightened minority or a 'closed shop' for specialists in which intellectuals act as spokesmen. Now we find ourselves at the centre of a social and political debate (albeit one that is often distorted) on so-called 'culture wars'. It is noteworthy that the terms 'cultural politics' and 'culture war' are now used by the traditional media in general and the new digital media in particular. This reveals the extent to which such topics have become a matter of heated public debate. In addition, others — sympathising with protest movements demanding a new kind of politics — have called for the re-politicisation of culture (Barbieri, 2012) and for turning culture into a tool for fashioning hegemony for the New Left (Barcelona en Comú, 2015). The Spanish State is assailed by a crisis of political and cultural legitimacy, in what has been termed 'The Culture of the Transition'[2] (Martínez, 2012).

Nevertheless, the debate on political commitment either largely ignores or down-plays the importance of the divide between the political Right and Left and the limits to public initiative in the cultural field. These structural limits reveal that the cultural field has long been a battleground for feuding elites. To this one should add that cultural sectors (especially cultural industries and cultural tourism) are favoured by those in government, which sees them as creating wealth, jobs and thus for fostering economic development and social consensus (Rius-Ulldemolins and Sánchez, 2015). One could oppose this perspective with a moralising vision of cultural autonomy or argue the need for alternatives to a world that is ever more business-oriented and run by the elites. Yet this would not help in quickly finding other ways of meeting the challenges of development in the context of a Post-Fordian, globalised economy. Furthermore, calls to turn cultural policy into a weapon in the battle against hegemonic forces are unrealistic. The barriers to such a change are prosaic but formidable: the inertia of cultural policy; the limitations placed by Administrative Law; the sheer cost of institutions fostering artistic excellence; lack of manpower and other resources in public administrations strapped for funds and weighed down by red tape (Rubio Arostegui *et al.*, 2014; Rubio and Rius-Ulldemolins, 2015). There are many criticisms one can make of the Social-Democratic vision of culture, for example its inefficiency and incrementalist

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2 **Translator's Note:** 'Transition' has a special meaning in Spain, often being used to refer to the end of the country's shift from Fascist dictatorship under General Franco to democracy in the mid to late 1970s.

tendency (Rubio and Rius-Ulldemolins, 2015). Yet despite its shortcomings, it sets objectives (the redistribution of cultural goods) and mobilises the resources needed to achieve them (public cultural services throughout the country and minimum public rights to culture) (Martinez and Rius, 2010). Even so, calling for a pro-commons culture may go no further than fine words unless a link is forged between the two elements that overcomes the elitism of Neo-Bohemian and Cyber-utopian practices (Rius-Ulldemolins, 2015).

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE DEBATE

Despite this growing centralisation in cultural policy, the debate in *País Valencià* [The Valencian Country, an autonomous region of Spain] and in the Spanish State is generally very limited and based on rudimentary considerations. In these respects, it lags far behind the debates in leading countries such as France or The United Kingdom. In Spain, the debates still focus on the valid but rather outdated choice between democratising culture (dissemination of 'High Culture') and cultural democracy (recognition of cultural diversity and daily creativity). It is thus far-removed from the new trends, 'agentisation' of cultural policy, the limits of public-sector action and criticism of its inertia, *de facto* elitism and role in legitimising speculation, gentrification and the politicisation of culture and its potential and scope for transforming society.

That is why this collection of papers — *Quadern de Debats. Revista de cultura, poder y sociedad* [Debating Papers. Journal of Culture, Power and Society] makes a notable contribution in getting to grips with the relationship between culture and the State. The paper by Clive Gray (professor at Warwick University, UK) reveals the difficulty of analysing cultural policy, given that there are various theoretical and methodological perspectives. Some of these approaches are oriented towards an institutional study rooted in Political Science. Others take a more critical, analytical approach to the ideological domination exercised by the hegemonic classes (from a Neo-Gramscian perspective) or by those in power (taking a more Foucoultian perspective). Both approaches are developed by Cultural Studies. That said, it is worth relating the institutionalist and critical perspectives, as does Vincent Dubois, a sociologist and politologist at *Université de Strasbourg*. From a perspective that combines sociological and political tools, Dubois makes a critique of the French system, which he argues is a model in crisis. This crisis is revealed in the model's limits, inertia and ambiguities. The French State's ambition, to paraphrase Crozier (1992), "is over-blown". France's cultural policy has serious social limitations and fails to 'democratise culture'. A combination of growing 'economisation', globalisation (with greater control by American media and multinationals) and the loss of the artistic autonomy won with the advent of modernity has rendered the French model less relevant.

Mangset at Telemark University College [*Høgskolen i Telemark* (HiT)] (Norway) considers another cultural policy model involving Arts Councils operating on an 'arm's length' basis (that is to say, with separation between politics and management). The model comes from the English-speaking world and aims to ensure autonomy in the cultural sector and avoid the self-interested bias and patronage that stem from over-dependence on the State. The 'English' model was adopted in Scandinavia and by countries in the former Soviet bloc at the end of the 20th Century. Such Arts Councils enshrine the principle of artistic autonomy and management based on independent boards of trustees and public competitions. The model has been interpreted and implemented in different ways, depending on the history and the balance between elites in each country. Such adaptation reveals that this model also suffers from dysfunctions and ambiguities. These are problems also found in the relationship between State and culture — issues that cannot be resolved merely through organisational formulas or 'best practices' as if they were some universal 'cure all'.

Pierre-Michel Menger and Gisèle Sapiro's articles take a longer-term view. In the first place, Menger, a Sociologist at the prestigious *Collège de France* lucidly analyses the links between culture, political commitment and the State in the Modern Age. He highlights the syllogism that equates the *avant-garde* with the struggle against bourgeois conformism and cultural conservatism. Here, he points out that while the elites have always been the most ardent fans of artistic innovation, a cultural policy that supports innovation for its own sake is a dead end and only leads to policies with no rhyme or reason. Gisèle Sapiro conducts an erudite, penetrating analysis of the origins of the Right-Left split in the literary field. This study (which ranges from the 19th to the mid-20th centuries) sheds light on the various kinds of political commitment shown by writers during this period. She shows that the division arose along with the expansion and organisation of the artistic field, which gave rise to its political labelling and rifts. As a result, a chasm opened up between the Left's 'committed' Art and the commercial, conservative Art favoured by the Right. Yet this political commitment cannot be understood without grasping the nature of the Art field, which is a relatively self-contained one that is reserved for battles between the elites.

Last but not least, Juan Arturo Rubio-Arostegui, Juan Pecourt and Joaquim Rius-Ulldemolins show that the notion of creativity has changed the notion of doctrine or vogue, which has been liberally used and abused. Specifically, the authors focus on two cases. The first concerns the (excessively) high regard in which creativity in and the transition to the digital field are held. The frequently ignored downside is that digitalisation weakens the focus and interaction needed for artistic creation. The second is that 'creativity' is trotted out by politicians as a pretext for big town-planning schemes/property speculation. Such schemes spawn 'White Elephants' that make a big media splash but cripple public finances and the scope for future cultural initiatives (Rius-Ulldemolins *et al.*, 2016).

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'The French Model' and its 'Crisis': Ambitions, Ambiguities and Challenges of a Cultural Policy*

Vincent Dubois

UNIVERSITÉ DE STRASBOURG / INSTITUT D'ÉTUDES POLITIQUES

vincent.dubois@misha.fr

ABSTRACT

French cultural policy is often regarded as a model. However, in France, the crisis of national cultural policy has been endlessly discussed since the 1980s. This disillusionment is partly due to over-estimation of the model's consistency from the outset. This paper looks at the foundations of French cultural policy, showing that the present difficulties stem from the model's foundational ambiguities and contradictions. We thus offer a critical view of the legacy of a policy that has been vigorously pursued over the last fifty years and analyse the difficulties it currently faces and their roots. The paper concludes with proposals for new ways of approaching these issues.

Keywords: *cultural policy*, *cultural field*, *French model*, *cultural democratisation*, *centralism*, *State*, *France*

INTRODUCTION: A MODEL IN CRISIS?

When it comes to cultural policy, France has long been seen as a model to follow. As with the 'Scandinavian Model' for welfare, the 'German Model' for vocational training, the 'American Model' for higher education and research, the 'French Model' is a safe, common-sense option if one compares it with cultural policies at the international level. It is, as it were, 'The Gold Standard'. The State's commitment to Art goes back a long way, together with high public spending, a large number of prestigious institutions that are ever-present in political debate, that command broad support and whose representatives, such as André Malraux[1] and Jack Lang[2] are national icons. Although polemicists sometimes scorn French 'arrogance'

1 First Minister, charged with Cultural Affairs during Charles de Gaulle's presidency, from 1959 to 1969.

2 Minister of Culture under François Mitterrand's presidency, from 1981 to 1986 and later from 1988 to 1993.

or compare the country's cultural policy with that of totalitarian regimes, it usually has positive connotations. Since the 1980s, the experience of France's Ministry of Culture and its efforts to structure a national cultural policy have inspired (albeit superficially) some European governments such as Greece, Spain, and Italy. This is because the virtues of the French model have been hyped (especially through UNESCO, the Council of Europe, and meetings of European Ministers of Culture at the EU level) as something that can easily be adopted by other countries. Indeed, France's Ministry of Culture even has a programme for disseminating its model, organisation and know-how worldwide.[3] Also when it comes to French government involvement in international negotiations on cultural issues (whether on the 'cultural exception'[4] principle in the 1993 Trade Agreements or, more recently, in affirming the principle of cultural diversity), stress is laid on the unique nature of the country's culture and France's firm political commitment to keeping it that way.[5]

The apparent international success of 'The French Model' contrasts starkly with the disillusionment and questioning it has faced at home since the late 1980s. Indeed, the belief that there is a 'crisis' in France's cultural policy is widely shared by various sectors, ranging from culture professionals to experts, artists, and opposition politicians. Yet there is less agreement when it comes to what the problems and their causes are, and even less regarding what solutions are needed. The analyses and criticisms reflect a broad spectrum of standpoints and approaches. In addition, they are often accompanied by calls for a root-and-branch reform of cultural policy. In the late 1980s, these debates were articulated around the need to 'soft-pedal' Lang's policy (begun in the early 1980s) and then took up the criticisms made by right-wing

and conservative circles. Subsequent budget limitations, clashes and controversy over the merits of successive Culture Ministers, and a lack of broad political support turned the idea of a 'crisis' into something that was taken for granted. The 'gaps and failures' of France's cultural policy were revealed in President Sarkozy's 2007 letter setting out the targets to be met by the Culture Minister and calling for "a new impetus".[6] Yet a Commission had been set up in 1993 charged precisely with the same kind of overhaul almost a decade and a half later. Management of government cultural initiatives seemed to be based on acknowledging the problems of the model they had inherited yet trying to maintain its legacy. The five years of François Hollande's government are no exception to the rule and the Culture Ministry's budget has been slashed. This flies in the face of the left-wing mantra that spending on culture is justified by its 'economic impact' and partly contradicts the foundational guidelines for France's cultural policy.

Two issues underlie the belief that France's cultural policy is in crisis. Above all, public policy in this field had failed to democratise culture; yet, it was precisely to achieve this aim that the policy was instituted in the late 1950s. The policy had also failed to keep French culture in the international limelight for want of effective ways to subsidise the creation of contemporary art and disseminating its works. To these two main flaws, one must add a host of other complaints about: (1) over-spending on Paris and under-spending in the rest of France; (2) shortcomings in the protection of artistic heritage; (3) failure to respond to cultural changes caused by widespread adoption of ICT [Information and Communication Technology]; (4) funding problems in the performing arts and the audiovisual sector (two key sectors in the government's cultural policy following the 2003 crisis in the 'tide-over' benefits paid to those working in these sectors).[7]

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3 The so-called *Rencontres Malraux* [Malraux Gatherings], begun in 1994.

4 **Translator's Note:** An explanation of the concept can be found at https: //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cultural_exception

5 Due to lack of space, we cannot include comparisons which could set French specificities into perspective. See Dubois, 2015a.

6 The *lettre de mission* or statement of objectives sent by President Sarkozy to Christine Albanel, Minister of Culture (1st August 2007).

7 These 'tide-over' benefits for sporadic workers in these sectors [in French: *intermittents du spectacle*] covered periods of unemployment between shows, plays, productions, etc., giving such workers steadier incomes.

In these respects, 'The French Model' is 'in crisis'. Recent studies state this *ad nauseam*, warning of: "the death of a myth" (Dijan, 2005); "a system whose days are numbered" (Abirached, 2005); a system plagued with "irregularities"; "a model that is choking to death" (Benhamou, 2006); "culture glut" (Brossat, 2008). Some even went so far as to look to the United States (a model the French had shunned hitherto) as a source of inspiration for a new cultural model (Martel, 2006). Such views are not baseless. Even so, could it be that the virulence and persistence of such criticisms stems from over-confidence in the model? Does it collapse have such an impact because so much faith was placed in its resilience and consistency?[8] Does it really make sense to talk of 'crisis' to describe a situation that has now been going on for nearly three decades? Could it be that the rhetoric of 'crisis' and all the harking back to a supposedly 'Golden Age' overlooks structural problems — a kind of Original Sin — that can be traced back to the inception of France's cultural policy? These questions are the starting point for a brief presentation on the French culture policy system and the challenges it faces.

First, we shall go over the foundations of this system, without forgetting their accompanying contradictions. We shall then see how transformations in relationships between the cultural and political fields[9] made such contradictions the basis for questioning a cultural policy whose success had been based on its provisional nature.

THE BUILDING OF A CULTURAL POLICY SYSTEM AND ITS CONTRADICTIONS AND WATERSHEDS

French cultural policy has never had the consistency of a 'model' (that is to say, something that was methodically designed as a coherent set of principles,

objectives, and organisational means and modes).[10] Nevertheless, its formation was accompanied by the development of a system of sorts (often in a halting, erratic manner) in the sense that a whole came into being whose component relationships were fairly well-balanced, inter-dependent, and mutually reinforcing. We shall sketch the main elements of the system, paying special attention to both its ambiguities and its evolutionary trends.

The origins

It is often considered that French cultural policy can be traced back to the secular legacy of absolute Monarchy. Indeed, from the 16th century onwards, strong links were forged between the State and fields of cultural production. The monarchy, together with the aristocracy and the Church, were patrons of the Arts. Moreover, the conflict-ridden process of forming a modern State (in which the King imposed his primacy over feudal lords and later the Church) led to big spending on Art, managed by the Superintendancy of Royal Buildings, an organisation set up in 1535. This competitive dynamic led to institutions springing up that, in addition to bolstering the monarchy's prestige, provided a framework for long-term support of scientific, literary and artistic endeavours in France. Some examples are: the *Collège Royal* (today *Collège de France*), founded in 1530; the *Comédie Française*, founded in 1680. The *Académie Française* (1635) and the *Académie Royale de Peinture et de Sculpture* (1648) were created by the State and maintained under royal patronage. These institutions were one of the first cases of setting out special rules for literary and artistic activities and paved the way for boosting certain fields of cultural production (Bourdieu, 1993).

Identification with these remote beginnings seemed to grow stronger in later stages of the formation of a Nation-State, giving free rein to public intervention and having a lasting impact on the cultural scene.

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8 While endless talk of a cultural 'crisis' and moaning about the state of affairs is not a purely French vice, the debate is particularly intense in France. There are two reasons why this is so: (1) the great expectations raised by France's cultural policy; (2) the central place accorded culture in French public debates. This points the way to a comparative analysis of the public stances taken on cultural policies.

9 Here, we use the notion of 'field' in the sense meant in Pierre Bourdieu's sociology (1993).

10 Except maybe — following Urfalino (1996) — when cultural policy initiatives were consolidated in *Maisons de la Culture* (cultural centres) between 1959 and 1963, and which created both a symbol and an instrument.

Here, one can cite the creation of the *Archives Nationales* (1799) *Musée du Louvre* (1793) at the beginning of The French Revolution, or Education Acts (1881 and 1882) and legislation for the protection of national monuments (1913) [*Loi du 31 décembre 1913 sur les monuments historiques*] during The French Third Republic.[11]

This brief look at the past reveals that the creation of a national culture in France and the genesis of elements for organising the cultural sphere are both strongly linked to the historical formation of the State. Indeed, the State not only contributed to institutional infrastructure and cultural development. Rather, the organisation of the State and of culture went hand-in-hand in a process of nation-building and unification — something that is very clear-cut when it comes to language.

This early historical articulation between State, culture, and the nation was intense and perhaps explains the many singular features of French cultural policy. Nevertheless, should we consider Francis I of France, Louis XIV, Colbert or Richelieu as the inventors of this policy, or even go back *ad infinitum* to discover the roots of the modern Nation-State in the mists of time? Such a quest is fraught with perils. One of the rules of the historical method is to be wary of anachronistic interpretations. It is all too easy to take modern cultural policy and read it in an unhistorical way, seeing it foreshadowed at every twist and turn in the past. In other words, there is a risk of reading the past through modern glasses. Taking Norbert Elias' metaphor, it is as if we were to see a house built in the modern style but made from old materials as a true testimonial to the past. Second, the genesis of contemporary cultural policy is not a linear story. Hence we should not be blinded by a discourse that stresses continuity.

The term 'cultural policy' and its manifestation in the form of special institutional structures, and of political and administrative functions can be dated back to 1959. This is when France set up a Ministry for Cultural Affairs. The step was especially significant when set against a long history of achievements on the one hand and on the other, structural limitations, lost opportunities and failures.[12] The event was a watershed and while it did not occur in a historical vacuum, it should not be read as inevitable and/or stemming from a pre-existing cultural policy.

Here, it is worth briefly looking at the background to the creation of the Ministry for Cultural Affairs (later renamed Ministry of Culture) as the flagship of French cultural policy. The setting up of the Ministry was basically due to a combination of one-off events. One was General de Gaulle's return to power in the middle of the Algerian War following the declaration of the French Fifth Republic, whose Constitution was ratified in October 1958. Along with General de Gaulle came a political team, some of whose members were new. One of 'the new boys' was André Malraux, a famed author described by de Gaulle as a «faithful friend». Malraux was highly-regarded by the left because of his support for the Republican cause in The Spanish Civil War. Yet he was also a tireless propagandist for the Gaullist Party [*Rassemblement du Peuple Français* — RPF). The change of government ushered in a period of intense reforms and modernisation and hence the roll-out of new policies. The Ministry of Cultural Affairs and the cultural policy that it gave rise to were the result of the conjunction of both factors. Without falling for the idea of 'The Great Man' theory of History, one should nevertheless recognise the key role played by André Malraux in these new policies. Malraux was made Minister without portfolio for Cultural Affairs in June 1958. He had no clear duties and apart from dealing with matters such as 'Youth' and Scientific Research, also acted as the President's spokesman in Council. Max Weber (Weber, 1971) noted that Malraux's charisma made him stand out. Despite his political usefulness, Malraux could not remain

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11 There are numerous historical syntheses on the issue. We especially recommend the one by Poirrier (2000).

12 We refer to our studies on these questions (Dubois, 2001; Dubois, 2012).

without portfolio indefinitely. Work was therefore begun on an administrative re-organisation whose main purpose was to carve out a Ministry for him. The Ministry of Cultural Affairs emerged from this re-organisation in July 1959 and basically focused on beefing up administration of the Arts and Literature, which until then have been the poor relations of the Ministry of National Education. The new Ministry incorporated cinema, which had hitherto been under the aegis of the Ministry for Industry and Trade.

Unlike in other cases, the Ministry had to come up with a mission to justify its existence. The institutional *bricolage* from which the Ministry sprang created a cultural policy that its promoters saw as new and a radical break with the legacy of the 19th century. The Ministry was to further an ambitious project that established the State's role in organising society and preparing its future. In these respects, it epitomised the style of government of the French Fifth Republic.

The fact is that French cultural policy is neither the simple continuation of a secular legacy nor the result of rational decision-making. Rather it is a spin-off from the long history of the links between culture and State and a short history of institutional accords being cobbled together in the midst of political and cultural changes. Yet the main historical enigma lies not so much in cultural policy intervention but rather its institutionalisation. Its most puzzling aspects are the social need adduced for such a policy and the political and bureaucratic legitimacy with which it was invested. These aspects make it hard to question such a policy (and whose aims were still far from being achieved in the early 1970s). We shall now see how the policy system emerged and evolved from these heterogeneous beginnings.

Specifying the culture
One of the main distinctive features of the French cultural policy system is that in France, the construction of 'Culture' (with a capital 'C') as a domain on its own for public action probably emerged earlier and with greater force than elsewhere. This policy category is inextricably linked with the consolidation of

public cultural bodies and with an officially-inspired definition of 'culture'.

Let us return for a moment to both the Ministry's consolidation and the government's cultural policy at the beginning of the 1960s. The first problem was to organise the administration of a remit, which though not entirely new, was intended to break with and be free from the political and institutional organisation of culture that had prevailed hitherto. In other words, the idea was basically to create a Ministry of Cultural Affairs independent from the powerful Ministry of Education from which it sprang. The new Ministry did not merely emerge after grappling with the challenges of the organisation chart but involved building a cultural policy by drawing a distinction between its mission and that of education policy. Indeed, the Ministry's promoters dwelt so much on this differentiation that they risked turning their new creation into a fringe body with a narrow remit. Similarly, Malraux and his first senior civil servants worked hard to dissociate the Ministry and its policy from institutions and spheres that in principle were closely allied — for example leisure organisation, entertainment, and public education. In the first place, the Ministry's mission was consolidated by delimiting its bounds, defining its cultural policy in an indirect way, and by stating what it was not about (to wit, it did not complement education or leisure management). This marks a major difference with the approach taken in other countries, where mental schemes and practical considerations lead to the forging of links between culture and other sectors (for instance: tourism, education, sport).

This way of consolidating the institution and the State's cultural mission led to a definition of 'Culture' that was initially highly restrictive (Dubois, 2003a). In fact, although the discourses reveal vaunting ambition and could easily be interpreted to refer to rising to the challenges of civilisation, initially the Ministry's cultural policy was confined to the classical heritage beloved by art historians and the contemporary cultural creation endorsed by erudite critics. In other words, cultural policy concerned the

culture of the elites. Everything else — the output of culture industries, folk traditions and the like — were left to fend for themselves, generally without any institutional support.

This cultural legitimisation by the State — still strongly marked today — was clearly shown in the formulation of cultural democratisation, which is a key mission in public cultural policies. Cultural democratisation is not framed in terms of the diversification of cultural forms, of majority expression, or of fostering creativity. Rather, it is intended to provide access to and to disseminate scarce cultural resources. The Decree setting up the Ministry defines 'democratisation' as "ensuring that works of Art are accessible" but only refers to putting them on public display and says nothing about disseminating art. Thus 'democratisation' differs little from proselytism and conversion, attempting to convince more people to join the elite's culture cult. In practice, this mainly led to displaying cultural offerings in museums, libraries and other cultural centres. This greatly boosted the number of cultural products available and whose quality was guaranteed by specialists. The idea was that boosting supply would automatically boost demand.

Although the policies currently adopted are still based on this 'supply and demand' rationale, institutional cultural offerings are much broader today than they were in the early 1970s (Dubois, 2003a). Local polices were drawn up in the wake of a spate of cultural controversies in the late 1970s. The decade saw the promotion of less institutional, less bourgeois cultural offerings in venues that sought to "get closer to the everyday lives of citizens". Later, cultural forms that had hitherto been dismissed as of minor value began to enjoy public support after the Left came to power in 1981 and especially after Jack Lang became Minister of Culture. Strategies for spreading 'Culture' would continue but now they were to be combined with more realistic approaches based on cultural renewal (promoting 'cultures'). By fostering more diverse sources of cultural creation, the Ministry sought to take an active part in consecrating the social production of 'culture'. This new symbolic function was applied

to things that fell outside the charmed circle of 'High Culture' (rock music, comics, photography, fashion, industrial heritage, and later hip-hop and so on). The aim was renovation and to confer prestige on fields that had previously been ignored. Yet there were limits to this change of heart. Without delving into the results of these new (sometimes contradictory) policies, one should note that governmental cultural policy has hardly taken 'fringe' cultures on board and that most of the money available continues to be spent on institutionally acceptable culture.

A centralised system?

The issue of defining what culture the policy should foster is linked to centralisation insofar as 'legitimate' French culture stems from national institutions that are mainly based in Paris. Even so, the centralism of French cultural policy is neither so straightforward nor so widespread as might seem at first sight.

First, one should stress that it is not just about a carve-up of powers between Central Government and local entities. In fact, "Parisian hegemony" (Menger, 1993) is due in equal measure to three factors: (1) strong centralisation of political and economic power; (2) the concentration of most of the major institutions of the cultural field (publishing houses, the media, main, national theatres, museums, libraries galleries, leading universities, and so on) in the capital; (3) the fact that many artists live there (in the performing arts, the vast majority of them). These three forms of concentration are mutually reinforcing. Thus, decentralising political and administrative power from central government to local entities is not enough to strike a new balance between the capital and the provinces.

The centre's pre-eminence in French cultural policy occurs at various levels and reflects diverse rationales. Here, we shall highlight the three most important ones. The first is the relationship between political and institutional forces. At the outset, the centralisation of cultural policy was not inevitable. Municipalities had a fair amount of experience in the field and this point was repeatedly made in the debates on how a national

cultural policy should be drawn up (Comité d'histoire, 1997; Dubois *et al.*, 2012). Yet political considerations (many municipalities representatives advocating for a non-centralised cultural policy at the time were communists) and the institutional strategy for strengthening the still weak authority of the Ministry of Cultural Affairs meant that the approach taken was mainly a centralised one. Later, the institutional consolidation of the Ministry of Culture and growth in the 1980s were accompanied by marked presence of national administration throughout the country. The Regional Offices for Cultural Affairs [*Directions Régionales des Affaires Culturelles — DRAC*) — a kind of cultural prefecture operating under the Ministry's authority — did a lot to disseminate centrally-drawn up directives. Their experience, the requirement to consult them on cultural matters and their control over funding[13] enabled them to maintain local leadership in their field.

Beyond these institutional matters, the centre's leading role was established at the same time at both the symbolic and the cultural level. The Ministry of Culture built up financial reserves, experience and forged networks of contacts in the cultural sphere. It consolidated a hegemonic position in defining culture and cultural quality. Proselytisation in the shape of 'cultural democratisation' was from the centre to the periphery. Despite the twists and turns along the way, one must acknowledge that the cultural policies (including decentralisation in the 1980s) favoured a national culture over local cultural diversity or the emergence of counter-balancing cultural poles in the provinces.

Last, one should recall that cultural concentration in the capital was also rooted in political options, or at the very least, stemmed from tendencies that successive governments had done very little to correct. In fact, cultural policy leads to an international projection which — going beyond a presence abroad (as we will see later in this paper) — stresses the

delights and prestige of Paris. This exacerbates the imbalance between Paris and the rest of the country. These policy options are clear for all to see in the concentration of great cultural works in Paris, the Louvre, the *Musée du Quai Branly, Opéra Bastille, Cité de la Musique*. This concentration reinforces the budgetary imbalance in favour of Paris — a city stuffed with cultural centres.[14] This concentration is not solely the result of an authoritarian dictat. It also stems from the concentration of cultural media in the capital, which offers the 'haves' ever more and also ensures the viability of new investments. Hence the building of an expensive new library in Paris when the libraries of France's university cities are in a sorry state. The cruel logic is that Paris is where such a facility will get most visitors.

French cultural policy is nevertheless not only about centralisation. Local, municipal, departmental [a *Department* being a kind of 'county'] and regional entities are involved in the cultural sphere and, taken as a whole, spend more than the Ministry of Culture. The municipalities are the first chronologically and in order of importance is this field. From the end of the 19th Century, the legislation gave them free rein to undertake cultural initiatives. This led to the creation of many theatres, museums and libraries. Ever since, culture (little-regulated in legal terms, and charged with symbolism) has been an innovative sphere for local leaders, many of them left-wingers. This is the case of 'Municipal Socialism' in the early 20th Century, and in Paris' 'red belt' during the inter-War period, and from the 1950s onwards. It was also true in other cities run by left-wing politicians (many with backgrounds in co-operative movements). In the 1970s, these cities strove hard to introduce 'participatory democracy' and meet the aspirations of 'the new middle classes' (teachers, social workers and other graduates, often with working-class origins). French cities had thus begun development

13 This leadership is currently being greatly questioned, as will be seen later.

14 Spending is currently split almost evenly between the Paris Region [Île-de-France] and the rest of France. That said, up until early 2000, the split was heavily weighted in favour of Paris and the Île-de-France. Source: *Ministère de la Culture et de la Communication.*

of cultural policies long before the 1982 and 1983 decentralisation legislation (which basically ratified the *status quo*) (Saez, 2003). For some time (and contrary to common belief), public cultural funding has mainly been in the hands of regional bodies. Their spending on culture rose to €7.6 million in 2010 (in comparison, the Ministry of Culture's budget in 2016 is €3.4 million in 2016, including subsidies for the audio-visual sector and press). Other Ministries have their own cultural budgets (for 2016, these total close on €4 million for conserving buildings, international cultural exchanges (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and even art education and cultural initiatives (Ministry of Education) (Ministry of Culture and Communication, 2016: 81–104).

These developments gave municipal governments a great deal more autonomy as they competed to attract tourism and to burnish their 'image' (and hence culture). Decentralisation helped nurture local cultural policies because it took place at a moment when the national government was spending more than ever in this field. Cultural policy, it seemed, was advancing by leaps and bounds. There was much cause for rejoicing: the development of national and local initiatives (which satisfied all parties for the time being); cultural democratisation still seemed achievable; the impact of cultural hierarchies was softened (but not questioned); a host of festivals and new facilities, providing lots of photo opportunities for tape-cutting local politicians and the cultural agents backing the initiatives. This was to be a decisive moment in the organisation of France's cultural policy yet it was also to give rise to some of today's problems.

Artists, intellectuals and the State: alliances and competitions

One of the features of the new cultural policy was a shift away from a direct relationship between artist and authority (Elias, 1991), and lack of specialised State administration. In its place there is a much more complex system of relationships among inter-dependent agents. The new system leads to the intervention of intermediaries between culture-producers and policy managers. As I cannot pinpoint these new configurations and the changes they have brought about, I shall confine discussion to the trends in five main categories of agents.

Paradoxically, artists played virtually no role in drawing up the initial cultural policy. This was largely due to the fact that the new Ministry feared the influence still wielded by the Academies in the early sixties. It also considered them responsible for making 'The Fine Arts System' increasingly hidebound during the French Third Republic. On the other hand, many artists openly distrusted a policy in which the stress was on 'culture' rather than on 'the Arts'[15] and an institution that was bureaucratic and, in Eugène Ionesco's words, should limit itself to being a 'Supply Ministry' for artists.[16] In general, one should not overestimate the support of artists in the beginning for a policy run by a State that had traditionally been the butt for their criticism. Thus academicism and subversion were the two poles of a structural tension in the relationships between artist and cultural policies. Academicism was scathingly dismissed as 'Official Art' and as little more than a fad. A return to 'academicism' was regularly denounced, conditioning relationships and debates. It was something to be shunned at all costs by 'real artists' if they wanted their *oeuvre* to be recognised by their colleagues. At the same time, those who opposed the cultural policy argued that one of the unavoidable evils of such public meddling in culture would be the imposition of an official aesthetic, with 'the powers that be' setting up 'court' with 'their' artists. Here, one should note that historically speaking, many artists had seen themselves as 'subversive' insofar as they were against the *status quo* (and by extension, against the State itself). The issue concerned the political role that artists could play in conjunction with official political agents. It also bore in a more general way on the key issue of the policies to be pursued and the nature of artistic legitimacy. Could an artist base his

15 For instance, Jean Dubuffet in his essay *Asphyxiante culture* (1968).

16 Eugène Ionesco in *Le Figaro*, 3rd August 1974.

or her reputation on institutions that were answerable to the State? From these tensions, one can deduce artists' attitudes towards government policy. Artists were at the same time the main clients of the State but also its severest critics, they were both beneficiaries and forever unhappy with their lot even if it was only because cultural policy had spurred growth in funding requests that could not be met.

The same ambivalence could be seen among intellectuals, who were trapped between experience and criticism. Intellectuals had long played an important role in French politics in the 'literary politics' tradition described by Tocqueville in *The Old Regime and the Revolution* (1865) — that is to say, in the name of universal principles and values, and through a well-constructed discourse full of references. Without wholly abandoning this critical stance, intellectuals played an auxiliary role in the cultural policy. They carried out sociological studies, theorising and legitimating 'cultural democratisation'; took part in commissions; produced literature accompanying and fostering public initiatives or at any event, highlighting them (Dubois, 2011). Nevertheless, they encountered hurdles, as the quick failure to set up a great debate on cultural options showed. The State's policy hampered intellectuals in playing a political role. Thus at the start of the 1980s, the left-wing government in power bewailed "the silence of the intellectuals", that is to say, their lukewarm public support for the government's policy. Later on, as we shall see, cultural policy became a happy hunting ground for a new intellectual sector that used the policy as a butt for criticism.

One should note that in France, intellectuals hardly occupy important political posts, even though they often play an important political role. At the national level, most politicians come from France's elite schools teaching Economics and Public Administration, such as the *École Nationale d'Administration* (ENA). This trend has become ever stronger since the foundation of The Fifth Republic. The consequence is that those running the country are becoming distanced from the media and their cultural concerns. This trend is

exacerbated by the fact that today's politicians are poorly schooled in the humanities and literature — something that was not true of their (illustrious) forerunners. While the legacy of Malraux and Lang is ever-present, both were exceptions to the rule. In addition, one of the difficulties encountered by all Ministers of Culture is how to give form to a policy in a highly sensitive sector in which they have little or no expertise. Appointing Ministers (from 2000 onwards) with a background in cultural administration[17] has not wholly solved the problem. Unlike in other public sectors, culture rarely offers careers with scope for specialisation. Yet this does not prevent post-holders gaining policy-making experience in the field — something that is particularly true among politicians in France's big cities. The important point to highlight here is that the institutionalisation of cultural policies had made many question crude forms of cultural censorship and manipulation by political agents. This is not to say that such risks had vanished but from then on they would take more sophisticated forms — which in part protected artists and cultural players. That said, the development of this system of institutionalised relationships posed a major challenge to freedom of art and culture.

The cultural intermediaries and administrators in this system played the role of middlemen, which often gave them a central position. In fact, the institutionalisation of cultural policy had involved the specialisation and professionalisation of these cultural administrators. This is what happened to the Ministry of Culture's central administration, in local cultural services, and in what were termed 'cultural projects' whether fostered by institutions or by associations/private bodies. The development of cultural policies was accompanied by cultural management training. Such training was seen

17 Catherine Tasca (2000-2002), a senior Civil Servant in the French Ministry of Culture from the end of the 1970s and whose career was wholly in the culture field. Jean-Jacques Aillagon (2002-2004), was, among other things, former President of the Georges-Pompidou National Centre for Art and Culture [*Centre National d'Art et de Culture Georges-Pompidou*]. Audrey Azoulay, Minister of Culture since 2014, has spent much of his career as a senior civil servant, mainly dealing with cinema.

by managers as a guarantee of cultural quality and of organisational competence, doing away with the amateurishness of volunteers and the like. Others saw a danger of culture being bureaucratised, homogenised and vanishing behind the new 'admin' jobs. These positive and aspects were not incompatible. In any case, the new middlemen played a key role in the management of cultural policies precisely because they occupied a strategic position between culture producers and politicians.

This overview would not be complete without referring to the role played by the media, which in many respects are decisive in the interwoven system of relationships and legitimations. We shall return to some of the aforementioned tensions further on. What is traditionally termed 'political instrumentalisation of culture' now refers to the expectations of the media impact of publicly-supported cultural initiatives. Although the media act as 'censors' insofar as they select what they consider worthy of attention, they also denounce acts of political censorship that do not accord with their view of artistic freedom. In short, apart from a few extreme examples, the relations between art and politics are mediatised in both senses of the term. This is because the media play an intermediary role in these relations. The concentration of the media in Paris is yet another factor exacerbating cultural centralism. Going beyond the media's comments on cultural policy (in which prestige and symbolism play a key role), the cultural press (and the press in general) are part and parcel of the cultural policy system.

UNRESOLVED FOUNDATIONAL CONTRADICTIONS

At this juncture, it is worth looking at some of the main elements underpinning French cultural policy and thus the rationale behind its historic organisation. One can only grasp today's policy problems and challenges by taking these elements into account. This is so because the present situation may call this legacy into question and because the issues now facing us are clearly the result of long-standing contradictions.

Going beyond superficial differences, the weakening of the 'fundamentals' of a cultural policy refers to a form of de-specification — that is to say, the questioning of its constitution as a sphere separate from public action and with its own rationale. The main elements called into question are cultural policy's forms, organistion and even its *raison d'être*. This de-specification centres on a basic problem: the imposition of non-cultural rationales in dealing with cultural matters.

The questioning of a foundational principle: the failure of cultural democratisation

'Cultural democratisation' was the first foundational principle to be challenged. It had served as a legitimising principle of public cultural policy and was a shared belief (or at the least, a common reference) among administrators, politicians and culture professionals. One can say that 'cultural democratisation' is a kind of catch-all principle: a political reference to democracy and equality, properly-approved public programmes, artists' mission in serving the people and so on. The failure of cultural democratisation can be seen as both the questioning of a shared belief and a *modus vivendi* among agents in the cultural policy field. This shaken belief and falling out stems from citizens' deep disappointment with the results of the policy carried out in their name. The belief was also questioned for other reasons — for instance, to foster transformation in the intellectual field and in the role played by intellectuals in cultural policy. In a nutshell, during the first period of cultural policy, most intellectuals supported the cultural democratisation project but the gradual rise of conservative intellectuals has changed the situation. In fact, the latter centred debates on cultural policy from the end of the 1980s onwards, imposing their thesis that the initial democratic idea has been lost due to 'relativistic' shifts in cultural policy. They argued that the project's vacuousness threatened real culture[18] by demystifying it.

18 Finkielkraut (1987) and Fumaroli (1991) furnish the main examples of these conservative criticisms. For such discussions, see Dubois (2012).

These critics have been emboldened by the figures showing the paltry results of democratisation policies. Since the end of the 1980s, French cultural statistics have backfired on officialdom. Instead of legitimising cultural policies, they have undermined them (Dubois, 2015b). Here, I mainly refer to the questionnaires on 'French citizens' cultural practices' — surveys carried out at the Ministry of Culture's behest (Donnat, 1998). Above all, these surveys revealed the very limited changes in the social distribution of cultural practices. Put another way, cultural democratisation had failed because the gap between social classes had not narrowed in the slightest: the 'have-nots' continued to lack access to culture. By contrast, the policy had spurred greater consumption of culture by the 'haves' (the middle and upper classes). These results are all the more disappointing considering that over the period, the average duration of education had lengthened and that greater access to higher education would make one hope for both growth in and a more equitable social distribution of cultural practices. Moreover, the expansion of public library networks had not halted the decline in reading — the cultural practice *par excellence*. There had been a fall in the number of books read a year. At the same time, the consumption of television and music in various formats had grown greatly but these were cultural practices that fell beyond the scope of public policy and were dismissed as 'commercial'.

Lack of space precludes an analysis of these figures here since one would need to delve into the data-gathering methods and other aspects.[19] Nevertheless, one can highlight two points. The first is that the statistical evidence undermined the foundational belief in cultural democratisation time and again, deepening the nagging doubts about the cultural policy's tenets and legitimacy. In fact, the issue had been raised to seek an alternative aim rather than to suggest another way of achieving democratisation.[20]

This fruitless quest, which has already lasted twenty years, contributes greatly to the disillusionment characterising contemporary cultural policies. Furthermore, the cultural policy's weak impact on the democratisation of cultural practices is hardly surprising in light of the planks of this policy. A combination of professional and political interests have spawned cultural offerings that hardly influence citizens' choices on whether to visit museums or go to the theatre. No doubt the rationale underlying the Ministry of Culture's foundation (specialisation in policy and culture, either without the Ministry of National Education's involvement or opposed to it) arose from historical need. Yet this rationale had long-term structural consequences. This institutional division led to sociological aberrations that can be traced back to the Ministry's origins. How can one separate culture and education? How can one hope to reduce social inequalities in accessing art and culture without taking into account the importance of schooling (the first sociological studies revealed the decisive link between education and culture)?[21] Drawing up a cultural policy to make schools a path to cultural democratisation was broached quite some time ago. It was proposed to use art teaching and awareness programmes to this end. Yet this long-standing demand in French cultural policy has fallen on deaf ears. While there is no strong opposition to the idea, there are no strong advocates either. So far, the idea has come to naught.

Similar considerations apply regarding another legacy of setting the bounds to cultural policy: the absence of television. In the beginning, this was explained by political issues (in the 1960s, French television was still subject to direct political control) and at the same time, certain ideas of what culture was (the classic, legitimist view that made it hard to see television as a cultural medium). Later developments did nothing to remedy this oversight. Indeed, in this field culture policy has actually made things worse, given that the

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19 For a summary, see Wallach (2006).

20 In this respect, the projects under way on partial free entry to museums are singularly unpromising.

21 See Bourdieu (1966); for an update. For an in-depth examination, see Coulangeon (2003).

'cultural' programming on TV (art films, programmes on books, music and artists, broadcasting of plays and concerts) has shrunk.[22]

A critical situation in key sectors

The questioning of the general belief in democratisation is accompanied by problems of a more sectoral nature. Here, I shall mention two examples that in many respects are key to French cultural policy: heritage and the performing arts.

Heritage is the oldest and least controversial part of State intervention in the cultural field. The policy has resulted in many more places receiving protection, while museums and other ways of conserving and re-evaluating the past have sprung up. Yet there is concern that many historical monuments are in a sorry state. A ministerial report states that one in five monuments are in danger. The size of spending on France's heritage at a time of public spending cuts leads the State to broaden funding sources. Having to seek private sponsorship and giving private firms the job of managing historic sites heightens fears that commercial consideration will be given priority over heritage-related criteria. A new wave of decentralisation begun in 2003 went so far as to consider transferring certain national monuments to local administrations in order to ensure proper management. Quite apart from the symbolism of the State 'ditching' parts of the national heritage, these transfers beg many questions. Even if local authorities are capable of expert evaluation of heritage sites, there is the risk that historic and artistic criteria will be dumped in favour of ones based on sites as a draw for tourism. There are also doubts about local authorities' long-term financial resources to meet such commitments, in which case decentralisation would turn out to simply be a sneaky form of privatisation.

Let us now look at a second example of difficulties in a given sector, in this case, employment in the performing arts. This sector has traditionally been a key part of French cultural policy. There are three reasons for this: (1) the links between the history of theatre and the birth of cultural policy (especially on the issue of democratisation); (2) its share of the Ministry's budget; (3) the fact that theatre professionals are very active and in the public eye. Cultural employment is a main plank in the political discourse and has sometimes been used to justify public spending because of the scope for creating new jobs in the sector. However, managing employment in the performing arts became a problem in the early 1980s. Unlike in Germany (a country in which actors and ancillary staff have fixed jobs), in France those in the sector are usually taken on for short engagements. In between contracts, actors and other staff are covered by unemployment benefits paid for out of employers' contributions and social security funds. The system takes account of the sporadic nature of jobs in the sector and accepts that the risks stemming from precarious employment are not covered by cultural institutions but by the social security system. This system sparked fierce criticism when unemployment soared (as did the cost of paying benefits to would-be actors and ancillary staff). This rise was not accompanied by a proportional rise in the number of jobs on offer (Menger, 2005). This led to a spectacular rise in the number of actors and ancillary staff on the dole[23] (excluding an army of uneligible applicants for benefits). Two reasons for this sharp rise were more public cultural offerings and widespread use of sporadic contracts by private audio-visual firms.[24] This engendered the following paradox: because the employment regime of performing arts workers and ancillary staff was not covered by cultural bodies, the problem was left in the hands of firms with a greater interest in saving money than in culture. In 2003, the terms under which workers in the performing

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22 The establishment of the *Arte* Franco-German TV network carries little weight in an audio-visual field that has been open to private competition since 1984 and which is increasingly shaped by the 'entertainment' model and the audience-rating war.

23 A rise of almost 150% in the period 1997-2003. The number of beneficiaries in the latter year reached close on 100,000 people.

24 These private companies also work with public TV networks.

arts and the audio-visual industry were eligible for unemployment benefits were drastically tightened up without the Ministry of Culture having any say in the negotiations. This led to a wave of protest, forcing the closure of numerous festivals, including the iconic Avignon Festival in 2003. The protesters not only demanded that the rights of workers in the performing arts be upheld but also highlighted the government's shaky cultural policy and failure to get to grips with a major problem (Sinigaglia, 2008). The unemployment benefits crisis for workers in the performing arts served yet again to highlight "the crisis in French cultural policy". The problems that spawned today's crisis go back a long way. The brutal exposure of the system's financial ambiguities helped to discredit a policy whose shortcomings were already known. From 2000 onwards, Ministers of Culture came and went without tackling employment practices in the performing arts, even though they directly affected a strategic sector of cultural policy. Yet in all fairness, it must be said that it was something over which they had little control. In fact, the employment and benefit regime was being managed by 'social agents' (employers and trade unions) and the Ministry of Employment. Nevertheless, an agreement reached in Spring 2016 may partially solve the problem for the meantime — something that will yield a more positive cultural balance after five years of François Hollande's government.

Could cultural policies be replaced by cultural management?

As noted in the cases of heritage conservation and the performing arts, cultural policies are plagued by problems of organisation, management, and funding whose technical aspects should not blind us to the major political and cultural challenges.

First of all, the 'boom' years mentioned earlier and the vast growth in cultural facilities mean that the lion's share of the public cultural budget goes to the upkeep of what has already been created. This is why public budgets in support of new projects are very thin on the ground and there is greater stress on finding private funding. Eight large institutions gobble up almost 20% of the Ministry of Culture's budget and all of them

are located in Paris.[25] Another revealing figure is that the Ministry's staff and running costs make up over a quarter of the total culture budget. This carve-up also affects a large number of French cities, starving them of funds and leading to tougher institutional cultural policies and scuppering new projects, which until now are what gave policies a more dynamic, innovative air. The financial straitjacket means that what we term 'cultural *policy*' is becoming little more than *management* of what already exists. This in turn leads to bad blood between cultural policy representatives (who have little room for manoeuvre), artists and other culture professionals. The latter find themselves split between those defending the funding they have already secured and those seeking scarce funding for new projects that are unlikely to come to fruition. We therefore deduce that the cultural policy 'crisis' does not stem so much from an organised dismantling of the system[26] but rather its poor maintenance during a period of stagnation and financial austerity, leading to widespread frustration.

The second problem, seemingly of a technical nature and that bears on great political and cultural challenges, concerns the distribution of powers among various tiers of government and public bodies. Decentralisation did not give rise to a clear division of powers regarding cultural matters but instead favoured duplication and complicated the management of cultural projects. State, municipalities, 'departments' and regions have jurisdictions that largely overlap. In the beginning, the so-called cross-funding system should have had an advantage, namely, allowing joint support by various administrative tiers while ensuring cultural operators enjoyed greater independence. In principle, this system should have made artists less beholden to their patrons by ensuring beneficiaries were not dependent on just one source of funds.

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25 *Bibliothèque nationale de France* [BnF], *Ópera, Centre Georges-Pompidou, La Cité des Sciences et de l'Industrie, Grande Halle de la Vilette, Cité de la Musique, Musée de la Musique, Musée du Louvre, La Comédie-Française.*

26 Unlike what happens (for example) in the welfare field.

These were reasonable concerns but the system proved to have three serious limitations. First, instead of achieving balanced support, the funding provided by each tier (cities, regions, State) was often dependent on the other two. In practice, this often meant that no tier was able to allocate money without the involvement of the other two. Second, this situation gave cultural policies a lower profile, even for cultural agents themselves. Third, the system had been drawn up when public cultural funding was on the rise and it was poorly equipped to deal with austerity and cut-backs.

This complex cultural support system, which brought together the State and local administrations, has changed a great deal over the last few decades. The arbitration role of the Ministry of Culture, especially through the Regional Offices for Culture [DRACs] has been weakened. There are two reasons for this. The first is that the Ministry is strapped for cash and thus finds it hard to fund new initiatives. The second is that local administrations have built up expertise in the cultural field and are no longer financially dependent on the State. As a result, the Ministry has less clout. Here lies another of the key elements in 'the crisis of the French Model': the State is no longer the helmsman — a role it either traditionally played or claimed as its own. Under this new configuration, cultural life is much more dependent on local representatives, who often act in ways that they consider most beneficial for cultural agents. To a large extent (and regardless of party politics) local representatives face a set of limitations that may be linked to their cultural orientations. First, limited regional development, which is currently the main criterion for evaluating management, means that cultural support tends to be seen merely as a way of attracting companies and/or tourists. The danger is that culture takes a back seat to boosting the local economy. The limited scope of local politics may also mean that support is given to the culture voters crave, to the detriment of more ambitious cultural options. It is also easy for cultural producers to wound local feelings or simply be out of touch with local tastes. In

a more general way, various issues have arisen on the cultural scene as a result of inopportune intervention by local representatives in local offerings and clashes with artists and/or other culture professionals, who hope that the State will arbitrate in the dispute. For the reasons given above, such arbitration seems increasingly unlikely.

Against this background, the previously uncommon practice of seeking private funds through sponsorship is on the rise. This is a third aspect of cultural funding and organisation and has major implications. Those advocating sponsorship argue that private funding is more flexible than the public kind and that additional sources of money always benefit culture. The detractors of sponsorship say that such funding is only showered on outdated offerings and makes it hard to approach culture from a non-ideological standpoint. To foster reflection on this point, one needs to get away from the idea that sponsorship is good or bad for culture *per se* and instead try to determine what role it may play in a given cultural situation. Here, it is worth taking several things into account. The first is that in France, to date, a big slice of private sponsorship has come from public companies or those with strong links to the State, which puts arguments about different kinds of funding in a different light (Rozier, 2003).[27] Second, political choices also affect sponsorship (especially in relation to tax deductions for those making charitable donations). Last but not least, it is likely that such tax deductions will have zero net effect on cultural funding given that lower tax revenue will be reflected in smaller public budgets for culture. In this respect, sponsorship does not make for a bigger kitty for culture. Rather it simply shifts cultural offerings from the public sector to private companies. This takes us back to the ideological question — is such sponsorship good or bad? Again, one needs to put things in context. France does not have a tradition of philanthropy by millionaires, foundations and companies, unlike other countries. While wholly disinterested philanthropy may not exist, in France one can reasonably assume that sponsorship

27 Nevertheless, there has been a wave of privatisation in these public companies over the last few years.

is mainly undertaken to burnish the donor's image and thus benefits big institutions and high-profile cultural events. In other words, it gives more to the 'haves' and thus reproduces the defects of French cultural policy instead of correcting them.

International challenges

To round off this analysis, I shall briefly refer to some international dimensions and the problems French cultural policy currently faces.

An article published in *Time* magazine (Morrisson, 2007) bemoaned the decline in French influence in the world, but this complaint goes back a long way. In fact 'loss of influence' and 'decline', together with the 'invasion' of American culture among the masses have been recurrent gripes since the end of the Second World War. This disillusionment bears a direct relation with the belief from which it springs, namely that France has a mission to 'civilise' the rest of the world.

Yet the problem goes deeper. Contrary to the common view, which sees French governments as strongly (and sometimes rather pompously) promoting culture, France has been quite weak and ineffective in spreading the word abroad for quite some time now. Let us look again at the institutions with which France began cultural policy at the outset. The Ministry of Culture never had much say on international matters. Traditionally, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is charged with disseminating French culture abroad, on which it could have dedicated a large slice of its budget and staff. On the other hand, the competitive division of competences is a problem, if only because placing 'the French cultural network abroad' in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs does not help forge links with culture at home. This is a recurring problem and has been denounced for over twenty years. Despite being well-funded, the dissemination of French culture abroad is based more on nostalgia for the splendour of yesteryear than on forging links with contemporary culture. The cultural envoy, Xavier North, among others, highlighted the problem in 1997: "If the State has the right to earmark a lot of resources to push French culture abroad, maybe its smugness is inversely proportional to the results it gets. When the

organisation is a big one and it costs a fortune, the bigger the sense of decline. Never has more been spoken about 'splendour' yet France's 'message' is more muted than ever." (North, 1997). Although the problem is not limited to resources, these have steadily shrunk since the mid-1990s, forcing the closure of many cultural centres abroad (Lombard, 2003; Djian, 2004). To this one should add a general trend: international cultural relations are seldom an end in themselves and this is probably now truer than ever. They are used to begin and foster trade. There was a specialised agency, the French Association for Artistic Initiatives [*Association Française d'Action Artistique* (AFAA)], which in 2006 became CulturesFrance in a re-organisation that took the British Council as its model, replaced by the Institut Français in 2011. Under the joint aegis of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (providing 75% of the funding) and the Ministry of Culture (furnishing the remaining 25%), CulturesFrance had an annual budget of €30 million. The AFAA had faced major problems both in its relations with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and those stemming from its internal management (in fact, the AFAA was questioned on several occasions by the Court of Auditors [*Cour des Comptes*] on its use of public funds. Taking a broader view, the consistency and scope of the AFAA's activities has often been questioned both in the cultural sphere and in parliamentary reports. Although it is still too early to say how the re-organised AFAA (now CulturesFrance) will fare after years of controversy, cultural and budgetary constraints give few grounds for optimism.

Whatever the institution organisation adopted, it is hard to see what public initiative can do in the context of a 'globalised' world. Here, we use 'globalisation' to refer to diverse processes, albeit ones that are interlinked. They are: intensification of international flows of cultural goods; the concentration of cultural industries (publishing houses, record companies, film companies) under the wing of international financial groups; new technologies (ICT, the Internet, downloading of content), which have revolutionised the dissemination and distribution of cultural products (Mattelart, 2005). Successive French governments have spent more on multilateral diplomacy that on international cultural

policy (whether through the classical 'cultural splendour' approach or by guiding and fostering exchanges). Part of the reason for this failure to pursue a true international cultural policy was a pervasive 'non-interventionist' ideology and the limitations imposed by European 'Free Competition' policy. In fact, we know of French lobbying during the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) negotiations in 1993 and 1994 in favour of a 'cultural exception' being made. The EU defined its line on 'cultural diversity' in 1999, and later on, its role in UNESCO in concert with other countries (especially Canada). This in turn led to a statement on cultural diversity in 2001 and to the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expression in October 2005. In the home political and cultural context, the battle for the 'cultural exception' has forged a common front among artists, intellectuals and politicians, giving the chance to renew faith in the virtues of 'The French Model'. By comparison, although 'cultural diversity' also mobilises organisations and agents in the cultural sphere,[28] at best it is seen as the result of tough negotiations (in which the government

takes the leading part) and at worst a step backwards (Regourd, 2002).

CONCLUSIONS

While French cultural policy is currently very shaky, there has probably never been a greater need for one. Indeed, it is vital to maintain a degree of autonomy in the cultural sphere. It may also be needed to counteract the economism that pervades all aspects of social life. This is why State intervention is more strongly demanded by French cultural agents than ever before while in other countries State involvement in being gradually dismantled. The refounding of a cultural policy must draw on France's historical legacy. Such a refoundation should not be an excuse for wallowing in nostalgia but rather a golden opportunity to identify contradictions. The critique and proposals made in this paper are neither yet another attack on the shortcomings of public intervention nor a call to return to an imagined 'Golden Age'. On the contrary, they are intended to help outside observers contribute to the debate on realistic, desirable options for today.

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28 Especially in the French Coalition for Cultural Diversity [CFDC] (http://www.coalitionfrancaise.org/).

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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Vincent Dubois is Professor at the University of Strasbourg (Institute for Political Studies). He belongs to the SAGE research unit (UMR CNRS 7363). His research fields include cultural sociology and policy, language policy, poverty and welfare and more generally sociological approach to public policy. Among his numerous publications on cultural policies and practices: *Culture as a Vocation* (Routledge, 2015); *The Sociology of Wind Bands* (Ashgate, 2013); *Le politique, l'artiste et le gestionnaire* [The Politician, the Artist and the Manager] (Croquant, 2012); *La politique culturelle. Genèse d'une catégorie d'intervention publique* [Cultural Policy. The Genesis of a Policy Category] (Belin, 2012). He is currently working on control policies in contemporary social state.

Art, Politicisation and Public Action*

Pierre-Michel Menger

COLLÈGE DE FRANCE / EHESS / PSL

pierre-michel.menger@college-de-france.fr

ABSTRACT

Cultural public action has progressively embraced two very different concepts of Art and culture: one universalist and linking innovation to democratisation; the other, differentialist and relativist, advocating a non–hierarchisable plurality of artistic forms. What happens to these differences within cultural public action and politicisation of the artistic sphere? One of the main aporias of cultural policy is the gap between the artist as an innovator and the general public, which can be seen from both demand (a function of democratisation), and supply (a function of support for creation) sides. This gap has been defended in a pessimistic, aristocratic fashion ('Baudelarian Modernity'), and through politico-aesthetical rationalisation (*avant–garde* in nature). Yet in both cases, it raises the question of the gap between the dynamics of creation and of consumption — a gap that highlights the constant paradoxes that arise from supposing a direct relationship between artistic innovation on the one hand, and socio-political emancipation and progress on the other. Ironically, it is the upper classes that lend the greatest support for artistic daring. For both ideological and political reasons, most of the avant-garde movement was ranged against the bourgeoisie. The duality of the value of originality in Art (the aristocratic heroism of the innovator versus the democratic individualism of the expressive artist) point to two differing standpoints in the politicisation of art. This duality offers two answers, which are now superimposed on this paradox.

Keywords: *arts*, *politics*, *cultural policy*, *cultural democratisation*

Two conceptions of culture were gradually hammered out over two centuries. One is Universalist and was forged throughout the 18th Century with the philosophy of The Enlightenment. The other was Differentialist and was consolidated in the 19th Century through the legacy of Rousseau and Herder). In the Universalist concept, the advance and broad diffusion of culture in all its forms reveals the emancipating power of a rationally-run society. Here, culture expresses society's quest for

greater freedom within the constraints imposed by Nature regarding risks and resources. The emancipating powers of culture are manifested through all kinds of creation (artistic, scientific, spiritual, symbolic and political). The advances achieved by culture help build a social system that is collectively liberating. In the Differentialist concept, the stress is on the spiritual development of individuals, who strive against society's corrupting influence. Here, society is seen as something

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that relentlessly expands the domain of what can be tallied up, bought and sold. In this schema, society relegates people to mere producers and consumers in the thrall of a system bent on foisting ever more new 'needs' and products on its hapless victims. Romanticism, based on the Roussean concept of relations between Nature, Culture, and Society, strongly linked Culture with Religion, moral values with an understanding of inner voice of conscience and individual expressiveness rather than attributing any of these things to the 'civilising power' of society. Primacy is given to the diversity of cultural representations, which in the final analysis stem from the singularity of each individual, and within the context of his or her creative abilities, and from the make-up of each group, the members of which share lasting common experiences.

Art, its social and political power, and its capacity for renewal are conceived differently in each of these systems of representation and interpretation. In the first case, the universalism of a culture and converging views on a limited set of universally-admired works are both values that are highly-prized. Here, Art may make cumulative advances, like civilisation itself and of which it is one of the most powerful symbolic representations. Furthermore, creation has a socially emancipating value, even though it may initially be understood and enjoyed only by an elite. In the second case, a 'differentialist' relativism prevails: artistic expression is very diverse and its hierarchical organisation stresses individual differences. In so doing, it gives life coherence and autonomy, enabling evaluation of the work produced by different groups in the light of social traits, geographic roots (country, region, city, neighbourhood), race, religion, and language. These factors can obviously be combined in any number of ways. The artist shows a general disposition to creativity, and the only aspect that allows one to classify Art and relations between Art producers and consumers is the nature of the shared creativity. An artistic movement is more closely linked to change and modernity than with progress.

Even so, in both conceptions (the Universalist, and the Relativist) of Culture and Art, the relationship between artist and public is a tricky one. On the one

hand, unanimous adhesion to the Arts and hallowed artistic values is a postulate that is far-removed from social preferences and practices. The artist elevated to the status of innovator can broadly further the social and emancipatory roles of Art, of which he is supposedly the protagonist. While creativity manifests a general disposition, there is a scale when it comes to artistic success. Here, the market is highly effective at attracting and selecting large numbers of talented people to fuel ever more fleeting fads.

Our analysis seeks to show how public cultural action takes these divergent concepts and their attendant dilemmas into account. Our point of departure is a simple characterisation of the functions of cultural policy and we successively examine the two sides of the market — demand (the object of democratisation) and supply (the object of support and creation). One of the justifications of public action is also one of its aporias: the gap between the innovative artist and the general public. This gap has been defended in a pessimistic, aristocratic fashion ('Baudelarian Modernity') through politico-aesthetical rationalisation (*avant–garde* in nature). Yet in both cases, it raises the question of the divergence between the dynamics of creation and those of consumption. This divergence testifies to the constant paradoxes that stem from equating artistic innovation with socio-political emancipation and progress. Ironically, it is the upper classes that lend the greatest support for artistic daring. For both ideological and political reasons, most of the avant-garde is ranged against the bourgeoisie. In this way, we progressively reveal the dualism of the value of originality in Art (to wit, the aristocratic heroism of the innovator versus the democratic individualism of the expressive artist), showing how cultural policy has assimilated this dualism by superimposing the two conceptions of culture just discussed.

THE UNIVERSALITY OF ARTISTIC VALUES AND INEQUALITIES IN THE CONSUMPTION OF CULTURE

The public cultural policy system focuses on four main objectives: (1) maintaining the cultural heritage; (2) training Art professionals and experts;

(3) supporting artistic production; (4) democratising cultural consumption (in both social and geographical terms). To ensure that works reach a wider public, new channels for accessing oeuvres are invented, broadening the definition of the culture to be fostered and disseminated through cultural actions.

That said, the two most-widely applied measures (namely, support for artistic creation, and democratisation of cultural goods and services) appear to be rooted in two opposing representations of the relationship between artist and society at large.

The principle of cultural democratisation is Unanimist in nature and rests on a representation of society as a unified body, and on the ideal of egalitarian access to a cultural heritage — that is, a compendium of universally-admired works (both material and intellectual).

The simplest version of this Unanimist concept is found in the argument legitimising a public cultural service, namely, that a large slice of cultural offerings cannot be left to the mercy of market forces.

Yet what observation serves as the point of departure? A large chunk of cultural offerings cater to a small slice of society — basically 'The Upper Crust'. Here, we refer precisely those cultural offerings of greatest artistic value (according to today's canons) — classic and contemporary theatre, classical music, opera, dance — and to cultural production and diffusion. Such things cost a great deal of money and require the kind of broad support that only a public body can give. This contradiction raises democratic hackles concerning equity (occasioned by big public spending on the cultural leisure preference of a minority). This in turn gives rise to broader criticism and to two defensive arguments.

THE MARKET AS THE PROOF OF THE PUDDING?
In *The Democratic Muse* (Banfield, 1984), the author applied the principle of market sovereignty, whereby only real consumers should pay. The principle is based on commercial viability under which goods

and services should only be produced at a price that consumers are willing to pay, with production continuing only for so long as consumer decide given that they need to set aside money for whatever they choose to buy. Why then should institutions be kept and fed with public funds? Such behaviour might lead one to think that the only reason is that they operate in fields that are economically obsolete and to which they should seek alternatives to survive. Were arguments of this kind put into practice, the lion's share of cultural institutions would vanish overnight, as would the labour market for most actors/performers (given that theatre prices would soar in the absence of subsidies). At this point there is a dilemma between the disappearance of the Arts as we know them or deciding that they deserve patronage. If we decide the latter, a good argument needs to be made for funding them.

Moreover, these considerations may nurture left-wing criticisms of public cultural policy as culturally and socially conservative. In fact, any heritage-based cultural policy is inevitably a conservative one. Hence free-market logic (which is inspired by a political philosophy that diametrically opposes public support) is brutally reductionist. The 'free-market' line can easily be confused with an opposing ideological argument, namely: that the legitimacy of a culture is directly proportional to the share of citizens consuming it. This latter argument is a valid one to the extent that the value set on cultural legacy stems from a time when societies were much more unequal and anti-democratic than they are today. Thus a policy based purely on a free-market approach would lead to cultural support being given solely to artistic practices and productions catering to the upper classes.

The democratisation asymptote
The argument for reducing cultural offerings to its socially-narrow consumer base (or even producer base) can be countered by the following argument. Maintaining cultural activities outside the free market implies finding weighty reasons for overthrowing the basic democratic rights of sovereign citizens

(and in this case, sovereign consumers). This issue goes beyond the purely theoretical one, given that in countries that commonly use referendums, cultural choices tend to fall within the sphere of direct, democratic-decision-making (Frey, 2000). However, the issue not only affects culture. There would be no legal system, education, law enforcement or national defence it the free market had its way. By contrast, if the principle of public service fostering the general interest should be the one that prevails, what level of inequality in access to and consumption of the services offered would be reasonable?

Two arguments play a decisive role at this juncture. The first draws on the distinction between the consumer's formal sovereignty and his real sovereignty. If we describe the market test as a choice in which the consumer can help in deciding which goods should be produced and what amounts, depending on how much they cost him, it is easy to see that not all votes carry the same weight. That is because wealthier consumers exert greater influence over the course of events.

To improve the conditions under which the commercial choice is made, the public actor must deal with three inequalities affecting the consumption of the goods and services under consideration. The first objective focuses on correcting geographic imbalances and inequalities at a given point of consumption (for instance, lack of facilities and people to staff them). Education is the second factor affecting the consumption of cultural goods. In fact, all of the sociological surveys reveal the extent to which education shapes the intensity, variety, and audacity with which citizens consume culture. Last but not least, the inequality in individual wealth and families' leisure budgets justifies subsidising cultural facilities to make entry prices affordable and to broaden their range. This amounts to 'positive discrimination' to the point where certain target groups may be admitted free on given days. Egalitarian concerns would largely assuaged by average admission prices set to make them affordable to broad swathes of the population

and that boosted the socially disadvantaged's share of total visitor numbers. This shift in demand could be achieved by increasing capacity, diversifying loyalty programmes and familiarising the new consumer segment with cultural offerings.

Yet the relationship between rising visitor numbers and greater social diversity is far from a linear one. Cultural consumption surveys reveal that one of the most important factors differentiating culture consumers is the nature of the facilities they visit. A small minority of consumers often go to the theatre, opera, and concerts. Unfortunately, the figures do not help identify and isolate this minority. That is because the statistics blur the distinction between the total number of spectators and a count of individuals.

In any case, the hypothesis of a gradual but slow reduction in inequalities regarding the consumption of High Culture is hard to prove in the face of two objections that differ greatly in their natures. The first objection is that the hypothesis neither takes into account evolution in the social and cultural setting nor growing diversity (whether potential or real) in the cultural offerings receiving public support. The measures of policy efficiency are diverse and yield conflicting interpretations. Visits to museums and Art exhibitions have risen in France over the last two decades but the number of classical concert-goers has hardly changed.

Reading also reveals a less positive trend than appears at first glance: "France reads more but the French read less" (Dumontier *et al.*, 1990), state the authors of an excellent analysis on a certain disaffection with books.

The statement by these authors can be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, between 1967 and 1987 (the dates of the two last surveys on leisure undertaken by France's Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE), the number of French readers rose but the number of books they read on average fell. This divergence basically stems from a drop in the reading by regular readers (those who read at least one book a month), as indicated by a small

drop in this group within the French population. On the other hand the nominal trend in the reading index is positive if one considers the number of individuals who have read at least one book in the twelve months before the survey. However, one needs to make corrections to these figures to take account of the social transformations that have taken place over this period. These adjustments can be likened to those made to prices to take account of inflation and yield current prices when looking at consumption figures. In our case, we can measure reading trends by adjusting for education, which is the main determinant of how much people read. Doing so produces a less rosy picture than the raw figures would suggest. The raw data show a rise in readers (those reading more than a threshold figure in a given period). Yet these figures hide a real fall when one adjusts them for the rise in education over the last twenty years.

In principle, this measurement adjustment could be made to all cultural sectors that are heavily dependent on individual educational attainment. Thus one needs to ask whether the frequency with which people consume 'High Culture' has benefited from the spectacular growth in education attainment over the last thirty years. If the answer is less than encouraging (as in the case of reading), we need to ask the following three questions:

1) Is level of education a good indicator of cultural preferences or should it form part of a wider, more complex set of factors, even when it stands out as a determining factor?

2) How should one model competition for leisure? Here, account needs to be taken of how time is split (at individual, family, and social levels) when subsidising more abundant and diverse cultural offerings. Here, one should bear in mind: *(a)* that 'format' may weigh more heavily than content; *(b)* the consumption patterns and forms taken by television, which is now the dominant leisure option.

3) Leaving criticisms aside, is it possible to measure the negative/disastrous impact that a less dynamic cultural policy would have had?

The counter-factual nature of the third question takes us on to a second objection commonly raised to public action: the failure to take Opportunity Costs into account. Here, the argument is based on what efficiency would have been achieved if the resources spent on cultural policy had been spent on something else or had followed other allocation methods. Economic thinking delights in considering other scenarios. Here a model of public action run by Central Government tends to draws fierce criticism for its inefficiency, systematic over-spending, unwanted side-effects caused by 'red tape', being unequal to the task of serving either the public interests or the interests of the artistic community as a whole. Yet the political reasoning used by the Left to counter the democratisation model overlaps to some extent, arguing that public action: yields poor results; only reinforces the status quo and benefits the ruling classes; and is used to legitimise more spending on 'High Culture'. We will come back to this relativistic attack on the foundations of democratisation later on.

The collective benefit of cultural business
The second line of argument rejects economic or political conflation of cultural value (social or economic) with the interests of the majority of consumers (who are thus the most influential). Such an approach, it is argued, cannot justify acting in the name of the public as a whole (or at the least, in the name of those groups that are not direct consumers). Thus the economics of cultural policies considers the Arts as mixed or semi-public goods. In fact, such policies procure cultural goods and services for direct consumers who are willing to pay for them. Yet going beyond direct cultural gratification for the privileged few, subsided cultural production also offers society as a whole a set of indirect benefits that justifies protection from market forces. Here, we refer to the prestige that cultural activities (whether temporary or permanent) confer on a country, Capital, region, city or town. We

should also bear in mind the indirect economic benefits stemming from artistic activities. In fact, surveys on the effects of cultural investments try to measure how far cultural offerings help a town: thrive by attracting tourists and consumers; attract firms to the area; to reap the economic benefit of tertiary activity clusters with lots of innovation potential. Artistic firms also directly and indirectly create jobs. Artistic expenditure, both by businessmen and consumers, benefits a city and its region through direct and multiplier effects on local businesses and trade. The benefits flowing from tourism and related business activities are just two examples of the ways Art and the economy can be reconciled, helping to put State-supported provision of cultural goods and services in context. Furthermore, the arts are interdependent and mutually-reinforcing, sharing opportunities for training, work, and for aggregating consumer segments by 'bundling' various artistic offerings. Finally, future generations will benefit from the efforts made by public bodies to conserve both the artistic heritage and the creators and other staff needed to underpin it and to seek new artistic horizons.

This last argument is particularly valid for the kind of works that require the passage of time to gain traction and become appreciated. History is littered with examples of Art that was derided in its day but which succeeding generations came to prize. Taking the time factor into account, this structural difference between kinds of supply and demand (even where latent) leads to legitimation of the distinction between a cultural policy supporting High Culture and the treatment meted out to more popular, market-based cultural production. These popular productions are short-term undertakings and are regularly changed. Moreover, their financial viability is based on the fact that consumers are directly responsible for their maintenance and evolution. By contrast, High Culture productions, the artist runs the risk of 'soft' present demand and may thus be unwilling to wait for history's uncertain judgment on the value of his work. If public sponsorship did not act to cover this risk, creative activity in the High Culture field might wither away. Future generations would be justified in blaming their forebears for this loss. History abounds with geniuses whose sacrifice was derided in their own lifetimes but whose works have been acclaimed by future ages.

Uncertainty as to which aesthetic values will stand the test of time is sufficient reason for a cultural policy to support systematically innovative artistic creation.

Little by little, the identification of the cultural sphere with easily-identified producers, workers and consumers is fading.

The argument for cultural policy is based on the universality of cultural value by directly or indirectly adding new consumer segments and broadening the temporal horizon. It is an attempt to rebuild the dogma of the universality of aesthetic pleasure and the transcendence of artistic creation — past or present — beyond the socio-historical conditions that gave rise to the works.

One needs to argue the case rather than simply starting from a premise that is clearly misleading — especially when it is passed off as self-evident.

This is the sophistication of the paradox that worried Marx in contemplating the great works of Classical Greece and what they spawned down the Ages.

THE ARTISTIC *AVANT-GARDE* AND ITS OPPOSITION TO THE BOURGEOIS ORDER

We shall now examine the issue from another standpoint — that of the artistic sphere itself.

Can one relate artistic progress to social progress? The traditional explanation given by an all-embracing Social History of Art — especially from Hauser (1984) onwards — consists of relating the commercial system of organising artistic life that gradually took hold in the 19th Century with the politicisation of innovative Art. The key here is the dynamic nature of innovation.

The schema for the systematic progress of the Arts was based on politicisation of the artistic sphere.

Competition between artists drawn from the same generation and relations between generations of artists took the form of successive ruptures and stylistic innovations that led to evolution in the formal resources in each kind of Art.

Competition in the commercial system of aesthetic innovation might be likened to the workings of gravitation, with attraction exerted between different elements. The notion of an *avant-garde* stemmed from the idea that the output of pioneering Art (which was ahead of public tastes) was wholly at odds with the output of conservative Art (meeting existing demand for purely mercenary reasons).

At the same time, Art and its market — the public — became heterogeneous. From the *avant-garde* standpoint, truly innovative Art had a role to play in ending bourgeois power, morality and conformity and in helping the lower classes throw off their shackles.

Under such circumstances, the artist has two options. The first is for him to stay ahead in his field and individually battle against bourgeois values — an option that makes it likely that understanding of his works will come later rather than sooner. The second is for the artist to put himself at the service of the social forces seeking the downfall of bourgeois parties. Here, he risks losing his artistic autonomy in exchange for some recognition.

The *avant-garde* ideologies that sprang up in the 19th Century in the European Arts seemed to have proposed both kinds of response: the politicisation of the Arts and the people's adhesion to the daring experiments in the elitist Arts. Artistic enterprises of a more political kind, though fewer, sought to link artistic production with political purpose. Their purpose was to make innovative Art consistent with the political and social transformations needed to build a truly revolutionary, proletarian culture. A surprising (albeit short-lived) example of this can be seen in the destruction of Russia's post-Leninist Futurist and formalist avant-gardes. This occurred after an initial impetus aimed at sealing the alliance between aesthetic daring and

a more radical political movement. The situation of the French Proletarian Literature movement in the 1920s and 1930s revealed the political aporias of such attempts — namely: (a) whether the value of Art should be measured in terms of its power to instruct and mobilise the lower classes; (b) the inability of the most 'committed' artists to use Art to raise the people's revolutionary consciousness (thereby dooming this functional, heteronomous conception of Art as a political instrument). The project of building an anti-bourgeois culture lost credit and steam in the 1930s as French Communist Party's turned to bigger issues (Gaudibert, 1977; Hadjinicolaou, 1978; Ritaine, 1983). These issues were the need to forge alliances beyond the working class to defend the national interest and to fight Fascism. The Communist Party's support for literature and paining in the 'Socialist Realism' style went through several stages — especially in the context of The Cold War in the 1950s. Yet the 'proletarian culture' line was opposed by many and there were many hurdles in the Guesdian [after Jules Bazile Guesde,] and Jaurist [after Jean Jaurès] traditions, fuelling the debate on the contribution of Art to the revolutionary political struggle, beginning with the exaltation of national cultural heritage (something that sparked heated argument) (Matonti, 2000: 405–424).

In fact, almost all the avant-garde artistic movements were organised in spheres far-removed from popular culture. From the Surrealism of intellectual Maoists in the 1970s to Bataille or Dubuffet, the artists who promoted some kind of cultural leftism fought on two fronts to show the revolutionary force of Art. The first front was criticism of what they called the 'Traditional Art' or 'The academic Art production bloc', which continued to pander to majority tastes. The second front was the denunciation of regressive trends in more popular Art forms. The argument of a 'sociological' affinity between artistic struggle and political struggle was based on the following syllogism:

– The Art to the majority's taste is conservative and conformist by nature and defends the established order of values and a fixed vision of the world;

– The domination of the ruling classes extends to the cultural sphere. Market workings ensure that the bourgeoisie (because it accounts for the lion's share of demand) is in a position to impose its tastes and direct artistic production;

– Combating aesthetic conservatism and the inertia of tradition in the strictly artistic sphere implies battling against the bourgeoisie's stranglehold over the arts. That struggle takes the form of criticism of radical innovation. Unlike Proletarian Art, the elitist *avant-garde* achieves political emancipation of the people without renouncing its autonomy.

Thus Art could be politicised in an indirect fashion without betraying itself. Above all, artists could struggle to deal with those aesthetic problems that most closely affected them and that stemmed from competition and conflict. Here, artists' independence and professionalisation were a condition for growing social influence insofar as conflicts were no longer moderated by external considerations (especially commercial ones). If alliances could be forged between artistic forces and socio-political movements, it was because artistic competition produced classification shemes and oppositions similar to those found in the social world.

Yet this self-proclaimed avant-garde policy clashed with a constant paradox: it was the upper classes that showed the greatest interest in aesthetic innovation, even when it took the most radical forms. In fact, the creators who were most aware of the antinomies in the avant-garde philosophy could make an effort to differentiate the elites while opposing the bourgeois commercial, utilitarian approach to catering to the most cultivated market segments. On the one hand, this would suppose defending a restrictive segmentation of the audience for innovative creators. On the other hand, it meant convergence in a formula for aristocratic aesthetism that had little or nothing to do social emancipation. Could it be the syllogism of indirect politicisation condemned artists to an autistic self-satisfaction and in so doing, created the dilemma of the politicisation of the Arts? Furthermore, could it be that the syllogism itself is based on a questionable historicist idealisation

of creation, thus rendering its representation of Art and artistic autonomy less than convincing?

At this juncture, one needs to return to the common origins of the 'evolutionist' conception of Art as an activity susceptible to modernisation and teleological interpretation, and to the contribution of Art to political emancipation. Thus the very idea of an *avant-garde* and the value set on the movement itself reveals a paradoxical equating of politicisation with artistic empowerment.

THE ARTIST, PROGRESS, AND THE MOVEMENT: BETWEEN MODERNITY AND THE *AVANT-GARDE*

What is the origin of the *avant-garde* principle? At the beginning of the 19th Century, Art occupied a new place among some of the most influential philosophies of social progress. These included that of Henri de Saint-Simon, with the division of society into classes, attributing supremacy to artists, men of ideas, scholars, engineers and businessmen. The idea of the social power of Art crystallised in the notion of an *avant-garde* — a term lifted from the military world [and whose direct equivalent in English is 'vanguard']. Poggioli (1968), in his analysis of the history of and meanings in the *avant-garde* movement, without intending to pin down a date, nevertheless notes that the first use of the military metaphor was in *De la mission de l'art et du rôle des artistes* [Art's Mission and The Role of Artists], written in 1845 by Laverdant, a fairly obscure disciple of Charles Fourier. In this ideological context, Art is clearly subordinated to political ideals, in which *avant-garde's* value does not affect the internal dynamics of the artistic sphere. Poggioli's indications of the strictly political purpose behind the term makes sense, given that before 1870 there is no aesthetic extrapolation of the notion, only disjunction.

In fact, assigning a political role to Art under the battle flag of a Saint-Simonian [Utopian Socialist] vanguard does not necessary imply innovative or revolutionary Art. Indeed, the Art of followers of Henri de Saint-Simon and Charles Fourier was often highly academicist if one is to judge from their aesthetic principles. Thus, aesthetic

innovation does not in the least imply revolutionary political daring.

In Poggioli's hypothesis, the notion of an *avant-garde* takes two forms, one succeeding the other before they intertwined and spawned a host of historical manifestations clouded in ambivalence. The Paris Commune and its political wake were of great importance in intertwining these two strands of the *avant-garde*. The works and deeds of Naturalist writers on the one hand, and the symbolic participation of Rimbaud in the Paris Commune sealed the direct alliance between the Left-Wing, and the Far Left, and certain individuals and currents in Art. However, this did not last long — at least in the hoped-for form of an explicit, systematic relationship. The rift was reflected in the columns of *La Revue Indépendante* in the 1880s, mainly mirroring Naturalism [literary style] and the initial positions taken by the Neo-Impressionist Art movement. When the political and artistic dimensions of the *avant-garde* movement stopped converging, the notion continued to be used in the Arts until it became so diluted in international art circles that it came to stand for whatever happened to be in vogue. Yet its use in politics was both less systematic and less exclusive. This fact, far from simplifying the workings of Art and politics, gave it a complexity and dynamism in the evolving links between *avant-garde* movements and political commitment, given that the values of artistic *avant-gardism* did not automatically translate into revolutionary political Messianism.[1]

Indeed, the anti-bourgeois position struck by many writers and artists in the first half of the 19th Century stemmed more from notions of Art and its paradoxes in a market economy than in drawing up clearly-defined political battle lines.

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1 Some authors, such as Michel Faure (1985), note that a creative, innovative artist may nonetheless hold Conservative or even reactionary political views (Debussy being a case in point), carrying out labyrinthine socio-historical reconstructions to justify these divergences. Such reconstructions are usually of a spectacularly reductionist nature. These singular feats of interpretation are victims of what might be termed 'the clock synchronisation myth', which assumes that artistic movements must be in lock-step with social struggles.

In a pioneering work, which was often more used than cited, Graña (1964) revealed the meanings underlying artists' tirades against the bourgeois world and the ambivalence of their positions. The attack on bourgeois materialism and mercantilism was largely an attack on the power of the market, which became the dominating force in the organisation of artistic life. The growing power of commercial organisation contrasted with a re-mythification of artistic creation. Exalting genius meant stressing distance and exceptionality. Creation was conceived as something deeply charismatic, and the creator (as portrayed by the Hugolian figure of the poet as inspired demiurge) as someone who should transform society with the ideals of justice, fraternity, humanism, and personal realisation. These ideas were taken on board without demur. Yet, as Graña (1964: 55) notes, this focus on artist's charismatic ego and exemplary nature distanced artists from the rest of society. Thus the double postulation of the creative genius (associated with self-confidence and sometimes insufferable arrogance) and the 'genius' fear of powerlessness and being misunderstood on the other could lead to contempt for 'the system' and feelings of martyrdom.

This was a transposition of the dual identity of Art at the socio-political level. On the one hand, there was the autonomy of the creator (whose work — based as it was on the authenticity of personal behaviour — could not be judged by any ordinary yardstick). On the other hand, the market system attached importance to public recognition of Art. The Artist might prefer not to grovel for such recognition but in any case, an anonymous public would still reward or penalise an artist through its preferences.

In a trilogy dedicated to Romantic and Post-Romantic writers, Bénichou (1973, 1988, 1992) stresses the ambivalence of 19th-Century French innovative writers and poets' social commitment, and the ideological nuancing found in the following proposition: "Not modernity, not anti-individualist, and not unthinking support for the masses". In the first phase, during the triumph of early Romanticism,

the implicit contradictions in the proposition were solved by glorifying the Poet, putting him ahead of the pack, turning him into a solitary genius who nevertheless drew on the collective conscience to light the path so that others might follow. In the second stage, pessimism and rescinded glorification were used to draw a disenchanted vision of the relationship between artist and society, whereby the relationship was formulated as both a curse and a redeeming sacrifice.[2]

2 Paul Bénichou saw in Vigny someone who was ambivalent to the highest degree. Vigny's of attributing creative genius with historical foresight both brought the artist closer to and distanced him from the people, allowing both facets of the creator's role to co-exist: "A relationship of greater scope [than the immediate application of ideas to things] united the thinker with the public; "the common people cannot do without this individual, and no matter how brilliant the genius, he cannot do without the common people". In this way, Vigny could both affirm that there was a strong alliance between genius and the public, and that the two were estranged: "Public conscience is the judge of everything. There is power in a people. An ignorant public serves the man of genius. How so? The answer is that the genius divines the secret of the public conscience. Conscience (the word literally means "to know with") seems collective". Yet at the same time he considered that "the thinking man can only appreciate his work to the extent that it is not a popular success and that he is aware that his work is ahead of the multitude". This is not a contradiction: the polarity is the ruling principle underpinned is conception of poetic priesthood, which is both reserved and fecund at one and the same time. How can one advance without remaining isolated, even if one knows that one is being followed from far behind? The reconciliation lies with history and the march of the multitude, which ignoring today's lesson, learns that of yesterday" (Paul Bénichou, 1973: 378). While the generation of poets that came after the great Romantics became disillusioned, Vigny's position led to a dissociation of the polarisations between impetus and withdrawal (if one will, the contrast between the activist brilliance of a missionary, prophetic poet in the mould of Hugo, and the painful pessimism of a Baudelaire, tormented by the errors of modernity to the point of turn art into a curse instead of sacred vocationa). "Thus the idea of a poetic priesthood went through various crises in the 19th Century, swinging between impetus and withdrawal. Vigny, from the very start of his career, found an enduring definition that could survive all vicissitudes. The 'embittered knight' became a thinking herald of progress so that he could survive in this cruel world. He, more than anyone, has kept faith with the poets sacred mission come rain, come shine. His austere approach — a little grey it must be said — impressed less than others but it is the one that best tackled the changing circumstances of the Age. In Vigny, we find a belligerent poet in exile — a Hugo and a Baudelaire but also a man whose rigorous reflection on the poet's conditional stopped him attaining the brilliance of either" (PAUL BÉNICHOU, 1973: 378).

In the Socialist thought of the Age and in Karl Marx, the power of the bourgeoisie proved useful in the course of history. The bourgeoisie, it was held, had brought the world universalism and emancipation, sweeping away the Old Order, with its religious orders and local aristocrats. In this respect, the bourgeoisie's ability to see the world in more objective terms and to exploit the progress laid the foundations for scientific and technical progress. Yet, went the argument, it would be this self-same progress that would dethrone the bourgeoisie in turn and lead to social justice. Among innovative artists, the criticism of the bourgeoisie was not based on purely political reasoning. Among innovative artists, criticism of the bourgeoisie was not directly political. For artists, the bourgeois world enshrined utilitarianism, hypocritical moralism, self-interested rationalism, and an ever-present materialism. Against this, artists set their own egotistical traits: anti-rationalism, the force of soaring imagination, free expression that went (far) beyond conventional bounds, and idealism based on the cult of the genius whose exceptionality exemplified the liberating power of creativity. Yet was it sufficient for the bourgeois to enshrine all that "the artist discovered to be its opposite"[3] (in Paul Valéry's words); for Art to embody the power of social transformation?

Charles Baudelaire and Gustave Flaubert criticised industrialisation, mechanisation, modernity, and all the forces (including the revindication of democratic equality) that placed society in the thrall of strictly materialist hopes framed in terms of well-being and quantifiable happiness. Hence their aversion to the masses, 'massifying' progress, and the aestheticisation of their social ideals. Here, an intelligentsia and creative output were to be the only bulwark against an insipid, worthless world. Graña noted that this aversion to the masses, vulgarity and above all, the bourgeoisie, was founded in nothing more substantial than ideological positions:

3 Cited by Compagnon (1990: 28).

While Flaubert and Baudelaire were not Conservative in the true political sense of the term, neither were they modern Machiavellis occupied with the subtleties of power as politicians are. They were not interested in the deliberate use of power, putting a social ideology into practice, or setting up a political party. They considered that the purpose of power was to surround the elite with a *cordon sanitaire* that allowed it to carry out intellectual tasks without being bothered by the masses (Graña, 1964: 121).

The cult of singularity (and its exaltation of ideosyncrasy, dandyism and 'larger-than-life' Bohemianism) as the only answer to the gap between artist and public gives a double meaning to the arguments and techniques for 'aristocratising' the writer. The first is the fostering of a non-conservative individualism to (aristocratically) protest against the bourgeois, materialist order. The second is the rejection of a teleological philosophy of history that confuses novelty/the creator's originality with progress (conceived as a collective desire to do better). An analysis of the ideology of *avant-garde* Art in France before 1870 reveals the first strands of artistic modernity. These were to interveave like a DNA Double Helix, spawning what came after. One strand was the artist's autonomy. This autonomy justified the full realisation of a creative project, understood as a tool for radical criticism of the bourgeois order. That is to say, it was a utilitarian argument that eradicated singularity. However, the temporal philosophy of artistic innovation had to satisfy the idea of movement without mechanising invention. That was because such mechanisation would impose a rationalised, obsessive approach to scaling new artistic heights and in so doing, would kill the very originality it sought to channel.

For Baudelaire, this duality was a source of a host of errors and splits, as Compagnon notes. Modernity, constituted by contradiction — modernity is fleeting and unchanging, contingent and eternal, forged by critical rejection, anti-bourgeois, useless and indeterminate in its meaning, reflexive, self-critical, self-referencing in its works and in the artist's lucid irony. In short, the Baudelairean philosophy of creative achievement rejected the temporalisation of novelty and celebrated the present. It was not a question of ignoring the temporal aspect of any deed or act but rather of rejecting the notion that the Past should determine the Present. This decision applied to both the Past considered as a reserve of meaning and value conserved in the Present, and to the Past as the embodiment of everything that must be rejected or systematically excelled. The Past was seen as a "succession of singular modernities",[4] and linking it to the Present would shackle it and eliminate it in the same way that the concept of the Present as permanent progress shackles it, consigning it to a perpetual future. A discontinuist conception of novelty can only conserve mistaken ideas of the beautiful, the ephemeral, and the eternal.

For the *avant-garde* to take off in the artistic world and create the conditions needed for equating aesthetic innovation with socio-political progress, critical rejection had to lead to rupture. This rupture was needed to place novelty on a time line of cumulative ruptures with the Past and to invent a cult of the Future, in which any creative act or expression only made sense if it was different from a rejected, criticised Past and anticipated a historicist contribution to a new perpetuity (a notion wholly opposed to Baudelairian

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4 When take Antoine Compagnon's (1990) formulation and analysis: "Modernity, understood as the sense of the present, annuls any relationship with the past, conceived as merely a succession of singular modernities, lacking any value for discerning 'the nature of present beauty'. Given that imagination is a faculty that is sharpened in the present, it supposes forgetting the past and concentrating on the here and now. Modernity is thuys awareness of the present as such, without past or future and whose only link is with eternity. In this sense, modernity makes a heroic choice by rejecting refuge in or deception by history. Baudelaire opposed the eternal or timeless to modernity's irresistible perpetual motion and its self-consuming thralldom, the constant obsolescence of a constant stream of fleeting innovations and that denied any past innovation. Modernity treated the Ancient, the Classical, the Romantic as empty of substance. Modernity sought recognition of the twin nature of beauty, that is to say, the twin nature of Man" (Compagnon, 1990: 30-31).

eternity). Avant-guardism, which equated aesthetic innovation with progress, fostered a teleological concept of the increasing autonomisation of Art. It sought to impose an ideologically-inspired deterministic framework on the future of Art and to re-evaluate Art's Past. The movement's Art works were significant here insofar as they spread awareness of this historical need. It was a sovereign principle of progressive reduction of innovation to a quest for the formal properties of each Art (and which it was supposed constituted the quintessential uniqueness of each art), which had no link to any other structure or reference. This principle was put into practice in the abandonment of natural representation in painting, the ditching of the tonal range in music, and of conventional grammar in novels and in the simple expressive transcription of feelings in literature.

We shall now present an intermediate evaluation. The historicist concept of novelty as systematic improvement oriented to a given aim provides an argument for forging alliances based on similar positions. The innovative artist and his *mileu* battling against conservatism and the established order were, it was felt, were part of the same revolutionary struggle as that of the working classes against their bourgeois masters. In this case, the question is just how effective this aesthetic radicalism was. Could such an alliance offer the artist more than merely lending indirect support to the social movement? Could the artist play a Messianic role when his art was placed within the imperative framework of aesthetic originality? Would the artist sooner or later win over those who did not understand his Art, bringing them into his charmed circle as he enjoyed ever greater freedom in pursuing his aesthetic quests?

What kind of individual is the artist? A teleological concept of history, such as that held by Theodor Adorno, makes an artist great when he assumes 'objective tasks' in the Hegelian sense. Such tasks might be those history obliges the artist to solve so that society can attain greater aesthetic autonomy, which itself goes to make up true historical development. This concept also opposes the false identification

of the artist with the triumphant singularity of the creator, which is no more than an extravagant, ideosyncratic epiphany. According to Theodor Adorno, being a true artist means ditching this false individualism, which is no more than the outward show of the publicity and the pseudo-teleological traits of the bourgeois world. The artist's mission is "to solve problems" that make artistic experience "the contrary of freedom linked to the concept of the creative act". The explicitly Hegelian scheme of the individual is transfigured when he (or she) becomes the tool of historical necessity:

> As Hegel knew, the most valuable works are those in which individual effort and the individual himself is subsumed in meeting an artistic need. Its very success turned it into a need (Adorno, 1994: 180).

This heightened the social and ideological contradiction: the principle of originality, with its teleological orientation (innovation to achieve systematic, cumulative improvement) is tantamount to a paradoxical exhortation to differentiate each creator from all the rest. Dictating creative individualisation leads to a competitive system that is hard to distinguish from the market system in the cultural sphere. Nevertheless, liberty to systematically seek original solutions would mean ruling out applying a collective regulating norm to artists, even if its purpose was to foster differentiation.

INDIVIDUALISM AND ORIGINALITY

It is not our intention to exhaustively compare the scope for innovation under the various systems for organising artistic production. As the most suggestive studies in the Social History of Art show, the common distinctions between these forms of organisation stem from stylisations. The real world never neatly fits the classification schemes we try to impose on it. This makes us think that an artist's influence is based on his reputation. In fact, the artist's powers of negotiation to expand control over his work wax

as he becomes famous. The ways in which an artist's reputation is forged vary among systems. Thus there are differences between a system of royal/aristocratic patronage, a commercial system, public patronage, control by an academy/professional grouping with a monopoly over the award of prizes, qualifications, and appointments. Yet in all cases, the innovative artist finds himself negotiating and fighting to build a reputation and in finding ways to turn the rules of a given system to his advantage, and to change them when he can. This entails freedom to negotiate prices, access to the patronage system, free competition in cases of commercial monopoly, and double-dealing under totalitarian systems of control. This quest may be especially based on competition among existing organisation systems. Raymonde Moulin puts it thus:

> None of the ways of professionalising in the Arts goes out of use. At any given moment, the proportion of the population involved in artistic activities and its professionalisation pose the biggest hurdles in the competition among artists to achieve social recognition and earn their daily crust (Moulin, 1995: 94).

By contrast, it is clear that the need for originality was linked to an object-oriented philosophy of history and opens the debate on the meaning of individualism, of which the artist is one of the most expressive symbols. In the first place, the debate bears on artists and their world. Vincent Descombes (1987), in a book on Proust, delves into the contradictions of Art modernity and asks what happens when the artist is obliged to be original. Baudelaire's analysis on this point again proves more enlightening: the individualistic system of creation involves a contradiction in terms. This is because most artists cannot hope that their work will resolve the equation between successful individualisation and emancipation, autonomy, and self-realisation. Under pressure to be creative, most artists face 'doubts', 'creative poverty' and 'the chaos of a wearying, sterile freedom' because they have not shown a recognised form of originality. Because of one of these paradoxes that are so common in artistic competition, artists who try to be singular spend their time prosaicly imitating

the innovative work of others and thus become 'artistic Monkeys' through their own self-loathing and the public's alienating admiration of the more inventive work of their colleagues, whose *oeuvre* both stimulates them and destroys these unfortunate 'monkeys' at the same time.[5] We can consider artistic production and the evaluation of artists from a complementary perspective: that of the market. In a market economy, competition fosters innovation but it also leads to spectacular differences in success and greater volatility in artistic careers. What value should be attached to these inequalities? Are they the result of the public's blindness (with Art market entrepreneurs shaping public taste at whim)? Do they reveal an objective hierarchy of competing talents, whatever the determining factors of the hierarchy may happen to be? Could the excessive rise in the (limited) differences in artists' talents be largely due to the impact of modern technologies for

5 The analysis that Vincent Descombes dedicates to Charles Baudelaire deserves citing at length: "Baudelaire saw [...] that being a happy artist is harder today than in the past. [...] In yesterday's world, there was a collective style, that is to say, one that belonged to a group (a 'school', and beyond schools, a society). [...] In such an artistic system, less original individuals found their 'rightful place' by performing another function: 'obeying the norms set by a powerful leader and helping hi in all their tasks' (Baudelaire, *Salon de 1846). In this sense, nobody felt obliged to be original. However, the system changed. In the post-revolutionary Art system, the collective style was not only missing in fact, it was also excluded on principle. Above all, the same style for everyone had to be avoided at all costs. Any project for 'a return to order' [...] is (rightly) construed as tyrannical usurpation. What possible justification could there be for certain individuals imposing their stylistic preferences on others? Could it be justified by arguing that the age of experiment and inventions had come to an end? Nevertheless, Baudelaire asks us to consider the other side of modernity — the price exacted by glorification of the individual. 'Individuality — this small trait — has done away with collective originality (Ibid) [...] In a holistic Art system, the originality of solutions to artistic problems is of a collective nature. In an individualist system, everyone is forced to provide a new solution to problems that become ever harder due to the 'infinite division of the Art field'. Baudelaire saw that glorification of the individual engenders 'doubts' and 'poverty' in most people, who are incapable of demonstrating personal originality. In this case, such an individual has to content himself with the originality lent by someone else. Here, the lack of a powerful collective style dooms most artists to vulgar imitation. Such artists become mere 'Artistic Monkeys' [singes artistiques]. Instead of submitting to the legitimate guidance and direction of a Master in a school, 'Artistic Monkeys' submitted to the demeaning domination of a more powerful character" (Descombes, 1987: 142-143).*

disseminating and reproducing works — something that greatly broadens markets and widens the gap when it comes to success? (Rosen, 1981). From the choice of answer, one can deduce a different representation of what the artistic community is and what its collective ideals compatible with the imperative of aesthetic originality may be.

The debate also has a wider social and political dimension, given that it a question of discovering whether the artist seeking originality may constitute a social model. In this case, one has to separate individualism from one of its representations: the bourgeois. Non-conformism serves as the basis for an expressivist conception of individuality. The values of originality, authenticity, and personal sincerity belong to what Taylor calls "subjective change" (Taylor, 1994) or "expressivist change" (Taylor, 1998: Chapter 21) in modern European culture (which this author sees as the continuation of Rousseau and Herder's work). From this standpoint, people are naturally innovative and their individuality arises from personality traits that need protection from imitation and the influence of others. Each person tries to connect to his deep inner being through reflection on the conscious ego and inner dialogue. Authenticity adds reflexive control to level with oneself, recognising the originality of each individual kind of existence, which is the source of a rhetoric on difference and diversity. Here, ideally self-realisation should not be hindered by social conformism, or by inequalities that make it impossible to recognise the true value of each individual's personality and to foster its full development. If one accepts that everyone is unique, then each individual has to 'discover himself' — a process for which there is no model. The reference to Art, and the artist as a model for defining himself is fundamental here:

> In Herder and his expressivist concept of human life, this relationship [between self-discovery and artistic creation] is a very close one. Artistic creation becomes the paradigm for defining oneself. The artist is raised to the status of a model human being, as the agent of an original definition of himself. From 1800 onwards, there was a tendency to make the artist a hero and

to see his life as the essence of Man's condition and to venerate him as a prophet and creator of cultural values. [...]

> If we become ourselves through the expression of what we are and what — in principle — is original and does not depend on what went before, then what we express os not an expression of what went before but rather a new creation. In this respect, we see imagination as a creative force.

> Let us examine this example more closely, which has become our model and in which I discover myself as an artist through my artistic creations. This self-discovery stems from creation, from creating something new and original. I invent a new artistic language — a new painting technique, a new metre, a new approach to novel-writing — and with this new language (and only with this) I realise my inner being (Taylor, 1994: 69-70).

Yet how do we take the step from expressive emancipation to individual behaviour to collective life? Does the value of originality constitute the social norm for self-realisation? As Taylor points out, the conjunction between authenticity, originality and freedom is based on a concept that is directly opposed to moral obligations and the utilitarian, rational order of modern life: technical progress; the industrialisation of the Machine Age; organisation of social relations following the rules laid down by the majority, including democracy itself. In this case, how can one consolidate a group around the highly differentiating principle of individual authenticity?

Following Comagnon, the first instance of artistic modernity stressing the role of the *avant-garde* appropriated the value of originality without submitting it to a historic teleology. The expressivist conception of self-realisation took the capacity for self-realisation for granted: only external obligations could prevent individuals fully developing their originality. This explains an aristocratic, relativistic variant of this modernist position. In the first variant, the ability to achieve only seems to be within

the grasp of a few extraordinary individuals who are willing to bear witness (even at the cost of great pain or tragedy) to their own brilliance in a grey world ruled by dull conformity. In the second, this ability to achieve embodies a new (almost anthropological) situation that legitimises the expressive differences of behaviour and commitment without relating them to a model setting norms for individual practices and representations.

The principle of the *avant-garde* simultaneously invoked critically surpassing any achievement and in dogmatically declaring the superiority of the future and thus making the movement committed to permanent innovation:

> We often confuse [...] modernity and the *avant-garde*. While both are paradoxes, they do not face the same dilemmas. The *avant-garde* is not simply modernity in more radical and dogmatic guise. While modernity identifies with a passion for the present, the *avant-garde* supposes a historical consciousness of the future and a desire to be ahead of one's time. The paradox of modernity is based on its erroneous relationship with modernisation whereas the paradox of the *avant-garde* depends on consciousness of history. In fact, these two contradictory factors constitute the *avant-garde*: destruction and construction, negation and affirmation, nihilism and futurism. [...]

> When the first modernity stopped being understood, modernity and decadence became synonymous. This was so because the implication of incessant innovation can be likened to the sudden onset of adolescence. The jump from the new to the out-of-date was instant from then on. In fact, the *avant-gardes* had conjured up this awful fate (and thereby dooming themselves to permanent obsolescence) by treating incessant novelty as critical improvement. To restore a little common sense and to draw a distinction with decadence, renewal needed to identify with a path towards the essence of Art through a process of reduction and purification (Compagnon, 1990: 48–49).

Raised to the status of doctrine, the critical liquidation of the past and any kind of conservatism paraded an undisciplined non-conformism that was unstrictured by notions of aesthetic improvement and that easily tended to anarchy, revolt and irony. On the other hand, the channelling of artistic advances tyrannically imposed an evolutionary model on the creators banded together in groups, circles, schools and so on. Leading artists and their followers formed these groups to ensure the viability and systematic exploitation of those innovations considered most fertile. The systematic aesthetic alliance and organisation of hierarchical groups led to authoritarianism, aesthetic dogmatism, and using 'science' to brow-beat members. The 'Master' exercised a charismatic domination over his fellow creators, who were either temporarily or permanently reduced to the status of disciples. These 'camp followers' found themselves forced to be 'original' in terms of their group's canons.

Non-conformism and the idea of a co-existing system in *avant-garde* concepts of artistic innovation at the end of the 19th Century gave rise to divergent oppositions to the established order at different times: Cubism; 12-tone Music; Russian Constructivism; Dadaism and Marcel Duchamp's provocative works; Satie and surrealist poetry, full of critical irony or nihilism, challenging convention at every turn. After The Second World War, there were the currents of: Abstract Art; Serialism (in music); formalist subversion in literary novels in the *nouveau roman* movement; the compositions of Cage; the marginal art of Dubuffet; Pop Art; the works of *Collège de Pataphysique* [an absurdist, pseudo-scientific literary trope invented by French writer Alfred Jarry].

AN UNCOMFORTABLE ENTHUSIASM: THE SOCIAL ELITES AND ADVANCED ART

Each of the *avant-garde* forms of surpassing tradition supposes sufficient familiarity with the artistic past being criticised and relegated so that *avant-garde's* daring experiments and provocations could be understood. This approach was particularly marked in the case of extreme nihilist works — as in the case

of Duchamp and Dadaism, whose *oeuvres* seem to embody arbitrariness and even insignificance unless accompanied by a persuasive interpretation. Such extravagance only served to distance *avant-garde* experiments from the masses that most innovative artists hoped to emancipate through the originality of their creations.

This begs the following question: How can bourgeois society accept the cultural and artistic protests against its domination of innovative Art? Here, one should recall bourgeois power to 'make' artists, turning them into the heroes of museums, exhibition halls, the opera, concerts and festivals while overlooking their criticisms and extreme positions. This was a question that also occurred to many artists, aesthetic theorists and authors who were aware of the social contradictions of their cultural activities. Likewise, how could artists accept the embarrassing enthusiasm of the elites for their revolutionary, audacious works? At a more general level, at whom is Art aimed in a system of aesthetic innovation that challenges the social order? Who does the State really represent in playing its role as cultural provider when it 'corrects' or even reverses the sanctions of the market? Does it act in the name of public bodies, supporting and preserving what (at least in theory) will become the common heritage in the long run? Or do its actions merely further the interests of a 'cultural class' or even simply those of Art professionals in the name of legitimate autonomy in the artistic sphere?

Without a doubt, the upper classes have always lent the most effective support for radical artistic innovations. Yet, as Crane highlights in a study on the pictorial *avant-gardes* in New York after 1940 (Crane, 1987), it is worth characterising the first audiences of these movements as 'constituencies'. These constituencies were found in: organisations (government, companies, foundations); members of professional sub-cultures (experts, critics, conservationists, art dealers, artists, Professors of Art); networks of collectors and intellectuals. The constituents acted independently within diverse groups and were competitors, whether directly or indirectly. As artists saw it, once their works

had gained wider fame and status, any reservations by the social minority on the value of rebellious Art vanished.

Bourgeois delight in anti-bourgeois Art gave rise to all kinds of arguments to explain away the paradox. One was that the full innovative scope of the works could not be understood by bourgeois philistines unless they were simply confused or affected by 'class contradictions'. Another equally ingenious one was that placing innovative works in commercial channels and public programmes did not nullify their long-term critical, revolutionary power one iota. Thus by a cruel twist of fate (or historical providence), the bourgeoisie would be hoist by their own petard.

We shall now refer to two politically opposed analyses of the social contradictions of the *avant-garde* movement, one by Bell and the other by Adorno. Bell's analysis measures the *avant-garde's* impact from the standpoint of members of the bourgeoisie seemingly hell-bent on putting an end to their social and economic power through their pursuit of a culture of hedonist nihilism. Adorno's analysis describes the aporetic consequences of the *avant-garde* movement.

Bell sets out to write the second part of a sociological history of the influence of ethics on the evolution of Capitalism (Bell, 1979). Yet Weber shows that the cult of work and individual effort, rewarded by social and financial success and prospects of eternal salvation, had been key to Puritan Morality's embrace of Capitalism. Bell highlights the extent to which values in the cultural sphere (especially self-realisation without reference to the collective) gave rise to an individual hedonism that progressively weakened the foundations of the Capitalist system. The Marxist concept of the bourgeoisie as a class that "could not exist without constantly revolutionising the means of production, which means the conditions of production and all social relations".[6] Bell superimposes one of the original elements in the Saint-Simonian

6 Karl Marx, cited in Bell (1979: 27).

concept of the *avant-garde* whereby entrepreneur and artist share the same obsession with novelty (thus legitimising both as historical players). Yet everything that entrepreneurs and the bourgeoisie foster in economic terms, they frustrate in the moral and cultural spheres. Entrepreneurial individualism is needed to develop economic liberalism and is lauded when it is pragmatic, utilitarian and rationalist. Yet the same individualism is reviled when it is expressive and anti-rationalist. It thus makes no sense to attribute cultural results that are the fruit of groupings of free, self-determining initiatives to the domination of the bourgeoisie.

Bell's analysis contains typically Durkheimian elements without explicitly referring to Émile Durkheim. For Durkheim, Art illustrates the risks of giving free rein to disorderly individual passions since there are no limits to desires (Menger, 2001). Art systematically appears in Durkheimian analysis when describing and conjuring the intemperance of these desires and their pathology — an unbridled exertion of effort on the superfluous. In fact, according to Durkheim, what defines Art, and cultural creation and consumption is the rejection of limits and obligations and hence — as Durkheim would have it — the negation of a central mechanism for social balance. Art therefore embodies and heightens the ambiguity making up individualism. The positive dimension of individualism's development is that it is based on the "progress of the individual personality", with the social benefits that accrue therefrom. After all, individualism and artistic expression surely flow from the same spring (the quest for originality). This quest in turns spurs innovation among competing individuals. Faithful to Rousseau, Durkheim repeatedly recalls that without imagination (the creative faculty *par excellence*) individuals would not be driven to constantly invent and to seek new solutions to meet new needs — that is, to progress.

Yet the perils of this social dynamic should not be under-estimated. The growing differentiation of social activities makes each individual increasingly autonomous and artistic activity merely strengthens

this trend. Thus the artist symbolises the risk of 'egoism', the desire for free self-determination and the rejection of collective duties. Durkheim's distrust of Art was clearly linked to this vivid representation of individual disorder turned into a profession. Bell is not far removed from this concept of the individual as shaped by two forces: unbridled desire on the one hand on the other, dependency on the group, with its powers of coercion to ensure group survival. The bourgeoisie's change of heart and willingness to go the whole hog is explained by a shift in the composition of two opposing forces:

> A look back over history reveals that bourgeois society has twin roots and a twin fate. Capitalism had both Puritan and Liberal variants. The Puritan variety was not only linked to business activity but also to the formation of character (sobriety, integrity, hard word). The Liberal variety was inspired by the philosophy of Hobbes and involved radical individualism: Man had boundless ambitions that were limited in the political sphere by the sovereign but were given free rein in the economic and cultural spheres. Both trends formed an awkward whole and, in the course of time, their links were sundered. We have seen in The United States how Puritanism became debased, leaving behind only a narrow-minded, surly mentality that put respectability first and foremost. Hobbes' principles nurtured the essential ideas of modernism, namely a ravenous appetite for unlimited experiences (Bell, 1979: 90).

Given that the individual's desires are not limited by social or economic obligations, by morality or spending justly, the hedonist culture centred on immediate gratification of the individual's desires in a spiral of endless novelties that were every emptier of meaning and doomed to ever-faster obsolescence. For Bell, the development of credit was the instrument that was the Protestant Work Ethic's nemesis. That is because it allowed immediate material reward for one's labours and broadened the right to create pleasures, which

the Capitalist machine strove to multiply in order to foster a production based on innovation and what Schumpeter calls 'creative destruction'. According to Bell, bourgeois society was undermined by the triumph of individualism (of which the artist was the most successful exponent). This individualism and the cult of an 'infallible cause' (the *avant-garde*) comprised the following components: ego-worship; rebellion as a cult; amoral personal liberation; a cult of opposition to the bourgeoisie; the quest for impulsiveness as a behaviour pattern; 'institutionalisation of the pursuit of self-interest'.

While Bell stresses the devastating effects of the adoption of a hedonistic, nihilist culture for bourgeois society, Theodor Adorno was mainly concerned about the disastrous effects of acclimatisation to innovation for artistic creation. His argument ran as follows: the critical power of modern works is basically manifested in the liberation from forms and the rejection of traditional aesthetic solutions, which hide social contradictions beneath a seemingly delightful, harmonious artistic unity. According to Adorno, this critical power was doomed to be wielded in a negative fashion when it came to inherited codes of artistic construction and meaning. This was so because there was a desire to ditch a dialectic willing to consider all artistic options and aspects. Here, one can draw a parallel with the *avant-gardes'* concept of 'the general interest' and 'bourgeois interests' in the political conception and management of the world. Adorno considered that authentic works of Art could only manifest what the dominant ideology concealed — namely, the ever-deeper economic and social crises that were destabilising Capitalist society (and concomitant suffering, affliction, pain, and the revolt against the established order). Under this scheme, Art was distanced from common categories of aesthetic perception and in the end, from protest. The same bad habits in contemporary creation manifested the 'diabolical catastrophe' that lay in store as a result of Capitalism's contradictions. Yet innovation always runs the risk of contemplating its own navel, becoming systematised and falling for the latest novelty even if it is devoid of any social meaning. This dynamic arises

because the market reaches agreement on methodically exploiting the cycle of innovations, no matter how radical or unacceptable works seem at the outset. Provocative innovations become commonplace and widely-accepted after being put into economic circulation, losing their provocative connotations.[7]

Likewise, the development of the administration of Art and its professionalisation is revealed by Theodor Adorno as the two most effective ways of neutralising Art. In addition, a historic stage in Western societies that tried to put an end to economic crises and social conflicts through bureaucratic organisation, technocracy, and planning served to boost consumption of the arts. In the process, society assigned entertainment roles to the arts and turned them into ideological vehicles for domination. If the conservatism of listeners and spectators dominated by consumption habits and manipulated by cultural industries confined progressive artists to painful social isolation, their position on the fringes seemed sufficiently perilous for bourgeois society to try to neutralise their impact by absorbing their creations in the culture management sphere.

The refinements of Adorno's dialectic reasoning, as in Baudelaire, took a wholly pessimistic tone. For him, the social essence of the *avant-garde* lay in its autonomy, which of itself was a protest against Capitalism's groping tentacles in every sphere of life. There could be no escape from those tentacles save through 'Passion' (in the religious sense) for truly innovative Art.

For Adorno and Bell, the success of the innovators and the public acclaim of their *avant-garde* provocation had pernicious consequences for diametrically opposed reasons. According to Bell, they were bad for Capitalist society, whereas Adorno thought they were bad for truly innovative creators. Yet in both cases, the question of the social and political power

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7 It would be worth considering the future of the analytical scheme giving 'Capitalism' a remarkable ability to chew up, digest and render harmless all kinds of protest after first taking advantage of them.

of artistic innovation remains an impenetrable aporia. Either innovation is diluted in a hedonistic 'democratisation of genius', to use Bell's controversial term for the phenomenon, or it leads the artist to bear the cross of painful revelation all by himself.

Both readings of innovative Art's socio-political precepts beg some searching questions. What autonomy can there be in an innovation system in which the market is so easily accommodated that it becomes the driving force behind *avant-garde's* development (even if public cultural policies and their expert advisers partially substitute for private demand)? What difference separates the world of elitist Art on the one hand and *avant-garde* experiments on the other? Here, one might reasonably ask how the *avant-garde* could hope to both establish a monopoly of artistic expressiveness and aesthetic originality and to tear down the hierarchical divisions between autonomous Art and heteronomous Art without giving rise to formalist excesses.

The evolution of cultural policy revealed that the two vectors of artistic originality (the creator's aristocratic heroism and the democratic individualism of the expressive subject) had come to co-exist and lend credibility to two systems of public action. The equating of "support for radically innovative offerings/ stimulating cultural demand" was to be the backdrop against which public action projected a relativising fragmentation of the cultural sphere (Menger, 2001).

IN THE WAKE OF POLITICISATION, POLICY: THE SECULARISATION OF THE *AVANT-GARDE*
Internal rivalries in the artistic world involved fierce battles between old and modern, conservatives and progressives. Yet going beyond the rivalries between groups and trends, the *avant-garde* found a strong incentive to radicalise. Its politicisation of daring aesthetic experiments and criticism paid handsome dividends. The social and political content of true novelty often proved highly unpopular. In such cases, the *avant-garde* could take solace in the argument that

the public was prisoner to aesthetic conventions and ignorant of its own alienation. More than a consoling rationalisation, this kind of reckoning was based on the potential universal appeal of any creation. Yet such potential could only be realised if the right social transformations occurred. If they did, it was expected that the whole community would end up rejoicing in the values enshrined in the Art. When the creation entered in the artistic circuit managed by public bodies, it provided a doctrine of public action in a secularised version of said transformations: namely, cultural democratisation, greater cultural education and hence higher cultural aspirations. The spatial metaphor of the *avant-garde* banalised the lag in demand with regard to supply, turning it into a structural feature of artistic markets, in which there is a flood of innovations. Here, public action might help shorten demand's structural lag behind supply. The beginning of democratisation is akin to this secularised version of the *avant-garde*. Gradually, the critical and provocative value of mould-breaking innovations becomes the general state of affairs in artistic life, following the Art world's competition rules and in which each wave of innovations racks up its own successes and symbolic representations to be compiled and disseminated through the usual channels.

From the 1960s, European public cultural policies accompanied growing funding of creative activities with rising support for the most innovative ones. With their ever-deeper pockets, cultural bureaucracies not only used their rising discretionary powers but also increasingly delegated protagonism in aesthetic battles. Once monopoly control by an academy had been ruled out, the public agent called for representatives of the 'artistic community' to carry out selective choices. Yet, as Urfalino notes:

> The State could base its delegation of powers neither on the consensus of an artistic community nor on authority with monopoly jurisdiction over principles of cultural legitimacy and the consecration of artists and their works. (...) To delegate choice, the State had

no alternative but to use the protagonists' institutional mechanisms and their battles to its own ends. The State thus sought to substitute for the market yet uphold the autonomy of Art, while overseeing self-management of Art by a community of 'leading lights'. (...) The impossibility of the State making the choice and giving putting a sole authority in charge of artistic activity meant that it helped create "invisible academies" (Urfalino, 1989: 100–101).

That said, by bringing in a wide range of agents into the public art arena through mechanisms for delegating choices, the cultural policy established the legitimacy of unrestricted access. This in turn meant that any kind of evaluation or choice was shrouded in mystery with regard to both present and future outcomes. This also introduced the seed of relativism. How could one hope that the arts and cultural productions would gain lasting, general recognition if a restricted definition of arts and culture was used when widening the circle of those making 'public' choices?

Second, cultural policy had maintained obsessive, indefinite conservation of the past yet also set great store by novelty. Through a readily understood transferral mechanism, museum sacralisation and broad diffusion of masterworks of the past inexorably conferred prestige on all those who could claim to be creators. The process was speeded up as daring works of Art were consecrated by public institutions. This in turn superimposed a short-term system of public recognition system on long-term selective evaluation. Hence the twin postulates of public action: (1) establishment of rigorous terms for the defence and protection of relatively stable artistic and heritage values that had withstood the test of time; (2) action on the volatile, uncertain values of the present on the basis of what the future might hold ("Public institutions will not fail to give support for and recognition to artists whose future importance we can only speculate on today"). Such an approach meant that the authorities delegating choices on artistic funding and support ran the risk

of unfairness in the short term and ineffectiveness in the long run.

Last, the public policy of supporting Contemporary Art established a more complex relationship with the market. Raymonde Moulin has shown how, in certain sectors of production, the agents of public cultural entities were ahead of the market in discovering, launching and valuing artists and innovative movements, and in consolidating market shares in other segments (Moulin, 1992). This relationship between public policy and the market was transformed through international competition among the nations with the greatest output of Art and artists. Thus public investment imposed a new logic and rationality as public and quasi-public institutions disseminating Art grew apace (museums, Contemporary Art centres, private foundations attracted by the generous tax breaks given for Art sponsorship).

What does the imperative of 'democratisation' mean in cultural policy organised in this fashion? We have already mentioned cultural policy's poor performance in relation to democratisation. The aim was to broaden audiences in the main fields chosen for cultural initiatives. It would be easier to ask below what threshold cultural elitism persisted thanks to social privilege and above which cultural heterogeneity was acceptable to audiences. It would also be easy to ask to what extent democratisation was a realistic, credible aim. Indeed, the objective was clearly beyond reach given that the determining factors in cultural practices and the mechanisms driving cultural inequalities give very little scope for public action. In reality, the democratisation principle tends to be identified with organising the production of cultural goods and services at set prices. Accordingly, the policy tends to be measured in quantitative terms: the more products and services are subsidised by a public entity, the greater the justification for the policy. Egalitarian concerns are met by the hypothesis that the social diversity of audiences grows along with the consumption of cultural goods and services.

The results of this system seem pretty unimpressive[8] when one considers its almost negligible impact on the cultural industries serving the mass market. The limitations of attempts to democratise 'High Culture' are revealed by strategies for segmenting offerings depending on the key factors of demand (especially age) in the cultural industries (music, audiovisual, cinema, multi-media). Cultural policy since 1980 has not renounced the principle of regulatory interventions in these markets. However, it has learnt some lessons regarding the implicit segmentation of targeted markets. Indeed, subsidised offerings in the 'High Culture' field are pitched at 'serial consumers' who make up the lion's share of demand and who are drawn from a narrow section of society. The explicit segmentation is the result of deliberately building a 'selection' of target markets by the producers of films, records and TV programmes. Rather than placing all its bets on the costly long-term (which would imply converting the masses to consumption of 'elitist' arts), public action has plumped for a relativist defence of cultural pluralism. Here, one should acknowledge that the public sector has acted as a safety net for 'High Culture', often in the teeth of opposition and entrenched hierarchies.

The cultural policy has resorted to: (1) various forms of support and recognition; (2) launching and re-appraising education programmes; (3) funding and distribution of products; (4) enhancing the status of artists; (5) promoting heritage works, archives and conservation in both commercial and non-cultural ways. Here, cultural policy has waged a two-pronged battle against the monopoly of the Fine Arts. The first prong is the re-activation and funding of activities, products and creators through the cultural policy. Its beneficiaries campaign to lower the barriers between: art and crafts: aesthetic invention and 'know-how;

Fine Arts and Applied Arts. Thus photo journalism (and not just Art Photography), artistic profession such as fashion, advertising, industrial design, the circus, puppet shows, and cooking all appear in the catalogue of promoted sectors. Mass-consumption sectors (such as pop music, rock music, so-called amplified music, comics) also benefit from direct and indirect public support.

The second prong and the other exercise in relativism (raised to the status of political dogma) involves a sweeping re-evaluation and revitalisation of cultural practices in the anthropological sense. Here, culture embraces: community and regional languages, and cultures; rites; customs; knowledge and 'know-how' expressed in traditions, teachings, lessons and skills whether of an individual or a collective nature. These practices form and re-form the unity and identity of social groups, places and regions. In this case, relativism takes an open-handed approach to manifold cultural idiosyncrasies that would otherwise be confined to small pockets in worker, rural, immigrant, rural, and youth cultures.

In this way, contemporary cultural policy unfolds to follow two approaches in which the historical analysis faces the same dilemma. The first approach consolidates the power of creative professionals by prescribing: democratisation (that is, mass conversion to 'High Culture'; support for the renewal of cultural offerings. The second approach fosters the birth of a cultural democracy, the dismantling, abolition or reversal of hierarchical division on which the domination of 'High Culture' is based (Pure Art versus Functional Art; Original Creation versus Imitative Culture; Autonomous, Universal Culture versus Local, Heteronomous Culture). This is an approach that celebrates individual intervention and amateurism, egalitarian relativism, and co-existence instead of fostering competition among cultures.

Yet what does this unfolding of public cultural action have to do with the results of a rise in funding? Here, one should note that *ipso facto*, more resources leads to greater diversification in interventions and a

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8 The uncertainty of a relativist appreciation can be summed up thus: following the reasoning set out in the first part of this article, it is logical to think that without public intervention, whole fields of artistic creation and diffusion would have vanished, especially those with most prestige. Yet these fields only exhibited a marginal increase in their social base. Above all, a re-allocation of resources might have boosted innovation covered the preferences of consumers of 'High Culture'.

broadening of beneficiary categories and means that supported sectors do not have to compete for funds. It has been noted that both cultural action strategies co-exist peacefully when public funding for culture is plentiful (Mulcahy and Swaim, 1982). Under such conditions, cultural policy is reduced to: pragmatic skirmishing over budgets; rejection of arguments over doctrine; realistic management of diversification; greater relativism or (framed in more conventional terms) more demands for pluralism. The coincidence of political and ideological opposites will be included in future public management, whose features are thrown into sharper relief when funding is plentiful. Thus, when the following characteristics are ascribed to public action in the cultural sector, there seems to be an irresistible temptation to throw the rules governing the rest of public expenditure to the winds. The singular treatment accorded to culture is seen in the ever-greater number of activities, spheres and forms of intervention, and more heterogeneity in additional activities. To make matters worse, there is indifference, impotence or even outright hostility to any proposals for rationalising cultural management (such as, setting specific goals and priorities, proper resource management, methodical evaluation of results).

Burgeoning budgets for cultural policy undoubtedly favour the expression and revindication of divergent issues and arguments, driven by a growing variety of constituencies and professional groupings rejecting any restrictive or monopolistic definition of culture. Nevertheless, the growth in funds is not sufficient by itself to explain the relativistic decentralisation of public action.

In many respects, the *avant-garde* movements have led to relativisation of their ideas by becoming the heralds of 'officially-recognised' Art. The scheme of innovation's indirect social and political influence has sustained formal quests for innovation and a professionalising concept of expert invention. In the process, it has relegated popular forms of artistic creation to mere surrogates for enriching cultural entrepreneurs and mercenary artists and confused

consumers. Yet the limits to cultural democratisation and the growing gap between autotelic aesthetics and the rest of cultural offerings has raised serious questions. One is that the current cultural policy is both ineffective and revolutionary in the long run. The argument is that formalist aesthetic innovation runs the risk of appearing as a flimsy ideology designed to allow a specialised group of artists to act in harmony with the history of their Art but outside the historical context.

What can one say about the growing sacralisation of artistic autonomy? The creation of 'High Culture' requires cross-fertilisation with popular art forms. Traditional European and non-European cultures showed that autonomous creation is rooted in collective myths — something that only part of the *avant-garde* wanted to keep and nurture to ensure the survival and integrity of their formal revolutions. Furthermore, some of the most influential *avant-gardes* and some of the most iconic innovations in the programme of radical rupture adapted to aesthetic relativism in various ways (nihilist, ironic, humorous, and militant ones). Again, we find a second wave of artistic innovations such as those of Duchamp, Schwitters, Dubuffet, Warhol, Satie, Cage, who questioned the frontiers that separate elitist Art from other kinds of Art.

The relativist de-hierarchisation of culture greatly shifted the social and political meanings of Art. This shift affected: (a) artistic authenticity; (b) the sincerity of artists' self-realisation; (c) what constitutes Art; (d) what Art questions; (f) the forces, authorities, norms, obligations, and injustices hampering artistic expression. Perhaps this relativistic de-herarchisation was only so easily superimposed on the traditional doctrine of social and individual emancipation through the cult of 'higher values' (as contemporary cultural policy would put it) because both were based on a common idealisation of youth. Public intervention suggests the introduction of a more tranquil, secularised alternative to revolutionary, *avant-garde* or populist ideologies, that drew on the identification between cultural development and new generations. Cultural policy thus freed itself of

the socio-political content and now seems to take its cue from the behaviour of Art markets. Surely such a public policy equates aesthetic innovation with business inventiveness and drive, which is expressed in every shorter production cycles and reduces artistic consecration to a one or two-year fad? Does it not contribute to naturalising an arbitrary succession of innovations that merely seek novelty for its own sake (contrasting starkly and none too favourably with the political and ideological justifications used in the past)? Could it be that the institutional triumph of the *avant-gardes* doomed them to decomposition and diverse forms of syncretism and ecclecticism that have

been labelled 'Post-Modernist' and that reject the teleology of self-proclaimed, cumulative ruptures?[9]

9 We cannot undertake an analysis of this kind of improvement given that the very idea of improvement has been overturned (or the ideologeme family) in Post-Modernity. Richard Shusterman (1991) began a lucid discussion (albeit, not lacking in aporias) to determine how a socially progressive aesthetic swept away traditional hierarchies between High Culture and the Culture of the Masses without succumbing to populism. The advent of Post-Modernity was the death knell for the concept of Art as either an autonomous sphere or one that was increasingly autonomous. Yet the proposal to hierarchise Pop Art to separate the wheat from the chaff and, by so doing, strengthen the value of Pop Art and to introduce sound criteria clashed with the aim of de-hierarchisation and to adapt to an unsustainable functionalism.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Pierre-Michel Menger studied Philosophy at *l'École normale supérieure and then Sociology at EHESS (École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales) [School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences] where he began his doctoral thesis under the direction of Raymonde Moulin*. He began his research career in 1978 as a CNRS researcher and completed his doctoral thesis at *La Fondation Thiers* before being recruited by the CNRS [French National Centre for Scientific Research] in 1981. He pursued his career at CNRS until May 2013, when he was admitted to the prestigious *Collège de France*. Menger directed CNRS – EHESS from 1993 to 2005. In 1994, he was appointed Director of Studies at EHESS, having taught sociologist methods and theories since 1987. He also gave courses on the sociology of consumption, life-styles and work for several years at the *Institut d'études politiques de Paris* [Paris Institute of Political Studies]. He has written numerous books on the Sociology of The Arts, work, and creativity, among which *Le travail créateur* [Creative Work], published by Gallimard-Seuil in 2009, is particularly noteworthy. He is also co-Director of the journal *Revue française de sociologie* and member of the Scientific Council of the journal *Revue économique*.

Uses and Abuses of Creativity. Sociology of creative processes, transitions to digital and creative policies

Juan Arturo Rubio-Arostegui

UNIVERSIDAD ANTONIO DE NEBRIJA

jrubioa@nebrija.es

Juan Pecourt

UNIVERSITAT DE VALÈNCIA

juan.pecourt@uv.es

Joaquim Rius-Ulldemolins

UNIVERSITAT DE VALÈNCIA

joaquim.rius@uv.es

ABSTRACT

Creativity is a notion awakening growing interest in the social sciences. This attention mirrors the debate on the potential economic and social development of creativity as a skill, profession or industry. However, there is also rising critical interpretation of the abuse of this concept, exploited to legitimize the hasty digitization of the cultural field, and of the instrumentalization of culture in pursuit of economic interests. This article is grounded on the contributions of numerous sociologists (Bourdieu, Collins and Menger) in an attempt to reconsider the conditions under which creativity develops, and examine how the framework of digitalization and instrumentalization is shifting (not always positively) the structure of this field, and the interaction frameworks that favour the development of this creation of culture.

Keywords: *creativity, cultural policy, digitalization, white elephants*

INTRODUCTION

The debate surrounding creativity (its origin, its uses and its effects) has become a main focus of controversy in the social sciences. This is due to a number of factors such as the growing role of the so-called *cultural and creative industries* in the field of production and consumerism. But it is also due to the very power of creativity as a discourse in itself which, like a liquid resource, is imbued with educational discourses based on new didactics and the central role of student learning, or with the management of personality aptitudes and emotional intelligence, besides expert knowledge, to survive in the labour market, to give but a few examples.

From our point of view, debates surrounding creativity take a substantivist position on this, and ignore or overlook the social conditions under which it arises and develops, on the one hand and, on the other, the niches and potentiality of this discourse beyond its role in the arts and cultural industries. Furthermore, the celebratory position on creativity as a formula for solving the problems of post-Fordism societies overlooks the potential destructuring effects of this discourse. Above all, when it interrelates and merges with other prevailing discourses, such as educational discourse, as we have just pointed out, or others such as management or innovation (Alonso and Fernández Rodríguez, 2013) and its effects on some transformation processes to digital culture. Here, we are going to show that these discourses on creativity have been abused or «hijacked» in order to design and legitimize creative projects, infrastructures, events or clusters. Projects that contemplate the social conditions under which creativity develops as those that establish the main contributions of the sociology of creativity.

In the first part of this article we will undertake the analysis of the sociological study of creativity and the production of cultural value, which is approached from different viewpoints. On the one hand, the Durkheimian view, which is centred on the configuration of institutionalized rites that contribute to focusing symbolic interest (Collins, 2009) and, on the other hand, the Weberian view, which analyses the social configuration of genius (Menger, 2010). In this work we will take ideas from both views, paying special attention to the contributions of Bourdieu and Collins, who follow in the wake of Durkheim, and of Menger, who is closer to the Weberian position. In the second part of the paper, we will contrast the main theses of sociological analysis with notions about transition to the digital world. In this sense, a critique will be made of cyber-utopian discourse, which advocates the benefits of our 21st century digital culture. And finally, we will analyse how the discourse on creativity has permeated territorial development and has led to the undertaking of large projects we could call «cultural white elephants».

CONCEPTIONS OF CREATIVITY AND SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

In highly diverse currents of thought, creativity is considered an essential attribute of action and a necessary, if not indispensable, condition influencing social change. However, in defining their basic characteristics, the differences between schools and disciplines are so striking that they seem to refer to different spheres of human experience. For example, in ancient traditions, from classical Greece to the Middle Ages, creativity was associated with spiritual and mystic beliefs (Runco and Albert, 1999). Creativity was believed to be a divine and supernatural reality, a manifestation of God or an exceptional quality that God bestowed upon certain chosen individuals. The Greek concept of *tejné* is transformed into the creationist-medieval culture, stripping it of man to become an utterly divine property. Classical Greece emphasized the metaphysical source of all creative achievement and believed in the existence of the individual *daimon*, a sort of spirit that guided the act of creation (Misztal, 2009). During modernity, the advent of the concept of *individual*, the process of secularization that begins with philosophical modernity (Descartes), among other factors, brings new ways of treating creativity and reintroduces creative activity in man, associated with man's capacities and his talent (English empiricism and German idealism —Kant and Schelling). In more recent times, emphasis has been placed on the importance of creativity and

originality as a fundamental element of economic development and the construction of personal identity. Indeed, for some, it does not depend on a talent or special gift, but originates in a specific mental state of the human mind (Bohm, 2006). This implies that such a creative mental state is not exclusive to a select minority, but can be achieved by anyone who has the required preparation and who uses the right techniques. Nonetheless, despite their apparent diversity, all these fundamentally Western traditions have in common the link between creativity and innovation. In other words, they affirm the capacity of the human being to produce something out of nothing, owing to the influence of an exceptional and mysterious power, or the aptitude of the human mind to come up with unprecedented and unexpected solutions.

The concept of creativity did not gain importance until the twentieth century, both in terms of philosophical discourse and social sciences in general, especially in psychology and pedagogy. Likewise, sociology has been too timid to deal with understanding the mystery or «black box» of creativity. The attention paid to studying large social structures and processes of change, the main approach to the rational and normative action of the individual, have left little room for a detailed reflection on creativity (Joas, 1996). However, while this notion, unlike others, has failed to acquire a central role in what we might call *classical sociology*, it has stimulated relevant debates that are gaining prominence. In this work, we start from the premise that sociology has highly valuable tools to gain insight into the social origins of creativity and the forms of valorization imposed upon it.

THE NOTION OF CREATIVITY IN SOCIAL SCIENCES
During the Enlightenment, the recognition of the power of reason and the increasing importance of empirical verification reversed the traditional discourse on creativity, thereby engendering new interpretative models in which social sciences played a fundamental role. A discussion of the complex debates generated by the idea of creativity falls

outside the scope of this work, therefore we will limit ourselves to identifying some of the main currents of thought and then examine contemporary sociological contributions, focusing on the works of Pierre Bourdieu (2002), Randall Collins (2009) and Pierre-Michel Menger (2010).

Broadly speaking, we can identify, on the one hand, the humanistic interpretation of creativity based on the romantic ideal that emerged in the nineteenth century and on the notion of individual genius (Herder, Fichte, Schelling). Creative individuals are geniuses, usually ahead of their time and misunderstood, whose contributions will only be understood by the generations to come. The romantic conception of creativity, which revolved around the idea of individual genius, has greatly influenced the West and has impregnated the debates of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries on the subject. In view of this humanistic conception, the social sciences have made diverse contributions to our understanding of creativity from the philosophy of science (Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos), sociology of science (Merton, Latour) and sociological pragmatism (Pierce, Mead, Dewey). The scientific discourse of creativity arose within the discipline of psychology in its different currents (mainly social psychology and cognitive psychology) during the twentieth century, during which time different approaches were adopted to endeavour to measure variables and find a relationship between creativity and intelligence, giftedness and personality traits. However, during that century there was a tendency whereby the focus on the individual was extended to other social variables in an attempt to explain creativity, (Rubio Arostegui, 2013).

An important author greatly influencing the scientific production of creativity from an ecological approach to psychology is Csikszentmihalyi (1988), who stresses the impact of the social environment on individual creativity. Thus, he describes creativity as the result of the interaction between culture, the person who brings novelty to the symbolic field and an environment of legitimation composed by experts endowed with symbolic capital, who label and recognize innovation.

More recently sociology has made important contributions that take elements of the aforementioned traditions to challenge the romantic conception of creativity. Instead, it emphasizes the importance of social conditions that favour creativity and the forms of social valorization that cause certain actions to be considered as creative while others are discarded. The most recent outstanding contributions are the works of Pierre Bourdieu and Randall Collins, which we will deal with in detail below.

Creativity in the cultural fields: the contribution of Pierre Bourdieu

Bourdieu's (2002) sociological conception of creativity is based on the dynamics of cultural fields and on the various expressions adopted by the individual habitus within. Creativity as an original artistic or academic novelty would be defined in terms of the dialectical process taking place in the artistic fields. Thus, Bourdieu understands the fields of interaction as structured spaces, comprising a limited set of social positions (which can be presented as individuals, groups, organizations, etc.) that compete for a specific resource that the French author calls capital. As the resources provided by the fields are scarce and, therefore, not all players can accumulate them in sufficient quantities, there is a tendency for these resources to be monopolized in the hands of a few (Bourdieu, 2008). Within the various fields that make up social life, Bourdieu identifies a cultural field characterized by the presence of a specific type of agent (artists, writers, actors, etc.) competing for the specific resource offered by this space. This is the so-called *cultural capital*, as well as *symbolic capital*. Cultural capital comprises the knowledge, skills and competences that the individual accumulates over time, while symbolic capital is the recognition and prestige attained.

Bourdieu assumes that a proper life trajectory and socialization, associated with the history of the cultural field, are required in order to be creative or, more specifically, for the creations themselves to be recognized as such within the cultural field. It is also necessary to possess certain symbolic resources

that provide insight into the true problems and the authentic spaces where creativity is found. Creativity is the result of conflict and competition between individuals and groups (schools, movements, associations, etc.) which thus try to mobilize their respective cultural capital and gain recognition from the community. These conflicts imply the existence of two large groups: *a)* dominant positions, i.e., those that are widely recognized by the artistic community and tend to control the specific game rules in the field (imposing styles, themes, issues, etc.), and *b)* dominated positions, occupied by players who have not achieved recognition within the field, because they have neither the right socialization nor the necessary resources to act in it. Bourdieu considers that the real prospects of innovation in the latter group are very scarce. Indeed, their structural limitations, both materially and mentally, will impose a repetitive and imitative logic on their actions, with no real capacity to propose innovative ideas that can transform the game rules of their cultural field. This basic premise of Bourdieu's theory clashes with many current perspectives that proclaim and celebrate the universality of creativity.

If dominated positions lack real prospects of making creative contributions in the cultural sphere, they will be restricted to what happens in the domain of dominant positions. Bourdieu's view on this point is rather nuanced: dominant positions do not form a homogeneous set of players with common interests. We can identify two competing poles within the dominant players: on the one hand, established players, those who have a long track-record in the cultural field and who, in their day, made some kind of symbolic revolution that placed them in a position of power. Over time these players have established their dominance by imposing the specific game rules that determine the functioning of the field (for example, when a particular historical moment witnesses the imposition of the realist novel or pictorial expressionism). On the other hand, we have the contenders, that is to say, those players who do not have the decision-making power of the established players, but who have a suitable trajectory

and enough capital to propose alternatives to the cultural *establishment*. Generally, the clash between the established players and the contenders takes the form of a generational conflict, where young people try to create their own space or even impose a symbolic revolution to change the game rules and place themselves in more influential positions. These struggles between social groups underlie the struggles between tradition and avant-garde, classical and modern, etc., in which creative innovations (Impressionists, Surrealists, Dadaists, etc.) emerge. Although the established players have adequate resources, Bourdieu does not consider them to be the most creative collective, because their interests lead them to maintain the *status quo* and prevent potential transformation. In contrast, the interests of contenders are directly associated with the renewal of the cultural field, so they will be more likely to make creative contributions (which are reflected in the emergence of new philosophical schools, new artistic movements or literary styles, etc.).

However, although contenders tend to be creative and commonly spark many of the revolutions that occur in the artistic and literary fields, they often find their prospects of action weighed down by their subordinate position with respect to the consecrated. Consecrated persons, as we have seen, tend to conservatism, dominate cultural institutions and are not very interested in change or novelty. However, among the consecrated, and in a setting of fully autonomous cultural fields free of the shackles of economic and political power, a specific type of creative player may arise that Bourdieu calls the *consecrated heretic*. In other words, those individuals who hold a dominant position in the cultural field and are able to impose styles and trends, as well as act as *gatekeepers*, while simultaneously transcending their specific interests (their temporary interests) to exercise a universalist action based on «interest in disinterest», which gives rise to «art for the sake of art» or «knowledge for the sake of knowledge» (Bourdieu, 2008). Within this select group of consecrated persons, their habitus and their specific dispositions will lead them to be creative

and to propose constant transformation of the field, sometimes in accordance with the interests of the contenders, who can adopt them as teachers or examples to follow.

Creativity and interaction rituals: Randall Collins' contribution

From the sociological perspective, a second contribution to our understanding of creativity comes from the American sociologist Randall Collins (Collins, 2005, Collins, 2009). Whereas Bourdieu focuses on the role of large social structures (in the fields of interaction) and the interiorization and reproduction of these structures by individual agents, Collins presents a microsociological vision focusing on the role of face-to-face relationships and the rituals that shape social relations in the realm of everyday life.

In agreement with the French author, Collins asserts that creativity is related to the possession of specific resources, although he specifically refers to two: cultural capital and emotional energy. The idea of *cultural capital* is taken from Bourdieu and, therefore, has a similar meaning to that explained above, although sometimes he refers to it as *symbols of group membership*, emphasizing its capacity to forge the individual's identity and to integrate him/her into a specific social group. For his part, through the idea of *emotional energy*, Collins alludes to the central role of emotions in the creative individual. Thus, among the resources available for action, there are not only economic or cultural resources, but also emotional resources (which reflect moods such as joy, sadness, hatred, enthusiasm or resentment) and lead to different ways of acting within the social reality.

The artistic, philosophical, scientific or literary communities are organized according to the manifold interactions that their members perform, and wherein cultural and emotional capitals are distributed. Collins asserts that interactions taking place in cultural settings are structured around specific rituals and that these rituals determine the individual's ability to gather symbolic and emotional resources, enabling him/her to be creative and occupy a relevant place within the cultural field. Rituals of interaction are important for

two main reasons: *a)* they provide a common focus for the whole artistic or literary community, i.e., they enable community members to focus on the same issues and problems, and *b)* bestow a common state of mind upon the community, which is reflected in the interest and enthusiasm for the objects and topics dealt with in these areas (Wittgenstein's philosophy, Schubert's music, Jackson Pollock's painting, etc.). The common focus of attention and common emotional energy give rise to «sacred objects», which can be ideas, words, images or sounds. Such objects are honoured by the community as a whole, and acquire an *aura* that is preserved thanks to the rituals organized around them (lectures, classes, concerts, visits to museums, etc.), which bestow value upon them.

The fact that ritualized interactions are decisive in boosting individual creativity imposes important constraints. In the first place, those individuals who do not form part of the rituals will not have much chance of being creative or, at least, of being recognized as creative people. They will not have gathered the appropriate cultural and emotional resources that enable them to make impactful contributions able to draw the attention of the whole community concerned. Also, forming part of the collective interactions does not ensure creativity: rituals impose stratification on participants and grants dual-structured spaces formed by a centre and a periphery. On the periphery, most participants contribute in a minor or intermittent way, have few cultural and emotional resources and, therefore, very few opportunities to make really creative contributions. These groups will tend to develop negative emotions regarding their situation and performance (sadness, depression, professional meaninglessness, artists' block, etc.), which will curb their creative options. Furthermore, their limited control of cultural capital will mean that they are somewhat unaware of where the most innovative trends lie at any given moment. By contrast, in the centre of the sphere we find the really influential minority, those who have the right cultural and emotional resources and tend to be enormously creative. These individuals, thanks to their successes, will tend to accumulate positive emotions (ambition,

enthusiasm, job security, professional satisfaction and fulfilment, etc.), which will boost their creative power and maintain their privileged position. Their domination of cultural capital will determine that they are, almost always, on the most innovative fronts, where true creative contributions arise.

According to Collins, the creative individual needs specific resources, but the creative act itself is collective and social, and it emerges and flourishes with interaction among equals, with strategic positioning within specialized rituals being determinant. The idea of the lonely and forgotten genius who lives in a loft composing an advanced masterpiece that only future generations will understand is, according to Randall Collins, a romantic myth that does not portray how these spheres actually work. This author affirms that the great cultural innovations have come about within communitarian dynamics, in which a host of people interacted around common «sacred objects». In this respect, necessary conditions of creativity include the relationship between teacher and disciple, and contact with the most productive and renowned representatives in the field.

Rituals of interaction play an essential role in stratifying artistic and literary communities, since they allow interactions to be fruitful and meaningful. Like Bourdieu, Collins asserts that originality and innovation are minority realities and that very specific conditions have to arise for them to flourish. In fact, this author suggests the existence of the «law of small numbers», a kind of iron law that determines creative potential in any cultural field (1987). The American sociologist fixes this number allowing for the emergence of really creative exchanges to be between three and six. A smaller number would greatly limit the possibility of exchange and would not foster the conflict from which creativity emerges, while a higher number would defocus the centre of attention and would not allow the existence of common spaces that would foster meaningful interactions. Again, as in Bourdieu's case, we see that Collins questions certain current visions that celebrate the democratization of creativity and its extension to the population as a whole.

Valuation actions and institutional selection mechanisms: Pierre-Michel Menger's contribution

The French sociologist Pierre-Michel Menger's contributions fall within the Weberian current that analyses the social configuration of genius (Menger, 2009). Certainly, other authors have worked on the social analysis of creative genius, such as the cases of Mozart (Elías, 2002), Beethoven (DeNora, 1995) or Van Gogh (Heinich, 1992). They emphasize the social determinants underlying these creators' creativity, and the construction of their artistic career and struggle (in some cases successful and in others frustrated) to attain autonomy in their creation and artistic legitimacy, without other factors (religious, political or commercial) influencing the response to their work. Therefore, these studies emphasize the perspective of charism as a social product, wherein the creation of cultural value stems from recognition.

However, beyond these socio-historical analyses, from a more meso-sciological perspective, Menger (2009) introduces the analysis of the everyday recognition processes which take place by two mechanisms. 1) The continuous acts of appraisal that the medium itself undertakes, whereby small differences in talent are considered essential and generate great distances in reputation. Such support provides better learning options (access to scholarships, training institutions or artistic projects, which constitute a fundamental learning mechanism, learning from practice). Also, greater recognition provides greater security and protection against failure, which in turn encourages innovative capacity, thus closing a virtuous circle. 2) There are formal institutional and market selection mechanisms, which pave the way towards recognition and learning among the elite, and promote a mass-media reputation, generating a mechanism similar to *the winners take all*, whereby a small elite possesses all the reputation indicators (Menger, 1999).

Thus, all these analytical systems emphasize the importance of interactions in creation, recognition and value setting. Therefore, we must consider whether certain cultural systems favour the generation of cultural value more than others, and whether

there may be developments or dysfunctions of the cultural system that diminish the capacity to generate creativity of the cultural system. This question acquires maximum relevance when considered within the context of the digital transition of culture.

THE DIGITAL TRANSITION AND RHETORIC OF CREATIVITY UNDER THE AUTHORS' SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS: STRUCTURES, INTERACTIONS AND CREATIVITY

Creation as a collective process and the creation of cultural and economic value: the role of intermediaries

In the first place, we must clarify that the notion of *intermediary* is totally inappropriate for the cultural sector, given that the creation phase cannot be clearly separated from the production or distribution phase, and symbolic capital or value can be produced in all segments of the cooperation chain as well as collectively by the whole cultural field (Bourdieu, 2008). The creation process requires the involvement of several professions considered as technical or managerial, but which play a very important micro-interactive role in the process itself, and in the configuration of the final product (Becker, 1984; Peterson, 1997).

Numerous sociologists have relativized the notion of *author* in cultural fields, pointing out that it is an ideological construction based on the romantic ideology of artistic genius (Williams, 1994, Williams, 2001). Some authors have drawn a parallel between the depiction of the artist, like Van Gogh — for instance — whose life was characterized by turbulence and social isolation, and the stories of the Catholic saints' lives and their martyrdom. And that, in fact, the accounts of Van Gogh portraying him as an artist who was cut off from the art market, actually underestimate the role played by the numerous intermediaries in constructing value and success posthumously (Heinich, 1992). We should also point out that the particular case of this artist is actually an exception regarding the pathological nature of his personality, rather than constituting a common trait, as can be observed by

considering the life of other great artists such as Picasso (Franck, 2003). In this respect, Picasso maintained many close relationships with his dealers, Vollard and Khanweiler, within a context of exchange and negotiation on the way of presenting (and, therefore, valorizing) his work, as well as on controlling the sale of his pictures and the corresponding economic conditions (Assouline, 1989).

One of the most interesting contributions to this field is made by Howard Becker, who adopts an interactionist view on the world of art (and is, therefore, relativistic about the notion of *authorship*). This leads him to reassess the figure of the artist in terms of how it fits into the cooperation chain intrinsic to artistic work (Becker, 1984). According to his perspective, art is a collective activity involving a host of intermediaries, in addition to those considered as creators. With respect to artists who do not find the right intermediaries for their works, they can look for other outlets, but this will also change the final result and open up new perspectives. In addition, there are operating rules in the world of art and a division of labour that is arbitrary and, although difficult to change, constantly evolving. For example, in the field of music there has always been conflict regarding the notion of *authorship*, although since the music sphere became consolidated as an autonomous cultural sphere in the nineteenth century the tendency is to consider the composer as the author and the musician-performer as an intermediary. Notwithstanding, various musical trends such as jazz or contemporary music call this convention into question. Nor is there a clear division between author and intermediary in fields like conceptual art or large sculptures, in which the artist does not perform the work, or in the film industry, where works are produced collectively and there may be several authors and important technical contributions (scriptwriter, director of photography, soundtrack composer, etc.).

Intermediaries also play a very important role in the creation of cultural value and reputation, being products, such as visual works of art, without a value defined *a priori* by the material they are made of, or by the man-hours required to produce them (Becker, 1994; Moulin, 1992). Then again, in the case of works targeting the most avant-garde sector, they lack a previously constituted public or demand (Bourdieu, 2002). Also, in the following stages of the creative career, the economic value of the market-constructed economic value of works cannot be defined mid-term (Becker, 1994). Critics of cultural intermediation argue that their action is based on creating an artificial scarcity and on contributing to reproduce a shortage of demand (Lessig, 2005). However, studies of cultural professions in which an artificial demand has been created based on public resources show that the works of artists that are not valued by intermediaries end up having the value of the material from which they are made, i.e., a value close to zero, and they are scarcely professionalized in the artistic field (Menger, 2009).

Thus, since the advent of the critic-dealer system in the late nineteenth century, which replaced the academic mechanisms of admission to and development of the artistic career, the intermediaries have played the following basic roles: *a)* on the one hand, they act as gatekeepers of the artistic worlds to reduce the excess supply, which is one of the characteristics of the creative professions (Menger, 1999); *b)* on the other hand, intermediaries can take on different roles within artistic markets: first, the initial promotion, career development at the regional or state level and, finally, institutional consecration and projection in the global market. Each of these career stages will correspond to a type of intermediary with different competences and economic capacity (Moulin, 1983; Moulin and Cardinal, 2012); *c)* these intermediaries, on being situated in the realm of the artistic market or a segment thereof, orient the consumer towards a type of offer. Such orientation can be interpreted as a structural homology, as a reflection of the hierarchies in the artistic field toward the social field (Bourdieu, 1991) or, in a less deterministic way, as a mediation between the artistic worlds and the formation of amateur communities able to develop criteria and experiences in order to create taste and value (Hennion, 2004).

Some authors extend the notion of *creativity* and affirm that not only are the authors creative but also the intermediaries; thus one may speak of creative management (Bilton, 2007). Without reaching this extreme, which seems inappropriate given its combination of clearly differentiable notions, such as cultural creativity and innovation in management, we understand that intermediaries play a fundamental role in the cultural system by providing creators visibility. For example, it is well known that art dealers establish the artistic system, as in the case of Daniel Henry Kahnweiler, an art dealer who contributed decisively to the concept of the cubist style (Assouline, 1989). To do so, he resorted to his social networks, art fairs and their conformation in urban art districts thereby attracting the attention of art collectors and enthusiasts (Rius, 2012). A similar role can be found for producers in the audiovisual and record sectors, who also play an essential role in generating new styles and musical labels, which provide greater visibility and connection with music consumers (Negus, 2002).

But perhaps we can find the most consistent example in the figure of the businessman Serguéi Diáguilev, who formed the company of Russian Ballets between 1909 and 1929 (the latter being the year of his death). The company was the hub of the vanguards in the arenas of music, visual arts and, of course, choreography. Diáguilev's death brought with it the disappearance of a company that had recruited the most important assets of musical creation for the previous two decades. These included Musorgsky, Tchaikovsky, Borodin, Prokofiev, Stravinsky, Ravel, Debussy, Satie, Fauré and Falla. In the field of the visual arts, painters who collaborated in the company's productions included Picasso, Matisse and Braque, to name but a few. But it is undoubtedly within the choreographic field that Diáguilev's entrepreneurial project bears even greater importance and significance, with the collaboration of choreographers who represent a benchmark in the history of much of 20th century choreography (Fokine, Petipa, Massine and Balanchine), providing a company model that tends to be mimicked by both classical ballet and contemporary dance companies, and even by flamenco and Spanish dance throughout the 20th century.

Creators and intermediaries: an interdependent system

Based on renowned authors and comparative research, the previous sections have emphasised the importance of social interactions in cultural creation and intermediation processes. However, in view of the processes that predict the beneficial effects of the dismantling of the cultural professions and industries as we know them today, we must consider that the cultural sphere is an interdependent system. Several authors have considered the appropriateness of analysing the cultural realm as a system of relationships involving different agents that are mutually determined (Hirsch, 1972).

Finally, some authors have perceived a growing awareness in the cultural sectors of the overlapping of the commercial, entertainment and the informal art sectors (Cherbo and Wyszomirski, 2000). It would be easy to find examples of actors simultaneously working in television series, which provide support, and in community theatre or artistic education that provide regular work and income, as well as in riskier projects related to experimental theatre that provide an opportunity for learning and cultural capital within their profession (Menger, 1997). Thus, from this viewpoint, the crisis or disappearance of audiovisual companies also indirectly affects community and educational projects as well as experimental theatre. Therefore, the digital transition and drop in revenues of a segment not only affects this segment but also the entire cultural system, with the consequent decline in the future prospects of developing innovative projects. Furthermore, we must also remember that one of the intermediaries' missions is to support the creator during the process of shaping a public that understands and appreciates their new creations, and generating the demand that will generate sufficient resources for the artist to be able to dedicate himself to his work professionally (Becker, 2008). In the absence of intermediation, the professionalization process experienced since the nineteenth century may be reversed, transforming cultural activities into parasitic activities, dependent on other professional activities such as teaching. However, part-time dedication decisively reduces the ability to undertake intensive projects in short-term interactions and long-term projects, as well as the generation of cultural movements that require

important investments in time and resources, like those facilitated by intermediaries in the form of salaries or up-front payment for works and their copyright (Levine, 2013).

In addition, intermediaries play a decisive role in establishing themselves as representatives of the cultural sector as a whole. Cultural intermediaries have a long tradition of professional and trade-union organization, especially in the performing arts and audiovisual sectors (also in the visual arts, albeit to a lesser extent), even in countries whose political culture is not prone to trade union movements, such as the United States (Martel, 2011)[1].

Creators, intermediaries and creation: an interdependent system

So far we have established that, far from being an individual activity carried out in isolation, creation is largely carried out within the framework of interaction structures and processes, which call for cooperation with other agents, i.e., intermediaries. This goes beyond simple service provision as it involves a substantive and valorising collaboration (and, therefore, content-forming) of creation. However, the sociological determinants of creativity do not end here, but, from a more meso- and macro-sociological perspective, we should also point out that creation takes place in organizations and social systems which, as Crozier and Friedman (1982) point out, condition — but do not determine — the performance of the agents involved.

Even so, sociological analyses have shown that there is a relationship between the determinants of the cultural system and the capacity of creation and innovation of cultural agents. Thus, some authors have analysed the changes in the cultural system as a product of various internal factors of the cultural field and, at the same time, drivers of fundamental transformations in the mode of creating. For example, this was the case of the transition from the academic artistic system to the market-driven system in the nineteenth century, caused not by a stylistic development but rather by the inability of the academic structure to provide an artistic career to a growing artistic population, or to satisfy the cultural demand of the urban population (White, 1993). Since then, the market-driven system constitutes a mechanism in which three independent but articulated actors play (creator, intermediary-entrepreneur and critic). This greatly boosted artistic creativity, first in the form of avant-gardes organized in the early 20th century (Moulin, 1983) until debilitating around the 1980s (Crane, 1987). Currently, although some authors predicted its dissolution, we are in fact witnessing a globalization process of the artistic sectors, especially visual arts, in which agents of international reach (international fairs, auction houses, transnational museums) are fostering new interventions and constructions of artistic reputations (Quemin, 2013).

From the perspective of the production of Peterson's culture (1982), which establishes five factors that influence creativity (legislation, technology, market, organizational structure and career structures), the cultural system can be found in two extreme situations: *a)* from the 1930s to the 1960s, the existence of an intermediation monopoly and stability or repetition (musical sector before 1959), or *b)* since the 1960s, the emergence of competition between intermediaries (new radio stations, record companies and independent music agents) generating a context of fierce innovation (with an explosion of creativity and styles in rock and pop music). However, Peterson himself acknowledges that since the 1980s there has been growing articulation between large conglomerates and independent companies, in a process that shapes a competitive scenario with lower creativity

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1 The defence of the disappearance of cultural intermediaries by political positions based on progressive or left-wing political positions is largely paradoxical in that it also affects the ability of wage earners and professionals to formulate collective interests within the cultural sector and compete with large production companies and technological multinationals. In fact, it should be understood that those defending the disappearance of cultural intermediaries form part of the libertarian and neoliberal ideology of the Californian school (Barbrook and Cameron, 1996)

(Peterson and Anand, 2004). This scenario is also altered by the emergence of large technology companies and the lax internet regulation regarding copyright (Levine, 2013), which, however, has not paralyzed the expansion of *blockbuster* cinema and, at the same time, the quality television series in the USA. (Martel, 2011)

Then again, some authors have focused their analysis of this cultural system on its urban dimension, engaged in the concentration in big cities (Rius-Ulldemolins, 2014) and in spatial configurations like the creation of cultural clusters, encompassing the concentration of cultural and creative enterprises, cultural consumption, cultural institutions and creative scenes (Zarlenga, Rius-Ulldemolins and Rodríguez Morató, 2013). These studies can be divided into two groups: first, research focusing on the dynamics of creative clusters (Moomas, 2004; J. Rius-Ulldemolins, 2014). These authors analyse the reasons for the concentration of the creators from variables such as the type of organization (the logic of the industrial district in the context of the post-Fordism economy), the particularities of the cultural sector (the concentration of demand, (cultural appraisal of cultural innovation and cross-disciplinary pollinization). Second, other authors analyse how economic growth is affected by the concentration of the creative class and their economic and social efficiency (Florida, 2005a; Markusen and Schrock, 2006; Scott, 2007). However, we have yet to demonstrate the effectiveness of cultural clusters (J. Rius-Ulldemolins and Zarlenga, 2014) in terms of their cultural creativity beyond the economic and professional benefits (J. Rius-Ulldemolins, 2014) or their ability to attract public and media attention to phenomena inherent to cultural consumerism (Currid and Williams, 2010; Molotch and Treskon, 2009). Anyhow, cybertopic notions such as «cross-pollination» (Moulier-Boutang, 2010) that foretell interdisciplinary cooperation and a merging of the boundaries between culture, economy and society, included by some authors in this urban framework (Currid, 2007), have not been demonstrated in the cultural sphere, despite representing a beautiful

metaphor. Thus they are only applicable to certain cultural movements that, as Collins analyses, have been driven by coalitions and tightly woven networks of few players rather than by extensive and decentralized networks (Collins and Guillen, 2012).

CREATIVITY AND CULTURAL POLICY: USES AND ABUSES OF A PARADIGM

The emergence of the discourse on creativity and innovation in cultural politics
In the post-Fordism capitalist economy, where the role of knowledge constitutes a key element in productivity and competitiveness, not only in the private sector but also in the public sector (nations, regions, cities), discourses of innovation and creativity shape and reinforce the processes of cultural change in our society.

From a sociological perspective, innovation and creativity take on a symbolic dimension that traverse the institutional conglomerate of society, forming a set of roles, norms and values that give meaning to social practices. An example of this is the university, an institution dating back centuries, whose mission (strategic plans) and vision and objectives are influenced due to the incorporation of the values (and practices associated with those values) of innovation and creativity. This binomial acts as an axis of change in this institution, the result of a process of mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio, 1991), as evident by analysis of the strategic plans of the public universities (Palomares Montero, García Aracil and Castro Martínez, 2012). Thus, content analysis of strategic plans shows that innovation is the first indicator of results and impacts (absolute numbers of all public universities) of the knowledge transfer mission, while the scientific park (linked to technological innovation) is the fifth indicator in the dimension of resources and activities of this mission. Likewise, creativity is also cited as an indicator of the results and impact of the university's research mission. An empirical comparison of the strategic

plans of Spanish universities highlights the mimetic isomorphism-driven influence of the discourses of innovation and creativity on the symbolic elements of the Spanish university (mission and values) and, consequently, their plausible effects on institutional practices. Here we obviate other types of coercive isomorphism such as incorporation into the European Higher Education Area and the European Research Area or the establishment of the Higher Education Space common to all advanced countries.

Focusing now on the field of art, the institutionalization process has been experienced due to the emergence of cultural policies in developed countries (especially in Western Europe) as of the second half of the 20th century. Artistic organizations are organized institutionally according to the processes of sedimentation historically articulated through national, regional and local cultural policies based on their orientation (cultural democratization, cultural democracy, etc.).

In the context of the Fordism economy, the paradigm of the creative city (Landry and Bianchini, 1995) has become a key element in territorial development (Scott, 2001; Scott, 2010). Mechanisms for spreading the use of large events as catalysts of urban development include the construction of flagship museums (Bianchini, 1993b), the generation of large events (Bianchini, 1993a; García, 2008) or the creation of cultural clusters. Based on these actions, a new model of cultural policy has been developed, which embodies the desire to unite urban change, economic development and social transformation (Connolly, 2011). Thus, since the 1980s cultural policy has been conceived as an engine of city economy and as a lever for the regeneration of urban centres and for metropolitan planning and development (Landry and Bianchini, 1995).

Likewise, a tendency arose to instrumentalize cultural policy for the purposes of other public policy agendas (Belfiore, 2004; Gray, 2008). Within this context, there is a change in the discourses on cultural policy objectives, which become legitimized as new ways of promoting social inclusion while simultaneously acting as an engine of urban economic development within the framework of the new knowledge economy (Connolly, 2011; Menger, 2010). In this context, the organizational dimension of cultural policy is transformed under the principles of New Public Management, with publicly funded cultural organizations becoming agencies and instruments to achieve these new objectives (Rius-Ulldemolins and Rubio, 2013).

The beginning of the 1990s witnessed a new movement that included urban planners, non-governmental organizations and administrative agencies, who understood culture as a central element of urban regeneration, economic development and social inclusion (García 2004). This kind of strategy represents a split from past practises, whereby some administrations conceive and use cultural products to create a national identity at a distance through elements of so-called *high culture*, to guide cultural democratization or to integrate different cultural expressions, according to the paradigm of cultural democracy (Urfalino, 1996). Nowadays culture is understood and instrumentalized in a very different way, as a product or a service that can provide a direct economic benefit to a city, either through strategies linked to the construction of the image of a city as a tourist attraction (branding), as an industry or a sector for economic development (creative industries).

The strategic use of culture brings together geographers, urbanists, economists and policymakers to develop a new type of urban planning that includes culture as a central element. Thus, we move from urban planning to cultural planning in cities (Evans 2001). A series of actions are deployed by means of various plans, competitiveness strategies between cities (such as European Cultural Capitals) or cultural mega-events (e.g., Universal Forum of Cultures 2004 held in Barcelona) aimed at promoting the economic development and regeneration of urban centres through creative industries and tourism (García 2004).

Instrumentalization of culture under the creative city paradigm

The growing instrumentalization of culture for economic, urban and social purposes is based on an a priori assumption that culture generates positive impacts and effects; indeed since the 1980s this discourse has come to replace traditional legitimations based on cultural value (Belfiore and Bennett, 2008; Belfiore and Bennett, 2007). This axiom, however, has rarely been based on empirical evidence, but rather on the discourse of political leaders in alliance with private consulting agencies (Belfiore, 2002; Belfiore, 2004). This programmatic and discursive transformation in cultural policy has not taken place, unlike other changes, in the deliberative areas of culture such as art councils or culture ministries, but mainly in the political and economic elites. Indeed, since their advent in the mid-eighties, think-tanks and cultural consultants have become established as processors and legitimizers of new cultural policies that, in tune with neoliberalism and its entrepreneurial drift, encourage local governments to use culture as a way of solving social problems without increasing social expenditure or rethinking economic policies (Miles, 2005; Mooney, 2004).

These consultancies, created in the heat of the new labour movement in the UK, coincide with the redirection of cultural policies towards a policy supporting the so-called creative industries and promoting creative enterprises and cultural management (Bilton, 2007; Schlesinger, 2013). Today, in most countries these discourses are disseminated through the academic media and international private consultancies, associating the idea of culture to an instrument of economic development and entrepreneurship that, according to this view, leads to cultural and artistic creation (Cunningham, 2009)[2]. Regarding entrepreneurship, this has become an all-encompassing ideology of the cultural sector (Rowan,

2010). It takes on the instrumental role in an entire economic sector, or economic development vector (the so-called *creative industries*) and further dismantles the autonomy of the artistic sphere by converting it into a common psychological attitude encompassing a huge diversity and heterogeneity of human tasks, side-lined from its humanistic and disciplinary tradition, and dominated by consultants and think tanks who redefine it (Fullerton and Ettema, 2014). Consequently there is confusion between cultural policies and policies for economic promotion, or between cultural activities and skill and ability-training activities (Jones, 2010).

Another dominant international discourse is that of the creative city, pioneered by Landry and Bianchini (1995) and developed by Richard Florida with the belief that the creative classes can transform the urban economy (Florida, 2005b). This idea has been criticized for its theoretical inconsistency in the use of the concept of social class, and its gentrification effects on the cities where it has been implemented (Peck, 2005; Pratt, 2008). In spite of such criticism, this discourse has achieved noteworthy prestige and diffusion in the Spanish State, where successive meetings of governors, consultants and cultural agents have been held to exchange experiences and, in general, promote this paradigm (*cf.* Manito Lorite, 2010).

Furthermore, the model of creative cities fits well in the context of Spain due to the cultural protagonism of cities, the importance of tourism and the trend towards the construction of oversized cultural infrastructures, legitimating state, regional or local political power (Rius-Ulldemolins, 2014; Rubio and Rius, 2012). In some cities, this paradigm of the creative city has entailed expensive cultural events, which have not generated clear social or economic profits apart from those gained by construction companies and real estate speculators (Majoor, 2011). Likewise, this ideology promoted and legitimized by consultancies has also led to the construction of large cultural infrastructures that have often been poorly designed with respect to their future uses and local cultural needs, such as Valencia's *Ciutat de les Arts* (City of Arts), Santiago de Compostela's *Cidade da Cultura* (City of Culture), or

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2 Spain, and especially Barcelona, is one of the places in Europe where this discourse and its way of operating has enjoyed greater success, and has become one of the elements of the so-called Barcelona model of cultural policy (Degen and García, 2012; Sánchez, Rius-Ulldemolins and Zarlenga, 2013).

the costly enlargement of infrastructures in Madrid, such as the Reina Sofía Museum (Hernàndez i Martí and Rodrigo, 2012; Lage, Losada and Gómez, 2012; Rius Ulldemolins, Rodríguez Morató and Martinez Illa, 2012). Not only do these infrastructures represent huge investment spending and a mortgage on future budgets due to their high maintenance costs, but they also represent a huge cost to opportunity by investing all energies of the cultural sector in promoting them (or criticizing them), neglecting efforts to weave real structured systems for cultural policy, or create truly sustainable spaces for cultural participation (Sánchez *et al.*, 2013).

All these negative effects were predictable in view of the dearth in planning based on objective cultural needs, and the disregard for social and cultural sustainability (Kagan and Hahn, 2011; Martinez and Rius, 2010); however, scant criticism has been heard from the social science sector against these actions, which have turned cultural policies into subsidiaries of the construction of international urban brands, so-called *place branding* (Pike, 2011; Rius Ulldemolins and Zamorano, 2014).

Indeed, it is the area of urban studies that has raised the most radical criticisms of this model, pointing out its commercial effects on urban spaces and the dismantling of community relations (Balibrea, 2004; Delgado, 2008). However, this criticism has not managed to influence the planning and decision-making processes implemented in the public management of culture. Evidence of this is that until 2010, when Spain was teetering on the edge of the economic, political and social abyss, many consultants and academics continued to promote projects of creative cities, clusters of cultural industries requiring huge investments on the basis of hypothetical future returns.

Abuses of the paradigm of the creative city: the «cultural white elephants »
One of the consequences of the creative city paradigm and its decision for follow the logic of «opportunity», heedless of planning anchored in the response to a budding welfare state, is the generation of «cultural white elephants». The expression *white elephant*, common in

both Spanish and English, refers to infrastructures or constructions whose maintenance costs exceed the benefits they provide, or infrastructures/constructions that profit others but only cause problems for the owner, especially if owned by the public administration. Thus, in cultural policy, we classify as *white elephants* those cultural projects, large infrastructures in particular but also major cultural events or clusters, that have been the focus of public cultural action for a long time, i.e., from the mid-nineties to the end of 2000 (Coinciding with economic expansion) and which have since become a problem and remain the cultural symbol of that era. Examples of white elephants can be found in Spain, although other examples and cases can be witnessed worldwide, especially in countries with a recent urban and cultural boom that lack developed cultural networks and infrastructures.

Although the term *white elephants* has been used in some articles, such as O'Connor (2012), its conceptualization has not been developed. From our point of view, as previously outlined (Rius-Ulldemolins, Hernández i Martí and Torres Pérez, 2015) we are dealing with: *a)* A development of cultural policy characteristic of the model adopted by cities that have opted for global culture, without endeavouring to create a balance with more sustainable elements or a link to the local culture (Bianchini, 1993b; Bloomfield and Bianchini, 2004) and who have found in the paradigm of the creative city and the creative class a justification for undertaking major projects without previous planning or assessment of the citizens' needs (Novy and Colomb, 2013; Peck, 2005). *b)* They may be large cultural facilities, major events or, in more recent developments, cultural facilities and service districts (arts, music or theatre cities) or cultural and creative clusters separated from the urban fabric such as science parks. *c)* These projects engender buildings and/or public spaces that quickly lose the utility for which they were built (either because the great event for which they were designed is over or because the actual use differs from the intended use) creating what Augé (2003) calls *modern ruins*, underused and falling into decay. *d)* White elephants are the product of a stratagem aiming to fascinate the public (in this case, local and global citizens), by

generating euphoria which distracts from the associated urban transformation process and justifies the negative effects it has on the excluded sectors (segregation and gentrification) in a discourse mixing the legitimacy of culture and the supposed future benefits of these actions with an instrumentalist discourse of culture, without demonstrating the final social impact (E. Belfiore and Bennett, 2007). They are not, however, the product of a contract or program previously drawn up between government and an agency in charge of project management (Rius-Ulldemolins and Rubio, 2013). Finally, its mission is not defined until after the project has commenced, based on the function they can provide rather than on the cultural needs detected through prior consumer studies or cultural participation. e*)* In this type of action, calculating the costs of its social uses is overlooked in favour of alleged indirect impacts and the intangible benefit of the city brand. Albeit in the short term, the white elephant stirs up fascination in the local population and has an impact in the global mass media; however, the fact it becomes an expensive infrastructure to maintain, impossible to monetize and difficult to upkeep, can create an image of squandering and decadence in the mid and long term. Sometimes, corruption occurs during its inception and development, calling into question the legitimacy of spending in the cultural sector. *f)* Finally, white elephants generate a great problem of sustainability and amortization, as they deplete present and future resources of the local cultural system and, furthermore, are often difficult to reuse for uses other than those for which they were conceived. White elephants, therefore, represent a serious medium and long-term debt for cultural policy, and a challenge to find new functionalities that add value to the system of local, regional or national cultural policy.

FINAL NOTES
The works by Bourdieu, Collins and Menger have been analysed in this article to offer a theoretical overview of the vision of the sociology of creativity. These three significant authors represent different currents of theoretical traditions and approaches, although

there are common denominators in their analysis. These commonalities include their questioning of the romantic conception of creativity, as we have stated previously, or the assessment of the role of social conditions that favour creativity, and forms of social valorization leading to certain actions being considered as creative while others are cast-off. Indeed, it is here that we find the differences in the approaches analysed. In the case of Bourdieu, it is not possible to obtain creativity outside the cultural fields and without the previous socialization of the habitus in the dynamics of the cultural field and its history. In the case of Collins, creativity is also reduced from a microsociological vision to small groups and to the role of face-to-face relationships and the rituals of everyday life in small groups. Menger, however, focuses on how the institutions themselves generate constant mechanisms of differentiation and distinction, focusing reputation (and creativity) on an elite.

The rise of new technologies inescapably facilitates access to cultural creation and undermines the role of intermediaries. This process, according to cyber-utopian discourse, entails the absence of frontiers restricting entry to the cultural sector and, therefore, a flourishing of creativity in a world where copy-associated costs are close to zero margin cost. This is celebrated by the discourse of free creativity made possible by access to technology. Likewise, the discourse of the disappearance of professional intermediaries is interwoven with the discourse that technology makes us all creators and intermediaries at once. However, this discourse progressively collides with the evidence of the dysfunctions of the process of digitization of the cultural system. In this respect, this excessively optimistic discourse can and should be juxtaposed with the contributions made by the sociology of culture, in relation to authors, intermediaries and the cultural system. Thus, cultural digitization enthusiasts, focusing their argument on producer-consumer opposition, where the power of producers is relativized in favour of consumers, tend to overlook the social configurations that promote creativity and favour recognition, which is hard to adapt to the utopian vision of virtual communities. In our opinion, a proper

understanding of the specific logic of cultural fields escapes these digital theorists because they disregard the role of cultural intermediaries in the process of cultural production, distribution and valuation, and their interpretive proposals ignore the structural traits characterizing specialized cultural production, which have been explored in the field of sociology of culture by diverse authors such as Bourdieu (2002), Collins (2009), Menger (2009), Becker (2008) or DiMaggio (1991).

Furthermore, creativity-based projects are highly effective tools for the redefinition of urban spaces and, undoubtedly, help attract the public. Creative clusters can also facilitate local and regional economic promotion, but if they fail to develop a structured field of creative players or circle of creators focusing on specific points of cultural attention, there is actually little cultural productivity. Without sectoral articulation or more intense interaction, their substantive benefits in cultural terms are somewhat mediocre. In these two cases, analysis of the virtues of creative clustering leads us to identify them as an empty institutional discourse, similar to the phenomenon of bullshitting (affirmations lacking an empirical basis but repeated time and again) identified by Franckfurt (2005), whose main purpose is to legitimize public investments or urban decisions.

Observation of the Spanish State discloses widespread examples of cultural white elephants. These include, but are not limited to districts housing cultural facilities such as the *Ciutat de les Arts* in Valencia or the *Cidade da Cultura* in Santiago de Compostela; mega-events such as the *Fòrum de les Cultures* in Barcelona, or clusters of cultural industries like the *Ciutat de la Llum* in Alicante or the *Centro de las Artes* in Alcorcón. All these are examples of projects developed under the rhetoric of creativity alleging benefits for local development and innovation, but which lack realistic planning or diagnosis of the socio-cultural impacts and costs or mid- and long-term sustainability. Cases like these embody the expression of a discourse on creativity that has turned a deaf ear to citizen opposition, and legitimized projects with high investment and inflated maintenance costs, on the one hand and, on the other, scarce (or even null) economic yields or value for the cultural sector or citizens as a whole.

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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

Juan Arturo Rubio Arostegui holds a PhD in Political Science and Sociology (Universidad Complutense de Madrid), a master's degree in Arts Management (music, theatre and dance), and a degree in Philosophy and Education Sciences. He is professor at Universidad Antonio de Nebrija and principal investigator of the Grupo Nebrija de Arte. He researches and lectures in the fields of cultural politics, cultural management, sociology of art, artistic education and research methods in the arts. He has participated in several national R & D projects and has published books and articles in national and international journals. In 2002 he received the Marcelo Martínez Alcubilla Prize for research on the General State Administration (Ministerio de Administraciones Públicas).

Juan Pecourt is trainee lecturer at the Universitat de València and holds a PhD from the University of Cambridge. Since his PhD award he has undertaken various research works within the cultural and political fields, focusing expressly on the figure of intellectuals and the political press. Product of this research work is the book published by the CIS entitled *Los intelectuales y la transición política* (Intellectuals and political transition). He is the author of several book chapters and articles dealing with the sociology of culture. Lately his interests have focused on the transformation of the cultural field and the emergence of a new public space made possible by the internet.

Joaquim Rius-Ulldemolins holds a PhD in Sociology from the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales. Currently, he is assistant professor in the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology at the Universitat de València. He has authored several books and articles on the sociology of culture and cultural policy in national and international journals, such as *International Journal of Cultural Policy, Urban Studies, European Urban and Regional Studies, REIS* and *RIS*, among others. His research interests focus on the analysis of creative professions and clusters, the role played by cultural institutions in cultural politics or the instrumentalization of culture in urban and territorial branding.

MISCELLANEOUS

Edward Said and exile: a gaze at counterpoint

Anouar Antara
UNIVERSIDAD DE LAS PALMAS

nourdanieles@yahoo.es

ABSTRACT

This article sets out to analyse the concept of exile as portrayed in the work of Edward Said. Our author's central idea of this term is that even if the term exile is inconsistent in the metaphorical sense he defends, it is enriching intellectually, given that from this perspective, it provides a different vision through which an "exiled" intellectual can analyse the historical experience. In other words, Said, believes that even authors who are not exiles in real terms and fully belong to their respective societies can adopt such a vision. In doing so, a distance is created, enabling critics to embrace a global vision that transcends ideological boundaries and facilitates the study of others and their culture within a humanistic context. The methodology followed in this work sheds a critical light on the interesting, albeit contradictory, concept of exile proposed by Said as a tool for cultural studies. In short, to a point, this essay aims to demonstrate how Edward Said's approach to the term of exile is relevant. Indeed, his own work is largely influenced by authors who have been exiles quintessentially speaking, and who somehow shaped the critique he put forward during his life.

Keywords: *Orientalism, Postcolonialism, Cultural theory, Comparative literature, Cultural Studies*

Corresponding author: Anouar Antara. Universidad de Las Palmas. Departamento de Filología Española, Clásica y Árabe. C/ Pérez del Toro, 1 35003 Las Palmas de Gran Canaria España.

INTRODUCTION

Edward W. Said (1935–2003), known worldwide as the author *Orientalism* and also for his staunch defence of human rights in Palestine, his country of birth, with which he identified himself lifelong. He was also a well-known literary critic, author in this field of books such as *The World, the Text and the Critic* (1983).

On reading Said's work, however brief it may be, we immediately grasp the complexity, richness, and even the controversy of the conceptual apparatus underlying the author's theoretical framework. This terminology provides a key to perceiving his cultural theory and his work as a public intellectual and, as we will see later, poses complications for certain critics.

As stated above, this New York academic, of Palestinian origin, was the author of an interesting work in the cultural field, particularly within the scope of the orientalist theory that, along with other works, gave rise to a whole field of new studies — in spite of him, according to some critics. This was the case of post-colonialism: Young (2001); Kennedy (2000); Child

(1997); Spencer (2010). Without disregarding, indeed, his remarkable contribution to literary criticism, as he was — first and foremost — a professor of English literature and comparative literature at the renowned Columbia University in New York.

EXILE AS A STRATEGY FOR THE ANALYSIS OF CULTURAL STUDIES

Undoubtedly, many of the basic concepts developed by the American writer are closely related to his work as a literary critic. In this essay I will analyse one of the most common threads of his cultural theory: the concept of exile. I will place particular emphasis on the fact that, although this term harbours several contradictions, for Said it is an enriching concept that paves the way for cultural research on new dimensions and offers another vision, among other things.

To begin with, I should point out that although Edward Said's analysis of this concept stems from the social and political history of displacement, it delves deeper. For him, the term is both real and metaphorical. In other words, even intellectuals who fully belong to their respective societies can be considered as either integrated or marginal.

Therefore, Said believes that the rule governing the course of the intellectual as an outsider in his own society is that of exile, the perception of being dissatisfied in the community itself is to always feel out of place. It is this metaphorical sense of the word he advocates as a study tool — as we will clarify later — which gave rise to the special, and for many critics the ambiguous and confused, vision of the work of this intellectual in exile.

In this context, it should be noted that Said's approach to the issue of exile is not without proper support. His treatment of this issue is strengthened by his own personal experience. As he narrates in his autobiography entitled *Out of place* (1999), his life experience was marked by a crucial event. His whole family, he tells us, was forced to leave their homeland, Palestine, after the Israeli occupation, and they took refuge in Egypt. Later, for other mundane reasons, he himself left the aforementioned Arabic country and headed for the United States.

As predictable, his first days in the USA were tough and he describes his arrival in the American continent as the saddest day in his life. In addition, the author himself has recorded in his writings that his own life experience was always conditioned by the circumstance of displacement and alienation with respect to his birth place. In this regard, he states the following in his above-mentioned memoir:

> Along with the language, it is geography — especially in the displaced form of departures, arrivals, farewells, exile, nostalgia homesickness, belonging, and travel itself — that is the core of my memories of those early years. Each of the places I lived in — Jerusalem, Cairo, Lebanon, the United States — has a complicated, dense web of valences that was very much part of growing up, gaining an identity, forming my consciousness of myself and of others. (Said, 2000: Prefix p xii).

Likewise, Linda Anderson, in her article entitled "Autobiography and Exile: Edward Said's Out of Place", asserts that Said's own memoirs serve to shed light on Said's shifting, even contradictory, position on exile, the question for her being: How can we understand the position of our author on this subject? On the one hand he speaks of exile as a real and cruel experience; the dismemberment of a human being from his native country that can never heal. On the other hand, he insists on the metaphorical aspect of such an experience. Following this line of reasoning, the writer asserts that this contradiction remains unresolved in Said's theory of exile. For her:

> Said has written about exile in a similarly paradoxical way, invoking it as a metaphor for intellectual's desired condition of marginality and continual journeying, and as a real historical event (Anderson, 2009: 165).

In our opinion, even admitting the aforementioned author's point of view, the contradictions that lie at the heart of Said's approach to exile, his analysis of this point, imply a new way of seeing; a lens through which one can perceive both historical experience and human relations. In this respect, exile would be a strategy rather than a vital dismemberment in the life of intellectuals: "it is a means not an end; it is above all a way of thinking" (Spencer, 2010: 389). It is — in Said's opinion —:

> … an *alternative* to the mass institutions that dominate modern life. Exile is not, after all, a matter of choice: you are born into it or it happens to you. But provided that exile refuses to sit on the sidelines nursing a wound, there are things to be learned: he or she must cultivate a scrupulous (not indulgent or sulky) subjectivity (Said, 2000: 183).

From this perspective, the above would mean that, although it may seem paradoxical to speak of the advantages and the pleasures of exile, by seeing through the exile's eyes, an intellectual embraces originality because, as Said points out, as opposed to most people who have knowledge of a single culture, a foreigner is always aware of at least two cultures. Thus, by crossing cultural borders, apart from having his or her own culture, the "exiled" intellectual adapts to the culture of the receiving country. This range of views, which such an intellectual has appropriated, helps him or her to have a contrapuntal awareness, a concept which Edward Said defines in the following terms:

> In the counterpoint of western classical music, various themes play off one another, with only a provisional privilege being given to any particular one; yet in the resulting polyphony there is concert and order, an organized interplay that derives from the themes, not from a rigorous melodic or formal principle outside the work. (Said, 1993: 59–60)

Furthermore, Said's proposal of exile as a research strategy for writers who feel hemmed in by the cultural and national barriers of their native countries also implies that that open themselves up to the opportunities afforded by seeing through the gaze of an outsider and an outcast. This critical approach enriches our view of the other and his or her culture, and enables us to actually travel to other humanistic conjunctures and judge them according to the worldly conditions in which they were born.

In short, this concept of exile does not exist in a stable state, on the contrary, for Said such a term would imply: intellectual restlessness, dissatisfaction with established norms, and rupture with tribal loyalties. Thus, in the words of the American professor Exile:

> … exists in a median state, neither completely at one with the new setting, nor fully disencumbered of the old, beset with half-involvements and half-detachments, nostalgic and sentimental on one level, an adept mimic or a secret outcast on another (Said 1994: 48).

In any event, it should be noted that when reflecting on the experience of exile, Said bore in mind the experience of the many exiles that influenced his intellectual work. Among these authors, noteworthy is the presence of Joseph Conrad, on whom Edward Said's first book, *Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography* (1966), was based, and to which he returns repeatedly throughout his work, such as *Cantus firmus* and as a future stamping ground.

For Said, there is an account in Conrad's novel *Amy Foster* (1901) that seems to exemplify the fate of the exile. In this story, the novelist tells the tale of a young man named Yanko, who left his home country to settle in England where he endured the hardships of exile. The young man does not know the language, nor does he know how to communicate with anyone. Only a young plain peasant girl called Amy tries to communicate with him. They marry and have a son but when Yanko falls ill, the young British woman tears their son away from him and flees.

In this account, Yanko's fate is described as a supreme disaster of loneliness and despair. In Said's words, Conrad took the exile's neurotic fear and turned it into an aesthetic principle. For him:

> Each Conradian exile fears, and is condemned endlessly to imagine, the spectacle of a solitary death illuminated, so to speak, by unresponsive, uncommunicating eyes. (Said, 2000: 143).

In this respect, and as one critic pointed out, might we believe that Said himself feared a similar death?

But when our author speaks of exile, he does not refer to something sad and helpless, even though he recognizes that one of the paradoxes of an exile is his or her feelings of happiness with the hint of unhappiness. On the contrary, he tells us that his book *Culture and Imperialism* (1993) was mostly written in New York City, city of the exile par excellence. Moreover, belonging to both sides of the imperial experience enabled him to understand them better and more easily. For Spencer, all Said's work — from his first book *Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography* 1966 to his last writings on the Iraq war and his impression of the late style — was distinguished by his awareness that personality, identity and perspectives are not static, but can be enriched by exposure to new experiences, strange encounters and thought-provoking reflections (Spencer, 2010).

CRITIQUE

As stated above, the concept of exile portrayed in Said's work poses a problem for certain critics. In a way, Said's treatment of these writers in exile is abstruse and skeptical. Abdul Jan Mohamed describes this as speculation, since he only places them in other cultures to track the policy of the inroads made into those cultures.

The best example for this critique is Said's analysis of Eric Auerbach's work. It is true to say that the latter author wrote his monumental book entitled *Mimesis* (1942) when he was a refugee in Istanbul, fleeing from Nazism. But the problem for Abdul is that Said attributes the very existence of this book to his Eastern exile. This argument does not appear to convince Jan Mohamed at all, given that there is no clear indication that the East had a decisive influence on Auerbach's ideas to the point of changing them. Furthermore, for him, the German author writes as a Western intellectual and for a Western audience just as if his book were to see the light anywhere other than the East. In this context Abdul states that:

> Said's specular appropriation of Auerbach for defining the value of exile seems to overlook some fundamental differences between the two men. While Auerbach writes about and for Western cultures, Said does not write principally for or about Middle Eastern cultures; he writes in the main for and about the West. Even The Question of Palestine is addressed, at least in part, as Said explicitly acknowledges, to a Euro-American audience. Thus, while Auerbach is an exile in the weak sense, that is, a subject who always belongs to his home culture in spite of, indeed because of, a circumstantial and temporary alienation, Said, who is neither quite an exile nor quite an immigrant, is able to develop, out of his more complicated border status, an enabling theory of "exile" an "ascetic ode of *willed* homelessness" (Abdul Jan Mohamed, 1992: 221)

CONCLUSIONS

In short, and to conclude, it is worth pointing out that the academic and intellectual evolution of our author demonstrates a mind already matured by the experience of exile, a person who prefers not to be ascribed to fixed ideas or geographically restricted worlds. His own identity is not geographically determined but rather his self-perception is of a cluster of flowing currents. These are of transcendence because they are not static, quite the reverse, they are in constant movement. Besides, Said prefers this to a solid and ahistorical identity. Anyway, the author states that: "With so many dissonances in my life I have learned actually to prefer being not quite right and out of place" (1999: 295).

Thus Said's writings imply we should consider the whole world, including ourselves, as a strange land, from whence to spread human love to geographies worldwide and never hold on to one as our own. Here, it seems fitting to end this article with a fragment quoted by Said throughout his work:

> "It is therefore, a source of great virtue for the practiced mind to learn, bit by bit, first to change about in visible and transitory things, so that afterwards it may be able to leave them behind altogether. The person who finds his homeland sweet is still a tender beginner; he to whom every soil is as his native one is already strong; but he is perfect to whom the entire world is as a foreign place. The tender soul has fixed his love on one spot in the world; the strong person has extended his love to all places; the perfect man has extinguished his" (Hugh of St. Victor, 1961: 101).

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

The author of this article is Anouar Antara. She holds a Bachelor's Degree in Arabic Philology from the University of Mohamed I in Morocco, validated by the University of Granada. She also holds a Diploma in Advanced Studies from the University of Las Palmas and a PhD in Spanish, Classic and Arabic Philology awarded by the Department of Literature and Theory of Literature of the same University.

From art after Auschwitz towards a sociology of disrespect of Buchenwald*

Francesc Hernàndez i Dobón
UNIVERSITAT DE VALÈNCIA
francesc.j.hernandez@uv.es

Benno Herzog
UNIVERSITAT DE VALÈNCIA
benno.herzog@uv.es

ABSTRACT

The aesthetic works of the Frankfurt School receive little attention by contemporary sociology. However, the article shows the relevance of aesthetic theory for a critical understanding of the social world. Therefore, we introduce the contradictions presented by critical theory of society especially after Auschwitz and we ask ourselves about how to conceive the inconceivable when the tools of Enlightenment are intrinsically guilty. Finally, we propose a mosaic of aesthetic sociology of disrespect as an option to overcome the paradoxes of Auschwitz. This procedure is related to the artistic production around the concentration camp of Buchenwald.

Keywords: *Aesthetics*, *Frankfurt School*, *Holocaust*, *Honneth*, *recognition*, *disrespect*

Corresponding author: Francesc Hernàndez i Dobón. University of Valencia, Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology. Faculty of Social Science. Avenida Tarongers, 4b, 46021 Valencia.

INTRODUCTION

The aesthetic theory of the Frankfurt School is practically inexistent for social debates and contemporary policies. Critical theory from the society of the first generation of the Frankfurt School is now considered too complex and of little relevance in terms of having a profound intellectual impact on the current world, and even less so for empirical analysis.

This verdict is true a *fortiori* for the aesthetic work of Adorno above all, but it also applies to Benjamin, Kracauer and others. However, the aesthetic theory of the Frankfurt School is inextricably linked to a crucial question of social sciences: Despite the powers that blur, shape or distort human perception, is it possible to know the social world? This question, for

* In this text we summarise some of the reflections we published in Hernàndez and Herzog (2015).

which sociology does not dare to suggest a negative response, is accompanied by an additional question in view of an affirmative answer: How can we know this world?

The purpose of this article is to show the relevance of aesthetic theory when it comes to forming a critical understanding of the social world. To that end, first we shall present the aporiae put forwards by the critical theory of society, especially after Auschwitz. Secondly, we shall ask how we can conceive — both logically and artistically — the inconceivable if the tools of Enlightenment are affected by blame. This deals with the relationship between Auschwitz and aesthetic theory. Finally, we propose the mosaic of the aesthetic sociology of disrespect as a way of overcoming the aporia of Auschwitz. This solution is related to the artistic production linked to the Buchenwald concentration camp.

FROM CRITICAL THEORY TO AESTHETICS AFTER AUSCHWITZ

Within the evolution of the Frankfurt School and with the intention of producing a critical theory, the book *Dialektik der Aufklärung. Philosophische Fragmente* (1944/47) by Horkheimer and Adorno represents a turning point (Horkheimer and Adorno, 2010). Following Honneth (1986), this book radicalises a "loss of the social" that had already been pointed out in the article "*Traditionelle und kritische Theorie*" in 1937. This concept text, and other contributions made by Horkheimer and the members of the Frankfurt School Institute for Social Research before the Second World War, defended a multidisciplinary approach in principle. However, the fact is that the main argument was devised around the framework of a philosophy of history centred on the Marxist model of social work. This model initially set aside other forms of social interaction in general and cultural reproduction in particular. However, if the working class had not decisively backed revolutionary change and had integrated in a non-conflictive manner into

industrial capitalism and National Socialism, it would be necessary to draw a terrible conclusion: the disappearance of the creative capacity and resistance of the members of the working class, as well as their potential for individual and collective conflict. The psychoanalytical model relating to the socialization and the psychology of masses provided Adorno and Horkheimer with reasons for understanding why those who were supposed to be the revolutionary vanguard joined the henchmen of barbarism.

In *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, a work created under the influence of the rise of national socialism and the war, with a clear intuition of the barbarism of the concentration and extermination camps that would emerge at the end of the war, Horkheimer and Adorno linked the transformations of subjects to the original act of dominance over nature. In this manner, they continued to use the Marxist philosophical-historical model centred on word, but they did so adding a greater distance between the objects of analysis, namely, social groups, and their interactions. Forms of conscience relate to material production. However, unlike the usual interpretations of Marx, Lukács or even Sohn-Rethel, it was not about analysing the modes of production or the forms of the exchange of goods. Rather, it was about going back to the first act of the appropriation of nature. That is to say, that first act would trigger a social pathology so powerful that it would even subsume scientific knowledge within the negative model of rational domination over nature. This inclusion even ruled out the very possibility of creating a critical theory. This is the conclusion that seems to emerge from the writing of Horkheimer and Adorno after *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, which have a deeply pessimistic tone.

Both *Eclipse of Reason*, from 1947, by Horkheimer and *Minima moralia*, from 1951, by Adorno, are fragmentary works, marked by a profound despair in the emancipatory capacity of human reason. (Horkheimer, 2004; Adorno, 1964). The fact that its course of action is subjected to the logical of identity, in terms of its linguistic framework and

way of reasoning, that is to say to objectifying thinking, would thus be the factor that would allow for knowledge and science, but also massification and barbarism. Faced with this objectifying dynamic, inherent to "instrumental" reason, one can only carry out a self-reflexive philosophical exercise, which is as hopeless as it is aporetic. From the outset, it must renounce all confidence in the revelatory capacity of language, in its claim to be a transparent enunciation.

The critique of language that Benjamin's theory of messianic time had outlined, thus was radicalised with the critique of instrumental reason by Horkheimer and Adorno. What can be done then once the instrumental character of reason and language has been revealed, it seems that the possibility of producing a critical theory vanishes? The question goes beyond that and even affects the very creation of an aesthetic theory. The only task that is possible, and even "obligatory", is its dissolution. Adorno states: The elucidated and concrete dissolution of conventional aesthetic categories is the only remaining form that aesthetics can take; at the same time it releases the transformed truth of these categories" (Adorno, 1997: 597).

Thus, the paths of Adorno's *Ästhetik* from 1958/59 as well as his posthumous work *Ästhetische Theorie* (Adorno 2009 and 1997, respectively) are organised based on the dissolution of categories: natural beauty and artistic beauty, the ugly and the sublime, reflection and artistic praxis, aura, aesthetic enjoyment, dissonance, expression and artistic construction, creativity, abstract art, etc., not as a closed list of clichés, but rather as stages of dialectical reasoning where each station illuminates its opposite and collides with it in order to allow passage to the following one, in order to free "transformed truth".

In short, critical theory after *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, faced insurmountable aporias, linked to notions of reasons of reason and language that it reached. They seemed to shut off the path towards not only a critical theory of society, but even of aesthetics and

any other discipline that does not carry out its own dissolution of categories. Let us take a closer look at the relationship between the historical experience of Auschwitz and aesthetic theory.

AUSCHWITZ AND THE END OF COMPREHENSIVE SOCIOLOGY AND AESTHETICS

Few historical phenomena elude language more than that of the Nazi concentration camps. Their common name does not allude to the exterminating role that they fulfilled. However, even talking about extermination camps involves a reduction of the forms of torture and murder that were carried out in these places and their surrounding areas. In the camps, millions of people were incarcerated extrajudicially. Camps were a place of non-rights.

One way of bypassing the semantic difficulty inherent to the notion of "concentration camp" is to simply talk of "Auschwitz". This is what Theodor W. Adorno and other members of the Frankfurt School did. Used in this manner, the word does not have a specific meaning. Rather, it refers to the historic phenomenon of the epiphany of absolute evil, the emergence of inconceivable evil. However, whether we talk about "concentration camp" or mention the word "Auschwitz" we carry out an abstraction that effaces the differences between the camps. Any person who reads about Nazi concentration camps, watches documentaries or visits the remains, will find a peculiar dialectic of similarities and differences. The dissimilarities also have to do with the associations that each camp brings to mind: Anne Frank and Bergen-Belsen, the Stairs of Death and Mauthausen, etc., associations that are neutralised with a mere mention of "Auschwitz".

But, furthermore, in terms of abstraction, Auschwitz was literally incomprehensible for sociology for three reasons. Firstly, invoking Auschwitz undermines the idea of comprehension, which is at the core of post-Weberian human and social sciences. Auschwitz cannot be conceived because it escapes all logic. In

short, what happened made no sense in the middle of a military conflict which required efficient action. From the perspective of administrative rationale, it would have been more understandable, for example, to subject the Jewish people to slavery (in the style of Schindler). Generalizing: any mechanism that explains social reproduction was abolished in Auschwitz (Claussen, 1996: 53). In reality, Auschwitz operated with a logic that is inherent to the spirit, its regression, however, knowledge cannot reach this heart of darkness: "Horror is beyond the reach of psychology" (Adorno, 1964: 215). Secondly, the critical theorists that tried to capture the complexity of Auschwitz were deemed to be "too difficult, brilliant or esoteric" to be of relevance to the daily work of academic or political discourse (Stoetzler, 2010: 165). This circumvention also made the possibility of understanding the historical phenomenon even more remote. This is to say, "Auschwitz" completely eradicated the conception of history as rationalisation and showed the contingency and irrationality of history (Krahl 1985: 287 s., cited by Claussen, 1996: 51). Thirdly, far from perceiving the Holocaust as a *possibility* of modern society, without which Auschwitz would not have been possible (Baumann, 1989: 12s), it was conceived as the opposite, as a "pre-bourgeois vestige" (Claussen, 2012), which likewise did not aid its comprehension.

However, the inconceivable nature of Auschwitz does not lead to scepticism, rather it poses a challenge to human reason, as Adorno states in his classes:

> "One simply needs to say the word *Auschwitz* to make them (the students, F.H and B.H) remember that is now barely possible to think of another figure of spiritual love, of *amor intellectualis* as meant by Spinoza, that is not the inexorable hatred of what is bad, false and frightening in our world. It is one of the most terrible configurations of our era the fact that almost all these formulas which immediately proclaim good, love of men, are turned, in secret and against will itself, into

something bad. Meanwhile, those that do not abandon that inexorability are reproached as inhuman, sceptical and destructive. I believe that learning to penetrate that strange inversion is one of the first demands that philosophy requires of you if you contemplate it seriously and if, to put it this way, you do not want to use it as one of the little bits of firewood which that little old women brought to the stake of Jan Huss. I am aware of what I demand of them, but I cannot remedy it" (Adorno, 1977: 153).

Therefore, following in the wake of the old negative theology, which bowed defeated before the God that like to hide himself, the *Deus absconditus*. Reason does not ascertain what is absolute, rather, on the contrary: that which cannot be conceived negatively shows reason its very self. This inconceivable nature of the world has important consequence not only for language and logocentric knowledge, but also for art, as this other passage by Adorno explains:

> "If thought is able to gain a relation to art it must be on the basis that something in reality — something beyond the veil spun by the interplay of institutions and false needs — objectively demands art, and in doing so, demands an art that expresses what the veil hides. Though discursive knowledge is adequate to reality, and even to its irrationalities (which originate in its laws of motion), something in reality rebuffs rational knowledge. Suffering remains foreign to knowledge; though knowledge can subordinate it conceptually and provide means for its amelioration, knowledge can scarcely express it through its own means of experience without itself becoming irrational. Suffering conceptualised remains mute and inconsequential, as is obvious in post-Hitler Germany. In an age of incomprehensible horror, Hegel's principle (which Brecht adopted as his motto), that truth is concrete, can perhaps suffice only for art. Hegel's

thesis that art is consciousness of plight has been confirmed beyond anything he could have envisioned. (...) The darkening of the world makes the irrationality of art irrational: radically darkened art. What the enemies of modern art, with a better instinct than its anxious apologists, call its *negativity* is the epitome of what established culture has repressed and that towards which art is drawn" (Adorno, 1997: 32s).

However, although "the darkening of the world makes the irrationality of art irrational: radically darkened art", the well-known Adorno thesis: "Writing poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric", seems to close the door to any form of artistic expression. Many people understood it as this, from León Felipe[1] to Günter Grass[2].

RECOVERING THE CAPACITY TO IMAGINE: THE AESTHETIC SOCIOLOGY OF DISRESPECT OF BUCHENWALD

However, to understand Adorno's sentence requires an effort on our behalf. We believe that the Frankfurt school of philosophy was not attacking the possibility of art, but rather the reduction of what art is saying to what art shows.[3] Adorno himself tried to explain that art always goes beyond its concept. The solution to the aporia is the Wittgensteinian distinction between *showing* and *saying*. Language or art can *show* barbarism, which cannot be *said*. In short, the closest thing to *saying* barbarism is the plurality of its *showings*, without it being possible to have a

single subsequent understanding. That would be approaching the world as a mosaic or as a limit (in the mathematical sense). Perhaps, what thus surges from moral desperation is in reality a practice of virtue, a form of art, the art of inquiring in the knowledge that there is no valid answer.

Below, we provide an example: different artistic manifestations linked to the Buchenwald extermination camp, that allude to the same day, the 15th April 1945, the date on which the camp was liberated: the photographs of Margaret Bourke-White and the literary accounts of Jorge Semprún, Fred Wander and Imre Kertész. This collage shows, in our view, what Siegfried Kracauer already said in *Die Angestellten*, *that reality is a construction inscribed in the mosaic of singular observations* (Kracauer 2006).

Margaret Bourke-White

Sunday, 15 April 1945, in the morning. The photographer Margaret Bourke-White began to take photographs of a group of German citizens, mostly women and elderly people from the town of Ettersberg, next to the city of Weimar, that came to Buchenwald camp, located very close to the town. Soldiers from the Third Army of the United States, led by General Patton, control the facilities of the concentration camp and escort the group. The photographs show some women crying or covering their face with handkerchiefs in front of piles of corpses and the cremation ovens. The survivors walk around or are held back by the soldiers.[4]

Some of the photographs that Margaret Bourke-White took that morning were published. Others remained in the image archive of the magazine *Life*, until Google digitalized and published thousands of photographs from that archive in 2008, and they can now be viewed on the internet.

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1 León Felipe expressed it in his poem "Auschwitz": "Look! This is a place where you cannot play the violin. / Here, the strings of every violin in the world are broken."

2 In the autobiography of Günter Grass, we read how his literary generation precisely understood Adorno's sentence in that way, as an appeal to believe there was a place for the creation of literature after Auschwitz (Grass, 1996: 132s; cf. also Grass, 1999).

3 "Say" (sagen) and "show" (zeigen) in the sense meant by L. Wittgenstein: *Tractatus logico-philosophicus*, 4022.

4 A reconstruction of the event can be found in the ninth episode of the series *Band of Brothers*, produced by the television channel HBO and broadcast for the first time in October 2001.

Source: *Life Archive* hosted by Google.

Jorge Semprún

A young 21-year-old prisoner, Jorge Semprún, witnessed the scene at Buchenwald photographed by Bourke-White. He recounts this in his novel *Le grand voyage*. According to the book, when he looked at the group he became distressed and went to the other side of the camp, where he buried his head in the grass and listened to the silence of Ettersberg forest. *L'écriture ou la vie* dedicates a chapter to the American army official who spoke to the group.

In 2006, Semprún received the Annetje Fels-Kupferschmidt prize and, when he went to collect it in Holland, where he had lived before the Second World War, he gave an interview (in Spanish) to RNW television, where among other declarations, he recalled the event.

JORGE SEMPRÚN. [...] That phenomenon of voluntary forgetting, which is sincere yet simultaneously opportunistic, is a very widespread phenomenon. It is possible to find that phenomenon in all countries where there have been dictatorships.

INTERVIEWER. Wouldn't that be because, in such dramatic circumstances, people find themselves facing an almost impossible dilemma? If people say "I knew about the situation", one assumes that if they knew, they could have done something...

JS. That is precisely the problem. Regarding this specific issue, I have an anecdote, an incident that I could recount if we have time...

I. Yes, please!

JS. In April 1945, on 11 April, the American army, specifically, Patton's Third Army, liberated Buchenwald camp. A few days after — I am not sure how many days, three or four days later —, the American military leaders organised a trip for the civic population of the city of Weimar to the Buchenwald camp. Weimar was the famous city of Goethe, of Nietzsche, the city of culture, home to all the museums and archives of Germany's cultural history. A visit for the civic population. I watched a group. The guide of that group was an American army lieutenant who spoke perfect German and went around explaining things. He took that group of about one hundred civilians from Weimar, mostly women and children (because men of a military age were still at war, mobilised as the war was still not over), to the yard of the crematorium, where hundreds of corpses were piled up like tree trunks. He began to explain what took place there, in the crematorium. Then, the German women began to shout and cry, and to say: "We did not know, we were not aware..." And

the American lieutenant calmly told them: "You did not know, because you did not want to find out. For years, have you not seen the trains pass through Weimar? Have you not seen your brothers or husbands make the deportees work in such and such a factory, the same people you used to work with? You are not guilty, but you are responsible." That episode has remained etched on my memory. Then it emerged (and I will not explain the rest, because it would constitute another story) that this American lieutenant was a German Jew, who was called Rosenberg.[5] I have put him in one of my books using the name Rosenfeld (Semprún, 1997), because I did not know whether he was still alive....and even to protect him from a possible glitch in my memory. However, a reader of the English version identified him and she told me that it was "Rosenberg". A man that is still alive. We have been in correspondence. The American lieutenant who gave the explanation was a German Jew, who had emigrated in the 30's, acquired U.S. Citizenship and enlisted in the army in order to wage an antifascist war against his own country, as someone fighting for freedom. That is why he spoke such perfect German.

I. Is it true that this story you witnessed caused you to suffer from stomach ache, and you went to the countryside to rest...?

JS. Yes, it is.[6]

Fred Wander

Fred Wander, who was 29 years old when the citizens of Weimar entered Buchenwald, remained in the barracks, according to his autobiography (Wander, 2010). Really, Wander does not say that he was inside the barracks exactly, while the group of German civilians was walking around. Rather, he goes beyond that: he turned the situation of remaining inside the barracks into his essential vital condition. Up until the end of his life, when he would wake up in the middle of the night in distress he would ask himself, in anguish, if he was still in the barracks: "Is it not that I have installed the barracks in the depths of my being?", he writes in the conclusion of *Das Gute Leben* (The Good Life). Wander published a book, *The Seventh Well*, about young victims in extermination camps, a Jewish

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5 Albert G. Rosenberg.

6 Cf. www.youtube.com/watch?v=7_QmLezLoy8; also in the Google video archive: video.google.com/ videoplay?docid=9059014605533661549# .

image[7] of the deepest part of our being. However, in *The Good Life* he declares that all his books are the same, in short, a repeated exercise of ascesis, which he notes quoting Semprún.[8] To be by not being what we are, and ending up discovering that we are precisely that. This is a formulation that practically paraphrases Hegel's *Logic*.[9] This is about the repeated exercise of reading and writing, and the narration of stories, a passion for Wander. He described himself as someone that would travel lightly, but always with a book. Because books, he would say, are found everywhere. Always reading and always travelling. A pariah, a *schlemihl*, a poor wretch. Facing, as Kertész wrote and Wander quoted, "a spiritual form of existence based on negative experience", a passion for narrating that which is unspeakable. Because, quoting again from Wander, "all suffering becomes tolerable if someone tells a story", as Hannah Arendt wrote.

The recent publication of Primo Levi's conversations with Giovanni Tesio further underlines Wander's approach. Levi is, as is well-known, the author of the most compelling autobiographical account of Auschwitz, *If This Is a Man*, which shares the pathos of Wander: "*una vita da inibito*" (Levi, 2016: 43).

Wander's story of his stay in Buchenwald recalls another famous image. When it was built, it was to be named the Ettersberg Camp or Weimar Camp, but that name was ruled out due to its literary and cultural associations. It is said that it was Himmler himself who suggested Buchenwald, as it was located in a beechwood. However, the German term for beeches (*Buchen*) is very similar to the word "books" (*Bücher*). It is a coincidence that the camp that housed so many writers had a name that was similar to a "wood of books", which immediately brings to mind the forest of book-men in *Fahrenheit 451*, the novel by Ray Bradbury that was made into a film by François Truffaut.

Imre Kertész

Imre Kertész received the Nobel Prize for Literature in 2002. In April 1945 he was a skeletal 15-year-old, incarcerated in Buchenwald. He remembered having seen the group of citizens from Weimar, while he was wrapped in a blanked and sat on a portable toilet in front of the hospital barracks, "as if I was the Duke of Vendôme greeting the Bishop of Parma." He was chewing American chewing gum, that a soldier had given to him.

> "Those moments retain an experience that is irretrievable and unmentionable. If I could live them again, I would say that I have conquered time, that I have conquered life. However, human beings were not created for that, rather, at most they can remember. And meanwhile, they should keep watch over the accuracy and immovable nature of their memory". (Kertész, 2002: 127).

With regard to the *dictum* of Adorno, he suggests inverting it: "I would modify in the same broad sense, by saying that after Auschwitz there could only be poetry about Auschwitz". The horror of the Holocaust "broadens out to enter the realm of a universal experience" (Kertész, 2002: 66 and 69). It is the end of the road for great adventures, reached after two millennia of ethical and moral culture, whose traumatic effect has dominated decades of modern art and drives current human creative strength: "In thinking about Auschwitz, I reflect, paradoxically, not on the past but the future" (Kertész, 2002: 60). Thus, the Hungarian Nobel Laureate concludes that it is possible to understand the Holocaust as "culture". "Suffering falls

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7 The well that is dug in the desert in order to find water. That is why other translations refer to the *Seventh Well*.

8 "*L'écriture, si elle prétend être davantage qu'un jeu, ou un enjeu, n'est qu'un long, interminable travail d'ascèse, une façon de se déprendre de soi en prenant sur soi: en devenant soi-même parce qu'on aura reconnu, mis au monde l'autre qu'on est toujours*" (Semprún, 1994: 377): "Writing, if it claims to be more than a game, or a gamble, is but a long, endless labour of ascesis, a way of casting off one's self by keeping a firm hold on oneself. Becoming oneself though recognising and bringing into the world that *other* one always is"

9 Jorge Semprún remembered having flicked through a Glockner edition of Hegel's *Logic* in Buchenwald, with a yellow hardback cover and Gothic typeface. In a subsequent visit to the camp he was able to check that indeed, in the barracks of the infirmary, there were for no apparent reason, some of the volumes of that edition.

on man like an order, and the solemn protest against it: that is what art is today, and it can be nothing else" (Kertész, 2002: 125).

CONCLUSION

Just one thought that takes Auschwitz seriously may can help to prevent the repetition of such barbarism. However, taking Auschwitz seriously has significant repercussions on our way of perceiving social reality. When horror silences us there are ways other than identifying thought, which can help us to approach the unthinkable. The term "approach" here can mean simply creating "mosaics", "fragments", "configurations" that draw close to the edge or reflect in spiral motions. This is how we have understood the aesthetic approach to Buchenwald sketched herein.

After Auschwitz and Buchenwald, the path is thus open for art, art that shows suffering, and thus becomes a societal theory of the forms of disrespect, stemming from the most extreme expression of suffering in history. Or, in other words: after Auschwitz it is only possible to create art about suffering, it is only possible to undertake a sociology of disrespect. This sociology of disrespect must be aware of its constructive nature, even that of observation in itself, and to advocate the conscious principle of assembly which Benjamin previously called for. This principle means "assembling large-scale constructions out of the smallest and most precisely cut components. Indeed to discover in the analysis of the small individual moment, the crystal of the total event." (705s). A polyhedric crystal without doubt.

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Francesc Jesús Hernàndez i Dobon. Doctor in Philosophy, Pedagogy and Sociology, University of Valencia. Professor of the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology of the University of Valencia and director of the Instituto de Creatividad e Innovación Educativa (Institute for Creativity and Educational Innovation). His most recent published works include "*Estética del Reconocimiento*" (Aesthetics of Recognition) (with Benno Herzog, PUV) and *Educación y biografías* (Education and biographies) (with Alícia Villar, UOC).

Benno Herzog. Doctor in Sociology awarded by the University of Valencia and Professor of sociology in the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology at the University of Valencia. His main research areas are: Critical theory, theory of recognition, sociological theory, discourse analysis, migration and racism.

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The main text of the article will be preceded by a summary of 250 words maximum (which will clearly and concisely state the objectives, methodology, main results and conclusions of the work) and a maximum of 6 keywords (not included in the Title, and which must be internationally accepted terms in the scientific disciplines and / or habitual expressions of bibliometric classification). If the text is written in Valencian-Catalan or Castilian/Spanish, the abstract and the keywords shall also be included in English. If the original text is written in English, the Editorial Team will translate the title, abstract and key words into Valencian-Catalan and Castilian/Spanish if the author does not provide this translation.

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Except in exceptional cases, articles will have an approximate extension of between 6,000 and 8,000 words including footnotes, but excluding title, abstracts, keywords, graphics, tables and bibliography.

Viewpoint shall consist of texts each with an approximate length of 3,000 words, including footnotes and excluding the title, abstracts, keywords, graphs, tables and bibliography. One of the texts should introduce the contribution that is subject of debate, made by the author of the same or by the coordinator of the debate.

Book reviews shall have an extension of 3,000 words maximum, and the following information shall be specified at the beginning: author, title, place of publication, publisher, year of publication and number of pages. It should also include the name and surnames, institutional affiliation and the e-mail address of the author of the review.

Interviews or Profiles shall have a maximum extension of 3,000 words, and at the beginning will specify the place and date of the interview and the name and surnames, the institutional affiliation of the person interviewed or the subject of the Profile. It should also include the name and surnames, institutional affiliation and the email address of the author of the interview or profile.

Text formatting should be as follows:

- Font type and size: Times New Roman 12.
- Text with justification and spacing of 1.5, except footnotes.
- Footnotes shall be consecutively numbered at the bottom of the page, not at the end of the text. We recommend minimum usage of footnotes and such use should be explanatory and not contain bibliographic citation.
- The pages will be numbered at the foot as of the Abstract starting with number 1 (the cover sheet with the author information will not be numbered).
- The beginning of paragraphs shall not be indented.
- All abbreviations will be defined the first time they appear in the text.

Each section of the text shall not be numbered and shall be written as follows:

- **BOLD, UPPERCASE, SPACED ABOVE AND BELOW.**
- *Italic, spaced above and below.*
- *Italic, spaced above and below, text begins after a space by way of example,* The text begins here.

Citations/References shall follow the APA (American Psychological Association) guidelines.

- Citations/References will appear in the text, avoiding footnotes with a purely bibliographic function.
- Citations/References will appear in parentheses, including the surname of the author, year; for example, (Bourdieu, 2002).
- When two works by the same author coincide in the year of publication, they will be distinguished with lower case letters after the year; for example, (Bourdieu, 1989a).
- If there are two authors, their surnames should be joined by «and»: (Lapierre and Roueff, 2013); when there are more than two authors, the surname of the first author should be followed by «*et al.*» (Bennet *et al.*, 2005), although in the final bibliographic references can include all the authors.
- The verbatim quotations will be quoted and followed by the corresponding reference in parenthesis, which will necessarily include the cited pages; should they exceed four lines, they will be transcribed separately from the main text, without quotes, with a larger indentation and a smaller font size.

The complete list of bibliographic references will be placed at the end of the text, under the heading «Bibliographic references». The references will be written according to the following guidelines:

- Only those works cited in the text will be included, and all cited works should be referenced in the final list.
- All references with a DOI (Digital Object Identifier) shall be placed at the end.
- Alphabetical order shall be observed taking the author's last name. In the event of several references by the same author, they will be arranged chronologically according to the year of publication. First, the author's references will be included, secondly the works compiled by the author, and thirdly those of the author with other co-authors.
- French indentation shall be applied to all references.

The citations/references in the text will be made following APA (American Psychological Association) guidelines according to the reference document:

- **Books:** Anderson, B. (1991). *Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*. London: Verso.
- **Journal article:**
  - One author: Hirsch, P. M. (1972). Processing fads and fashions: An organization-set analysis of cultural industry systems. *American Journal of Sociology*, 77(4), 639-659.
  - Two authors: Bielby, W. T. and Bielby, D. D. (1999). Organizational mediation of project-based labor markets: Talent agencies and the careers of screenwriters. *American Sociological Review*, 64(1), 64-85.

- More than authors: Dyson, E., Gilder, G., Keyworth, G., Toffler, A. (1996). Cyberspace and the American dream: A magna carta for the knowledge age. *Information Society*, 12(3), 295-308.

- **Book chapter**: DiMaggio, P. (1991). Social structure, institutions and cultural goods: The case of the United States. In P. Bourdieu, & Coleman, J. (Eds.), *Social theory for a changing society* (pp. 133-166). Boulder: Westview Press.

- **Internet references:** Raymond, E. S. (1999). *Homesteading the noosphere* (on line). http: //www.catb. org/~esr/writings/homesteading/homesteading/, access 15 April 2016.

Authors of original works are requested to adapt their bibliography to follow the APA guidelines. Texts that do not conform to these guidelines will be returned to authors to make the necessary changes.

Selection and publication criteria

Debats. Journal on Culture, Power and Society publishes academic papers of rigorous theoretical and empirical research in the fields of social sciences and the humanities in general. However, some monographs may incorporate some contributions from other disciplines related to the theme of culture, power and society, such as history, political science and cultural studies.

Peer-review will be undertaken by expert academics and will follow the double-blind method for the articles in the monographic section entitled *Quadern* and in the miscellaneous research articles entitled *Articles*. All of the work in these sections sent to *Debats. Journal on Culture, Power and Society* shall be evaluated according to criteria of the strictest scientific quality.

Formatting and presentation errors, non-compliance with the journal's standards or spelling and syntactic errors may lead to rejection of the work prior to review. On reception of a text meeting all the formal requirements, receipt will be acknowledged and the review process will begin.

In a first phase, the Editorial Team will carry out a general review of the quality and appropriateness of the scope of the work and may directly, without external review, reject works that are of an ostensibly low quality or that make no contribution to the scope of the journal. In this initial review, the Editorial Team may require assistance, if deemed necessary, from the members of the Editorial Board or the Scientific Board. The proposals put forward for discussion may be accepted after passing this preliminary review phase without the need for external peer-review.

The articles that pass this first review will be sent to two external reviewers, specialists in the corresponding research line or topic. In the event that the evaluations are discrepant, or for any other reason deemed necessary, the Editorial Team may send the text to a third reviewer.

According to the reviewers' reports, the Editorial Team may take one of the following decisions, which will be communicated to the author:

- Accepted for publication in the current version (or with slight modifications).

- Accepted for publication subject to revision. In this case, publication will be subject to the author making all the changes requested by the Editorial Team. The deadline for making said changes will be one month, and a short report should be attached on resubmission explaining the changes made and how they fit the requirements of the Editorial Team. The proposed changes may include the conversion of a proposed article into a research note / bibliographic note, or vice versa.

- Non publishable, but with the possibility to rewrite and resubmit the work. In this case, the re-submission of a new version will not imply any guarantee of publication, but the review process will restart from the beginning.

- Non publishable.

In the event that a paper is accepted for publication, the author must revise the galley proofs within a maximum period of two weeks.

Debats. Journal on Culture, Power and Society annually publishes a list of all persons who have made anonymous reviews as well as the statistics of accepted, revised and rejected articles and the average length of time between receipt of an article and communication to the author of the final decision.

Debats. Journal on Culture, Power and Society may make public, in the event, any scientific malpractice: plagiarism, falsification or invention of data, individual appropriation of collective authorship or duplicate publication.

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Publishing ethics, good practices, detection of plagiarism and/or scientific misconduct

Debats. Journal on Culture, Power and Society is committed to complying with good practices and ethics in publication. These are understood as:

- Authorship: in the event of multi-authorship, the participation of all authors must be acknowledged, all authors must agree on the submission of the article and the author who is responsible must ensure that all authors approve the revisions and the final version.

- Publication practices: the author must make known any previous publication of the article, including translations or simultaneous submissions to other journals.

- Conflict of interest: authors must declare financial support of the research and any commercial, financial or personal relationship that may affect the results and conclusions of the work. In these cases, a statement should be included in the article stating such circumstances.

- Review process: the Editorial Board must ensure that the published research papers have been reviewed by at least two specialists in the field, and that the review process is fair and impartial. Therefore, it must ensure confidentiality of the review at all times and the non-existence of conflicts of interest of the reviewers. The Editorial Board shall base its decisions on the reasoned reports prepared by the reviewers.

The journal will implement mechanisms and double-check to detect plagiarism and/or scientific malpractice. Plagiarism is understood as:

- Present others' work as your own

- Adopt words or ideas from other authors without due recognition

- Absence of quotation marks in a literal quotation

- Provide incorrect information regarding the true source of a citation

- Paraphrasing of a source without mentioning the source

- Abuse of paraphrasing, even if the source is mentioned

The practices constituting scientific malpractice are as follows:

- Fabrication, falsification, or omission of data and plagiarism

- Duplicate publication and self-plagiarism

- Individual authorship of collective authorship

- Conflicts of authorship

Debats. Journal on Culture, Power and Society may make scientific malpractices public should they be discovered. In these cases, the Editorial Board reserves the right to withdraw those previously published articles when the lack of reliability is determined subsequent to publication, due to involuntary errors or to fraud or the aforementioned scientific malpractices. The objective of such withdrawal is to correct any previously published scientific production, ensuring integrity of the works. The conflict of duplicity, caused by the simultaneous publication of an article in two journals, will be resolved by determining the date of receipt of the work in each journal. If only a part of the article contains an error, it can be corrected subsequently by means of an editorial note or admission of errata. In the event of conflict, the journal will ask the author or authors for explanations and relevant evidence for clarification, and will make a final decision based thereon.

The journal will publish a communication in its printed and electronic versions regarding the withdrawal of a particular text, stating the reasons for taking such a measure, in order to distinguish malpractice from involuntary error. Likewise, the journal will notify the withdrawal to the officials of the institution to which the author or authors of the article belong/s. As a preliminary step to the final withdrawal of an article, the journal may publish a communication of irregularity, providing the necessary information in the same terms as in the case of withdrawal. The communication of irregularity will be maintained for the minimum time required, and will conclude with its withdrawal or with the formal retraction of the article.

Checklist for preparing submissions

As part of the submission process, authors must check that they fulfil all of the following conditions:

1. The submission has not been previously published or submitted to another journal (or an explanation has been sent via «Comments to the publisher»).

2. The submission is filed as an OpenOffice or Microsoft Word document.

3. Wherever possible, DOI has been provided for references.

4. The text spacing is 1.5 spaces; Letter size is 12 points; Italics are used instead of underscore, except for URLs. Placement of all illustrations, figures and tables is in the corresponding place in the text and not at the end.

5. The text meets the bibliographic and style requirements described in the author's instructions in the author's guidelines.

6. If the submission is sent to a reviewer, expert in a section of the journal, all instructions should be followed to ensure anonymous review.

7. The author must comply with the ethical standards and good practices of the journal, in accordance with the document available on the journal's website.

The files should be sent to: secretaria.debats@dival.es

In the event these instructions are not followed, the submissions may be returned to the authors.